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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a narratological and rhetorical study of the speeches made by leaders in 
the Anabasis as attempts at persuasion. It aims at interpreting the function of the 
speeches by linking a leader‟s use of rhetoric to the success or failure of his 
leadership. This thesis closely examines how the speeches relate to the narrative and 
how the narrator guides the reader‟s interpretation of speech, speaker and audience. 
It applies the rhetorical division of the three modes of persuasion, logos, ethos and 
pathos, to the examination of the speeches, bringing out contrasts and similarities in 
how different leaders respond verbally to comparable situations.  
This thesis proposes that Xenophon uses the speeches with three chief roles 
or effects in mind. Firstly, the speeches involve the reader by evoking tension, 
suspense and surprise. Secondly, when compared to the narrative, they characterise 
the speaker by illuminating the differences between real and proclaimed motives and 
attitudes, as well as highlighting a speaker‟s intention and ability to match his words 
and actions. The internal audiences are also characterised. Thirdly, the speeches 
provide positive and negative exempla in order to teach the reader that it is not 
enough simply to persuade others successfully. A leader must also approach 
persuasion with the right moral attitude and motives, live up to his words, and 
benefit his audience. To demonstrate this, the speeches are analysed according to 
three themes: the success or failure of leaders in evoking emotions in their audiences, 
the narrator‟s presentation of leaders verbally deceiving those on their side, and 
leaders using the concepts of honour and profit in their persuasion attempts. All the 
leaders that are scrutinised are lacking in one or more of the areas examined, except 
Xenophon, who is ultimately the only leader that the reader should emulate in his 
persuasion attempts. 
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Introduction 
This thesis adopts a narratological and rhetorical approach in examining the speeches 
of the Anabasis, with the goal of interpreting the possible roles and effects the 
speeches had in relation to the work‟s aims and agenda. While the Anabasis is more 
than simply historiography, speeches formed an established part of the existing 
historiographical tradition, and so I am investigating how Xenophon uses this 
inherited element to serve his own preoccupations rather than why he included them 
at all. Because the majority of the speeches in the work show speakers who are 
leaders in some capacity attempting to persuade various audiences, this thesis links a 
leader‟s use of the tools of rhetoric to the ultimate success or failure of his 
leadership.  
 But why the Anabasis and why the speeches? Xenophon‟s popularity waned 
during the nineteenth century, but during the last forty years in particular, scholarly 
interest in Xenophon has increased dramatically, and scholars are again recognising 
that Xenophon is an important representative of his time, whose work contains 
important information relating to numerous fields of interest within the ancient 
world. This renewed interest can be seen by the number of recent volumes of 
collected papers covering an array of subjects across his oeuvre.
1
 Two such volumes 
particularly focus on the Anabasis,
2
 which is testament to the importance of this text 
but also to the many questions that still surround it. Two scholars have written 
commentaries on the work,
3
 and a general work introducing the main areas of 
interest in the Anabasis has recently been published.
4
 The last forty years have also 
seen a wealth of other monographs, important chapters and articles on the Anabasis. 
These can be roughly divided into topic areas. Some scholars have tried to classify 
the genre of the Anabasis, but because it encompasses elements from several 
different genres, and because genres were still evolving at the time in which 
                                                             
1 Pontier (2014), Hobden and Tuplin (2012), Gray (2010) and Tuplin (2004a). Volume 45 of Cahiers 
des Etudes Anciennes and 26 (2) of Polis are also devoted to Xenophon. 
2 Lane Fox (2004a) and Briant (1995). 
3
 Lendle (1995) and Stronk (1995). 
4 Flower (2012). Prevas (2002) has also retold the story of the Anabasis with various background 
information after retracing the army’s route. 
12 
 
Xenophon was writing, it has proven impossible to pinpoint a definitive answer.
5
 
Others have investigated certain passages in the Anabasis,
6
 and particular 
characters.
7
 Certain scholars have also investigated how the army and its 
„community of soldiers‟ function, including decision-making processes, payment, 
motivations, organisation, day-to-day life, and comparisons with other armies and 
communities.
8
 Others have specifically investigated the terrain, route, landmarks, 
locations, tactics, difficulties and chronology of the march.
9
 Scholars have also 
examined the Anabasis in relation to Xenophon‟s other works and to other authors 
and their works.
10
 There are also investigations concerning Xenophon‟s presentation 
of different categories of people within the Anabasis, from the Persians to women,
11
 
and Xenophon‟s political views.12 Scholars have further explored particular ways in  
 
                                                             
5 See Gray (2011c), Bradley (2010), Roy (2007), Rood, (2007a), Laforse (2005), Reichel (2005), 
Cartledge (2002), Lee (2001), and Momigliano (1971). In their descriptions of the Anabasis, Flower 
(2012, 40-1 and 46), Rood (2005, xix) and Dillery (2001, 2 and 13) try to capture the variety of genres 
reflected in the work, although Flower emphasises that the modern conception of each genre would 
probably be unrecognisable to Xenophon. See also Nicolai (2014, 65-8, 78-9 and 81-4), who argues 
that ‘history’ and ‘fiction’ are modern divisions, and again emphasises Xenophon’s innovative 
adoption and adaption of genres. 
6 For example, the arrest of the generals by Jansen (2014) and Bassett (2002); Orontas’ trial by 
Keaveney (2012); a possible gap in the chronology of the journey by Brennan (2012); Xenophon’s 
account of his estate at Scillus by Tuplin (2004b) and Ruggeri (2004); Cyrus’ death by Bassett (1999); 
and the battle of Cunaxa by Ehrhardt (1994, 1-2), Wylie (1992) and Bigwood (1983). 
7 For example, Clearchus by Tritle (2004), Bassett (2001), Laforse (2000) and Roisman (1985-8); 
Clearchus and Cyrus by Braun (2004); Anaxibius by Roisman (1988); Cyrus and Tissaphernes by 
Ruzicka (1985); and Tissaphernes’ lying and oath breaking by Danzig (2007). Xenophon the 
character’s piety is examined by Parker (2004), the combination of Xenophon’s private and public 
religious devotion is analysed by Bruit-Zaidman (2005), and Xenophon’s mercenary status and 
interaction with money is discussed by Azoulay (2004a). Tuplin (2003a) examines the main leaders in 
terms of their heroism.  
8 De Callatay (2009), Lee (2007 and 2004b), Roy (2004), Whitby (2004), Hornblower (2004), Cordano 
(2000), Dillery (1995), Dalby (1992), and Perlman (1976-7).  
9 Paradeisopoulos (2014), Ma (2010), Brennan (2008 and 2005), Waterfield (2006), Manfredi (2004 
and 1978), Tuplin (2003b), Mitford (2000), Lendle (1998, 1988 and 1984), and Glombiowski (1994). 
See also the various chapters in Briant (1995).  
10 See Sage (1991) for the Cyropaedia; Bartley (2008) for Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum; Schubert (2005), 
Tuplin (2003a), Tsagalis (2002) and Rinner (1978) for Homer; van Soesbergen (1982-3) for Isocrates; 
Howland (2000) for Plato’s Respublica; and Ehrhardt (1994, 3-4) for comparisons with Thucydides’ 
account of the retreat after the Sicilian expedition. Narcy (2014) and Lendle (1996) discuss 
Xenophon’s appreciation of Gorgias. 
11 See Hirsch (1985) for the Persians; Humble (1997) for Xenophon’s view of Sparta; Millender (2012) 
for Spartan relationships with barbarians; Lane Fox (2004b) for women and ‘others’; Boëldieu-Trevet 
(2010) for the various ‘others’ the army encounters; and Lee (2004a) for hetairai.  
12 Kuwabara (1979) investigates “the origin of Xenophon’s theory of the state”, although I have been 
unable to read this Japanese article. Rood (2015) critiques interpretations of Xenophon’s political 
thought in the Anabasis by Leo Strauss and several followers of Strauss, and Lenfant (2001) 
examines Xenophon’s possible transmission of Cyrus’ own propaganda against his brother. 
13 
 
which Xenophon the author constructs the Anabasis,
13
 and the language he uses.
14
 In 
addition, much work has been done on the modern reception of the Anabasis.
15  
Closer to the topic of this thesis, some scholars have discussed leadership in 
the Anabasis. Buzzetti (2014) and Ruderman (1992) examine Xenophon‟s vision of 
Socratic political rule, while Seelinger (1997) investigates how Xenophon‟s good 
leadership is revealed through his dealings with Seuthes, and how his leadership 
contrasts particularly with Seuthes‟ and Clearchus‟ leaderships.16 Humble (1997, 46-
106) examines how the Spartan leaderships in the Anabasis compare to Xenophon‟s 
portrayal of his own ideal leadership, to determine whether Xenophon was pro-
Spartan. Sears (2007), a Lieutenant Commander of the US Navy, enumerates what 
the modern reader can learn about being an ideal leader from the work.
17
 
Narratological elements of the Anabasis have also been examined recently. In 
particular, much has been written about the narrator and his distinction from 
Xenophon the author and Xenophon the character.
18
 Further, some scholars have 
                                                             
13 Wencis (1977) examines the theme of suspicion that runs throughout the work, while Ferrario 
(2012) has investigated the characters’ agency and ownership in how others remember them, and 
how the narrator and author ultimately control this. Bradley (2011) investigates how Xenophon’s 
conversation with Eucleides (7.8.1-6) brings closure to Xenophon the character’s story and affects 
the reader’s understanding of the entire work. 
14 Buijs (2005) examines Xenophon’s use of sub and participial clauses in the Hellenica and Anabasis, 
while Goodall (1976) compares Xenophon’s use of reflexive pronouns in the Anabasis and Hellenica 
to Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ use. Diggle (2002) discusses the unusual sentence construction at 
3.1.6-8, Martin (2007) concentrates on the translation of πζλτθ at 1.10.12, Nielsen (2000) focuses on 
Xenophon’s use of the word πολισ, and Woronoff (1987) examines what Xenophon defines as a 
κώμθ. 
15 See Rood (2014, 2013b, 2013a, 2012b, 2010a and 2004a).  
16 Nakamura (1986) also examines the difficult situation whereby the generals want to extend their 
authority while the soldiers do not want to submit to the generals’ authority, although I have been 
unable to read this Japanese article.  
17
 See Gray (2011b, 372-6) for Xenophon and modern leadership theory. For Xenophon’s interest in 
leadership as a central theme throughout his works and not just in the Anabasis, see Humble (2014, 
213 and 1997, 1-2), Flower (2012, 30), Hobden and Tuplin (2012), Gray (2011b, 1), Pontier (2001, 
404 and 408), Dillery (2001, 11), Hutchinson (2000), Zimmerman (1992), and Breitenbach (1950, 29-
104). Gray (2011b), Woronoff (1993), and Wood (1964) discuss Xenophon’s theory of leadership, 
while Tamiolaki (2012) discusses some of Xenophon’s leaders in terms of the virtue they 
demonstrate or fail to demonstrate. 
18 See Gray (2003 and 2004), for example, who discusses the narrator’s objectivity and analyses 
moments when Xenophon the author intervenes in the text to praise or blame, or to cite his sources. 
Grethlein (2012) investigates the fine line between Xenophon as narrator and character and 
demonstrates that the two generally exist separately but also overlap in the narrative function they 
perform, as well as in perspective. Bradley (2010) also studies the narrator’s perspective and the 
effect of his privileged position on the reader. 
14 
 
investigated focalization (or point of view),
19
 space, place, landscape and time,
20
 and 
even naming techniques.
21
  
Despite this wealth of recent scholarship, and despite speeches usually 
playing an important role in the investigation of the various areas that particularly 
interest narratologists, when we turn to the speeches in the Anabasis, there is still 
much research that needs to be undertaken. Tuplin (2014, 119) concludes that 33% 
of the Anabasis consists of direct speech.
22
 There are 269 direct speeches in the 
work, given by 63 different speakers, 40 of whom are specifically named. In 
Appendix 1, I have listed these by speaker and audience.
23
 The speeches in the work 
have been examined previously, but, given their prominence in the text, to a much 
lesser degree than may be expected. In terms of scholarly works fully devoted to the 
speeches, there are only a small number. Tuplin (2014) reports the data he has 
collected about direct speech in the Anabasis, such as the distribution of speeches 
across books and the whole work. He also briefly discusses topics such as the 
interaction of the speeches with the narrative, and whether the speeches reflect what 
was actually said at the time. However, he does not analyse individual speeches. 
Rood (2004b) examines certain speeches to ascertain whether or not Xenophon is 
using them to advocate a Greek attack on Persia to his readers, and to investigate 
Xenophon‟s self-presentation through speeches assigned to Xenophon the character. 
He concludes that the speeches do not advocate a Panhellenic attack,
24
 and that 
Xenophon is not simply defending his own leadership, but using the speeches to 
teach ethical and political lessons about leadership. Rood (2007b) also briefly 
examines some examples of giving and receiving advice in the speeches, including 
how this compares to advice and advisors in Herodotus and Thucydides. He 
discusses the complexities behind whether or not the speeches offering advice 
                                                             
19 Pelling (2013) and Harman (2013). 
20 Rood (2014, 2012a, 2010b and 2007a) and Purves (2010). 
21 Tsagalis (2009). 
22 Compare Tuplin’s (2014, 80-1) figures for other works: 4.3% of Arrian’s Anabasis is direct speech, 
14.6% of Herodotus, 18% of the Hellenica, and 23.1% of Thucydides (26.6% without book 8). 
23 To put this in context, in the Hellenica there are 162 direct speeches, given by 76 different 
speakers, 50 of whom are individually named. In Herodotus, there are 409 speeches between 182 
different speakers, 100 of whom are given a personal name. In Thucydides, there are 91 direct 
speeches across 37 speakers, 10 of whom are identified only by their ethnicity or their ethnicity and 
role and 2 of whom are unnamed. Only 39 of Thucydides’ speeches are given by characters who are 
personally named. 
24 Flower (2012, 168ff.) also concludes this.  
15 
 
indicate a possible didactic aim for the work, and touches on some of the themes that 
recur in these speeches. He argues that while some of the speeches offering advice 
demonstrate Xenophon‟s good leadership in response to a variety of situations, a 
problem arises from the advice Socrates gives to Xenophon about the expedition. 
Socrates is correct about the problems the expedition might cause for the Greek 
participants, but is incorrect about the reasons for this. Rood concludes that 
Xenophon develops from being a man who receives advice to being a man who is 
able to give good advice to Seuthes.  
Kelly‟s (1977) thesis examines the speeches in the first book of the Anabasis 
in terms of their content, how these speeches serve to characterise the speakers, how 
they compare with what the narrator presents about the characters elsewhere, and 
why the speaker is successful in persuading his audience. Kelly‟s main interest is in 
the language and style of the speeches, as well as who may have influenced 
Xenophon‟s mode of rhetoric. Kelly (1977, 70-97) argues that the speeches serve the 
functions of characterisation, individualisation and of demonstrating how the 
characters interact with each other. Also, he contends, they illustrate leaders‟ moral 
and military qualities and show leaders turning “crisis” into “opportunity”, while 
strengthening their positions and improving relations with the soldiers. Further, he 
claims that the speeches serve the didactic role of illustrating the qualities needed in 
a leader, as well as the importance of persuasive speech to avert crises. Finally, he 
argues that the speeches explain events, add dramatic tension, involve the reader 
emotionally, and encourage the reader‟s “participation” in the episodes. He also 
argues that Xenophon emerges as an ideal leader.
25
 
Two Spanish articles each carry out a rhetorical analysis on one speech by 
Xenophon. Varias (2010) examines Xenophon‟s speech defending why he hits 
soldiers (5.8.13-26), and Morales Harley (2013) analyses Xenophon‟s speech 
encouraging Proxenus‟ captains to act after the Persians have killed the army‟s main 
                                                             
25 Another thesis, by Oğuz Yarlıgaş (2008) investigates the significance of the speeches in the 
Anabasis, but as I am unable to read Turkish, my knowledge of its contents comes from the English 
version of the thesis abstract. Yarlıgaş firstly examines how previous historiographers used speeches. 
Then, after introducing the literary character of the Anabasis, he demonstrates how Xenophon uses 
the speeches to create a “persona” for his characters. He first examines Clearchus’ “persona” and 
concludes that Clearchus “is unable to handle the leading role of the army”. He then examines how 
Xenophon’s speeches reveal Xenophon to be an ideal leader, particularly with regard to Xenophon 
countering criticism from the army.     
16 
 
leaders (3.1.15-25). Varias highlights some of the rhetorical aspects of the speech, 
such as the use of rhetorical figures and the progression of the argument, as well as 
the ideological messages the speech contains about discipline and good leadership. 
He argues that through his use of rhetoric, Xenophon the character is able to 
demonstrate that he has the right qualities for a leader. Morales Harley has a more 
systematic approach, analysing the rhetorical aspects of the speech section by 
section. He uses theory from Anaximenes‟ and Aristotle‟s rhetorical discussions, as 
well as modern theory about argumentation to explain why Xenophon successfully 
persuaded his audience with this speech. He argues that Xenophon presented a sound 
argument according to the recommendations made by classical rhetoricians and 
modern argumentation theory.   
Other scholars comment on the Anabasis speeches as part of their wider 
investigations, and their findings will be discussed throughout this thesis. Three of 
the more extensive comments on the speeches in the Anabasis are by Pontier (2001), 
Grethlein (2013) and Farrell (2012). Pontier examines the function of the speeches in 
the whole of Xenophon‟s oeuvre as a way of revealing Xenophon‟s intentions and 
concerns. His methodology is to examine the overall structure of Xenophon‟s 
narratives and examine when speeches occur, what the common thread between 
them is, and what repeated message emerges. He concludes that, across Xenophon‟s 
oeuvre, the speeches tackle disorder and lack of courage in their internal audiences. 
Grethlein (2013) discusses the speeches as a technique used by Xenophon to make 
the past seem present for his reader, to allow the reader to experience proceedings as 
the protagonists did, and to make the reader realise that the course of history might 
have been different. Finally, as part of his thesis on Xenophon‟s relationship with 
Athens and democracy, Farrell (2012, 225-78) argues that, in the Anabasis, 
Xenophon presents himself as being an Athenian orator, who successfully uses topoi 
from Athenian rhetoric to advise, benefit and serve his community in a democratic 
way.
26
 He argues that Xenophon‟s success and authority derive from his speeches, 
and that these are important in ensuring order and instilling virtue. 
More often, scholars make a single generalised statement about the function 
of the speeches throughout Xenophon‟s oeuvre, without providing details about how 
                                                             
26 See further Gray (2011a) and Kroeker (2009), who also question the common conception that 
Xenophon does not support democracy. 
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they arrived at their conclusions. For example, Humble (1997, 254) argues that 
Xenophon‟s speeches are didactic, depict character and provide historical 
explanation, while Walbank (1985, 246) argues that the speeches Xenophon writes 
reflect his own views rather than the characters‟. Specifically in relation to the 
Anabasis, Flower (2012, 100) argues that the speeches are vivid, entertaining, and 
have the effect of characterisation, as well as being useful for revealing extra 
information not in the narrative. Some scholars directly connect the speeches to 
Xenophon‟s lessons for leaders. Often, this will be a general comment about how the 
speeches exemplify leadership qualities,
27
 demonstrate that successful leaders need 
to be skilled at oratory and persuasion,
28
 are good examples to use for composing 
speeches and indicate how a leader should speak.
29
 
From the above, it is clear that there are gaps in the investigation of the 
speeches that still need to be filled, and deeper studies that need to be carried out. 
Fundamentally, there remains scope for using the speeches in relation to their 
surrounding narrative as a starting point to reveal the wider aim of the whole work. It 
is worth bearing in mind Higgins‟ (1977, 93) argument that we do not necessarily 
have to assume that Xenophon had a set purpose for any of his works, but the 
speeches are important in understanding the aim if there is one. Scholars have used 
the speeches in their investigations of the aims of the work before, particularly in 
defining the work as an apology or a self-defence against another work or specific 
criticism,
30
 as self-praising,
31
 as promoting a Panhellenic expedition against Persia,
32
 
as revealing the difficulties of leading an army and creating a community out of it,
33
 
                                                             
27 For example, Wood (1964, 60-1). 
28 For example, see Stoll (2012, 251), Humble (1997, 51 and 54) and Wood (1964, 54). 
29
 For example, Tuplin (2014, 105 and 1993, 29) and Jaeger (1945, 159). 
30 See Farrell (2012), Erbse (2010, 486), Azoulay (2004a), Cawkwell (2004, 59 n.31, 60, 63 and 67), 
Zimmermann (1992, 241-2), and Dürrbach (1893).  
31 See Waterfield (2006, 190) and Anderson (1974, 83-4).  
32 See Dillery (1995, 61) and Jaeger (1945, 161-2). See also Delebecque (1957, 83, 201-4, 288, 291-2 
and 299) who believes that the anabasis section was written to oppose the King’s Peace and to 
advocate an attack on Persia, while the parabasis was directed towards defending Spartan power in 
the face of the Second Athenian league, as well as being an apology for Xenophon. 
33 According to Rood (2004b, 328 and 2005, xx), Xenophon is examining “the fragility of the attempt 
to create order” while investigating how the community of the army operates and how different 
leaders try to stabilise or destabilise the group. Dillery (1995, 59) argues that Xenophon partly aims 
to examine the army as a “model society, a blueprint utopia in action” by charting the rise and then 
decline of an ideal community. 
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and as having a philosophical aim.
34
 As we saw above, Rood (2007b and 2004b) 
suggested that the prominence of advice giving speeches, as well as the political and 
ethical lessons in Xenophon‟s speeches could indicate a didactic aim for the work. 
Other scholars concluded that the speeches reflected Xenophon‟s interest in 
leadership. This thesis likewise argues that Xenophon‟s aims centre around the 
leadership of the army and the didactic messages emerging from it, but this is arrived 
at by centralising a wider range of speeches than the scholars just mentioned did, by 
examining these in more depth and in closer relation to the narrative, and by 
focusing on how Xenophon represents leaders persuading others.  
I believe that speeches from the whole work that have different aims and 
agendas behind them need to be examined for what they are: attempts by leaders at 
the persuasion of an internal audience. This analysis can then be used to attempt to 
ascertain the roles they play in Xenophon‟s aims and agenda, and the effects they 
have. This differs from the investigations mentioned above. Kelly‟s thesis is the 
closest in perspective, being concerned with how speakers are represented as 
persuading and how this relates to their leadership. However, my thesis differs in 
scale, because Kelly only examines the speeches in the first book of the Anabasis, 
and examines these in full and in order. Our conclusions are also similar, but reached 
in different ways. His conclusions are partly hypothetical, given that he did not 
investigate the speeches in books 2-7, and therefore did not examine Xenophon the 
character‟s speeches. In my thesis, Xenophon the character‟s speeches form a central 
part even of understanding the characters of Clearchus and Cyrus. Indeed, while 
Kelly argues that Clearchus and Cyrus are presented as model leaders to emulate, my 
thesis arrives at the opposite conclusion. Similarly, I expand on Pontier‟s 
investigation. Like him, I highlight passages across Xenophon‟s works that reflect 
different leaders responding in similar ways to comparable situations, and I 
concentrate on aspects of persuasion that recur within different speeches in the 
Anabasis, while looking for consistent messages. However, I examine the speeches 
as part of their immediate context rather than looking at them as structural elements 
                                                             
34 Gray (1998, 102) argues that the work “comes close to being a kind of Socratic self-examination”. 
Ruderman (1992, 129) describes it as “a guide for those who wish to return to or adopt “Greekness”, 
understood as civilization or human freedom as guaranteed by political rule or leadership”. Buzzetti 
(2014, 229) argues that “the Anabasis is ultimately an introduction to philosophy in the guise of a 
chronicle and a soldier’s memoir”. 
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of whole works. Like Varias and Morales Harley, I examine why speeches in the 
work are successful or unsuccessful but on a much wider scale, and I relate 
individual successes and failures to the wider role of all the speeches.  
In order to carry out this investigation of the speeches as persuasion attempts, 
I analyse the speeches using some of the theories of rhetoric that were current in 
Xenophon‟s time,  like Varias and Morales Harley do, but I focus chiefly on the 
three modes of persuasion, logos, ethos and pathos, rather than rhetorical figures and 
techniques. As part of this rhetorical approach, I examine how a speaker attempts to 
manipulate his audience‟s emotions and impression of himself, how the speaker 
understands his audience‟s motivations and mood, and how the internal audience 
interprets and react to the speech.  
As well as a rhetorical analysis, I believe it is also necessary to undertake a 
close examination of how the speeches relate to the prior and subsequent narrative, 
and how the narrator guides the reader‟s interpretation of the speech, the speaker and 
the audience.
35
 This approach continues the now well-establish application of 
narratology to Greek historiography as a theoretical framework.
36
 Of course, scholars 
have examined speeches in other authors‟ works using the tools of narratology 
before, and so the application of this method is not new in itself.
37
 The narrator can 
guide the reader‟s interpretation of the speeches through direct comment, through the 
content of the speeches themselves, or by careful selection of what to present before 
and after the speech, which can also bring out contrasts and comparisons with 
previous episodes in the story. He also controls basic elements of the speeches such 
as who delivers the speeches that he chooses to include and invent, in what form they 
are represented, how much space he gives to different characters‟ voices, why a 
particular speech is selected for inclusion, and why a speech appears where it does 
                                                             
35 See Morrison (2006) for the importance of the reader analysing how speech and narrative interact 
in Thucydides. He examines interactions between a speech and its immediately preceding and 
subsequent narrative, between speeches and narrative within the same episode, and the different 
ways in which speech and narrative in one episode can interact with speech and narrative in other 
episodes.   
36 For clarity, however, I prefer not to use some of the more controversial terminology of 
narratology, such as ‘focalizer’, ‘narratee’ and ‘focalizee’. De Jong (2004), Rood (1998 and 2004c) 
and Hornblower (1994) have been particularly instrumental in demonstrating the relevance of 
narratology to the study of Thucydides and Herodotus. De Jong’s (1989) seminal narratological 
interpretation of the Iliad has also strongly influenced this thesis. 
37 See, for example, Lang (2011) on Thucydides, Lang (1984) on Herodotus, and Beck (2012) on the 
Iliad.  
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(especially if it details events which do not take place at that chronological point in 
the narrative). As part of this investigation, it is important to make clear the 
distinction between the author, the external narrator, and the internal characters.
38
 
Characters themselves can narrate and interpret the story or present their (or 
someone else‟s) point of view through their speeches.  
When information about the speeches and speakers is revealed, and who this 
information is directed to is important. The narrator can deliberately create gaps 
between the knowledge of the internal audience and the reader, and the effect can 
vary depending on whether the relevant information is revealed before or after the 
speech. My approach also takes into account the narrator‟s and speakers‟ comments 
on the speakers‟ motives. There is a difference in effect on characterisation and 
interpretation depending on whether the narrator reveals a speaker‟s motivation for 
speaking, the speaker reveals his own motivation, or the reader has to infer the 
speaker‟s motivation from previous information about the speaker. By comparing the 
speech and narrative, the reader can further see whether a leader matches his 
motives, words and actions. The outcome of a speech in both the short and long term 
reveals whether the speech benefitted the leader himself and those he addressed, or 
whether it was misjudged in some way and caused harm. Also important is whether a 
speaker‟s leadership concludes well or badly for him in the work. It is particularly 
relevant if this can be linked directly to the leader‟s speeches. This suggests how the 
reader should interpret a leader‟s character, rule and use of rhetoric. Based on how 
                                                             
38 It is unlikely that Xenophon’s contemporary readers would have been able to separate the 
narrator and author. When discussing the Homeric poet and narrator, Aristotle argues that there are 
three different ways of representing objects. The poet can represent them in his own voice, through 
the characters, or by assuming a different character, as Homer does (Poetics 1448a.19-24 and 
1460a.5-12). Aristotle seems to be describing a new concept here and because Aristotle post-dates 
Xenophon by some decades, only Xenophon’s later readers may have been able to appreciate the 
distinction. However, Rabel (1997, 6) writes that it is really only since the 1950s that the author and 
the third-person narrator have been understood as being separate. One particular passage from 
oratory seems to confirm that Xenophon’s readers would be able to differentiate the author from 
the characters at least. Lycurgus (1.100-1) refers to a speech in a Euripides play. He describes how 
Euripides made (ἐποίθςε) a character demonstrate certain values but also discusses the qualities of 
the character themselves. This shows that Lycurgus is aware of the necessity to separate the author 
and character when reading or hearing speeches. In the Anabasis, it is also important to separate 
the character Xenophon from the narrator Xenophon. The narrator describes some events at which 
Xenophon was not present, without indicating how Xenophon came to know the details (e.g. 5.6.19-
20). The narrator also sometimes reveals the motivation of individual characters, which Xenophon 
himself could not have known (e.g. 3.4.2). The character and narrator also sometimes know 
different information (e.g. 2.6.1/ 3.1.29). Despite this, from book three, events are seen mainly from 
the viewpoint of Xenophon as a character (e.g. 4.1.16-18). 
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the different leaders respond to similar issues that arise within the army and how 
they use the tools of rhetoric, the reader can compare the leaders and judge them 
favourably or unfavourably.  
Based on such a rhetorical and narratological analysis, this thesis proposes 
three roles or effects for the speeches in the Anabasis: the speeches involve the 
reader, characterise the speaker and audience, and have the didactic function of 
teaching the reader how to persuade others both successfully and morally. The 
comparisons between the speakers, their speeches and their leaderships that generate 
these conclusions can be seen most effectively by examining the speeches according 
to certain themes of persuasion, which has not been done before. These themes are: 
leaders evoking emotions in their audiences (chapter 2), leaders verbally deceiving 
their friends (chapter 3), and leaders appealing to the concepts of honour and profit 
to motivate others and to represent themselves (chapter 4). Although this thesis 
separates out these particular elements of persuasion, a consistent picture emerges of 
the key leaders‟ abilities at persuasion, their real characters (compared to the ethos 
they attempt to project), and what can be learned from their speeches.
39
 
The first thematic chapter links Xenophon‟s interest in rhetoric with his 
interest in leadership to examine the success and failure of certain leaders in terms of 
                                                             
39 In chapters 3 and 4, I refer to passages from Xenophon’s other works that seem to reflect the 
same messages about how to persuade as are revealed in the Anabasis. Just as Gray (2011b, esp. 6 
and 62-3) argues that Xenophon has consistent lessons across his oeuvre about how one should 
lead, I believe that Xenophon has consistent messages about persuasion. Gray is particularly arguing 
against ‘darker’ interpretations of Xenophon’s works, and scholars who read ‘between the lines’. 
Such interpretations, she argues, often render the passage in question anomalous to Xenophon’s 
thought elsewhere, and this should indicate that the interpretation is incorrect. I follow Gray’s 
argument to the extent that if something is represented positively in one work by Xenophon, it is 
likely to be positive in his other works. However, I also believe that Xenophon can make a comment 
about a leader by omitting information, for example, or condemn him without explicit criticism. This 
is reading between the lines to some degree. See further Johnson (2012, 124) who argues that we 
cannot simply dismiss Strauss’ darker interpretations, and Hobden and Tuplin (2012, 32-6) who 
argue that Xenophon’s readers must examine how what is said relates to what is not said, how what 
is said in different places interacts, how reality relates to appearances and what consequences 
spring from. 
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whether they can evoke or allay emotions in their audiences.
40
 Xenophon‟s interest 
in contemporary rhetorical theory emerges particularly in the emotional appeals he 
writes, because we see that he pre-empts some of the recommendations that Aristotle 
and Anaximenes provide for evoking emotions. Thus, he is presumably engaging 
with existing theory on emotions.  
It is important to be able to manipulate others‟ emotions because, when a 
leader has no tangible reward to offer in return for his audience acting or thinking in 
a certain way, he has to rely on altering his audience‟s perception of something they 
care about in order to persuade them to do as he wants. The emotional appeals that 
will affect an audience vary with the composition of the audience, the audience‟s 
previous experiences, the circumstances of the appeal, the current mood of the 
audience, and the audience‟s expectations and prior knowledge of the speaker. The 
speaker must make appeals that are fitting to his character, as his audience 
recognises it, and his reputation. The unsuccessful speeches give a clear indication as 
to what makes for a poor emotional appeal, such as the audience not respecting the 
opinion of the speaker, while the successful speeches indicate how emotional appeals 
can be made effectively, such as by relating an appeal to the men‟s desire to survive.  
In the second part of this chapter, I examine how the interpretation of these 
speeches changes when we examine the motives of the speaker for making the 
appeal, and when we see whether the speech brought harm or benefit to the speaker 
and his audience. What emerges is that it is important to recognise that the outcome 
of a speech can determine whether an appeal should have been made and whether it 
should be emulated or not. The way a speaker‟s leadership ends in the work also 
affects how the reader regards him and his command, including his speech making. 
Thus, there seems to be a didactic function behind the speeches and their related 
                                                             
40 Xenophon’s interest in rhetoric has long been of interest to scholars (see Pomeroy 1995, 10-15 for 
references to numerous early German dissertations on the subject). More recently, Kelly (1977) 
focuses on the rhetorical techniques that Xenophon uses in the speeches in the Anabasis and argues 
(pp.76-7) that Xenophon was “well-versed” in them. Gray (1989b) analyses “the rhetorical theory of 
propriety” in Xenophon’s Apology and also (1998) the use of the form and rhetorical techniques of 
real defence speeches and eulogies in his Memorabilia, while L’Allier (2012, esp. 478 and 486-7) 
discusses Xenophon’s own sophistic style in the Cynegeticus. Xenophon also clearly admires 
Hermocrates, who taught (ἐδίδαςκε) his fellow leaders to speak both unrehearsed (ἀπὸ τοῦ 
παραχρῆμα) and after deliberating (βουλευςαμζνουσ, Hellenica 1.1.30). Xenophon thus appears to 
believe that it is important for a leader to be able to speak well and to teach others in this field. See 
Buzzetti (2014, 305-6) for similarities in the careers of Xenophon and Hermocrates. 
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narrative. As well as a leader being characterised by how well he can anticipate his 
audience‟s frame of mind and achieve persuasion, his motive for making the 
emotional appeal distinguishes between those who persuade for selfless reasons and 
those who persuade for selfish reasons. Thus, the speeches also seem to have a 
characterising effect. Again, this helps to distinguish between which leaders should 
be emulated and which should not. Further, the direct speeches place the reader into 
the original situation, along with the internal audience, and allow him to hear the 
speeches in their original contexts. This involves the reader in events and makes the 
interpretation of the speeches important to him. Speeches evoking or calming 
emotions can have dramatic effects on the reader. The internal audience is usually in 
danger when the appeal is made and the reader may engage with the story, feeling 
the same emotions as the audience, and subsequently experiencing the emotions that 
the leader evokes. Because the reader may become involved in this way, he may 
engage with the subtleties of characterisation and the didactic messages that I argue 
exist. Thus, another effect of the speeches seems to be reader involvement. By 
analysing the speeches in this way, Xenophon emerges as the only leader who is 
motivated selflessly, who successfully makes appropriate emotional appeals for the 
benefit of others, and whose leadership ends well in the work. Other leaders 
variously cannot successfully persuade, cause more harm than good or are motivated 
poorly. 
A gap in modern scholarship exists here because very little work has been 
done on Xenophon and the emotions.
41
 Regarding the Anabasis, there are some 
mentions of Clearchus‟ use of fear as a tool of leadership and of Xenophon‟s use of 
the fear of punishment when it becomes necessary, such as by Nussbaum (1967, 21-
2, 72 and 110-17), but these do not focus primarily on the speeches, and indeed 
Clearchus does not verbally evoke fear of himself, as Nussbaum comments. Scholars 
often mention that a speaker appeals to certain emotions when commenting on a 
                                                             
41 Recently, however, Tamiolaki (2013) has examined Xenophon’s use of emotions to reveal 
historical explanation in the Hellenica. She concludes (2013, 39-45) that Xenophon is innovative and 
experimental in the way he represents emotions felt by groups, that he puts greater emphasis on 
emotions experienced by individuals and the consequent alteration of their psychological states, and 
that, as a narrator, Xenophon offers his own theories on emotions and describes his own feelings. 
She argues that Xenophon’s narratorial comments on emotions offer direct advice to leaders. Some 
of these conclusions seem to hold true for the Anabasis, as we shall see. See Higgins (1977, 126) 
who also recognises Xenophon’s interest in emotions as causes for actions. In contrast to Xenophon, 
much work has been done on emotions in Thucydides, particularly on fear. See, for example, 
Sanders (forthcoming), Petersen and Liaras (2006), and Desmond (2006). 
24 
 
particular speech, but there is no investigation linking a leader‟s use of verbal 
emotional appeals in the Anabasis to his characterisation or the didactic aim of the 
work.  
The second thematic chapter looks more closely at the disjunction between 
success, motives for persuasion, and the outcomes of speeches. I discuss a 
fundamental choice that leaders make when they consider how to persuade those 
who are on their side to act or not to act: whether to speak truthfully or to deceive. 
Despite the narrator and Xenophon the character claiming that deceiving friends is 
reprehensible, Cyrus, Clearchus, Timasion and Xenophon all successfully do this, 
raising the question as to how the author wants the reader to interpret their success 
and moral character.  
The deceitful speeches involve the reader both in arousing the reader‟s 
suspicion and in recognising the deceit. When the internal audience is being 
deceived, tension arises because the narrator sometimes creates different levels of 
knowledge between the internal audience and the reader. The narrator may let the 
reader know in advance that a speech will be deceitful, or give him the tools to 
understand, as he is reading the speech, that it is deceitful. For example, the narrator 
may reveal information in the narrative before the speech that conflicts with what the 
speaker says. In such cases, the reader will be left in suspense as to whether the 
internal audience will recognise the deception or later become aware of it. 
Alternatively, the narrator may allow the reader to be taken in by the speech, along 
with the internal audience, which may make the reader feel a range of emotions 
when the deceit is eventually revealed, such as surprise and anger. By recognising 
that the leaders are practicing deceit, the reader can often appreciate that the 
audience‟s reactions are misguided.  
The difference between the ethos that a speaker projects and the character 
that the narrator allows the reader to see in the narrative is particularly large when a 
speaker deceives. The speakers are characterised particularly by the motives for 
deceit that the narrator reveals or confirms. The reader can see whether a deceiver is 
motivated by his own interests or the interests of others, and thus whether the 
internal audience, and the reader, should trust him or not. In successfully deceiving, 
the leader is also characterised by his correct anticipation of his audience‟s 
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disposition. Further, these audience members are characterised by what they are 
willing to believe and whom they are willing to trust.  
By examining the outcomes of the deceitful speeches, both short and long 
term, we can see whether the leader benefitted or harmed himself and others through 
his deception, and thus, whether or not he was justified in deceiving. We must also 
examine the way a leader‟s command terminates in the work. For example, Cyrus 
and Clearchus die after being deceived themselves. This seems to link their 
deception of others to their fate. This creates a clear didactic message to the reader 
about the unacceptable nature of their deception of friends. The didactic message 
that emerges from the deceitful speeches is that not all who deceive should be 
condemned, however. Sometimes deceit is necessary for the greater good of the 
army. Xenophon emerges as a leader who deceives but who does so with the right 
motives and benefits others as a result. He does not always have the trust of the 
soldiers but he continually acts in their best interests, while other characters are 
trusted but fail the soldiers. It is important that a leader tries to gain a reputation for 
trustworthiness, but this trust must not be abused. Thus, the narrator creates clear 
positive and negative exempla from the leaders who deceive others, which the reader 
may want to emulate or shun. That the internal audience can be taken in by a 
deceitful speech which leads to negative outcomes indicates the importance of 
audiences being certain that a leader is working in their best interests before they 
believe what he claims.  
There is a gap in the scholarship for an investigation of the deceitful speeches 
used against friends in the Anabasis. There are two works on deceit in Xenophon‟s 
Anabasis already, but they do not examine the implications that leaders using speech 
to deceive friends has for exposing the real character of the leader. Nor do they 
investigate how such deceit relates to the way these characters‟ leaderships end in 
the work, how it can reflect badly as well as positively on a leader and his leadership, 
and the message the author wants the reader to understand regarding when it is 
acceptable and unacceptable to deceive friends. Danzig (2007) specifically looks at 
deception of the enemy, which I do not investigate, but he does highlight the 
importance of characters appearing trustworthy to others, which is also of prime 
importance when deceiving friends. Hirsch (1985) investigates all types of deceit, by 
Persians, Greeks, friends and enemies, and links it to the recurring references to trust 
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in the Anabasis. He constantly relates the presentation of deceit to Xenophon‟s 
representation of the Persians, however, whereas I relate it to Greek leadership.
42
  
On one occasion, the soldiers recognise that Cyrus is deceiving them but 
decide to continue under his leadership, partly because he is willing to give them 
money. Seemingly, once a leader has demonstrated that he gives others what they 
want, or has made convincing enough promises that he will do so, these people will 
be more inclined to stay with him, which makes any deception and manipulation of 
their emotions easier. Thus, the third thematic chapter looks in more depth at appeals 
to what a speaker knows his audience is motivated by or desires. As mercenaries, the 
soldiers and leaders are motivated by making financial gain or profit (θέξδνο), as 
well as by obtaining honour (ηηκή) and avoiding disgrace. There is a difficulty in 
appealing directly to profit and honour, however. Someone who appeals to and 
accommodates the soldiers‟ desires is not necessarily doing what will benefit the 
army and may give the soldiers license to be driven by greed rather than by what it is 
right to do. However, soldiers are not going to follow someone who repeatedly 
denies them their desires, even if this is beneficial for them. As part of his ethos, a 
leader will also need to represent his own attitude towards these desires and 
motivations, and meet his audience‟s expectations of how a leader should speak and 
act concerning them.  
The speeches in which a leader mentions profit and honour involve the 
reader. Based on a leader‟s motivations and previous words and actions, the reader 
may become suspicious about whether a leader will prove true to his promises and 
claims regarding the gaining of honour and profit, and whether he is accurately 
representing his attitude. Suspense may further be generated for the reader who waits 
to find out what will happen if an audience realises that a leader cannot fulfil his 
claims. There is also tension for the reader in anticipating whether such appeals by 
leaders are best for the army or whether they will put the army into direct conflict 
with others. 
A leader may present himself as someone who can be relied upon to fulfil his 
audience‟s desires and to act well in relation to his own pursuit of honour and profit, 
                                                             
42 Hesk (2000) examines deceit in Classical Athenian literature, but his section on Xenophon is only 
concerned with the Cyropaedia. 
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but the narrator either confirms or undercuts this picture. A leader‟s choice of what 
to appeal to in the particular situation, his real motives for doing so, as well as his 
ability and intent to fulfil his promises, characterise him. Thus, the narrator indicates 
whether the leader can be trusted to do what is best for others, or whether he has his 
own personal agenda. The audience is also characterised by its desires and its 
willingness to believe that a leader will fulfil his promises.  
Examining how the different leaders choose to respond to certain scenarios, 
as well as the outcome of their appeals, and the end that befalls their command, gives 
a clear didactic message. Before appealing to desire in others, a leader must ensure 
that thoughts of the honour and profit that he can make do not prevent him from 
doing his duty to his soldiers, and he must represent his attitude accurately. Although 
he cannot preach to his audience about what it is morally right to do without 
alienating its members and making them think that he will not provide for them, he 
can educate them through his own example in words and actions and by making 
exempla out of scenarios and other people. Even though, outside of war, appealing to 
the desire for profit in others may be open to censure, sometimes, in the situation the 
army finds itself in, appealing to the desire for profit is the correct thing to do for the 
greater good. A leader must be able to judge an audience‟s character and often-
changing needs and desires, and speak accordingly on each occasion in order to 
encourage an audience to positive actions. A leader is rendered a negative paradigm 
by causing his audience harm through his appeal, for example, by causing damage to 
the army‟s reputation, or by falsely representing his attitude to the detriment of the 
audience. Once a leader has made a promise, he must deliver on it. He must also be 
able to inspire belief when representing the army‟s outlook on obtaining profit and 
honour to outsiders. Finally, the reader learns that an audience must test a leader in 
order to be sure that he will fulfil his promises. In the Anabasis, only Xenophon the 
character successfully negotiates the difficulties inherent in appealing to others‟ 
motivations, while controlling his own desires, and emerges as a positive paradigm.  
There is still room in the scholarship on the Anabasis to examine how a 
leader‟s appeals to honour and profit, as well as references to his own attitude 
towards these concepts, can be a tool for involving the reader, for demonstrating a 
leader‟s character, and for revealing the author‟s recommendations for how to 
persuade successfully and morally. In relation to these concepts in the Anabasis, 
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there has only been one investigation, and this concerns Xenophon the character 
making profit. Azoulay (2004a) argues that both Xenophon the narrator and 
Xenophon the character deliberately distance Xenophon the character from being 
regarded as a mercenary and from receiving money, in response to specific criticism 
he must have received. Although Azoulay‟s argument focuses on Xenophon‟s 
character, it does not focus on how he appeals to the concept of profit to persuade an 
audience to act or not act.  
 From these three different elements of verbal persuasion, the reader sees 
more than just whether a leader achieves successful persuasion. He learns whether 
the leader understands his audience, how he wants his audience to view him, how he 
manipulates others‟ emotions, what methods of persuasion he uses, whether he has 
selfless or selfish motivations, whether he makes recommendations and appeals to 
others based on what is morally right and acceptable, whether he brings benefit to 
others, and ultimately whether he succeeds in his leadership. All the leaders that this 
thesis examines fail in one or more of these particular areas, except Xenophon. 
Through the narrator‟s guidance, the reader learns what makes a successful speech, 
but also the vital importance of persuading morally, being motivated rightly and 
bringing benefit. The reader can then choose to either emulate or shun these leaders‟ 
examples. The idea that Xenophon has a didactic aim and presents his leaders, both 
in the Anabasis and elsewhere, as exempla to reject, imitate or learn from, as well as 
presenting himself as an ideal leader is not new.
43
 Indeed, according to Stadter 
(2012, 59), this was already recognised by Plutarch. However, I arrive at this 
conclusion through the speeches and their relation to the narrative, which teaches 
that leaders must ultimately say and do what is best for those they are responsible 
for. It remains to demonstrate in the next chapter exactly what method will be 
adopted in this thesis and how this will produce fresh interpretations. To do this, the 
proposed method will be applied to certain speeches in the Hellenica that scholars 
have already examined.  
 
                                                             
43 For this interpretation, see particularly Nicolai (2014, 66-8, 74, 81 and 84), Stoll (2012, 251 and 
2010, 14, 66 and 82), Flower (2012, 118-19), Hobden and Tuplin (2012, 16-17, 34 and 39), Gray 
(2011b, 1 and 51), Rood (2004b, 324-5), Tuplin (2003a, 151-2), Hutchinson (2000, 18 and 21), 
Humble (1997, 242 and 245), Dillery (1995, 10-12, 15, 94, 130, and 249-51), Breitenbach (1950, 29-
104) and Jaeger (1945, 159). 
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Method for the Analysis of Xenophon‟s Speeches 
In the first part of this chapter, I outline the method that I shall adopt throughout this 
thesis to interpret the speeches in the Anabasis. In the second part, I discuss the 
previous scholarly approaches to examining the speeches in the Hellenica, in 
comparison to my own approach. In order to demonstrate how my approach and 
methodology can add to existing scholarship, in the third part, I use the method I 
have outlined to analyse three speeches from the Hellenica and compare existing 
scholarly interpretations to my own.
44
  
Method 
Speeches in a historiographic work cannot be regarded as freestanding, and instead 
are part of a multi-layered representation. Firstly, this consists of an external frame. 
The author controls the voice of the narrator, who in turn controls the speaker and his 
speech. This speech is nominally directed at an internal audience, and witnessed by 
the reader. However, the author, via the narrator, may mould the speech to have 
relevance for the reader. Secondly, the speeches have an internal frame comprising 
of the external situation, the audience's mental state, the speaker's persuasive aims 
and the audience's susceptibility to persuasion. Therefore, I propose to investigate 
the following elements of the speeches, although I shall not always investigate these 
in the same order or separate them so clearly from one another. 
Context: the circumstances surrounding the speech which led to it being given and 
which will influence the way the speaker attempts to persuade. In this and the 
following areas, it is important to ascertain whether the internal audience also knows 
the information provided by the narrator to the reader or not.  
Relevant information that the narrator has revealed to the reader about the speaker 
before the speech: this may include, for example, judgements about the speaker by 
the narrator or another character, information on the speaker‟s past words and deeds, 
                                                             
44 Despite the large number of speeches in the Cyropaedia, I shall not extend my analysis to them 
and shall only occasionally refer to individual speeches from the work. This is due to both reasons of 
scope and the complicated division in existing scholarship regarding whether Xenophon intends the 
reader to see Cyrus as an ideal leader or whether he undermines Cyrus’ leadership by revealing the 
flaws in it. For particularly opposed readings see Gera (1993), Tatum (1989) and Due (1989).  
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or details of previous interactions between the speaker and his internal audience.
45
 
The narrator may also have revealed the speaker‟s long-term aims and motivations, 
and his reasons for giving the speech, sometimes presenting the character‟s internal 
thought processes and feelings. Such information will allow the reader to assess the 
character of the speaker, whether the speaker is trustworthy, why the speaker has 
chosen to speak or is advocating a particular course of action, whether the speaker is 
revealing his true motives or is being deceptive, and what feelings the speaker has 
previously evoked in the same audience either because of preconceived ideas about 
him or because of a speech or action.  
Relevant information that the narrator has revealed to the reader about the internal 
audience before the speech: this information may allow the reader to assess what the 
internal audience expects from its circumstances and the speaker, as well as 
revealing the audience‟s motivations and mood. The reader can then begin to 
understand whether a speaker‟s arguments, the ethos he projects, and the emotions 
he tries to evoke or combat are likely to persuade the particular audience.
46
  
How the narrator introduces the speech: for example, the narrator may indicate 
visual or audial elements, or the general manner of delivery. As an example of a 
visual element, indicating that the speaker wept before delivering a speech may help 
the reader to understand that the speaker was trying to evoke pity in his audience. 
The general manner the speech was given in can be indicated, for example, by 
specifying that a speaker was sober when he gave his speech. This reveals that the 
speaker is in control of what he is saying. The narrator‟s choice of verb to introduce 
a speech can be important in interpreting what follows. For example, by indicating 
that a speaker reproached his audience, the narrator makes the reader aware of the 
tone of the speech, the speaker‟s intention, and also the speaker‟s emotions. 
Interpretive clues can also be revealed in the narrator‟s choice of how to name the 
                                                             
45 For narratorial interventions in Xenophon, see Gray (2004 and 2003). She argues that these are a 
way of explicitly evaluating a character or event, often through praise or blame, but that the 
narrator can also use more implicit methods such as similes or metaphors to do this. Gray’s work 
highlights that it will be particularly important to see where the narrator comments and where 
events and characters speak for themselves.  
46 For the vital importance of understanding a speaker’s audience to both the speaker and the 
reader, see Debnar (2001) who examines the internal audiences in Thucydides’ Spartan debates. She 
demonstrates that failing to take into account one’s audience is significant in these speeches, and 
that Thucydides himself assessed the audiences when choosing the appropriate words for his 
speakers to say.  
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speaker. For example, if he provides a speaker‟s rank or ethnicity, he may be 
commenting on the speaker‟s suitability to speak, or political influence. The same 
may be said about how the narrator introduces the audience. 
The arguments the speaker adopts in his attempt to persuade: this reveals what 
factors the speaker believes will most persuade his audience, such as thoughts of 
safety, advantage or reputation. Debnar‟s (2001) work highlights that the power an 
argument has over the same audience changes over time, as this audience‟s 
circumstances and motivations shift, and that opinions will differ even between 
members of the same audience.      
The ethos the speaker presents to his audience:
47
 a speaker can project his true 
character in his speech or he can manipulate an audience to believe in a specific 
ethos that he has contrived for the situation (ethopoeia). Narrators often directly or 
indirectly provide the reader with the knowledge to identify whether a character is 
presenting his real character or a false one.
48
 The projection of a specific persona 
indicates the type of character that the speaker thinks will lend persuasive force to 
his arguments. For example, a speaker who claims that his interests coincide with his 
audience‟s interests, and therefore that he has the same aims as his audience, may 
calculate that the audience members will trust him as someone who can help them 
fulfil their aims and desires.
49
  
A speaker can build on a pre-established reputation if this is positive, or he 
may need to refute suspicions at the beginning of his speech if this is negative.
50
 If 
                                                             
47 Although I have separated ethos, logos and pathos for convenience, these often overlap. See 
Carey (1996) for the overlap of ethos and pathos, and his argument that “in the hands of a master, 
ethos, in the sense of dramatic characterization, may fulfil the role of argument” (1996, 414). 
48 Regarding the Anabasis, Ferrario (2012) discusses the interplay between the way the characters 
want to be remembered and how the narrator or author allows them to be remembered as part of 
her discussion about the author’s awareness of the role his work has in creating memory. Although 
she concentrates on actions that affect how a character is remembered, if the narrator presents a 
speaker portraying himself as having a certain character but also reveals to the audience that this is 
not an accurate representation, the narrator is effectively undercutting how the speaker wants to be 
seen. We must remember, however, that the speeches (and indeed aspects of actions) are as much 
constructions of the author as the narratorial elements revealing the discrepancy, and so to speak of 
what the character “wants” here is a fallacy. 
49 Stadter (2009, 457) argues that Xenophon was particularly aware of how a person’s character 
could affect politics. He says that Xenophon represented many different character traits and linked 
these to specific actions and repercussions. This suggests that Xenophon will also be interested in 
how leaders portray their own characters in speech, and what arises from this. 
50 As recommended in Anaximenes’ Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, 29.6-26, 1436b.17-1437b.33 and 
36.3-15, 1441b.37-1442b.28. 
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the speaker is unknown to the audience, he will need to construct his character 
entirely through what he says in his speech. A speaker can establish his ethos by 
directly describing his own character, by referring to his previous behaviour, or 
through his selection of arguments.
51
 Of course, the particular cause a speaker is 
arguing for will also incline his audience to view him in a particular way. For 
example, an audience will take a different view of a speaker who advocates helping a 
friend in need, despite the harm it will bring to himself, and a speaker who advocates 
abandoning friends because it is expedient. Whether the audience believes that the 
first speaker is morally right or foolish will depend on the specific addressees and 
circumstances.  
The emotions the speaker tries to evoke or combat: the choice of which emotions to 
manipulate indicates what the speaker believes to be the mind-set of his audience, 
both in terms of what the audience values most and in response to the current 
situation.  
The audience’s response: when the narrator indicates a response, it usually takes the 
form of a narratorial comment indicating how the speech was received, the 
description of an action that explicitly or implicitly results from the speech, or the 
presentation of another speech. These indicate whether the audience has been 
persuaded or not.
52
  
Why the speech is successful or unsuccessful: this is sometimes explicitly indicated 
by the narrator, often by revealing the emotions the audience feels about the speech 
or by providing the audience‟s thought-processes in analysing it. Success indicates 
that the speaker anticipated the character of his audience correctly and hence selected 
the right arguments, ethos and appeals to emotions. An unsuccessful speech can 
                                                             
51
 As Kelly (1977, 90) argues, in the Anabasis, speakers cannot be differentiated by their style or way 
of speaking. Instead, they all speak in Xenophon’s own mode. For more on Xenophon’s own style, 
see Chiron (2014) and Gray (2014). Colvin (1999) argues that the conventions of historiography 
mean that dialects in particular are not usually represented in such works, although he says that 
Xenophon occasionally includes elements of the Laconian dialect. My own investigations have 
confirmed that there is no stylistic differentiation between the ways people from different cities 
speak. See further Roy (1972) for Xenophon’s use of ethnics in the Anabasis.  
52 Leidl (2010) examines responses to speeches in historiography and concludes that they have two 
main roles. Firstly, they indicate the effect that the speeches had on the internal audience and relate 
to the continuation of the narrative. Secondly, they engage the reader with the author’s aims for the 
work by allowing the reader to compare his own intellectual and emotional reactions, in order to 
interpret the speech and the action that is caused by the speech correctly. Leidl further argues that 
unsuccessful speeches have their effect on the reader rather than the internal audience. 
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usually be explained by the speaker‟s failure to understand his audience.53 A 
speaker‟s prior reputation may also influence an audience‟s decision, as might 
speeches delivered by others, both in support of the speaker‟s argumentation and in 
opposition to it.
54
  
Allusions to other speeches: these can be speeches within the same work, within 
Xenophon‟s oeuvre, or within earlier literature. Within the same work, the narrator 
may indirectly invite a comparison between the ways in which different speakers 
responded to a similar situation, evoked the same emotion, used the same arguments, 
or appealed to the same motivation, for example. The narrator may also implicitly 
invite the reader to compare the different characters of the speakers and audiences in 
various episodes, as well as the reactions by different audiences to similar 
circumstances. Allusions to speeches in different works by the same author may shed 
further light on how the author wanted the reader to interpret the speech. For 
example, the allusion might confirm that a particular rhetorical method is effective or 
ineffective, that a particular type of person uses it, or that it is morally unsound. 
Links to speeches outside of Xenophon‟s work invite comparisons with famous 
speakers, audiences, persuasion attempts and outcomes. Such external allusions will 
not be a central preoccupation of my thesis, but I shall discuss them as and when 
they aid interpretation of the speeches in question. 
The short-term and long-term outcomes for the speaker and the audience of 
successful or unsuccessful persuasion attempts: when the narrator reveals whether 
the speech was ultimately beneficial or harmful to the speaker and the audience, this 
invites the reader to judge one or both parties. For example, if the speech is 
successful but leads to disaster, this brings the speaker‟s motivation, aims and 
judgement into question, as well as the audience‟s decision to accept the speaker‟s 
arguments. If a speaker fails to persuade and this leads to harm, the reader may judge 
the speaker equally culpable. Here, the reader should assess the speaker‟s choice of 
how to persuade. 
                                                             
53 See Debnar (1996). She examines a speech in Thucydides by the Thebans (3.61-7) and shows why 
it is an example of “inept rhetoric” in contrast to scholars who have tried to save the speech from 
reflecting badly on the Thebans’ abilities. 
54
 When there are multiple speakers making similar arguments but all contributing a different ethos, 
the narrator sometimes indicates that the character of a particular speaker persuaded his audience, 
but it is often difficult to distinguish whose character had the successful impact. 
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Further relevant information in the subsequent narrative: this includes information 
relating to how the speaker‟s leadership ends in the work and whether a leader is 
able to live up to his promises.  
Previous Approaches to the Hellenica 
I shall now give a brief overview of the major scholarly works on the speeches in the 
Hellenica, and demonstrate how my focus is different. The scholar who has 
examined these speeches in the most depth is Vivienne Gray. In The Character of 
Xenophon’s Hellenica, she uses close reading to analyse the majority of the speeches 
in the work in their contexts. In each case, she highlights the moral and ethical 
message conveyed in the episode in which the speech appears. In particular, she 
examines the moral qualities of speakers, leaders, cities and audiences that emerge 
from the speeches. Overall, Gray argues that the Hellenica has a moral and 
philosophical aim, and that it portrays examples of moral achievement and virtue. In 
contrast to Gray, I do not focus on classing speakers and audiences according to 
whether they show virtue or vice, although my analysis may reveal characters to be 
moral or corrupt. Instead, I concentrate on the speeches as persuasion attempts where 
the speaker either succeeds or fails, and I use the preceding and subsequent narrative 
to interpret the attempt further. While this includes an assessment of the characters of 
the speakers and their audiences, I focus on investigating the speaker‟s motives and 
understanding how accurately the speaker judged the character of his audience.
55
  
 In her earlier article, „Dialogue in Xenophon‟s Hellenica‟, Gray examines the 
role of the dialogues in the work through a close reading of their contents and their 
surrounding narrative. She particularly examines how the narrator presents the main 
speaker as persuading others and what this reveals about the speaker‟s character. She 
argues that the narrator presents dialogue to reveal the main speaker‟s clever 
manipulative talents and persuasive methods in a form that allows the reader to 
detect these skills for himself, and that the dialogues highlight themes that Xenophon 
wants to portray as part of his characterisation of particular leaders. In The Character 
of Xenophon’s Hellenica, however, Gray includes these same dialogues as examples 
                                                             
55 Kane (1990) does not examine the speeches in the Hellenica specifically, but he also suggests a 
moral interpretation of the work, whereby the narrator indicates that justice and piety lead to 
positive outcomes and poor behaviour leads to negative outcomes. This is similar to my method of 
examining the outcomes of speeches to reveal how Xenophon may have wanted the reader to 
interpret the speeches.  
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revealing moral virtue. The approach she adopts in her article is close to the method I 
use in examining what a persuasion attempt can reveal about a character, but I 
primarily focus on set speeches presented directly and indirectly and only 
occasionally examine dialogue. Further, when analysing the Anabasis speeches, I 
examine them thematically and investigate additional elements of characterisation.
56
 
Buckler analyses the speeches in Hellenica 6.3.1- 7.5.27 in his article 
„Xenophon‟s Speeches and the Theban Hegemony‟. Firstly, he examines the role of 
the speeches in relation to the aim of this specific section of the work, and secondly, 
he examines the speeches to see whether they accurately reflect what the speakers 
said at the time. Buckler concludes that the function of the speeches is to allow 
characters to present their views and policies. While I also examine what arguments 
the characters present, I discuss the reasons for a speaker‟s selection of particular 
arguments and why he may have believed that these would be persuasive. Buckler 
compares the speeches in the work with other accounts of the same episodes to 
ascertain their authenticity. A similar approach is adopted in Usher‟s article 
„Xenophon, Critias and Theramenes‟. Here, Usher attempts to establish whether the 
speeches of Critias and Theramenes in Hellenica book 2 are based on actual 
transcripts of the speeches. The question of the authenticity of individual speeches is 
outside the scope of my work.
57
  
Tamiolaki examines the influence of Thucydides on Xenophon‟s speeches in 
her article „A l‟ombre de Thucydide? Les Discours des Helléniques et leur Influence 
Thucydidéenne‟. Her method is to compare the representation and function of 
                                                             
56 See also Hau (2014, 253-6) who argues that the dialogues in the Hellenica are partly included to 
explain what caused subsequent events. In contrast, I examine subsequent events for their impact 
on the interpretation of the speeches.  
57 The problem in relation to the Anabasis stands thus. Although Xenophon was present on the 
expedition and purportedly gave many of the speeches in the work, the events happened long 
before he composed the Anabasis, and he includes some speeches that he was not present for 
(7.6.4-6, for example). As Woodman (1988, 11-15) argues with a focus on Thucydides, it is unlikely 
that readers would actually expect a verbatim quotation and would instead expect a historian to 
make edits to the speech, although providing the essence. See further Marincola (2011, 120-7) who 
concludes that speeches in historiography are ultimately interpretations of speakers, characters and 
aims by the historian, rather than accurate representations. While the Anabasis can only partially be 
described as historiography, these conclusions most likely apply to this work too. Sacks (1981, 5-6) 
highlights that accurate representations of speeches are only relevant to internal audiences, while 
free inventions can only educate the external audience and do not fit the context. Speeches that are 
part accurate and part invention, he argues, are aimed at both the internal and external audiences, 
and progress the narrative as well as passing a message to the reader. Thus, if Xenophon is providing 
any lessons for his readers, it is likely that his speeches are not direct quotations. 
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speeches in Thucydides‟ and Xenophon‟s works. By way of introduction, she briefly 
compares several factors in the presentation of the speeches in both works. Firstly, 
she mentions some similarities and differences in the number of speeches, as well as 
the genres and structures of the speeches. Further, she examines some aspects of who 
speaks, how much, and when in the two works. She also comments on some similar 
and different factors in the presentation of audience reactions and the way the 
speakers‟ motivations are described. Finally, she touches on how moral qualities are 
described by each author. In the main body of her article, she examines specific 
echoes and adaptations of Thucydides by Xenophon, and common themes and 
motifs. She does not apply a rhetorical analysis to the speeches themselves in order 
to assess the representation of their persuasiveness or lack of it, but is concerned 
with the extent of Xenophon‟s innovativeness and whether he deliberately echoes 
Thucydides. As I mentioned above, I do not make allusions to other works a main 
focus. 
In her article, „Charakter mów Ksenofonta w "Hellenika"‟, Turska compares 
the content, form, type and function of the speeches in the Hellenica with those in 
Herodotus and Thucydides, and focuses especially on how each author presents the 
characters of the speakers. She concludes that the Hellenica narrator allows the 
reader to form his own opinion of a speaker based on what he says and does rather 
than providing explicit opinions. In my work, I examine what some of these readers‟ 
opinions might be by relating the speeches to the narrative and comparing the 
characterisations that emerge. I do not compare Xenophon‟s use of speeches to the 
employment of speeches by other authors.  
Other scholars also touch on the speeches while investigating the Hellenica. 
Pownall (2004) argues that Xenophon has a moral agenda and aims to provide moral 
exempla for the benefit of aristocrats engaging in politics. She argues that speeches 
are one way in which Xenophon chooses to convey his moral teachings, and includes 
analysis of select speeches as examples of speakers displaying their moral qualities 
and thus providing good and bad moral paradigms. In my own work, Xenophon‟s 
overall ethical message is not the main focus, although it will be a factor in the 
interpretation of the speeches, for example, in understanding whether the narrator 
approves of speakers deceiving their audiences.  
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Marincola (2010) briefly examines a few instances of the employment of 
historical examples by speakers in the Hellenica in terms of why their use succeeds 
or fails. Similarly, Rood (2012c) examines speakers‟ use of the „plupast‟ in the 
Hellenica and how such examples from the past reflect on contemporary issues of 
political relations, have power as models, and indicate speakers‟ exploitation of 
events for different audiences. While my own work will touch on historical examples 
used by characters as part of their persuasion attempts, this is again not my sole 
focus. Tuplin (1993) analyses the Hellenica as a critique of the struggle for 
dominance between the main Greek states and, as part of this, he discusses various 
aspects of the speeches, including the arguments presented in them and their 
outcomes. My work differs again in depth but also focuses less on how the speeches 
are political commentaries and more on what can be learnt from them as persuasion 
attempts.  
Various scholars have also analysed specific speeches in the work, such as 
Schepens (2001), who examines the speeches of the three Athenian ambassadors at 
6.3. Although he touches on elements such as characterisation and choice of 
arguments, he primarily focuses on what the speeches reveal about Xenophon‟s 
political vision. In examining an element of the relationship between leader and 
follower, as well as considering Xenophon‟s possible representation of the army as a 
polis on the march, I am clearly touching on Xenophon‟s political message in the 
Anabasis. Nevertheless, this is not my main concern and I am not letting Xenophon‟s 
political ideology guide my interpretation.  
Examples 
In order to illustrate how my focus on the content of the speeches and their relation 
to the information provided in the narrative may contribute insight into the 
interpretation of the speeches, I shall apply my method to three speeches in the 
Hellenica. They are all the subject of scholarly debate and I will set this out in the 
course of the discussion.     
Polydamas’ Speech to the Spartans (6.1.4-16) 
Investigating this speech particularly reveals the importance of carefully reading the 
narrative after a speech, understanding a speaker‟s real motive in relation to his 
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claimed one, and linking a speech to the way a speaker‟s story ends in the work. 
These will all be important for investigating the speeches in the Anabasis. In this 
episode, Polydamas has come to Sparta to ask for Spartan aid against Jason, who 
wants to bring Polydamas‟ Pharsalus under his control. In the scholarship on this 
speech, Polydamas is often judged positively, while the Spartans are judged 
negatively, but I shall be arguing for the opposite.  
This is Polydamas‟ first appearance in the work, and the narrator introduces 
him with an unusually extensive comment on the high repute he is held in 
throughout Thessaly and how his own people regard him as virtuous 
(θαιόο…θἀγαζὸο, 6.1.2-3). The narrator recalls how Polydamas‟ people put their 
Acropolis in Polydamas‟ hands and how Polydamas managed incoming and 
outgoing funds fairly, even adding subsidies from his own purse. Finally, the 
narrator describes Polydamas as hospitable (θηιόμελόο) and magnificent 
(κεγαινπξεπὴο). This appears to be a ringing endorsement of Polydamas‟ character 
and his devotion to his city, but, notably, the narrator does not comment on 
Polydamas‟ persuasive skills, which the reader is implicitly invited to judge for 
himself in the subsequent speech. The narrator does not comment on what 
Polydamas will argue, what his motives are, or how he will speak, and so this must 
emerge from Polydamas‟ own words. This, of course, raises questions about whether 
the reader can trust Polydamas to speak truthfully about his motivations, and the 
reader should consider this when interpreting the speech.   
While the narrator does not indicate the Spartan audience‟s state of mind 
before this particular speech, he does provide information pertaining to the 
circumstances in which the audience finds itself. This allows the reader to 
understand whether the Spartans should follow Polydamas‟ advice or not. Polydamas 
gives his speech at a time when the Athenians and the Thebans are pressing the 
Spartans hard, a few years before Leuctra; Nicolochus the Spartan recently led fifty-
five ships to oppose an Athenian and Theban force travelling around the 
Peloponnese, but suffered losses (5.4.62-6). The narrator also reveals that the 
Thebans have just made an expedition into Phocis, and that the Spartans have sent 
four regiments, led by King Cleombrotus, in response to a Phocian request for help. 
The narrator provides a summary of the speech by which the Phocians persuaded the 
Spartans to help them against the Thebans (6.1.1). Unless the Spartans send aid, the 
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Phocians say, they will have to yield to the Thebans. Thus, the Spartans are already 
committed on several fronts.   
Within his own speech, Polydamas embeds a speech purportedly given by 
Jason to Polydamas himself.
58
 „Speech within a speech‟ is frequently found in fourth 
century oratory, in both public and private cases.
59
 Bers (1997, 223-4) argues that 
vividness is not the aim of including speech within speech, as is often suggested. 
Rather, he argues, in lawcourt speeches it is probably a characterisation technique 
that will be recognised by the listener as a rhetorical device rather than as an accurate 
representation of an actual speech. Thus, we should pay attention to how the speech 
characterises both Polydamas and Jason. That Polydamas‟ speech merges features of 
forensic oratory with symbouleutic oratory suggests that Xenophon has an interest in 
how speakers attempt persuasion in practice, even if it transcends the theory he may 
have found in the handbooks of three distinct genres of oratory, each with their own 
special features. There are further examples of speeches within speeches in addition 
to those in lawcourt orations.
60
 Polydamas‟ speech presents striking parallels to 
Herodotus‟ representation of Alexander, son of Amyntas, quoting to the Athenians a 
speech that Mardonius asked him to report to them with the aim of bringing about an 
alliance between Persia and Athens (8.140). Within his representation of Mardonius‟ 
speech, Alexander further represents Mardonius quoting a message from the Persian 
king. Alexander, like Polydamas, comments on the speech he is quoting himself. 
Also like Polydamas, Alexander fails to persuade his audience (8.143). We shall see 
further similarities between the speeches as we investigate Polydamas‟ words. It may 
be that Xenophon is deliberately alluding to this speech and indicating that a speaker 
who represents another‟s speech within his own speech is often unsuccessful.  
As part of his argument, Polydamas presents his motives first. He says that he 
thinks it is right to come to the Spartans when he is in difficulty or if there is trouble 
for Sparta in Thessaly (6.1.4), although he does not specify whom the trouble 
concerns on this occasion. As his speech progresses, Polydamas directly connects 
                                                             
58 We must take into account that while Polydamas portrays Jason in a particular way, the narrator is 
responsible for how he represents Polydamas doing this. Further, the narrator is a construction of 
the author who is ultimately controlling everything in the work. 
59
 See Bers (1997) for examples and discussion. 
60 In Odyssey books 9-12, speeches are presented within Odysseus’ discourse to the Phaeacians. See 
also Herodotus 6.86-7, and Anabasis 1.6.5-10 and 5.6.20. There are no parallels in Thucydides. 
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Jason‟s attempts to win over Pharsalus with Spartan interests. He claims that Jason 
has said that he does not think that any other city could easily contend with him 
(6.1.5), and this presumably includes Sparta. At 6.1.8-10, „Jason‟ says that Sparta‟s 
enemies are already his allies and that they want to become his followers as soon as 
he frees them from the Spartans. To convince the Spartans that Jason himself is a 
serious threat, Polydamas describes Jason‟s character and leadership qualities. He 
does this in terms that the Spartans themselves traditionally would understand the 
value of, such as Jason being a harsh disciplinarian (6.1.6) and the most self-
controlled (ἐγθξαηέζηαηόο) in relation to bodily pleasures (6.1.16). Polydamas 
dwells on the extreme yet effective training that Jason gives his men, which may 
particularly interest an audience who is famed for the quality of its warriors and 
training. Polydamas even says that Jason casts out weaklings (6.1.6), which sounds 
similar to Spartan practices.
61
 Polydamas does not actually explain what he wants 
from the Spartans until close to the end of the speech. He reveals that Jason allowed 
him to come to ask the Spartans for help against Jason (6.1.13). Polydamas argues 
that the Spartans need to take Jason seriously, but also that he thinks the Spartans are 
likely to be successful, as long as they send a large enough force to convince the 
Thessalian cities under Jason‟s control to become allies with them (6.1.14-15).  
Polydamas chooses to present himself as a simple reporter who allows Jason 
to speak through him. This method of presentation is designed to pre-empt any 
Spartan suspicion that Polydamas is exaggerating the severity of Jason‟s threat 
because it concerns his own city. In reality, Polydamas has edited, arranged and 
perhaps even made up Jason‟s words for maximum effect, possibly including the 
argument by „Jason‟ that Polydamas would be blameless in befriending him if the 
Spartans fail to help (6.1.13).
62
  
Polydamas also presents himself as someone who has goodwill towards the 
Spartans, who values his relationship with them, and who wants to do what is right. 
Firstly, he reminds the Spartans that he is their proxenos and benefactor (εὐεξγέηεο), 
                                                             
61 Alexander and ‘Mardonius’ use similar methods to Polydamas and ‘Jason’ to try to persuade the 
Athenians to become allies with Persia, including mentioning what would be in the Athenians’ 
interests, and describing how strong the king (and Mardonius himself) is. 
62 After Alexander’s speech to the Athenians in Herodotus, Spartan ambassadors speak against him 
and argue that Alexander has ‘smoothed’ (λεινασ) Mardonius’ words (Herodotus 8.142). 
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as all his ancestors have been (6.1.4).
63
 Throughout the speech, Polydamas 
represents himself as loyal to the Spartans (e.g. 6.1.13) despite the offer by „Jason‟ to 
make him the second greatest man in Greece (6.1.8). Polydamas also recalls the 
admiration of „Jason‟ for Polydamas‟ adherence to his friendship with the Spartans 
and the exclamation by „Jason‟ that he must hold on to the allegiance of Polydamas 
even more because he has such a good character (6.1.13). Polydamas‟ implication is 
that the Spartans should likewise strive to retain his allegiance. Polydamas also 
presents himself as having practical wisdom when he interrupts „Jason‟ to comment 
knowledgeably on the situation and on Jason‟s talents (6.1.6 and 6.1.14-16).64 
By giving Jason the bulk of the speech, the negative emotions that Polydamas 
evokes are directed towards Jason rather than himself. For example, if Polydamas 
had told the Spartans that Jason would easily be able to undermine Spartan control, 
the Spartans may have felt anger towards Polydamas for this slight on their strength, 
and refused to help. Instead, Polydamas seems to be trying to evoke gratitude in the 
Spartans towards himself through the presentation of his loyalty and concern with 
their interests.  
Polydamas appears to try to evoke fear by recounting several different 
aspects of Jason‟s threat. To some extent, these arguments may have originally been 
used by Jason to make Polydamas fear. He represents Jason as having a well-crafted 
plan and as being astute. For example, Jason recognises the weak areas in his 
existing troops (6.1.8-9) and anticipates that his actions will gain him peltasts, which 
the Thessalian army is presently lacking (Brownson, 2004, 120-1 n. 2). In addition, 
Polydamas describes Jason‟s detailed knowledge of his enemy and confidence 
concerning his own ability to act. For example, Polydamas has „Jason‟ describe how 
he will turn down the Athenians‟ friendship because the Thessalians have better 
access to timber, will be able to build more ships, are better able to fill the ships with 
men and supply them with corn, and because they have more income. Because of 
                                                             
63 C.f. the opening of Alcibiades’ speech in the Sicilian debate (Thucydides, 6.16ff.). ‘Mardonius’ and 
Alexander also emphasise their goodwill towards the Athenians. Alexander chiefly does this by 
saying that his goodwill does not need to be mentioned.  
64 In commenting on the speech by ‘Jason’, Polydamas acts almost like the narrator does in an 
historiographical work. Thus, it is possible that Xenophon is playing with generic conventions in his 
representation of Polydamas’ speech. The Hellenica is not straightforward as historiography, 
however. Scholars have detected shifts in Xenophon’s conception of historiography (see Rahn, 
1971), and even doubted that the work is historiography at all (see Grayson, 1975). See further 
Tuplin (1977).   
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these advantages over the Athenians, „Jason‟ believes that he could easily rule by 
sea. This may be specifically aimed at the Spartans who have never achieved long-
lasting success at sea and may feel threatened by the thought of a sea power even 
stronger than Athens. „Jason‟ goes on to explain how he could subdue the King of 
Persia because of the Persians‟ traditional servitude and his own knowledge of 
previous expeditions against the Persians (6.1.10-12). Further, with himself as 
Tagus, „Jason‟ believes that the Thessalians would not consent to be subject to 
anyone (6.1.8-9). Supporting this fearsome account, Polydamas represents Jason as 
being unlikely to fail in anything he tries (6.1.6 and 6.1.15-16).
65
 Polydamas also 
presents Jason as having a good sense of diplomacy (6.1.7), which may suggest that 
he will easily win people to his side. Polydamas further makes it clear that Jason is 
already in a position where he might cause serious trouble for the Spartans. For 
example, he mentions how powerful and famous Jason is (6.1.4), recites the list of 
Jason‟s subjects (6.1.7), and claims that a force of freed helots and a private 
commander will not be sufficient to tackle Jason (6.1.14-15). Polydamas is 
presenting Jason as an imminent threat who is highly capable and desirous of 
causing great harm. Polydamas‟ words also indirectly warn the Spartans that they are 
currently overconfident and underestimate their rivals. The Spartans are typically 
slow to act, do not take risks, and are inclined to take time for deliberation (as they 
are characterised in Thucydides, e.g. 1.84), and so Polydamas‟ appeal is designed to 
make the Spartans fear not acting quickly. He is seemingly aware that appeals to 
greed and the desire for expansion would not persuade the Spartans, as they may do 
an Athenian audience.  
If the Spartans do not fear Jason, these arguments may make them feel 
contemptuous towards Jason because his excessive ambition, confidence and 
presumption are not to be admired. They may also be angry at the slights Jason made 
towards themselves, which may make them want to teach him a lesson. The Spartans 
may particularly feel angry when Polydamas has „Jason‟ explain why mercenaries, 
such as he has, are better than citizen soldiers. Few men in cities train their bodies, 
he says, while all his men are able to endure severe toils like himself (6.1.5). The 
implication is that Sparta‟s soldiers would not be a match for Jason‟s men. „Jason‟ 
also argues that it is better to have willing allies rather than forcing people under his 
                                                             
65 C.f. Demosthenes’ similar presentation of Philip, for example at 9.49-50. 
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control (6.1.7). This may strike a chord with the Spartans who had numerous 
troubles in subduing the Messenians by force and keeping them subdued. 
Polydamas may also be trying to make the Spartans feel ashamed that they 
have let Jason become so powerful, despite others recognising the threat and 
becoming Jason‟s allies. He might also be recalling his ties of friendship with the 
Spartans to shame them into reciprocating the work he has done in their interests. 
This lack of action and potential refusal to help a friend may cause dishonour in 
others‟ eyes. 
In response, the Spartans are not angry at Polydamas‟ criticism of them. 
Instead, the narrator reports that the Spartans deferred their answer to Polydamas and 
over the next two days assessed how many regiments they currently had deployed. 
The narrator reports their eventual reply: they cannot send Polydamas an adequate 
force and so he should go home and arrange his affairs and those of Pharsalus as best 
he could (6.1.17). Polydamas commends the Spartan state‟s simplicity (ἁπιόηεηα), 
presumably in giving a clear answer, and leaves (6.1.18).  
Immediately afterwards, Polydamas becomes allies with Jason, gives him his 
children as hostages, and helps Jason to win over Pharsalus and become Tagus 
(6.1.18). Jason is killed four years later because „the Greeks‟ (νἱ Ἕιιελεο) feared 
that he might become a tyrant, and his killers were honoured in most of the Greek 
cities they visited (6.4.29-32). In the intervening period, Jason has not caused the 
Spartans excessive trouble. Indeed, before he dies, Jason dissuades the Thebans from 
trying to crush Sparta (6.4.20-4). Soon after Jason‟s death, his brother kills 
Polydamas and eight others from Pharsalus (6.4.34). By being unpersuasive, 
Polydamas has benefitted Jason in the short-term, but the Spartans in the long-term. 
He has brought only harm to himself and the Pharsalians who are killed.  
Interpretation 
This speech involves the reader in understanding why the Spartans were not 
persuaded. Polydamas‟ appeal has similarities to the Phocians‟ appeal presented 
immediately before it, in response to which the Spartans sent aid. Similarly, 
Polydamas‟ speech is often linked to Cleigenes‟ successful persuasion of the 
Spartans and their allies to deal with the growing threat presented by the Olynthians 
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(5.2.12-19) because they use similar arguments (see Gray, 1989a, 185-6 and Tuplin, 
1993, 130). Cleigenes says that the Olynthians are a potential danger, that they have 
threatened the Acanthians and Apollonians to join them willingly or be forced, that 
there needs to be a strong force sent against the Olynthians, that the Olynthians 
themselves already have a strong force and position, that the Olynthians may make 
an alliance with stronger powers (including Boeotia and Athens), that the Olynthians 
are proud, and that cities who share citizenship with the Olynthians but who dislike 
them will desert if a strong force goes against the Olynthians before their cities 
become closely connected. Thus, Cleigenes‟ speech shows that the Spartans can be 
persuaded by similar arguments to those used by Polydamas. A key difference, 
however, is that Cleigenes has emphasised that the Olynthians are not currently hard 
to deal with, despite their advantages (5.2.18), whereas Polydamas has emphasised 
the difficulty of fighting Jason. This may alert the reader to the fact that this 
difference will be important in interpreting Polydamas‟ failure.   
The Spartans do indeed seem to want to help Polydamas. Thus, Polydamas‟ 
assumption that the Spartans can be persuaded by considerations pertaining to their 
own interests, that they are more likely to be convinced if he puts the points he raises 
in terms that they can identify with, that they will want to help a loyal friend, and 
that they are driven to action by strong emotions seems to be right.
66
 However, 
Polydamas may be a victim of his own success in ensuring that Jason comes across 
as a pressing threat. Rather than making the Spartans want to crush Jason 
immediately, Jason comes across as so great an opponent that the Spartans do not 
believe that they have the forces at hand to combat him and would need to recall 
troops in order to send aid. By saying that a private individual with emancipated 
helots will not be sufficient (6.1.14), Polydamas is effectively saying that the 
Spartans will have to turn back from campaigning against the Thebans in Phocis, 
because this is where King Cleombrotus is fighting, while Agesilaus is injured 
(5.4.58 and 6.4.18). Thus, the success of the speech actually depends on whether 
Polydamas has managed to persuade the Spartans that it is more important for them 
to use their troops against Jason than against their other enemies, which he fails to 
do. 
                                                             
66 See Sanders (forthcoming) who argues that the Spartans in Thucydides can be incited to war 
through anger and fear. Thus, Polydamas’ appeal to these emotions may have been apt.  
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Some existing interpretations judge the Spartans negatively for their response 
to Polydamas. Gray (1989a, 122), for example, argues that the Spartans put their 
own safety above their friendship with Polydamas and should have spared him one 
regiment. Their poor character, she argues, stands in contrast to Polydamas‟. Pownall 
(2004, 100) also believes that Xenophon wants the reader to judge the Spartans as 
uncharitable. She contrasts this with Jason, who generously allowed Polydamas to go 
to the Spartans. However, the narrator indicates that, rather than deserting Polydamas 
in his time of need, the Spartans sensibly weigh up their options and actually follow 
Polydamas‟ advice of not sending any troops if they cannot send a large enough 
force. Indeed, Tuplin (1993, 130-1) rightly argues that the Spartan decline that 
Xenophon is presenting is not in moral terms, but in terms of their dire lack of 
resources. Polydamas even praises the Spartans‟ clear response, suggesting that he 
did not think that they had acted wrongly. 
A close reading of the subsequent narrative actually reveals that the narrator 
represents Polydamas‟ recommendation to attack Jason as a poor one. This is not 
apparent until the narrator reveals additional information about Jason. Before this 
time, the reader may simply believe that Polydamas was caught in the difficult 
situation of trying to protect his people and aid his friends against a dangerous 
enemy. The reader may even feel suspense about what will happen to the Spartans 
and Polydamas. Later events demonstrate that Jason did not pose a significant threat 
to Sparta. In fact, Jason helped the Spartans more than he hindered them by 
preventing Thebes from crushing them. This vindicates the Spartans‟ decision not to 
send a force against him. Xenophon‟s original readers may even have known this 
when they were reading Polydamas‟ speech.67 Tuplin (1993, 119-20) similarly notes 
that the narrator does not indicate that Jason has made much progress in his aims 
between Polydamas‟ speech and Jason‟s death, but he concludes that such 
development is not the narrator‟s concern. Rather, Tuplin argues, Xenophon is 
interested in demonstrating Jason‟s fulfilment of the warning that he has Jason 
                                                             
67 Polydamas is a real historical person, but Xenophon may be playing with the audience’s 
knowledge of Polydamas in the Iliad, who acts as an advisor to Hector. The Iliadic Polydamas usually 
fails to convince because of his conservative stance. In the Hellenica, Polydamas fails because he 
argues for the necessity of such a big force. Homer gives Polydamas the epithet ‘wise’ (πεπνυμζνοσ) 
at Il.18.249, when ignoring his advice leads to the death of Patroclus and the subsequent events. 
Again, in the Hellenica, the reverse is the case and failing to follow Polydamas’ recommendation to 
attack Jason is the right course. Perhaps Xenophon’s readers would expect the Pharsalian Polydamas 
to be a wise advisor who should be listened to, but, if so, Xenophon overturns their expectations. 
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himself articulate: god can make the small great and the great small (6.4.23). Thus, 
Tuplin argues that Polydamas‟ speech demonstrates Jason‟s greatness before his fall. 
The main difficulty in this interpretation is that it does not adequately explain 
Polydamas‟ role in presenting Jason‟s „greatness‟ and his reason for doing so. 
The narrator does not allow the reader to know whether Polydamas was 
genuinely concerned for the Spartans or not. The reader may believe that Polydamas 
makes a poor recommendation because he honestly repeats and believes what Jason 
has said. In this case, Polydamas would be the author of his own downfall for 
transmitting Jason‟s scare-tactics. Because Polydamas‟ own interests are so clearly at 
stake, and because he must have feared for his people, the reader is more likely to be 
suspicious that Polydamas has reworked Jason‟s speech for a new audience. 
Presumably, he deliberately exaggerates Jason‟s threat.68 As we saw, certain 
arguments seem designed to speak directly to the Spartans, and so presumably come 
from Polydamas himself. This interpretation is pace Gray (1989a, 185-6), who 
argues that the similarities to passages representing ideal commanders in 
Xenophon‟s other works suggest that the speech “is almost entirely from Xenophon 
                                                             
68 There may be an allusion here to Nicias’ speech at Thucydides 6.20-3. Nicias tries to prevent the 
Athenians from launching an expedition against Sicily by exaggerating the resources that they would 
need to commit. He achieves the opposite outcome, however, and his speech only makes the 
Athenians more determined, confident and desirous to attack. It may be that Xenophon is playing 
with the reader’s expectations here. The reader, being familiar with Nicias’ speech, will perhaps 
expect Polydamas to be successful and for the Spartans to overcommit troops, to their own 
detriment. Instead, Polydamas achieves the outcome that Nicias hoped for in putting off the 
Spartans. Nicias’ argument that against such opponents the Athenians cannot just send a light naval 
force but need also to send a large infantry force is similar to Polydamas’ recommendation not to 
send emancipated Helots and a private commander. Also, both argue that the enemy is powerful 
and has a large number of land forces. Nicias further argues that the enemy have abundant ships, 
men and money and are better able to get corn than the Athenians. As we saw above, ‘Jason’ used 
similar arguments when he discussed his advantages over the Athenians. There are differences in 
the emotional appeals made by the two speakers. For example, Polydamas tries to persuade the 
Spartans to act by playing on their fears while Nicias tries to use fear to deter his audience from 
acting. However, the Athenians are motivated by greed and desire, as well as overconfidence, and in 
trying to make them reassess the situation by making them fear, Nicias is fighting against the 
Athenians’ typical characteristics. Tamiolaki (2014, 132 and 135) also sees intertextuality with 
Thucydides in Polydamas’ speech. She argues that both the arguments used by ‘Jason’, and the 
Spartans’ reply rework Thucydides’ motif of voluntary submission from the Melian dialogue (5.85-
113), while Polydamas’ character introduction recalls the structure of Pericles’ characterisation at 
Thucydides 2.65. She argues that Xenophon is deliberately recalling Thucydidean ideas in these 
allusions, at the same time as demonstrating his innovativeness. The main difficulty with this 
interpretation is ascertaining Xenophon the author’s aims in making such allusions. For example, if 
Xenophon consciously recalled the character of Pericles, does he want to imply to the reader that 
Polydamas is like Pericles in character, or does he create this expectation only to undercut it in the 
subsequent speech? Tamiolaki does not elaborate. 
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and not Polydamas”. Assuming that Xenophon is using Polydamas as a mouthpiece 
ignores the interesting form in which the narrator presents this speech and the 
questions it raises about the methods of persuasion that the narrator represents 
Polydamas as adopting.   
Perhaps Polydamas did not know how many forces the Spartans had already 
committed elsewhere. If so, he would be guilty of having not researched the situation 
and of thus misjudging his argument. Indeed, Polydamas has possibly misunderstood 
the circumstances further. A later remark in a speech by Jason demonstrates that the 
Spartans forged diplomatic links at an unspecified time with Jason. Jason tells the 
Spartans that he desires to save them because of his father‟s friendship with them 
and because he is their proxenos (6.4.24). Given that he is speaking to the Spartans, 
he is presumably representing his relationship with them accurately. If Jason had 
been made their proxenos before Polydamas spoke to them, Polydamas completely 
misjudged Jason and the Spartans‟ relationship; indeed, the Spartans may have felt 
that they already had Jason under control. In this case, the Spartans may have 
suspected Polydamas of exaggerating Jason‟s threat to them in order to save his own 
people and of being insincere in his claim that Jason posed a direct threat to the 
Spartans as well. Given the Spartans‟ willingness to investigate whether they could 
spare troops, it seems more likely that the Spartans heeded some of Polydamas‟ 
warning and tried to tame Jason afterwards in the only way available since 
Polydamas had persuaded them that their available force was not big enough. This 
friendship suggests further exaggeration in Polydamas‟ speech, although it is unclear 
whether it is from Jason or Polydamas. If Jason truly believed that he could take on 
any citizen army, bring the Athenians and the Persian king under his control, and had 
Sparta‟s enemies on side, it seems unlikely that Jason would be content to settle for a 
diplomatic alliance with Sparta, even if he thought he could use it to his advantage 
eventually (6.4.25). 
In any case, if Polydamas had persuaded the Spartans to withdraw troops 
from elsewhere when they did not need to, they might have suffered losses and 
defeats against one of their other enemies, most probably Thebes. Polydamas is 
therefore not as positive as he may initially seem, and is not a foil to the heartless 
Spartans. This interpretation differs from Gray‟s (1989a, 121-3). She argues that the 
function of this speech is to contrast the morality of Polydamas, the man from a 
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small town, with the morality of those from a big city. She argues that the speech 
demonstrates Polydamas‟ good character, as described by the narrator before the 
speech, particularly his loyalty in the face of danger, and his honesty. However, this 
does not take into account that we cannot simply accept Polydamas‟ representation 
of himself, and that the threat of Jason does not materialise. Admittedly, Polydamas‟ 
character introduction seems glowing. Indeed, Pownall (2004, 100) believes that the 
narrator represents the character of Polydamas as credible through his introduction, 
and Dillery (1995, 164 and 171-6) argues that Polydamas‟ character introduction is 
included to notify the readers that Polydamas will speak truthfully. However, basing 
judgement of Polydamas primarily on the introduction does not take into account the 
information about his character and his particular motivations that arise from his 
speech and the subsequent narrative. In fact, Polydamas‟ introduction serves only to 
demonstrate that Polydamas primarily looks after the interests of the Pharsalians, 
despite the way he characterises himself to the Spartans. Interestingly, the 
introduction does not reveal what the Spartans thought of Polydamas, but only what 
the Thessalians thought. Perhaps the Spartans were not so convinced of Polydamas‟ 
character. In the end, Polydamas emerges from the Hellenica as being devoted to his 
people, but also as being misguided in his approach to his persuasion attempt and as 
being untrustworthy and a poor friend to the Spartans. 
The speech does occur in a digression which the narrator specifically says is 
about Jason (6.1.19), and the narrator does clearly admire Jason (see 6.4.28). It is 
likely, therefore, that the speech is partly about Jason‟s character and achievements, 
as well as Polydamas and the Spartans. Pownall (2004, 99-105) argues that 
Polydamas‟ speech centres on Jason and that the speech reveals how dangerous 
Jason is, as well as demonstrating his positive characteristics, such as his decency in 
allowing Polydamas to go to the Spartans. The function of this, she suggests, is to 
create a contrast with Jason‟s later corruption and loss of virtue, in which he 
provides a parallel to Sparta. Both fell because of the arrogance engendered by their 
good fortune.
69
 Tuplin (1993, 117-18) also discusses Jason‟s good persuasive 
abilities, in particular his use of reason, as well as the positive character and 
leadership skills that are revealed in Polydamas‟ speech. However, these positive 
interpretations of Jason do not take into account Polydamas‟ role in presenting 
                                                             
69 Dillery (1995, 164 and 171-6) similarly makes the link between Jason’s and Sparta’s decline. 
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Jason‟s threat, character and skills, which leave open to question how much of the 
picture he presents is accurate. 
Tuplin (1993, 120) argues that the death of Polydamas demonstrates how 
different Jason‟s brothers are to Jason, rather than relating it to Polydamas‟ speech, 
while Pownall (2004, 100) argues that the killing of such an honourable man as 
Polydamas shows the wickedness of Jason‟s family. However, I would argue that 
Polydamas‟ death is a result of his inability to persuade the Spartans to crush Jason. 
The death of some of his people also indicates that he failed to save those who relied 
on him. This speech and the related narrative provide a lesson about the 
repercussions of being a poor speaker rather than representing a morally corrupt 
audience and a virtuous speaker. Polydamas‟ comeuppance demonstrates to the 
reader the vital importance of leaders being able to persuade others by offering 
genuinely good advice. The reader also sees the importance of not exaggerating, of 
being thought trustworthy, of fully understanding the situation, and of being able to 
anticipate an audience correctly. The reader may also recognise the importance of 
rational assessment, which here saves the Spartans from overcommitting themselves. 
A related lesson may be that, as an audience, it is important to anticipate what really 
motivates a speaker and whether he exaggerates his claims. Subsequent history could 
have been different if Polydamas had persuaded the Spartans; perhaps Xenophon the 
author wants the reader to recognise how important persuasive speech is to the 
course of history.  
Procles’ speech to the Athenian Assembly (6.5.38-48) 
The importance of examining fully the narrative before and after a speech, of 
recognising the difference between a speaker‟s real and claimed motivations, and of 
appreciating what happens to a character as a result of his speech can be seen even 
more clearly in Procles‟ two speeches in the work, and so I shall analyse them both. 
Regarding Procles‟ first speech, scholars generally argue that Procles is an 
honourable character who provides a contrast to the character of his Athenian 
audience, but it is actually possible to reach the opposite conclusion about Procles‟ 
character by examining the speech and narrative in tandem.  
The Athenians, having heard about the Spartans‟ troubles in their fight 
against the Thebans, have called an Assembly. The narrator indicates that the 
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Athenians are unsure as to whether they should aid Sparta (6.5.33). The narrator 
summarises five speeches given by the Spartan ambassadors in support of aiding the 
Spartans, and then comments on which arguments most affected the Athenians 
(6.5.33-6). The Spartan ambassadors mention past occasions when the Spartans and 
Athenians stood by one another through crises, the successes they had when working 
together, and that they now have the opportunity to conquer and tithe the Thebans 
(6.5.33-5). The narrator says that the Athenians were not very willing to accept this 
and a murmur passed around that the Spartans were saying this now, but that when 
the Spartans were thriving, they pressed upon (ἐπέθεηλην) the Athenians (6.5.35). 
This indicates what arguments do not persuade the audience. Clearly, they remember 
events which the Spartans carefully avoided mentioning and/or remember differently 
the events the Spartans did mention. The narrator tells the reader that the Spartan 
argument which the Athenians found most weighty was that the Spartans acted well 
in preventing the destruction of Athens previously, when the Thebans had 
recommended it.
70
 The narrator says that emphasis was also placed on the 
Athenians‟ oath, which bound them to help the Spartans, although the audience is 
divided about this (6.5.36). While the Athenians are trying to decide, Cleiteles the 
Corinthian gives a speech that evokes pity at his own state‟s unwarranted destruction 
by the Thebans and develops the argument that the Athenians‟ oaths oblige them to 
help. The Athenians shout approval that Cleiteles had spoken rightly and justly 
(6.5.37). This further indicates to Procles the Phliasian, and the reader, what 
arguments may persuade the Athenians. Following this, the narrator gives Procles‟ 
speech recommending helping the Spartans.  
Earlier in the narrative, in an entirely different context, the narrator reveals 
that Procles and his partisans (νἱ ἀκθὶ Πξνθιέα ηὸλ Ἱππνλίθνπ) are friends of 
Agesilaus (5.3.13). The background to this reference concerns the Phliasians 
refusing rights to their former exiles. In their search for impartial judges, these exiles 
go to Sparta. When the Phliasians fine those who went to Sparta, the former exiles 
encourage the Spartans to take action against Phlius. The ephors call out the ban 
against Phlius and the narrator says that Agesilaus was pleased because Podanemus‟ 
followers had been friends of his father and because of his own links with Procles‟ 
followers. It is not clear exactly how Procles is involved, but it seems that Procles is 
                                                             
70 See Steinbock (2013, 280-341) for the effect this episode had on the Athenians generally. 
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in favour of the attack on Phlius and is thus a traitor to his own city. He and his 
followers are not specifically mentioned as former exiles, whereas Podanemus‟ 
followers are, which may make Procles‟ motives even less creditable. The narrator 
praises the Phliasians‟ self-restraint (ἐγθξάηεηα) and courage (ηόικα) when they are 
besieged by the Spartans, but in the end, they run out of food and surrender. The 
Spartans leave a temporary garrison and order a group of former exiles and a group 
of defending citizens to decide who should be punished and what constitution to 
establish (5.3.14-25). The narrator‟s phrasing in 5.3.13 suggests that the reader 
already knows who Procles is. Thus, Xenophon probably assumed that the reader 
would recall Procles‟ character and actions when reading his later speeches. The 
narrator does not state what Procles‟ aim or motives are when he speaks at 6.5.38-48 
but simply that he stood up and spoke after Cleiteles. 
Procles uses two main strands of argument. Firstly, he represents the benefits 
the Athenians will gain if they follow his advice. He redefines the issue under 
discussion from being about giving the Spartans aid to being about the Athenians 
giving themselves aid (6.5.39). He represents it as being an opportunity sent by god 
to secure a friendship with the Spartans that the Spartans will be unable to renege on 
due to the numerous witnesses (6.5.41). It may seem unlikely that Procles will 
successfully convince the Athenians that the Spartans will be trustworthy and never 
try to go back on their friendship because of the suspicions the narrator indicated the 
Athenians as harbouring against the Spartans. Indeed, Procles seems to recognise 
this pre-existing view of the Spartan character, because he claims that the Athenians 
will benefit whether they trust the Spartans or not. The Spartans will either be 
honourable or will lose followers, both to the advantage of the Athenians (6.5.42).
71
  
Procles and the reader also know from the narratorial comments after the 
Spartans‟ speeches that the Athenians did not respond positively to arguments about 
the times Sparta and Athens had worked together and the benefits that resulted. 
Perhaps with this in mind, Procles tries a slightly different tactic from the Spartan 
speakers. He describes how previous incidents illustrated the Spartans‟ good 
character and how useful the Spartans may be for the future. Procles argues that the 
                                                             
71 Compare the later advice in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum about how to combat prejudices arising 
from the subject of a speech (29.23-4, 1437b.17-28). Anaximenes recommends that the speaker 
should employ anticipation and claim that his advice stems from necessity, luck, circumstance or, as 
we see in Procles’ speech, advantage.  
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Spartans are more likely to be honourable than go back on their friendship because 
they strive for praise, abstain from shameful deeds and were brave at Thermopylae. 
They would also be desirable to have around if any further trouble with barbarians 
occurs (6.5.42-3). The Athenians previously responded positively to mention of the 
Thebans failing to persuade the Spartans to reduce the Athenians to slavery and, 
perhaps to cement his argument about the character of the Spartans, Procles 
mentions this again (6.5.46). However, he uses the argument slightly differently, and 
points out that the Thebans are arguing that the Athenians should let the Spartans, 
their saviours, be destroyed. The Athenians should not be worse than the Spartans 
who were not persuaded by the Thebans. Thus, it may be detrimental to the 
Athenians‟ reputation not to help the Spartans. Another benefit that Procles touches 
on is that the Spartans‟ allies will recompense the Athenians for their aid in the 
future (6.5.44). 
The second strand of Procles‟ argument is to appeal to certain ways in which 
he judges that the Athenians liked to think of themselves and wanted others to think 
of them. For example, he refers to their reputation for helping people who are 
wronged (ηνὺο ἀδηθνπκέλνπο) and afraid (ηνὺο θνβνπκέλνπο). This reputation is at 
risk, he implies, since the Spartans and their friends are here asking for aid and may 
not get it (6.5.45). He has already described how the world, including the gods, will 
witness the Athenians aiding the Spartans (6.5.41). The Athenians have the chance to 
increase their reputation, he says, particularly for nobleness and generosity because 
they could live up to the deeds of their ancestors and even exceed them (6.5.46-7). 
Procles uses particular representations of the Athenians that recur in their extant 
funeral orations, as well as in numerous forensic speeches, to try to persuade them 
that helping the Spartans would reflect well on them. Living up to ancestors, for 
example, is commonly appealed to (e.g. Plato, Menexenus 247a-b).
72
 Most notably, 
Procles mentions the Athenians aiding the Heraclidae and arranging for the burial of 
                                                             
72 See Loraux (2006, 34-8, 281 and 308) for the topoi of funeral speeches. She also discusses how 
these topoi later come to be used as rhetorical tools in others genres of speech, as we see in Procles’ 
speech, and lose some of their original meaning. Other themes which occur both in Procles’ speech 
and funeral orations include the Athenians acting on behalf of the rest of Greece (6.5.48; c.f. Lysias 
2.20-44 and 58-60); being people who do right (6.5.43; c.f. Demosthenes Epitaphius 7), being noble 
and high-born (6.5.46-8; Plato, Menexenus 245c); being moved by pity for others (6.5.45; Plato, 
Menexenus 244e), being pious people (6.5.41; the tradition of the funerary oration itself embodies 
this perception of themselves), outdoing others (6.5.46-8 c.f. Thucydides, 2.40) and having a strong 
force (6.5.40; c.f. Lysias 2.42-4). 
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those who died at the Cadmea. As Loraux (2006, 106) highlights, all the extant 
funeral speeches cover these two events in some sense. The mention of the 
Heraclidae is, of course, particularly apt to this speech because the story involves the 
Athenians helping the Spartans‟ ancestors.73 Procles‟ speech is an example of a non-
Athenian cleverly using the typically Athenian topoi that he had either himself heard 
Athenians use or heard reports of, and which were more often used to contrast 
Athens and Sparta, than bring them together.
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Procles appeals to a range of emotions. In conjunction with demonstrating 
the benefits that aiding the Spartans would have, in the first part of the speech, he 
raises fear in the Athenians of what might happen if they do not give aid, and mixes 
this with hope. The other speakers did not try this particular tactic. He says, for 
example, that it is clear to all that the Thebans would march against Athens as soon 
as they have beaten the Spartans, in their attempt to rule all the Greeks (6.5.38). 
Procles is here presenting the Thebans as an imminent threat who have the desire and 
ability to harm the Athenians. As well as directly confronting the Athenians with 
their fears about losing power to Theban domination, he gives them the hope that 
helping the Spartans will mean that the Thebans will have someone else to focus on 
before the Athenians. This presents the fearsome prospect as more distant, gives the 
impression of potential safety, and suggests that the Athenians can gain themselves 
                                                             
73 A speech in Herodotus demonstrates that he believes that the Athenians use this particular deed 
to praise themselves outside of solely funerary contexts (9.26-7). Interestingly, the Tegeans, who 
also speak in this passage, argue that their finest exploit is that they stopped the Heraclidae when 
they attempted to return to the Peloponnese. 
74 For similar tactics of persuasion to Procles’, see Rubinstein (2013) who discusses the recurring 
combination of the deliberative and epideictic genres in envoy speeches, including the regular 
mention of past favours rendered and received, and emulation of ancestors’ generosity. We also 
perhaps see something similar to Procles’ appropriation of Athenian topoi at Anabasis 1.7.3. Here, 
Cyrus is encouraging the Greek leaders for the forthcoming battle. He tells them to be worthy of 
their freedom, which he congratulates them on, and which he says he would choose himself if he 
could. Cyrus is appealing to something that he knows the Greeks are proud of, even if he does not 
specifically know that Athenians typically refer to their freedom in their funerary speeches (e.g. 
Plato, Menexenus 240e). This is all the more apparent as a motivational tactic because it seems out 
of place in the mouth of a Persian. Like Procles, Cyrus presents himself as an admirer of his 
audience.  
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allies. Procles either takes concrete fears that he knows the Athenians have or creates 
new ones that they may not hitherto have considered.
75
  
Procles may also be appealing to feelings of gratitude towards the Spartans 
for their behaviour at the battle of Thermopylae and for sparing the Athenians in 
405/4. This latter favour was done at a time of great need, increasing its value. 
Procles may also hope that the Athenians feel gratitude and friendly feelings towards 
him for considering what would benefit them. In regards to his argument that the 
Athenians risk losing their existing reputation if they do not help the Spartans, he 
evokes shame at the potential dishonour or disgrace this could bring them. In saying 
that they could increase their reputation if they do help the Spartans, he attempts to 
inspire pride in their reputation, a desire to be viewed positively and feelings of 
emulation towards their ancestors.  
It is unclear whether the internal audience is aware of Procles‟ link to 
Agesilaus and the Spartans, other than that he comes from an allied state, or that he 
is a traitor to his own city. The narrator does not represent Procles as feeling the need 
to combat any suspicions about his character or previous behaviour at the opening of 
his speech though. Procles is clearly a real person, but one of the Heraclidae is also 
called Procles and is the grandfather of the founder of the Eurypontid dynasty. Thus, 
Procles‟ name itself may seem to link his cause with the Spartans‟, if the Athenians 
make the connection, and may make him seem more concerned with the Spartans‟ 
benefit than the Athenians‟. However, it may also remind the Athenians that their 
ancestors aided a Procles previously.  
Procles never directly characterises himself but does so indirectly in several 
ways. Primarily, he demonstrates his astuteness in understanding what the Athenians 
stand to lose or gain by aiding the Spartans. This shows goodwill towards the 
Athenians, as does his concern with their reputation, and empathy with their fears. 
                                                             
75 Further mixed fears and hopes: having the Thebans as rulers of Greece would be worse for the 
Athenians than having enemies far away, suggesting that the Athenians have the option to maintain 
their enemies at a distance (6.5.39). If the Athenians do not act now, there may not be others to 
fight with them later and they might have to face the Thebans alone, suggesting that now there are 
people who will act with them (6.5.39). Some may fear that if the Spartans survive now, they will 
cause the Athenians trouble in the future, but it is only people whom one injures who should be 
feared, giving the Athenians hope that their actions now could prevent further conflict with the 
Spartans (6.5.40). It is useful to build up favours while strong (raising hope) for times when one is 
powerless (evoking fears, 6.5.40).  
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By voicing his belief that the Spartans would not act badly in the future because 
everyone would have witnessed the Athenians‟ aid and because the Spartans 
formerly behaved well, Procles is characterising himself as someone who 
understands the restraints of shame and appreciates good behaviour in others. In 
presenting Sparta‟s allies as noble and fearless (6.5.44 and 6.5.48), Procles is 
including himself in this characterisation. He also presents the allies, and thus 
himself, as needing help, and as being grateful to Athens. He represents himself as 
someone who has previously admired the good behaviour of the Athenians, and as 
someone who is now present to see, rather than just hear, whether the Athenians live 
up to their reputation or not. Thus, his expectations are clear and he is in a position to 
judge the Athenians. By describing some of his audience‟s praiseworthy 
characteristics, Procles presents himself as sharing some of the Athenians‟ most 
important values, as he perceives them, and as being admirable himself. A 
contemporary reader may recognise in this a stark contrast to the man who earlier 
committed treason and believe that Procles is deliberately presenting a false ethos. 
The narrator reveals that Procles is successful in his attempt to persuade. The 
Athenians deliberate, he says, and then refuse to listen to those who spoke in 
opposition (θαὶ ηῶλ κὲλ ἀληηιεγόλησλ νὐθ ἠλείρνλην ἀθνύνληεο, 6.5.49). They vote 
to aid the Spartans with full force and choose Iphicrates as general. The campaign 
that follows is a failure and the Athenians achieve nothing and do not aid Sparta 
(6.5.49-51). By the time the Athenians arrive in Arcadia, the enemies have either 
already left Sparta or were just about to depart. The Athenians return to Corinth 
shortly after the Thebans retire. To conclude the account, the narrator dwells on the 
poor leadership that Iphicrates demonstrated on the campaign, branding his actions 
either in vain (κάηελ) or inexpedient (ἀζπκθόξσο), particularly in allowing the 
Thebans to return home as they pleased (6.5.51-2). Procles has not benefitted 
himself, the Athenians or the Spartans with his speech.  
Interpretation 
While elements of the speeches before Procles‟ were persuasive, the narrator 
presents Procles‟ speech as the one that finally persuades the Athenians to aid the 
Spartans. Thus, Procles‟ assumptions that the Athenians are pragmatic, that they can 
be made to overlook their distrust and fear when a situation can be shown to be to 
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their advantage, that they seize opportunities and that they are proud of their 
reputation and the identity which they have crafted for themselves are shown to be 
correct.
76
 Procles is clever in representing himself as being concerned with what is 
best for everyone, when his chief concern is really to get aid for his allies. While 
attention to Procles‟ particular choice of arguments, ethos and appeals to emotions is 
important, without taking into account his real character, this only provides half the 
story.
77
  
When scholars do discuss Procles‟ character, it is usually to describe him as 
the virtuous representative of virtuous Phlius. Baragwanath (2012, 322 and 333), for 
example, argues that Procles is a wise speaker and that his small-town origins 
demonstrate Xenophon‟s interest in revealing value where a person may initially 
seem insignificant. Pownall (2004, 74-5) argues that Xenophon must be interested in 
Procles because he gives him two long speeches and must agree with his words 
because he is connected to Agesilaus and is a Phliasian. Gray (1989a, 114-18) 
contrasts the Athenians‟ doubt and ultimate inability to help Sparta with Procles‟ 
magnanimity, which, she argues, either equals or surpasses the famed magnanimity 
of the Athenians. She further claims that the praise the narrator gives to the 
Phliasians for their loyalty to the Spartans (7.2.1-7.3.1) also applies to Procles. Gray 
maintains that Procles‟ speech is an example of the narrator‟s comment that the 
achievements of small Phlius were more worthy of record than one achievement of a 
                                                             
76 See Sanders (forthcoming) who argues that hope and desire are two typical emotions used by 
speakers in Thucydides to incite the Athenians to war. Thus, Procles’ choice to appeal to these 
emotions, among others, may be particularly apt.  
77 Several scholars examine why Procles is effective without assessing his real character. For 
example, Marincola (2010, 273-9) concludes that Procles’ use of the example of Thermopylae, 
combined with an appeal to advantage, led to his success. Procles’ references to deeds that the 
Athenians themselves show pride in also convinces the Athenians, Marincola argues, and pointedly 
contrasts the Spartans’ appeals to Spartan deeds. Rood (2012c, 90-1) similarly argues that Procles’ 
use of the Athenians’ own traditional rhetoric lay behind his success. Tamiolaki (2014, 134) links 
particular phrases at 6.5.40-1 and 6.5.45 to Pericles’ speeches at Thucydides 1.144.3, 2.37.1, 2.41.4 
and 2.64.6. This presumably again highlights the importance of Procles’ use of the Athenians’ own 
perception of themselves, although she does not argue for this. Dillery (1995, 247-9) argues that 
Procles’ success arises from his ability to relieve Athenian fears that the Spartans would soon 
become their enemies again. Although Steinbock is not attempting to explain the success of the 
whole speech, he (2013, 54-5, 155-210, 304, and 329-30) examines why Procles’ mention of the 
Thebans failing to persuade the Spartans to enslave the Athenians, and the Athenians’ actions 
regarding the Heraclidae and the dead at the Cadmea are fitting to the occasion. The first of these, 
he argues, aptly demonstrates the requirement to reciprocate, and Procles carefully does not 
mention the other states who were involved in wanting to destroy Athens. Regarding the latter two 
episodes, Steinbock argues that they both highlight Athens as the just and altruistic protectors of the 
Greeks, particularly those who come as suppliants, against arrogant barbarian and Greek powers. 
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bigger city, thereby revealing Procles‟ virtue. However, these positive interpretations 
do not take into account that the narrator has earlier connected Procles with the 
betrayal of his own city, and that before Procles‟ speeches, the reader has only read 
praise for the Phliasians in terms of their resistance to the Spartans. The praise for 
the Phliasians‟ loyalty comes later in the Hellenica. The narrator has clearly 
positioned himself on the opposite side to Procles, and even thrown into question 
Agesilaus‟ role in using the exiles for an attack on the city.78 The reader‟s knowledge 
of Procles‟ previous actions creates tension and suspicion for him about Procles‟ 
motives and the soundness of his advice. This suspicion is confirmed in the narrative 
that follows the speech. While the narrator does not seem to indicate that the 
decision to aid Sparta was itself a bad one, the subsequent failed mission 
demonstrates that the Athenians made a poor decision in how they carried it out.
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Some scholars interpret the speech and mission as reflecting badly on the 
Athenian character, but they do not mention that Procles must take some blame for 
the outcome of their mission. Gray (1989a, 115-16) argues that the narrator rewrites 
the Athenians as failing to live up to their own ideal. Pownall (2004, 74) maintains 
that the subsequent narrative serves to “undermine Athenian patriotic claims”. 
Baragwanath (2012, 329) argues that the idealism of Procles‟ speech stands out all 
the more because of the subsequent ineffective mission. However, because Procles 
spoke at such length about how helping the Spartans could reflect well on the 
Athenians‟ reputation, they set out immediately and seem to be more concerned with 
how the mission will benefit themselves rather than how they can best help Sparta. 
The narrator says that the Athenians thought that Iphicrates could lead them to do a 
noble deed (θαιόλ…ἔξγνλ) and that they were eager, and critical of delay (6.5.49). 
Iphicrates is certainly an adequate leader for the job, despite his failure here, and the 
narrator has previously praised him (6.2.32 and 6.2.39). Consequently, the problem 
seems to lie in the enthusiasm that Procles created, and which ultimately resulted in 
poor planning. As scholars note, the Athenians do not emerge from this episode with 
much credit, but this, I argue, is chiefly because they have allowed themselves to be 
                                                             
78 Once more, we see that Xenophon is not a Laconophile. This is pace Buckler’s (2008, 141 and 153-
5) conclusion that Xenophon invented Procles’ speech so as not to embarrass the Spartans by 
describing them petitioning the Athenians for help.  
79
 Dillery (1995, 247-9) maintains that Xenophon is using the speech to advocate a new type of 
Greek leadership based on nobility and goodwill, as Procles argues for, rather than greed and 
oppression, but this does not take into account the description of the mission that followed.  
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taken in by someone whom they should not trust. This teaches the reader to be wary 
when listening to speeches himself. The reader learns the importance of recognising 
the real motives of a speaker and the danger of bad advice.  
Procles to the Council of Athenians, Spartans and Spartan Allies (7.1.2-11) 
In the episode that follows straight on from the criticism of Iphicrates, Procles speaks 
again. The reader must base his interpretation of this second speech, as well as the 
response to it and the outcome, on what he has understood from Procles‟ previous 
speech, the previous audience response, and the narrative episode that followed. The 
narrator indicates that ambassadors from Sparta and her allies have come to Athens 
to discuss the terms of the Athenian-Spartan alliance. The narrator says that many 
xenoi and Athenians argued that the alliance must be based on equality and sameness 
(ἴζνηο θαὶ ὁκνίνηο), although he does not provide these speeches (7.1.1). This 
indicates to those who go on to speak, as well as the reader, what terms the internal 
audience are likely to find persuasive. The narrator does not reveal Procles‟ motive 
or any further information about him before he speaks.  
Procles makes it clear that the Council only have the issue of how to divide 
the leadership left to discuss. He says that he agrees with the proposal by the 
Athenian council to give leadership of the sea to the Athenians and leadership of the 
land to the Spartans. He directs his speech solely to the Athenians. This might be for 
several reasons, although neither he nor the narrator specifies. It may be because the 
Athenians are hosting the meeting, because he is echoing their proposal, because 
they are hesitating over the decision, or because he is an ally of the Spartans and so 
is presumably already saying what they want him to say. Despite the narrator having 
indicated what the audience wants from the terms, Procles does not discuss what 
would be an equal arrangement, but considers what will make the friendship last the 
longest (7.1.2). He bases his argument on what is most advantageous, what has been 
ordained by a higher power than man, and on an enumeration of the practical reasons 
why each side should lead one particular force.  
 Procles argues near the start of his speech that what will make the alliance 
likely to endure is to base it on terms that will most benefit (κάιηζηα ζπλνίζεη) both 
sides (7.1.2). He reiterates this in his conclusion, when he claims that he believes that 
the course he has recommended is the most profitable (ζπκθνξώηαηα) for both 
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Athens and Sparta (7.1.11). Procles also argues that the division of leadership 
proposed by the council is arranged by god and determined by fate (7.1.2), that the 
gods are behind both states‟ respective successes, including the Spartan victory over 
the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war (7.1.5-6 and 7.1.9), and that the Athenians‟ 
reliance on the sea for their safety is determined by nature (7.1.7).
80
 This thread of 
argument encourages Procles‟ audience to believe that the decision over the 
leadership has effectively been made for them by higher forces, and that the division 
he is recommending would be supported by the gods.   
Furthering his claim that his recommendation will be best for all, Procles 
outlines in turn why the Athenians are best qualified to lead at sea and why the 
Spartans are best qualified to lead on land. He uses roughly the same criteria and 
order of discussion in both sections (7.1.3-11). Firstly, both states have the best 
physical location for their respective leaderships. They are also both the best 
prepared for warfare in their respective spheres because they have the most relevant 
resources, skills and experience, and because their lives centre on trading by sea or 
on training for land-based warfare respectively. He further argues that the allies 
would be most likely to join and have confidence in the state that is supreme in each 
sphere. As mentioned above, he claims that the gods have granted the Athenians and 
Spartans great success by sea and land respectively. He also argues that in the 
Peloponnesian war, the Spartans did not finally defeat the Athenians until they had 
won at sea, and the Athenians did not crush the Spartans until they had won on the 
land, when the Spartan children, women and state were in danger. This phrasing 
(πεξὶ παίδσλ θαὶ γπλαηθῶλ θαὶ ὅιεο η῅ο πόιεσο) recalls Procles‟ words in his 
section enumerating the Athenian advantages. He says that the Athenians should not 
be happy to let the Spartans lead at sea, because the Spartans are less experienced 
and because the Spartans only risk those men whom they put on the triremes, 
whereas the Athenians endanger children, wives and the state itself. There is further 
correspondence with this argument when Procles says that for the Spartans it would 
be a terrible thing to allow others to lead by land, especially because the Spartans 
themselves are the best at the management of matters on land. Procles‟ parallel 
                                                             
80 He also refers to the attention the Athenians pay to the sea as being necessary and proper 
(ἀναγκαία καὶ προςικουςα, 7.1.6), and the Spartans’ attention to the land as being necessary 
(ἀναγκαία, 7.1.10), furthering his argument that Athenian rule by sea and Spartan rule by land is 
natural and ordained.   
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discussions suggest that logically, it would be most advantageous if each side played 
to its own strengths in the leadership.   
 Some of the arguments Procles uses here are similar to those he used in his 
first speech. In both, he presents his recommendations as being beneficial for the 
Athenians and suggests that the gods are overseeing events and aiding the Athenians. 
He also mentions in both whom the allies will support in the future and why. Further, 
he recalls recent history between Athens and Sparta in each speech, although in the 
second he recalls a time when they were enemies. In both speeches, Procles slightly 
adjusts the topic under discussion.  
Procles does not directly characterise himself in this second speech but his 
argument does this indirectly. He appears as someone who is motivated simply to 
give advice on how to make the alliance endure, and as someone merely developing 
the arguments for a proposal that the Athenians have already made themselves 
(7.1.2). In this, he presents his goodwill towards the arrangement, and in dwelling on 
trying to ensure terms that will be most beneficial to both sides, he shows his 
goodwill towards both Athens and Sparta. He even ends by wishing the Athenians 
good fortune in deciding on what is best for them all (7.1.11). This reiterates his 
friendliness and acknowledges the Athenians‟ power over the decision. 
In suggesting that higher powers have already arranged and endorsed 
Athenian rule by sea and Spartan rule by land, Procles presents himself as piously 
deferring to the wisdom and designs of these forces. His list of why each side is best 
placed to lead in their respective areas of dominance demonstrates his practical 
wisdom. He represents himself as knowing about both states‟ past successes and 
failures, their current situation, their strengths and weaknesses in resources, training 
and character, and the supreme importance of children, wives and state to them.  
Procles uses language indicating that he admires both sides. For example, he 
says that the Athenians greatly surpass (πνιὺ πξνέρεηε) others in their naval 
experience (7.1.4), and that the Spartans are the best (ἄξηζηα) at managing land 
affairs (7.1.11). By using the same criteria and a similar order to discuss why each 
state is best suited to lead the two forces, Procles is demonstrating that he has a fair 
approach and does not think that one state is superior to the other. His references to 
both sides‟ defeats in the Peloponnesian war may also make Procles appear realistic 
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in his praise of each side, because he shows himself aware that each side can be 
defeated in their own sphere of domination, albeit by each other. His arguments that 
the allies would be likely to want to follow the Athenians on sea and the Spartans on 
land (7.1.5 and 7.1.9) ring true because he is himself one of the allies. In 
characterising the allies in general as being supportive of both sides and as having 
confidence in them, he is characterising himself as such too. 
He highlights that he is not making radical arguments when he says, for 
example, that it is quite clear (εὔδεινλ) that the Athenians‟ safety rests on the sea 
(7.1.6). He also shows that he is making logical deductions, for example, by saying 
that his audience can judge his argument from what has happened (ἐθ ηῶλ ἔξγσλ 
ἔμεζηη γηγλώζθεηλ, 7.1.10). In this, he presents himself as arguing for what the 
audience already knows. Again, there are similarities with his first speech. In both, 
he appears to admire the two states and have goodwill towards them. He also 
demonstrates in both his astuteness in understanding what will benefit and harm the 
Athenians. 
Procles‟ claim that he agrees with the proposal of the Athenian Council may 
be designed to win goodwill towards himself. In making it clear that he is concerned 
about making the alliance last and about ensuring that both sides benefit, he may be 
trying to evoke the Athenians‟ gratitude. His comments about the gods ordaining the 
division of leadership and supporting both sides in the victories they have had 
previously could be designed to give the Athenians confidence in their decision, as 
could the arguments that the allies will likely follow the Athenians at sea and the 
Spartans by land. Similarly, the list of Spartan achievements and skills may evoke 
Athenian confidence in the Spartans, as well as respect for them. Procles‟ list of the 
reasons why the Athenians are best suited to lead by sea may evoke the Athenians‟ 
pride in their achievements and skills. The mention of Sparta and Athens defeating 
each other in the Peloponnesian war may evoke a momentary hatred, but this may be 
replaced with relief that the Spartans are now allies and instil further confidence in 
the power Sparta brings to the alliance. Finally, Procles evokes fear about what could 
happen to the Athenians‟ children, women and whole state if they let the Spartans 
rule by sea. There is again overlap with Procles‟ first speech because in both he 
arouses fear of what will happen if the Athenians do not do what he recommends and 
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confidence in doing what he does recommend, while evoking positive feelings 
towards himself.    
The narrator indicates that the Athenians and Spartans strongly approved 
(ἐπῄλεζαλ…ἰζρπξῶο) of Procles‟ speech (7.1.12). However, Cephisodotus 
immediately directs a speech to the Athenians (7.1.12-14). He opens by claiming that 
Procles is deceiving (ἐμαπαηώκελνη) them and that he will prove this. He argues that 
if the Athenians lead at sea, the Spartans will send captains and marines who are 
citizens, but will send Helot or mercenary sailors. By contrast, the Athenians who 
fight under the Spartans on land will all be citizens. He explains that this would 
mean that the Spartans are leading Athenian citizens while the Athenians lead only 
Spartan slaves and the others least valued by them. Cephisodotus then questions the 
Spartan Timocrates about a speech that he made during this debate but which the 
narrator did not provide for the reader. Cephisodotus asks whether Timocrates had 
said that he had come to make terms based on equality and sameness. After 
Timocrates agrees, Cephisodotus proposes that equality would actually be if each 
side leads the fleet and the army in turn, with both sides sharing any advantage that 
comes from leading in each domain. The narrator indicates that the Athenians 
changed their minds and voted that each party should alternate leadership every five 
days.  
The narrator goes on to describe the Spartans guarding a particular point at 
Oneum (7.1.15-17). Here, the Thebans attack the Spartans while they are 
unprepared, and cause casualties. The narrator says that the Spartan commander 
could have called for backup and held his position, but instead, while the Thebans 
were perplexed as to what to do next, the Spartan commander concluded a truce with 
them. The narrator says that most people thought that this was more to the Thebans‟ 
advantage than the Spartans‟. 
Interpretation 
Despite using similar arguments, presenting a similar ethos and trying to evoke 
similar emotions in both speeches, Procles‟ second speech ultimately fails. As we 
ascertained from Procles‟ first speech, he clearly understands what is likely to 
persuade his audience. Procles assumes rightly that the Athenians will listen to a 
speaker who appears trustworthy and seems to have everyone‟s interests at heart, and 
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that they are susceptible to fear but can be made to feel confident. He also anticipates 
that the Athenians are driven by thoughts of their own advantage, respect higher 
forces, and can be persuaded by logical arguments. Procles is clearly a very 
proficient speaker, because he evokes a strong reaction on both occasions.  
Some scholars explain Procles‟ eventual failure on his choice of arguments. 
Marincola (2010, 275-9), for instance, argues that the examples of past successes 
that Procles uses have no relevance to Athens and Sparta‟s future co-operation. 
Tuplin (1993, 113-14) also maintains that Procles‟ speech rests on out-dated ideas, 
such as Sparta still being dominant on land, when they have just been defeated in 
this field. The difficulty with these interpretations is that they do not take into 
consideration the characterisation of Procles as a bad advisor from his first speech. 
The Athenians have clearly forgotten that taking Procles‟ advice previously was not 
to their advantage, contrary to his claims, and was instead potentially dangerous for 
them, or they did not make this link in the first place. Even if the Athenians do not 
tie Procles‟ first speech to their subsequent disastrous campaign, the reader surely 
will. Thus, when reading the second speech, the reader may feel concern at what 
following Procles‟ recommendation may lead to this time. Indeed, after the final 
decision has been made about the division of command, the narrator plays out an 
example of Spartan leadership on land. The Spartan commander is a poor leader and 
the Spartans are clearly not as strong on land as Procles described in his speech. 
Thus, the risk to Athenian citizens is considerable, as Cephisodotus argues. Procles 
has obscured the fact that Athenian citizens will be in danger if the Spartans lead by 
land, and instead mentions the danger to their people only if the Spartans are allowed 
to lead at sea. Alternating the leadership at least mitigates some of this danger. Thus, 
the narrative sequel seems to demonstrate that the Athenians are right, on this 
occasion at least, to vote in favour of Cephisodotus‟ proposal. Because the Athenians 
rejected Procles‟ advice, the better solution has been reached and the Athenian forces 
are less at risk than they would have been if they had followed Procles‟ advice for a 
second time.  
Tuplin (1993, 114) argues that the Athenians‟ suspicions here demonstrate 
that Sparta and Athens would never be able to co-operate. This is pace scholars who 
argue that this episode demonstrates Xenophon‟s positive visions for the Athenian-
Spartan alliance. For example, Schepens (2001, 96) argues that Procles‟ speech 
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continues Xenophon‟s theme of the desirability of dual hegemony between Athens 
and Sparta. Daverio Rocchi (2014) argues that through Procles‟ speech in particular, 
Xenophon is putting forward his own ideas about hegemony, and that this vision has 
its parallels in contemporary rhetoric on the subject. The difficulty with these latter 
two arguments is that they do not take into account that the narrative supports 
Cephisodotus‟ advice against Procles‟. Xenophon does seem to be raising questions 
about how each side conducts itself in the arrangement of the Athenian-Spartan 
alliance, although I argue that the real focus of suspicion falls on Procles‟ motives.  
It is Cephisodotus, not Procles, who emerges as the wise advisor and as being 
concerned for Athens‟ interests. This is contrary to the interpretation by scholars 
who praise Procles and criticise Cephisodotus in this episode. Gray (1989a, 118-19) 
argues that this episode shows Procles‟ good character, the Athenians‟ self-interest, 
and Cephisodotus as making a “morally inferior proposal”. Pownall (2004, 75) 
argues that the Athenians are led by the “demagogic” Cephisodotus into making a 
poor decision that demonstrates their “incompetence”, “folly” and shows “the 
illusory nature of the standard Athenian patriotic claim”. The difficulty with these 
arguments is that they do not take into account the narrative that has gone between 
Procles‟ two speeches, which has revealed that his advice has previously caused the 
Athenians to act impulsively and unsuccessfully, and the narrative after 
Cephisodotus‟ speech. Unlike Procles, who has been revealed as a traitor to his 
country and a giver of bad advice before this speech, Cephisodotus has previously 
been entrusted with the roles of general (2.1.16) and ambassador (6.3.2).
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Cephisodotus is perhaps the character that the reader has been hoping will come 
forward to prevent the Athenians taking Procles‟ advice again. Indeed, because of 
him, Procles receives his comeuppance for giving bad advice when the Athenians 
ultimately reject his recommendation. Procles is presumably speaking with the 
Spartans‟ benefit in mind, and it may be meaningful that the narrator indicates that 
the Spartans responded positively to Procles‟ speech (7.1.12) but does not indicate a 
response by them to Cephisodotus‟ speech.  
                                                             
81 By the time the Hellenica was published, the Athenian readers would possibly still remember their 
anger at the arrangement Cephisodotus made with Charidemus, for which they recalled 
Cephisodotus and tried to have him put to death (Demosthenes 23.167-9). This occurred after the 
events told in the Hellenica but it is important for his characterisation in the work that the narrator 
does not refer to it. Not mentioning less savoury incidents in a leader’s career is also important in 
the Anabasis regarding Cyrus and Clearchus, as we shall see.  
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Thanks to Cephisodotus, the Athenians finally learn that they should not 
follow Procles‟ advice. Thus, a lesson arising from Procles‟ second speech is that an 
audience should remember past interactions with a speaker, and what these led to. 
The episode also demonstrates the need for actual wise-advisors. The importance of 
full deliberation is also demonstrated by Procles‟ speeches, and here, the Athenians‟ 
responses to Procles‟ speeches can be compared to the Spartans‟ response to 
Polydamas‟ speech. Whereas the Spartans stopped for further deliberation and 
decided not to aid Polydamas, the Athenians rushed into their decision after Procles‟ 
first speech, to their own detriment. They nearly do the same after his second speech, 
until further deliberation prevents this. Procles and Polydamas actually use some 
similar arguments and present a similar ethos, and both seem to be concerned with 
their own interests, but there is a difference in the presentation of their characters by 
the narrator. Whereas the narrator praises Polydamas in the narrative before his 
speech, he reveals negative information about Procles. This information helps the 
reader to understand their respective motivations.
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Conclusion 
I have demonstrated that the method I propose to use for analysing speeches in the 
Anabasis is both viable and can yield new interpretations for certain speeches in the 
Hellenica.
83
 These readings are only apparent with a narratological and rhetorical 
approach. We have begun to see the importance of Xenophon‟s interest in rhetorical 
theory and leadership, and the way the speeches involve the reader, reflect on the 
speakers and audiences, and contain important lessons for the reader. In the next 
chapter, I apply the same method to emotional appeals in the Anabasis and attempt 
to ascertain whether such factors are still important in these speeches in order to 
understand the roles and effects of the speeches in this work. 
 
 
 
                                                             
82
 For the difficulty of interpreting certain Xenophontic characters, see Moles (1994), who 
demonstrates that scholars cannot agree whether Callicratidas is presented positively or negatively. 
83 Analysis of a fourth example can be found in Appendix 2. 
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Emotional Appeals in the Anabasis 
Evoking and calming emotions is of such fundamental importance to speechmaking 
that it is defined as one of the three means of persuasion alongside character 
projections (ethos) and rational argumentation (logos). Thus, it may be fruitful to 
begin the investigation of Xenophon‟s employment of speeches in the Anabasis by 
examining verbal emotional appeals.  
Successful emotional persuasion causes an audience to act, not to act or to 
change its judgement without offering any tangible gain, such as profit, for doing so. 
Scholars such as Nussbaum (1996) and Konstan (2006, 20ff.) argue for the rational 
and cognitive aspect of emotional appeals, through which a speaker manipulates his 
audience‟s emotions by using reasoned argument to alter the way the audience 
perceives something, for example, the danger of a particular situation. It is clear from 
Aristotle that this way of understanding emotional persuasion was already being 
recognised in ancient rhetorical theory (see Rhetorica 2.1, 1378a.19-20). In order to 
manipulate emotions in this way, a speaker should understand what his audience 
believes in and values most. In addition, Aristotle argues that orators who want to 
evoke an emotion must know the state of mind of someone who feels that emotion, 
the people or objects towards which the emotion is usually felt, and the 
circumstances that give rise to the emotion (Rhetorica 2.1, 1378a.22-26).  
Xenophon’s Narratorial and Authorial Interest in Emotions and Leadership 
Elsewhere (see Appendix 3), I have demonstrated that there is remarkable overlap 
between the emotions Xenophon mentions that a leader should evoke, allay and 
manipulate in the Hipparchicus and those discussed in the slightly later rhetorical 
treatises by Aristotle and Anaximenes. This, I argued, indicates Xenophon the 
author‟s interest in emotions and contemporary rhetorical theory.84 I also suggested 
that because the Hipparchicus is a techne, we might expect this work to include 
examples to accompany the instructions Xenophon offers, as we find in Aeneas 
Tacticus‟ Poliorcetica, Aristotle‟s Rhetorica and Anaximenes‟ Rhetorica ad 
Alexandrum, and even (in the form of case studies) in Epidemiae I and III of the 
Hippocratic corpus. I then demonstrated that there is a convergence between the 
                                                             
84 I further suggested in this article that Xenophon’s interest in rhetorical theory can be seen in his 
use of the rhetorical term ‘enthymeme’. 
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instructions in the Hipparchicus regarding how to manipulate emotions and certain 
speeches in the Anabasis. Thus, I tentatively explained the absence of examples in 
the Hipparchicus by suggesting that Xenophon may have considered that he had 
already supplied the examples in the Anabasis and possibly other works, and that he 
would expect the reader to be able to recognise this.
85
 I concluded that the speeches 
evoking emotions in the Anabasis act as exempla of successful and unsuccessful 
persuasion attempts for leaders to emulate or avoid.
86
 In this chapter, I shall develop 
this last argument further.  
Xenophon‟s interest in emotions may confirm Aristotle‟s criticism of those 
who wrote rhetorical treatises before him. Aristotle complains that these writers 
concentrated on evoking the emotions of the dicast, which he censures (Rhetorica 
1.1, 1354a.11ff.). If, as I believe, Xenophon was drawing on contemporary rhetorical 
theory when he composed his speeches, we should not be surprised that Xenophon 
shows a particular interest in this area of rhetoric. However, Aristotle argues that 
arousing emotion is more important in forensic oratory whereas character projection 
is more important than the emotions evoked in symbouleutic oratory (Rhetorica 2.1, 
1377b.28-31). The majority of the speeches in the Anabasis are symbouleutic, and 
indeed, Xenophon is also particularly interested in the characters his speakers 
present. Here, both Xenophon and Aristotle may reflect recognition by contemporary 
rhetorical theorists that a speaker‟s ethos is extremely important when delivering 
advice on future courses of action. Xenophon‟s interest in emotional appeals can 
perhaps be explained by Xenophon‟s symbouleutic speeches also containing 
elements of pre-battle speeches. 
 Because Aristotle‟s Rhetorica was written after Xenophon, rather than 
making use of Aristotle‟s work to explain the rhetorical features found in 
                                                             
85 This raises the question of whether Xenophon’s use of a pseudonym for the Anabasis debars the 
reader from making connections between this work and the rest of his oeuvre. See Appendix 4 for 
the debate regarding whether the Anabasis was published pseudonymously and how Xenophon’s 
contemporary readers would have reacted to such a pseudonym. In my opinion, Xenophon’s readers 
would have seen through the pseudonym with ease because of Xenophon’s style and the 
consistency of his interests across his works. 
86 See further Tuplin (2014, 69-79) and Pernot (2014), who discuss the ancient responses to 
Xenophon’s speeches, including Dio Chrysostom’s claim that Xenophon is the only writer a public 
man needs, and that the Anabasis covers all the speeches such a man will need to make (Discourses 
18.14-19). While Tuplin argues that Dio’s praise does not wholly match with the Anabasis speeches, 
Pernot agrees that the Anabasis does offer the best model for all kinds of speech. 
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Xenophon‟s speeches, it is interesting to see that what Aristotle was treating was 
already being used by Xenophon. We shall see this particularly in terms of 
Aristotle‟s recommendations for how to evoke emotions. In this sense, Xenophon 
throws light on Aristotle‟s work, rather than the reverse. The direction of influence 
between rhetorical treatises and historiography has been investigated by Hornblower. 
He (1987, 46-50, 1996, 83-4, and 1995, 47ff.) suggests that the Rhetorica ad 
Alexandrum and other fourth-century treatises may have drawn their examples from 
Thucydides. In turn, he argues that Thucydides may have been influenced by 
“rudimentary” fifth century rhetorical treatises, as well as actual speeches. While the 
idea of Thucydides influencing the theoretical discussion is interesting, more 
emphasis should perhaps be put on the likelihood that Thucydides‟ speeches and the 
examples in handbooks both reflect real speeches, as Heath (1990, 396 n.21) 
argues.
87
  
Xenophon‟s interest in leadership across his oeuvre is well known. Because 
of Xenophon‟s interest in both rhetoric and leadership, in this chapter, I examine 
various occasions on which leaders attempt to evoke or allay emotions in their 
audiences, concentrating on the reasons for their success and failure. The ability to 
evoke emotions in an audience is an important skill to master within a city context, 
particularly in relation to giving speeches in law courts or assemblies, but the 
Anabasis provides examples of emotional appeals made by leaders in an army 
setting. Here, the leader and his audience are not surrounded by the defences of a 
city, and persuasion attempts are more critical. Persuasive speeches are vital for 
unifying an army, especially in times of danger, because disunity can quickly lead to 
defeat. The inability to persuade an army to make a beneficial decision can be fatal. 
Thus, it is extremely important that leaders of armies can effectively appeal to the 
emotions to persuade their audience to act in a certain way, and can use their real or 
projected character to reinforce their appeal. However, ill-advised decisions resulting 
from successful persuasion attempts can also be harmful. Thus, effective persuasion 
must be coupled with tactical vision and unselfish aims. This chapter investigates 
how such difficulties are represented in the speeches in the Anabasis. While the 
                                                             
87 Indeed, Pelling (2012, 284-8) argues that the comparison of Thucydidean and Herodotean 
speeches to rhetorical treatises is most fruitful when the differences are highlighted, rather than the 
similarities. Like Heath, he argues that the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and the speeches in Thucydides 
and Herodotus are based on existing rhetorical conventions, as demonstrated by these differences. 
69 
 
Hipparchicus contains explicit instructions for evoking, allaying and manipulating 
emotions, there is no explicit comment in the Anabasis about how to evoke emotions 
verbally in an audience. Occasionally, Xenophon the narrator comments directly on 
the emotions evoked by leaders in the Anabasis. However, he focuses mainly on the 
emotions the leaders invoke towards themselves rather than those evoked as a 
response to the subject of their speeches, such as the enemy or a particular situation 
(see, for example, Clearchus‟ evocation of the fear of punishment by him, 2.6.8-14).  
Emotional Appeals in the Anabasis 
In a mercenary army, the leader faces different challenges than the leader of a citizen 
army. Mercenary soldiers are free to leave a commander‟s employment when they 
no longer consider that he is providing them with what they desire (primarily profit 
and safety), when they no longer want to be part of the current campaign, or if they 
simply do not like him. Thus, the emotions an audience feels towards a mercenary 
leader are particularly important. Secondly, a mercenary army is bonded only by its 
desire for profit and safety, rather than by common citizenship, and so the chances of 
disintegration are higher. Emotional appeals are thus even more important in a 
mercenary army for overcoming discord. Mercenary armies are also assembled from 
people of different ethnicities. Sanders (forthcoming) has demonstrated that in 
Thucydides, when speakers incite audiences to war or when battle exhortations are 
made, different emotions persuade different ethnicities. Such ethnic stereotypes may 
be part of the historiographer‟s agenda and so may not be accurate, but the 
representation of different peoples typically being moved by different feelings must 
reflect a reality. A mercenary leader must thus be aware that emotions have different 
effects on different people according to their background. The leader himself may 
also have a particular set of emotions that he believes to be persuasive because of his 
own background and civic identity.  
The Cyreans‟ situation and mind-set changes repeatedly in the Anabasis. The 
army works for two different paymasters, faces numerous enemies, interacts with 
different peoples, alters its aims and motivations, responds differently depending on 
the location, and reacts differently to the same leaders under different circumstances. 
As well as making emotional appeals to the army, leaders must also appeal to certain 
external audiences. Thus, in the Anabasis, we may expect to see represented how the 
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ability to judge the appropriate emotion to evoke at the right time in the right 
audience is a necessary skill. Even when addressing the army, where the speaker 
may understand his audience relatively well, there is a difference between a leader 
evoking fear of punishment from himself if his audience does not fight an enemy, 
evoking feelings of shame at not facing the enemy, and evoking confidence that the 
audience can overcome the enemy. Indeed, at Memorabilia 3.5.5, Xenophon 
represents his Socrates as saying that confidence can lead to negligence, indifference 
and disobedience, while fear causes people to be more attentive, obedient and 
orderly. Concerning those outside of the army, the leader may not have any kind of 
understanding of what emotions these audiences are susceptible to or even what they 
value most. He also cannot use his established ethos to back up his emotional 
appeals. By contrast, when speaking to the army, a leader‟s ethos can enhance his 
emotional appeal. If his audience already recognises him as an expert tactician, for 
example, he may more easily instil confidence in his plan than a leader 
recommending the same plan without such a reputation. 
Approach to the Anabasis and Method 
I begin by examining particularly notable emotional appeals by six different leaders 
in the work. These are not examined chronologically but as responses to similar 
situations, which allows some comparisons to be made. Firstly, I examine emotional 
appeals made by Cleanor, Clearchus and Xenophon to other leaders who are afraid 
or despondent about the situation the army is facing. Secondly, I discuss emotional 
appeals by Cheirisophus and Clearchus responding to the soldiers being afraid and 
despondent. Thirdly, I investigate appeals made by Cyrus and Proxenus in response 
to the Greek army causing a dangerous situation for itself. Fourthly, I examine 
emotional appeals by Cyrus and Cheirisophus that respond to their audiences‟ mixed 
feelings about them as leaders. Finally, I look at emotional appeals by Cleanor and 
Xenophon that respond to speeches from outsiders. At the end of the chapter, I 
investigate how the interpretation of the speeches is affected if we take into account 
the motives of the speaker and the outcomes of the speeches.  
In order to analyse the speeches as persuasion attempts, I first investigate 
what emotions the speaker may be trying to evoke and exactly how he tries to do 
this, such as by using direct or indirect appeal, by using specific vocabulary or by 
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detailing the consequences of potential actions. Following this, I examine several 
elements of the surrounding narrative, starting with the information given about the 
mood of the audience when the speaker began his appeal, and what measures the 
speaker took either to build on the existing mood or to counteract it. I also discuss 
whether the speech succeeds in winning the audience over and why the emotional 
appeal was successful or unsuccessful. Finally, I consider whether the choice of 
emotional appeal depends on the character of the speaker, either as already 
recognised by the audience or as projected in the speech itself, and whether the 
speaker is constrained by his existing reputation and the general demands and 
opportunities of the situation.  
Further investigation of the wider narrative connected to these appeals 
indicates that there is more to the speeches than just success or failure. I argue that 
the emotional appeals produce several dramatic effects and may particularly involve 
the reader in the story. If the reader engages with the speeches, he may be more 
inclined to consider why the emotional appeals were and were not successful, and so 
may learn lessons from these examples about what produces success. However, the 
reader should not simply emulate successful emotional appeals and shun the example 
of failed ones. The positive and negative repercussions from successful and 
unsuccessful emotional appeals indicate whose example should really be emulated. 
Linking the appeals to the characterisation of the speaker further reveals how a 
leader should appeal to emotions. It becomes clear that leaders should have positive 
and selfless motivations. Only Xenophon the character emerges as a speaker able to 
reconcile successful emotional persuasion, benefit to the army and selfless 
motivations, and is thus the only leader who should be emulated.  
In this exploration of verbal persuasion, Xenophon may share some of the 
concerns that Plato had about rhetoric. In the Gorgias, Plato represents Socrates as 
criticising the sophists for telling their audiences what they wanted to hear rather 
than telling them the truth. This seduction of the audience and distortion of the 
substance of the speech does not instil virtue, and is not backed by justice or 
knowledge. In the Phaedrus, Plato has Phaedrus admit that orators only need to 
know what seems to be just, good or noble to the audience rather than really knowing 
what is just, good and noble. Plato has Socrates argue that for rhetoric to be 
acceptable, the orator must know both the truth and the nature of man (259e.1ff.). 
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Thus, both Plato and Xenophon believe that rhetoric can be harmful unless it is 
practiced in a virtuous way. Further, in indicating that the ability to persuade through 
words is important but that it can be dangerous in the hands of the wrong person, 
Xenophon seems to anticipate Aristotle‟s belief that rhetoric is a tool, and that the 
harm or benefit it causes depends on the intent and morality of the speaker 
(Rhetorica 1.1, 1355b.2-7). Sophists, Aristotle says, are distinguished not by their 
ability but by their aims (πξναηξέζεη, Rhetorica 1.1, 1355b.17-18).  
Marincola (2003, 288-9) discusses the difficulty for the modern historian of 
writing about emotions represented by ancient writers. He includes such problems as 
defining what an emotion is, both in comparison with what ancient writers thought 
and also in relation to contemporary research on emotions in scientific and 
psychological fields, whether there are differences between cultures in the way 
emotions are experienced, and whether everyone experiences emotions in the same 
way. Further, it is impossible to confirm whether the emotions that a modern reader 
believes a speaker in a text is trying to evoke would have been the ones felt by the 
internal audience, unless it is explicitly stated. Likewise, we cannot categorically 
state what emotions Xenophon‟s contemporary readers would have believed the 
speeches evoked. I attempt to minimise these issues by paying close attention to the 
narrative in relation to the speeches. As well as explicit narratorial comments, I take 
into account such factors as the requirements of the situation and the likelihood that a 
speaker will appeal to a specific emotion.     
Examples 
Emotional Appeals Responding to Leaders Fearing the Situation 
Clearchus’ Appeal to Fear and Confidence (2.2.3-4) 
Clearchus is one of the main Greek leaders working for Cyrus on his mission. After 
Cyrus‟ death, the Persian Ariaeus has offered to return home with the Greeks (2.1.3), 
and Clearchus has sent a reply, offering to put Ariaeus on the throne if Ariaeus 
comes to the Greek army (2.1.4). In the meantime, Phalinus has brought a message 
from the king demanding that the Greeks hand over their arms, which Clearchus 
returns a non-committal answer to (2.1.7-23). The Greek messengers return from 
Ariaeus and bring word that certain Persians would not allow Ariaeus to be king and 
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that the Greeks should go to him before he sets out in the morning (2.2.1). Clearchus 
gives another non-committal reply and then calls a meeting of the generals and 
captains (2.2.2-3). The narrator does not indicate what Clearchus‟ aims are for the 
speech he proceeds to give, or what motivates him. 
 Clearchus begins his speech by indirectly evoking fear over the army‟s 
situation. He then indirectly evokes confidence in the army‟s future actions, and 
confidence in himself as a leader. Clearchus opens by disclosing what the sacrifices 
revealed to him that the army should not do, which is pursue the king. Perhaps this 
was what the other leaders were most inclined to do because Clearchus dwells on 
this option the most. Having first raised fear at the thought that the Greeks would be 
going against the gods if they followed this course, Clearchus then explains a further 
reason why they should not go after the king. He says that he now understands that 
the Tigris River stands between the army and the king and that the army cannot cross 
this without boats. He follows this by emphatically stating that the Greeks have no 
boats, although the other leaders presumably know this. Clearchus is perhaps 
evoking fear that the king can reach the Greeks, while the Greeks are unable to reach 
the king.  
Clearchus next discusses another option for the army, which is remaining 
where it is. He does not seem to have asked the gods about this option and he 
quickly dismisses it by saying that the army cannot remain where it is because there 
are no provisions. This does not seem to have been a seriously considered option, but 
Clearchus raises the fear about the army not being able to provide for itself. 
Following this, Clearchus changes his tone and tries to evoke confidence. He simply 
says that the omens are exceedingly (πάλπ) favourable for joining Cyrus‟ friends. 
This would seem to suggest that the leaders should have absolute confidence that the 
gods strongly back this option and that no more needs to be said. This anticipates 
Aristotle‟s recommendation that a speaker can evoke confidence by mentioning 
signs that all is well in an audience‟s relations with the gods (Rhetorica 2.5, 1383b.4-
6).  
Finally, Clearchus tells the leaders what to do next. He tells them to eat, and 
then what to do at each signal in preparation for their departure. He even tells them 
how to proceed, with the beasts of burden advancing alongside the river and the 
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hoplites on the outside. By being authoritative and giving the leaders orders, he is 
trying to give the other leaders the confidence that he knows what they must do and 
that he will lead them in this. Clearchus, in indicating that he has carried out the 
sacrifices, examined the surrounding area and contemplated each option, is also 
trying to give the other leaders confidence that he is concerned for the army and is 
actively trying to ascertain what is best for its members. 
The narrator does not indicate the mood of the audience before the speech, 
but the reader might be able to gauge it. The leaders have recently spoken to 
Phalinus, and while some seem defiant in resisting the king, others offer to be the 
king‟s friend. The narrator also says that Clearchus wanted to make the Greeks more 
hopeful (εὐέιπηδεο κᾶιινλ) about not giving up their arms to the king when he spoke 
to Phalinus (2.1.18), although Phalinus does not oblige him. Thus, the leaders seem 
to have mixed feelings and to be insecure about their situation and what to do next. 
Clearchus initially seems to build on negative feelings in his audience by talking 
through two options and saying why the army cannot choose these. He then 
counteracts the mood by not leaving room for discussion about what the army is 
going to do. 
The narrator says that the generals and captains departed and followed 
Clearchus‟ orders (2.2.5). This does not specify what emotions were evoked by the 
speech, but the narrator immediately says that, after this, Clearchus commanded and 
the army obeyed (ἐπείζνλην), not because the soldiers had elected him but because 
they recognised that he alone was wise (ἐθξόλεη), as a leader should be, while the 
others were inexperienced (ἄπεηξνη, 2.2.6). The army simply follows (εἵπνλην) him 
(2.2.8). This suggests that the army did feel confident in Clearchus and his leadership 
and in his actions and the decisions he made. Clearchus is successful in this speech 
because he is taking charge and reassuring the leaders that what they are going to do 
is the right choice, while backing this up with evidence from sacrifices and 
observations. Amid the confusion and indecision after Cyrus‟ death, this is exactly 
what the army needs. Clearchus plays on the leaders‟ concern for their lives and 
gives them hope that they will be safe and successful if they follow this option and 
his orders. 
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Clearchus is authoritative enough to be convincing in his portrayal of 
himself. His choice of emotions to evoke partly depends on his character as already 
recognised by his audience. Although his power over the army really started with his 
resolution of the mutiny at Tarsus, after Cyrus‟ death, Clearchus begins to take 
charge of the army‟s affairs and the army does not question this. He responds to the 
announcement of Cyrus‟ death seemingly independently, in a confident and decisive 
manner, whereas the soldiers and leaders have taken the news gravely (βαξέσο, 
2.1.4). Clearchus also takes charge when Phalinus visits the army, answering first, 
and telling the generals to give Phalinus the best and most noble replies when he is 
called away (2.1.9). Here, he leaves to sacrifice on behalf of the army, something 
that no other leader appears to have considered. Phalinus also seems to regard 
Clearchus‟ answer as the most definitive (2.1.15).  
Although Clearchus‟ authoritative stance has been directed at outsiders until 
now, the leaders surely recognise this as part of his character when he directs it 
towards them. Clearchus talks in terms of „us‟, „we‟ and „our‟ when discussing the 
army‟s options, perhaps to indicate that, despite his recent rise in authority, he shares 
the army‟s plight. When he issues orders, however, he uses the second person plural, 
separating himself from the leaders and reminding them that he is the one giving 
them direction. Evoking confidence is a natural choice to complement his 
commanding and self-assured existing character. In Clearchus‟ obituary, the narrator 
reveals that in dangerous situations, the troops were exceedingly (ζθόδξα) willing to 
listen to Clearchus and would choose no one else as commander, because his gloomy 
and severe character seemed bright and resolute when facing an enemy, which 
promised safety (2.6.11) and gave them confidence (ζαξξαιέσο, 2.6.14). If 
Clearchus had established this character with the army before his speech, then he 
was again furthering the presentation of a specific ethos through his appeal to 
confidence. Evoking fear also matches his existing character because it complements 
the projection of himself as understanding the dangers of the situation.  
Clearchus has a reputation as someone who is fearless and he may also be 
limited by this in which emotions he can appeal to. He cannot dwell too much on the 
frightening aspects of the situation and has to give the leaders reasons why 
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ultimately they should not be afraid.
88
 Clearchus is also constrained by the prevailing 
mood when he starts speaking. In his audience‟s relatively immobile and insecure 
state, trying to make the leaders act by creating more fear than he does in this speech 
might have caused panic, and so ending by evoking confidence is a better option. 
The situation demands that the army chooses a path and begin moving on it as soon 
as possible, further affecting Clearchus‟ choice of emotional appeal. The narrator 
says that the sun was already setting (2.2.3) and, because following Ariaeus means 
that the army would have to travel during the night, Clearchus has to find the 
quickest emotional appeal to get the leaders moving, which suggests ultimately 
evoking confidence.  
Xenophon’s Appeal to Fear, Confidence, Shame, Pride, Emulation and Desire 
(3.1.15-25) 
Xenophon has only briefly appeared in the Anabasis before this speech, and it is with 
this oration that he comes to the fore. After Tissaphernes has betrayed the Greeks 
and tricked the majority of the army‟s leaders to their deaths, Xenophon has a dream, 
which he believes comes from Zeus (3.1.11-13). Following the account of this 
dream, the reader hears the internal thoughts by which Xenophon persuades himself 
to get up and take action when everyone else is despairing (3.1.13-14). After rising, 
Xenophon speaks to Proxenus‟ captains. From his internal thoughts, it is clear that 
Xenophon‟s aim is to begin making plans for the army‟s survival, and that his 
motive is fear for his own and the army‟s safety.  
 Xenophon appeals indirectly to fear, shame, pride, emulation, and desire 
for honour, and both indirectly and directly to confidence. He opens by trying to 
make the captains fear. Xenophon says that the Persians are fully prepared but that 
on the Greek side no one is making preparations to ensure that they fight the enemy 
as best they can. This threatens the captains with the thought that the Persians hold 
all the advantages over the Greeks while the Greeks are passively going to allow the 
                                                             
88 Interestingly, Clearchus’ reputation for fearlessness does not prevent Clearchus from trying to 
evoke pity in his troops at the sight of him crying, after his men have tried to stone him for trying to 
force them to continue with Cyrus (1.3.2). The speeches that follow Clearchus’ weeping will be 
discussed in the next chapter, but it is important to note here that Clearchus does not seem to 
consider his reputation when he attempts to evoke pity. Perhaps he assumes that the men will 
believe that if such a fearless leader cries, the situation must be dire. The troops watch him, are 
amazed (ἐκαφμαηον), and stay silent.  
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Persians to attack them. Xenophon has made it clear that the Persians are more than 
able to harm the Greeks. He next asks rhetorically what he and the captains think 
(νἰόκεζα) the Greeks will suffer if „we‟ submit (ὑθεζόκεζα) and fall into the king‟s 
hands, trying to get them to visualise the potential consequences. Throughout the 
speech, when Xenophon talks about the army‟s situation, he uses the first person 
plural. He is clearly trying to reassure the captains that he feels as they feel and that 
he is trying to understand their predicament along with them.  
 Xenophon next vividly reminds the captains of what the king is capable of, 
in order to make them fear what the king might do to them. He describes how the 
king did not just kill his own brother born from the same mother (ὁκνκεηξίνπ 
ἀδειθνῦ) but, afterwards, he cut off Cyrus‟ head and hand and impaled them. This 
provides the captains with evidence of the king‟s viciousness, rendering Xenophon‟s 
suggestion about the king‟s probable cruel treatment of the Greeks extremely likely. 
If the implication from this is not obvious, Xenophon questions the safety of the 
Greeks‟ position. Since they have no protector (θεδεκὼλ) and since they advanced 
against the king to make him a slave and to kill him if they could, what do the 
Greeks think they will suffer? Again, Xenophon is provoking the captains‟ minds to 
draw terrifying pictures of what might happen. Xenophon describes his own 
assumption next, in the form of another rhetorical question. He asks the captains if 
the king is not likely torture them so extremely (ἔζραηα αἰθηζάκελνο) that all men 
would be afraid (θόβνλ) to attack him again? Here, Xenophon is making clear the 
desire in the Persians to harm the Greeks. In his later recommendations on how to 
evoke fear, Aristotle says that fear is felt when others intend to and are able to cause 
harm (Rhetorica 2.5, 1382a.33-5). Xenophon‟s appeal clearly pre-empts Aristotle‟s 
recommendation. Again, the captains are being pressed to imagine their worst 
nightmares. By saying that others will be afraid by what has happened to the Greeks, 
Xenophon is further indicating that the captains should be afraid too. Xenophon 
concludes this part of his speech by saying what the captains are surely now 
thinking, that the army must do everything not to fall into the king‟s power.  
 Having demonstrated that he knows that the situation is to be feared, 
Xenophon follows this up by indirectly giving the captains the confidence that they 
can defeat the enemy. Xenophon describes how at times he feared (ἐθνβνύκελ) the 
truce more than he now fears war, because the terms of the truce were so detrimental 
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to the Greeks. This suggests that Xenophon feels that the army‟s current situation 
may actually be an improvement, which may encourage the audience to feel hope 
along with him. He goes on to say that since the enemy ended the truce, they have 
also ended their own outrageous acts (ὕβξηο) and the Greeks‟ ill-feeling (ὑπνςία). 
This again suggests that the Greeks might have reason to feel optimistic. Xenophon 
next explains the positive elements of their present scenario. He says that the good 
things (ἀγαζὰ) which the Persians have now stand as prizes for whichever side is the 
braver (ἀκείλνλεο), and that the gods will judge this battle and are likely (εἰθόο) to be 
on the Greeks‟ side. Here, Xenophon is relying on the likelihood that the captains 
will believe that Greeks are braver than Persians. He is also presenting the situation 
as being almost out of the Greeks‟ hands and in the control of the gods. The gods 
will back them, he says, because the Persians have sworn falsely by the gods 
(ἐπησξθήθαζηλ) while the Greeks have firmly (ζηεξξῶο) kept away from the 
temptations they saw before them on account of their oaths to the gods. That the 
Persians broke their oaths suggests that they should fear punishment from the gods. 
In contrast, the Greeks can have confidence in the gods‟ retribution on the Persians 
and perhaps even pride in their own behaviour. Xenophon is presenting the 
forthcoming confrontation as a contest that the Greeks can win in order to evoke the 
captains‟ confidence. 
 Xenophon next overtly appeals to the feelings he wants to evoke. He says 
that the Greeks can go into the battle with much greater spirits (πνιὺ…θξνλήκαηη 
κείδνλη) than the enemy. Xenophon also offers further reasons for confidence. He 
says that the Greeks have more sufficient (ἱθαλώηεξα) bodies than the Persians for 
dealing with cold and hot temperatures and for working. He says that they also have 
better (ἀκείλνλαο) souls, thanks to the gods. Xenophon further says that the Persians 
are more vulnerable (ηξσηνὶ) and more liable to death (ζλεηνὶ) than them, if the gods 
give the Greeks the victory, as they have done before. Here Xenophon is appealing 
to stereotypes, and perhaps pride in the Greek constitution and character. He is trying 
to make the Greeks even more confident that they will be victorious if they face the 
Persians. In saying that the gods have provided the Greeks with their good souls, he 
is reminding the captains that the gods back the Greeks. This section prefigures 
Aristotle‟s recommendations for evoking confidence. Aristotle says that confidence 
can be produced by assuring someone that he has advantages such as a stronger body 
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(Rhetorica 2.5, 1383b.1) and that his relations with the gods are good (Rhetorica 2.5, 
1383b.4-6). In reminding the captains that the Greeks have already defeated the 
Persians, he is giving them evidence that the gods back them and that the Greeks can 
defeat the enemy. Xenophon almost presents the outcome of the battle as inevitable; 
it does not matter what the king‟s intentions and abilities are if he has angered the 
gods. Xenophon‟s evocation of confidence anticipates Aristotle‟s recommendation 
that when appealing to this emotion, the speaker should indicate that the audience‟s 
safety and success is imminent while what the audience fears is now non-existent 
(Rhetorica 2.5, 1383a.17-19).  
In the final section of this speech, Xenophon seems to appeal to the captains‟ 
shame. He says that others in the army may have thought these same things and so 
the captains should not wait for these people to come and rouse them to the finest 
deeds (θάιιηζηα ἔξγα) but should be the ones rousing others to excellence (ἀξεηήλ). 
The thought that others may have to encourage the captains to perform valiant deeds, 
rather than the captains acting valiantly of their own volition, may make the captains 
feel ashamed. Xenophon is discussing their task in terms of honour, nobleness and 
excellence, and appealing to their desire to act well and be recognised for it. He says 
that the captains should demonstrate that they are the best of the captains, appealing 
to their pride. Next, he seemingly appeals to emulation by saying that the captains 
should show that they are more worthy to be generals than the generals themselves 
(ηῶλ ζηξαηεγῶλ ἀμηνζηξαηεγόηεξνη). This concept of competition and recognition 
works on the captains‟ pride in how they appear to others and gives them an 
immediate incentive for carrying out Xenophon‟s recommendations, in that they will 
be recognised as acting well. 
 The narrator has indicated the mood of the army before the speech and the 
reader must assume that the captains share this. The army members are perplexed 
(ἀπνξίᾳ), dispirited (ἀζύκσο), feeling grief (ιύπεο), and yearning (πόζνπ) for home 
and family (3.1.2-3). Despite the Greeks winning their own battle at Cunaxa, they 
are clearly not confident about facing the king due to Tissaphernes‟ treachery and the 
loss of the majority of their leaders. Xenophon begins by building on these feelings 
and increasing the captains‟ fear at their situation. First, he identifies with his 
audience‟s fear. He opens the speech by saying that he cannot sleep, just as he thinks 
they cannot. Here, he not only characterises the captains as afraid, but also himself. 
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On other occasions, a leader admitting his own fears might find it harder to 
command confidence and trust. However, when an audience is truly afraid, its 
members may not believe a speaker who does not appear to recognise the gravity of 
the situation. Xenophon‟s admission of his fear makes the captains believe that he 
knows the seriousness of the situation and also perhaps counteracts the suspicion that 
he may wish to make them feel ashamed for feeling fear or ashamed at their lack of 
action. Xenophon‟s words here establish a feeling of unity and rapport between 
speaker and audience, which he carries throughout the speech. Xenophon allows the 
captains to give in to their feelings of fear by making them fully visualise what may 
happen. The situation perhaps just needed someone to articulate an unspoken fear to 
make the danger seem real. The narrator has indicated particular elements about the 
army‟s situation that concern its members already, such as the insurmountable terrain 
and the lack of guides (3.1.2), but Xenophon is focusing on the fear of extreme 
personal harm, and relying on the natural urge to self-preservation. He dwells on the 
impending threat of evil, rather than issues that do not immediately face the army, 
such as having no guides. He then counteracts the fear that the captains are feeling 
by explaining why they do not need to fear any of this happening, arguing from 
likelihood. Further counteracting their negative mood, he ends the speech by giving 
the captains more reasons to act and sets up the actions he is recommending as 
something worthy of doing.  
 At the end of his speech, Xenophon has said that he will obey the captains 
or, if they choose him to lead, that he is in his prime to protect himself. The captains 
all respond to Xenophon‟s speech by indicating that they would like him to lead 
them, except Apollonides. Apollonides argues that the Greeks will only be safe if 
they persuade the king to let them go (3.1.26). Xenophon interrupts Apollonides and 
criticises him for suggesting that they could trust the Persians after they have already 
shown that they do not abide by truces and are now torturing the leaders they took 
captive. Xenophon says that Apollonides should not be allowed to associate with the 
leaders, should have his captaincy taken away, and should be treated like a pack 
animal (3.1.27-30). Agasias claims that Apollonides is a Lydian, and Apollonides is 
driven away (3.1.31-2). This extended response does not explicitly indicate what 
emotions the captains are feeling, although all except Apollonides presumably feel 
confidence in Xenophon himself. Given their response to Apollonides, the captains 
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also seem to be persuaded by the interpretation Xenophon makes of how the king 
would treat them, and of their chances of success. Apollonides‟ criticism allows 
Xenophon to use his response to demonstrate further that he is right in his 
interpretation of the situation. Following this, Proxenus‟ captains talk to the 
remaining generals, lieutenant-generals and captains of other divisions and invite 
them to a meeting (3.1.32), as Xenophon suggested. The speech has been successful, 
although Apollonides was not convinced, and Xenophon has counteracted his 
audience‟s negative emotions. Xenophon is successful because he has been able to 
evoke the right emotions to rekindle the captains‟ desire to act and to believe in 
themselves. He does this by successfully anticipating what his audience knows about 
the situation, what his audience believes and desires, and by getting his audience to 
trust him. 
 Xenophon‟s choice of emotional appeal does not depend on his character 
as already recognised by his audience, at least as far as the narrator presents it, 
because Xenophon is not represented as having had any prior contact with Proxenus‟ 
captains, although he was with the army as Proxenus‟ friend. Xenophon‟s 
presentation of himself as someone who feels the same as his audience could have 
been ineffective because the captains do not know him, but it was perhaps effective 
in this situation because of the immense danger the army is in. Xenophon presents 
himself as understanding how the king will act and as understanding the dangers in 
the Greeks‟ current position. He further represents himself as making careful 
observations, and this is reflected in the language he uses. He ponders (ἐλζπκνίκελ), 
examines (δηαζεώκελνο) and reasons (ινγηδόκελνο). Once he has established that he 
knows what he is talking about by discussing what is fearsome about the situation, 
Xenophon presents himself as being even more perceptive than others and as being 
the only one who is able to see that the army might actually be successful. Thus, he 
appropriately switches to evoking confidence in the captains to accompany this 
presentation of himself. Xenophon also presents himself as pious and as believing in 
right behaviour and its reward, along with the inevitable punishment of immoral 
behaviour. This compliments his message that the Greeks‟ actions mean that they 
have good reason for confidence. He further presents himself as admiring brave and 
noble behaviour. In this, it is fitting that Xenophon appeals to the feelings of shame, 
pride, desire and emulation to make the captains want to act well and achieve 
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rewards for their actions. The particular characteristics that Xenophon presents 
himself as having anticipate Aristotle‟s recommendation that in symbouleutic 
oratory, for a speaker to be convincing, he must project the characteristics of good 
sense (θξόλεζηο), virtue (ἀξεηὴ) and goodwill (εὔλνηα).89   
 As well as being constrained in his choice of emotional appeal by his 
audience‟s fragile state of mind before the speech, Xenophon is also restricted by the 
situation, which demands that Xenophon persuades his audience to act immediately. 
He must select the emotional appeal that he thinks will work most quickly and most 
effectively.  
 We can now briefly compare Clearchus‟ and Xenophon‟s appeals. There 
are certain similarities. Both men use their appeals to take charge when no one else 
will, after the death of key leaders. Both open their speeches by evoking fear, and 
earn trust in their understanding of the situation from this. They then both evoke 
confidence in the army‟s situation and what they recommend proceeding to do. They 
are both successful and persuade the leaders to undertake certain actions. Both also 
succeed in evoking confidence in themselves as leaders, and both increase their 
standing with the army. This is despite Xenophon having no formal position in the 
army when he began speaking. Although there seems little to separate the success of 
Clearchus and Xenophon here, we shall later see that considering the connected 
narrative paints a different picture.  
Cleanor’s Appeal to Fear (4.6.9) and Xenophon’s Appeal to Fear, Hope and 
Confidence (4.6.10-15) 
Cleanor is one of the eldest generals in the army. When the Greeks encounter a force 
of Chalybians, Taochians and Phasians, the generals and captains call a meeting to 
discuss tactics. Cheirisophus outlines the issue and says that they should decide 
whether it is best to try to cross the mountain today or on the next day (4.6.6-8). 
Cleanor is the first to give his opinion. The narrator does not reveal Cleanor‟s aims 
or motives.  
                                                             
89
 See Fortenbaugh (1992) for a discussion of this combination of qualities, as well as the 
complications arising from Aristotle’s account of persuasion through ethos. See also De Temmerman 
(2010) for the value of applying rhetorical treatises to analysing character in narrative literature.  
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 Cleanor tries to evoke fear indirectly by focussing on the leaders‟ thoughts of 
their own advantage, safety, and ease. He consistently uses first person plural verbs, 
demonstrating his shared concerns with the other leaders. He recommends that the 
army has breakfast as soon as possible (ηάρηζηα) and then attacks the enemy as 
quickly as possible (ὡο ηάρηζηα). In mentioning haste twice, Cleanor implies that the 
decision needs to be made rapidly because the audience is in danger. Cleanor goes 
on to describe what will happen if the army does not do as he proposes. He says that 
the army would waste (δηαηξίςνκελ) the day, suggesting that they should fear 
missing an opportunity. He also twice mentions that not attacking immediately 
would lead to the enemy becoming bolder (ζαξξαιεώηεξνη… ζαξξνύλησλ). A more 
confident enemy will be harder to face and the possibly of this happening would 
inspire fear. Cleanor also claims that not only would the Greeks have to face the 
enemy who are currently looking at them (ἡκᾶο ὁξῶληεο), but more (πιείνπο) hostile 
people will also join this enemy if they delay. A larger enemy is also something to be 
feared, and Cleanor may be adding further pressure in his representation of the 
enemy as observing the Greeks. This prefigures part of Aristotle‟s description of 
how to evoke fear. Aristotle describes fear as a feeling of pain or worry at the idea 
that an imminent and nearby threat will cause pain or destruction (Rhetorica 2.5, 
1382a.21-6 and 1382b.29-30). As we saw above, Aristotle also advises discussing 
the intent and ability of an opponent to cause the audience harm. 
 The narrator does not specify the mood of the audience when Cleanor 
begins his speech. The leaders are presumably alarmed at the situation because they 
have called a meeting to discuss how best to overcome the enemy. Cleanor is 
attempting to exacerbate the leaders‟ concerns and direct these anxieties towards the 
necessity of accepting his recommendation. He does not succeed in persuading the 
leaders to follow his proposal, however, because of Xenophon‟s subsequent speech, 
which we can also examine.  
 Xenophon indirectly redirects the fear that Cleanor has created about the 
enemy, while mixing it with indirectly evoked hope and confidence. He does this in 
order to persuade his audience to follow his plan instead of Cleanor‟s. Like Cleanor, 
Xenophon uses the first person plural to connect with his audience. Xenophon opens 
by saying that he thinks that if it is necessary to fight the enemy in front of them, the 
army should make preparations in order that it can fight as strongly as possible. This 
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implies that it might not be necessary to fight the enemy. Given that Cleanor has 
played on fears about the enemy, this may give the leaders hope that there is a way to 
avoid confrontation. Suggesting that the army would need to fight as strongly as 
possible also plays on the fear that Cleanor has evoked about the strength of the 
opposition. Xenophon next hints at an easier and safer alternative to facing the 
enemy head on. If they want to pass over the mountain as easily as possible (ὡο 
ῥᾷζηα), he thinks they must examine how they can take as few wounds as possible, 
and lose as few lives as possible. Xenophon is implying that following Cleanor‟s 
plan, the Cyreans are likely to sustain many wounds and lose many lives.  
 Xenophon then sets out the situation as he sees it. The part of the mountain 
visible to them is more than sixty stadia, but the only men guarding it are those that 
Cleanor recommended fighting. Xenophon says that it is far better (πνιὺ…θξεῖηηνλ) 
to concentrate on the empty part of the mountain and try to both steal the position by 
escaping the enemy‟s notice and seize it by outstripping them, if possible, rather than 
fighting against strongholds (ἰζρπξὰ ρσξία) and prepared men (ἀλζξώπνπο 
παξεζθεπαζκέλνπο). This is logical, and again Xenophon is playing on the fear that 
Cleanor has already exacerbated about the strength of the enemy, by suggesting that 
it is advisable to avoid facing this. Xenophon goes on to explain why it is easier to 
take the unguarded route, even though it is presumably obvious. He says that it is 
much easier (πνιὺ…ῥᾷνλ) to go uphill without resistance than to go over even 
ground with enemies all around (ἔλζελ θαὶ ἔλζελ). It is also easier to see by night 
without resistance than by day when fighting, and the rough road is more agreeable 
(εὐκελεζηέξα) to walk on without resistance than the level ground is when objects 
are being thrown at the soldiers‟ heads. This may put images into the heads of the 
leaders about what they will have to face if they follow Cleanor‟s recommendations. 
This makes it clear that although Xenophon‟s suggested route may be challenging, it 
is at least preferable to Cleanor‟s proposal.   
  Xenophon next evokes confidence in his recommendations. He says that 
stealing a position is not impossible (νὐθ ἀδύλαηόλ) in his opinion, because the 
Greeks can go during the night and be unseen, and get far enough away that they 
cannot be heard. Again, this seems easier and safer than fighting the enemy head on, 
and also requires little effort. Further, it may evoke hope in the leaders. Xenophon 
next suggests that if the army appears to attack the enemy, the rest of the mountain 
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will become more deserted (ἐξεκνηέξῳ) because the enemy would rather stay 
together. Xenophon is recommending a feint that will make the army‟s passage even 
easier, which perhaps gives the leaders further confidence in his recommendations 
and further desire to carry it out. Finally, Xenophon addresses Cheirisophus and 
suggests that, as a Spartan who practiced stealing as a child, Cheirisophus should use 
his skills to form the plan for how to steal the mountain.  
 It is not explicitly stated that Cleanor has been successful in building on the 
concerns of the audience and evoking further fear of the enemy. Xenophon 
represents himself as fearing the enemy, enough to want to avoid a confrontation, but 
it is unclear how much he already felt this emotion before Cleanor tried to exacerbate 
it. Cleanor presumably had at least some success in increasing the fear his audience 
felt, especially because Xenophon proceeds to build on this emotion too. Xenophon 
does this chiefly by further representing the enemy as a major obstacle and threat. 
When he evokes hope and confidence, he is not counteracting the leaders‟ fear of the 
enemy, because he gives them hope and confidence that they can avoid what is 
fearful, i.e. facing the enemy. Here, Xenophon has decided that it will be better for 
the army if he keeps the leaders scared for the purposes of engendering a useful 
outcome rather than relieving them of their fears.  
 Xenophon‟s speech succeeds. The leaders do not take a vote, but 
Cheirisophus responds to Xenophon‟s words by saying that Athenians are also good 
at stealing and so Xenophon can use his training too in carrying out his own 
recommendations. Xenophon proceeds to offer to lead the process of putting his plan 
into action, but Cheirisophus asks why Xenophon should leave his current posting 
with the rear-guard. Cheirisophus suggests that others should be sent if no one 
volunteers. Others do volunteer and a plan of action is formed. As it is presented, 
Xenophon‟s recommendation is so clearly preferable to Cleanor‟s plan that no 
discussion on whether to adopt it or not is needed. Xenophon thus seems to have 
convinced the leaders, but it is again not directly indicated whether he has evoked 
any emotions in them. That the leaders want to proceed with the proposal suggests 
that Xenophon has succeeded in evoking confidence in them in response to his plan, 
however, and part of the attraction of the plan is that the audience can avoid facing 
the enemy. This suggests that Xenophon‟s appeal to fear worked too, although we 
cannot say how much Xenophon has increased the fear already felt by the leaders 
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and the fear enhanced by Cleanor. Xenophon is successful because he uses what the 
audience is already feeling to back up his own argument.   
 Xenophon presents himself as being tactically astute, observant, aware of 
the terrain and opportunities of the situation, interested in the army‟s safety, and as 
able to understand what makes a situation difficult or easy. He also represents 
himself as knowing when to defer to others. Xenophon the character earlier 
presented this same ethos for himself in his speeches to the leaders and soldiers after 
Tissaphernes had betrayed the Greeks (3.1.35-45 and 3.2.7-32). Given that the 
leaders and soldiers responded positively to Xenophon on these occasions, the army 
presumably believes in Xenophon‟s character portrayal when he speaks at 4.6.10-15. 
Because he represents himself as understanding situations, he must appeal to fear 
because facing this enemy is clearly a fearsome prospect. He must also appeal to fear 
because otherwise he may inadvertently give the men confidence that they can 
overcome the enemy by facing them head on. In this sense, the prevailing mood of 
the audience limits Xenophon‟s choice of emotional appeal because he does not want 
the army to act rashly. Indeed, it may also have been particularly difficult to 
counteract the audience‟s fears, depending on how strong they were. Xenophon‟s 
choice to evoke confidence in his plan depends on his presentation of himself as 
tactically astute, because such a man would be confident in his own plans and would 
want others to believe in them along with him. The reputation he has built with the 
army thus also constrains Xenophon in his choice to appeal to fear and confidence. 
Finally, he is limited in his selection of emotions by the demands of the situation. In 
needing to save the men from unnecessary danger, he has to play up this danger, as 
well as the hope that they may not have to face it. In all of the four speeches we have 
examined so far, the speakers are constrained by the fact that they are attempting to 
persuade an audience who is as knowledgeable about the situation as they are, rather 
than an audience composed of soldiers whose understanding could be manipulated. 
 To return to Cleanor‟s speech, it is possible that without Xenophon‟s words, 
Cleanor would have been entirely successful and his evocation of fear would have 
backed up his argument. Xenophon, however, is better able to use the audience‟s fear 
in support of his plan. There are other reasons for Cleanor‟s failure. Cleanor portrays 
himself in the speech as understanding which tactics would give the army the best 
chance in the battle and as someone who works in the best interests of the army. He 
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also presents himself as being able to understand how the enemy will react to the 
Cyreans‟ actions. However, as the narrator presents it, the audience does not yet 
know Cleanor as a leader who recommends tactics and evokes fear of the enemy. He 
is made a general at 3.1.47, which suggests he does have good leadership skills, but 
on his other appearances in the work so far, he has spoken of bravery and correct 
behaviour rather than offering any concrete plans, and the only fear he evokes is that 
of being shamed. His choice to appeal to fear is dependent on his projected ethos, 
because it demonstrates that he understands what the army most needs to be 
concerned with and to prevent from happening. However, Cleanor is presenting a 
freshly constructed ethos here, and the army may not be in such a dire situation that 
they disregard that they do not know whether they can rely on him or not. Cleanor 
clearly does not feel limited in his choice of emotion to appeal to by his previous 
lack of reputation as a tactical expert, but he seemingly should. Like Xenophon, he is 
constrained in his choice of emotional appeal by the prevailing mood in the 
audience. Like Xenophon, he can either channel his audience‟s existing concerns, or 
try to make the leaders feel another emotion, such as confidence that they can easily 
defeat the enemy. Again, it may be more challenging to attempt to replace concern 
with confidence, especially because the situation does not seem to give grounds for 
confidence. Cleanor is thus also constrained by the situation in his choice of 
emotional appeal.  
Emotional Appeals Responding to Soldiers Feeling Disheartened about their 
Situation 
Clearchus’ Appeal to Fear and Hope (2.4.5-7) 
The Greeks have joined forces with Ariaeus and have been waiting more than twenty 
days for Tissaphernes to join them. During this time Ariaeus‟ relatives visit him, 
Persians come to talk to Ariaeus‟ followers with messages from the king, and 
Ariaeus and his followers pay less attention to the Greeks (2.4.1-2). The soldiers are 
unhappy and tell Clearchus and the other generals their fears (2.4.3-4). Only 
Clearchus is mentioned as responding. Neither the narrator nor Clearchus specify 
why and to what end Clearchus speaks. 
Clearchus tries to indirectly evoke fear throughout most of this speech, and 
then closes by attempting to evoke hope indirectly. Whereas the soldiers raised fears 
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about staying, Clearchus raises fears about leaving. Clearchus uses the first person 
plural when discussing their situation. He also opens his speech by explicitly stating 
that he shares their thoughts. This bridges the gap between himself as a leader and 
his audience as soldiers, and identifies his own concerns with theirs. This may give 
the army confidence that he is taking the situation seriously. He then explains what 
the men would need to fear if they chose to leave. Instantly, it would appear to the 
Persians that the Greeks were acting with hostility and violating the truce, and 
Clearchus proceeds to elucidate the ramifications of this appearance. Firstly, no one 
will provide a market to the soldiers or anywhere to obtain provisions from. This is 
presumably intended to make the men fear starvation and their own deaths. 
Secondly, no one will guide them because their current guides will immediately 
(εὐζὺο) desert them. They would also have no allies because their existing friends 
will become their enemies. These statements appeal to fear in the men about being 
alone and being unable to obtain help from anyone. The motivations Clearchus 
assigns to the guides, the people they will encounter, and their former friends 
realistically suggest that these people would desire to harm the Cyreans.  
Clearchus then discusses the rivers. He says that there may be other rivers 
that he does not know about, but the soldiers know at least that they cannot cross the 
Euphrates while facing an enemy. This confronts the soldiers with the fearsome 
possibility that they will be trapped and potentially slain. Also, Clearchus says, the 
army has no cavalry, should it have to fight, while the enemy has a large and most 
efficient (πιεῖζηνη θαὶ πιείζηνπ ἄμηνη) cavalry unit. Thus, he asks rhetorically, even 
if the Greeks defeat the enemy, who could they kill? Alternatively, he says, if they 
lose, they would all be killed. This confronts the soldiers with the fearsome reality 
that the enemy is far more powerful than they are and is far more likely to defeat 
them. As Clearchus presents it, there are no advantages to leaving, and the soldiers 
can only get themselves killed or in terrible trouble by doing so.  
After confronting his audience with the realities of the situation, Clearchus 
ends by offering the soldiers the hope and reassurance that their fears about staying 
might be unfounded. He claims to think that with so many allies (ζύκκαρα), if the 
king was really eager (πξνζπκεῖηαη) to destroy (ἀπνιέζαη) the Greeks, it would be 
unnecessary for the king to make an oath, give pledges and swear falsely by the gods 
and thereby appear untrustworthy before Greeks and barbarians.  
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The narrator indicates that before this speech the soldiers were displeased 
(νὐθ ἤξεζθνλ) with the Persians (2.4.2). From their speech to Clearchus, it is clear 
that they are afraid that the king wants to destroy them to make an example out of 
them, and that he is biding his time until he is in a position to attack them or has 
made the way home impossible for them. Clearchus begins by building on the fear 
his audience feels. After agreeing that the soldiers‟ fears are valid, he demonstrates 
that there is even more to fear by leaving. He thus redirects the soldiers‟ fear towards 
ensuring they remain, because the army‟s safety and return home depend on it. 
Finally, he counteracts the original fears through a logical evaluation of the Persians‟ 
motives and methods.  
The narrator indicates that Clearchus said these things many times (ηνηαῦηα 
πνιιὰ ἔιεγελ). This suggests either that many different groups of soldiers come up 
to him or that the men do not believe his argumentation and he has to reiterate it 
more than once (2.4.7). Potential reasons for this could be that Clearchus‟ evocation 
of fear may have been more convincing than his assumption of how the Persians 
think, and the soldiers may feel even more trapped. They may also believe that 
Clearchus is basing his evaluation of the Persians‟ likely actions on the Persian 
reputation for trustworthiness, and that relying on this when the army is at the mercy 
of the Persians may be dangerous. However, the army does not leave, which 
demonstrates that Clearchus has succeeded in the aim of his speech.  
As mentioned above, the narrator indicates that soldiers feel confidence in the 
face of the enemy under Clearchus. Thus, Clearchus‟ appeal to confidence may be 
dependent on a character that is already recognised by his audience.
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 The Greeks 
also now believe that Clearchus is a wise leader, and evoking fear and confidence 
about their situation demonstrates that he understands their predicament and has 
                                                             
90 Indeed, the reader has recently seen that Clearchus is skilled at increasing the army’s confidence, 
although he deceived the army to achieve this. When the soldiers feel fear (φόβοσ) and there is 
uproar (κόρυβοσ) and din (δοῦποσ) amongst the army during the night while they are camping close 
by the enemy, Clearchus recovers the situation by evoking confidence in the army through a 
message he gives the herald to announce (2.2.20). The message states that the commanders give 
notice that whoever gives information about the person who set free the ass among the arms will 
receive a talent of silver. With this message, the noise and confusion is explained and assigned to 
one man’s actions rather than the enemy. Clearchus tries to show that there is nothing to fear about 
their situation, which Aristotle recommends as a way of evoking confidence, as we saw. Thus, the 
men can stop panicking because they are safe. Clearchus’ message is reassuring and maybe even 
distracts the men with desire for the talent of silver. The narrator says that the soldiers came to 
know that their fears were empty (κενὸσ) and the commanders were safe (2.2.21). 
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taken thought for them. His reputation for fearlessness may also make his appeal to 
fear more convincing, rather than restricting his persuasiveness. If Clearchus himself 
fears the repercussions he discusses, the men must surely take them seriously. 
Clearchus is limited in his choice of emotions to appeal to by the prevailing mood in 
the army when he begins his speech, and the situation. In choosing the emotions to 
evoke, he needs to ensure that he does not cause the army to act rashly and endanger 
itself. The men need reassurance and so he must give them this by trying to give 
them reasons to stay. As we saw above, it is risky for a leader to admit his fear to 
others, but the situation is so serious that only a fool would not feel fear.  
Cheirisophus’ Appeal to Fear and Pride (3.2.2-3) 
Cheirisophus is the leader of a contingent of Spartans that is aiding Cyrus on his 
mission. After Tissaphernes has tricked most of the Greek leaders to their deaths, 
Xenophon brings the army out of its despondency and persuades the remaining 
commanders to choose new leaders to fill the place of those who had died (3.1.11-
47). The army gathers and Cheirisophus addresses it. Cheirisophus‟ speech and the 
two that follow appear to put into action Xenophon‟s recommendation to the leaders 
of the army that they should encourage (παξαζαξξύλεηε) the soldiers, make them 
more cheerful (πνιὺ εὐζπκόηεξνη) and motivate goodness (ἀγαζνὺο) in them, in 
order to make them more confident and successful (3.1.39-44). 
 Despite this aim, Cheirisophus indirectly appeals to a mixture of fear and 
pride. He begins by describing the army‟s situation as difficult/painful (ραιεπὰ), 
which the audience is presumably already aware of. He then elaborates on why the 
situation is so bad. Except for one occasion at the end of the speech, he uses the first 
person plural throughout to indicate that he shares the situation with his audience and 
will share in the actions they must take. Firstly, he reminds the audience that the 
army has lost such good quality (ηνηνύησλ) generals, captains and soldiers. In listing 
each rank, Cheirisophus is drawing out the extent of the army‟s predicament. On top 
of this, their former allies have betrayed (πξνδεδώθαζηλ) them. This again does not 
provide new information but reaffirms exactly why the army is in a terrible situation. 
He does not try to hide how dire the situation is or make it seem any less fearsome. 
He then changes his tone by saying that nevertheless (ὅκσο), it is necessary that „we‟ 
become (ηειέζεηλ) brave men (ἄλδξαο ἀγαζνὺο) in this situation and do not 
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surrender, but try (πεηξᾶζζαη), if „we‟ can (ἢλ κὲλ δπλώκεζα), to save „ourselves‟ 
through glorious victory (θαιῶο ληθῶληεο). It is not just recommended that they act 
bravely, it is necessary for their very survival. Cheirisophus is suggesting that the 
Greeks cannot allow their fears to hold them back, despite how perilous the situation 
is. He does not offer his audience reasons for confidence that the army can defeat the 
Persians, but appeals to the men‟s pride at the thought of a glorious victory. He may 
expect that the idea of obtaining this, as well as the subsequent honour the Cyreans 
would receive for it, would be stronger than feelings of fear. If the Greeks cannot 
achieve a glorious victory, he says, they should at least die gloriously (θαιῶο), and 
not come under the power of the enemy alive. If they do, he thinks that they will 
suffer (παζεῖλ) what he hopes the gods bring upon their enemies. This last section 
mixes pride and fear. While the men may fear to die, the idea of a glorious death 
may again be designed to appeal to their pride in how they are remembered. 
Cheirisophus tries to makes the men fear not achieving a glorious victory or dying 
well by evoking fear at their potential suffering at the hands of the Persians. Here he 
is vague as to what would happen to them, possibly allowing the Greeks to fill the 
gap with their own worst imaginings. Cheirisophus is intimating looming pain and 
destruction, while representing the enemy as having the means and the intention to 
cause this. As we saw, Aristotle later discusses these elements as part of his 
recommendations for evoking fear. 
 The narrator states before this speech that the army is perplexed (ἀπνξίᾳ), 
dispirited (ἀζύκσο), feeling grief (ιύπεο), and yearning (πόζνπ) for home and family 
(3.1.2-3). Rather than trying to counteract these feelings, Cheirisophus seems to try 
to exacerbate them through his description of the Greeks‟ situation, the possibility of 
their mistreatment by the enemy, their possible deaths, and by not mentioning 
anything that could give them real hope that they might succeed.  
The speech receives no response, and two further speeches follow. After 
these speeches, the narrator reveals that the soldiers are encouraged to begin 
preparations to face the enemy. The exact effect of Cheirisophus‟ emotional appeal 
on this outcome is unclear. Some scholars argue that it would have been 
unpersuasive for the particular audience it is addressed to. Buzzetti (2014, 130-1), 
for example, argues that this speech needed to be “addressed more reassuringly” 
rather than dwelling on the noble, and that Cheirisophus failed to understand what 
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would move his audience.
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 Humble (1997, 83-4) likewise argues that “altogether 
this is a very unsatisfactory speech: it is negative, dwells too much on death and uses 
the wrong topos at the wrong time and with the wrong audience”. She maintains that 
the noble death topos might have been effective if Cheirisophus had been addressing 
Spartans or a citizen force, but that he had failed to take into account his current 
audience. She also argues that when Cheirisophus says that the soldiers should try to 
get a glorious victory, if they can, he does not sound like he believes that this is 
possible, and that this would affect his chances of persuading his audience. This is 
perhaps going too far. Cheirisophus is most likely just expressing caution and 
ensuring that the army does not become overconfident. Perhaps another element that 
may affect his success is his mention of the good leaders the army has lost. This may 
reduce the army‟s confidence in its new leaders. Also, if the army is already unable 
to act because it feels a range of disheartening emotions, it may be counterproductive 
to increase or reinforce these. Buzzetti (2014, 133 and n. 59) further notes that 
Xenophon the character does not comment on Cheirisophus‟ speech, as he does after 
the speech that follows Cheirisophus‟. He also argues that Xenophon the character‟s 
claims that the army should not be concerned that its former allies have deserted 
them (3.2.17) are an implicit criticism of Cheirisophus‟ argument. Both suggest, 
Buzzetti maintains, that Xenophon did not believe that Cheirisophus had spoken 
persuasively.  
Without an explicit narratorial comment, these interpretations remain 
unconfirmed. What we can say is that further speeches were needed afterwards to 
convince the audience to act. Perhaps Cheirisophus‟ speech was only meant to 
appeal to a section of the army. Hirsch (1985, 31) argues that the three speeches may 
have been coordinated beforehand and perhaps reflect the speaker‟s outlook. Thus, 
Cheirisophus‟ may have been perfectly apt and meant to appeal to like-minded 
people. As Buzzetti and Humble argue, the speech seems geared towards a Spartan 
audience. Perhaps we should conclude that the speech works on some in the 
audience but not on others.  
Cheirisophus‟ choice of emotional appeal is perhaps dependent on the 
character his audience already recognises in him. His internal audience only seems to 
                                                             
91 He further argues that Xenophon mentions noble death in his speech to the leaders (3.1.43-4) but 
that this was appropriate to his audience. 
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know him as a Spartan, and his ethnicity is important to his authority. Indeed, 
Xenophon later suggests that Cheirisophus should head the front of the army because 
he is a Spartan (3.2.37). Thus, the internal audience perhaps expects Cheirisophus to 
be a hard-headed leader like Clearchus, who does not smooth over the obvious 
difficulties of the situation, and expects him to appeal to typical Spartan pride and 
the desire to fight well, whatever the odds. Cheirisophus‟ speech certainly lives up to 
this stereotype. An attempt to evoke confidence and reassure the army instead of 
evoking fear and pride would fit less with his character and perhaps have even less 
chance of success. Cheirisophus is thus also limited in his choice of emotional 
appeal by the prevailing mood. If he cannot convincingly counteract the mood, his 
best choice is to exacerbate the existing fear and try to put this to positive use. He is 
also constrained by the situation, because he is following a particular 
recommendation by Xenophon to rouse the spirits of the men.  
 We can now briefly compare Clearchus‟ and Cheirisophus‟ emotional 
appeals to the soldiers. Although Clearchus is trying to prevent the soldiers from 
acting and Cheirisophus is trying to make them act, both mostly exacerbate the 
negative mood of their audience and dwell on the predicament the army is in. Both 
identify with the audience and offer a way to overcome the negative emotions. 
Clearchus offers logic to suggest that the audience is safe to remain, and 
Cheirisophus offers the thought of achieving something honourable to encourage the 
men to fight well. The appeal to both of these may seem weak for some in the 
audience. Cheirisophus is at least suggesting that the army has its fate in its own 
hands, whereas Clearchus suggests relying on the Persians.   
Emotional Appeals Responding to the Audience Causing Danger 
Proxenus’ Appeal to Calmness (1.5.14) and Cyrus’ Appeal to Fear (1.5.16) 
Proxenus is one of the original leaders of the Greek army who comes on the mission 
to aid Cyrus. Before this speech, one of Menon‟s soldiers argues with Clearchus, and 
Clearchus flogs him (1.5.11). The rest of Menon‟s soldiers become angry with 
Clearchus, and when Clearchus rides through their camp, Menon‟s men begin to 
throw axes and stones at Clearchus (1.5.11-12). Clearchus assembles his troops and 
begins to advance on Menon‟s soldiers, who get their arms (1.5.13-14). Proxenus 
arrives, later than the others, the narrator explains, and situates himself in between 
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the two sets of troops with his own soldiers (1.5.14). The narrator presents Proxenus‟ 
speech in oratio obliqua and merely says that Proxenus begged (ἐδεῖην) Clearchus 
not to do what he was intending. The narrator states that, as a result, Clearchus was 
angry (ἐραιέπαηλελ) because Proxenus spoke lightly (πξάσο) of Clearchus‟ 
suffering, when he had nearly been stoned to death. Seemingly, Proxenus‟ 
persuasion attempt failed because he does not present himself as appreciating the 
reason for Clearchus‟ anger. This may be a reflection of an idea current in rhetorical 
theory because Aristotle later mentions in his discussion of calmness that to deny an 
evident slight which has led to anger is impudence, and that impudence is contempt 
(ὀιηγσξία) and disdain (θαηαθξόλεζηο), which is not conducive to evoking calmness 
(Rhetorica 2.3, 1380a.19-21). Thus, Proxenus presumably intended to evoke 
calmness in Clearchus but has instead made him even angrier.  
The verb ἐδεῖην indicates the desperation of Proxenus‟ plea, and Clearchus‟ 
response to Proxenus humbling himself actually highlights Clearchus as acting 
unreasonably as much as Proxenus‟ inability to evoke calmness. It is hard to see how 
else Proxenus could have tried to evoke calmness, especially because acknowledging 
Clearchus‟ slight might have antagonised Menon‟s men instead. It is thus Proxenus‟ 
role as peacemaker that is problematic here. Proxenus does not have the authority to 
make Clearchus stop, and Clearchus orders Proxenus to move aside.  
 Proxenus is a foil for Cyrus in this scene, and his failure makes Cyrus‟ 
subsequent successful appeal seem all the more remarkable. Cyrus rides up, learns 
what is happening, picks up his spears, and proceeds into the space between the two 
sets of troops with his counsellors. It is not yet clear whether Cyrus wants to talk to 
the Greeks or threaten them with his spears. In fact, Cyrus indirectly evokes fear. 
Cyrus addresses his speech to Clearchus, Proxenus and the others Greeks present and 
says that they do not know what they are doing. By using the second person plural 
here, he is blaming the Greeks for their actions. Cyrus then outlines what the 
consequences would be if the Greeks were to continue fighting amongst themselves. 
He says that they must know (λνκίδεηε) that he will be cut down (θαηαθεθόςεζζαη) 
on that day (ἐλ ηῆδε ηῆ ἡκέξᾳ), and that they will be killed not long (νὐ πνιὺ) after. 
Cyrus thus presents the Greeks‟ safety and success as being in their own hands. The 
certainty with which Cyrus presents the consequences is fearsome, and the future 
perfect tense of θαηαθόπησ indicates his clear vision of his death occurring. This 
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choice of verb itself adds to the vivid nature of the description. The speed of the 
anticipated outcome is also frightening. Not only are the Greeks threatened with the 
loss of their paymaster, but also the loss of their own lives. Their safety, and, while 
they are alive, Cyrus‟ ability to pay and reward them are the two things that motivate 
the army most. Cyrus ends by saying that if they allow matters to go badly (θαθῶο), 
the barbarians in his army will be more hostile (πνιεκηώηεξνη) to „us‟ than the 
barbarians who work for the king. Here Cyrus is aligning himself with the Greeks in 
his army, perhaps with the intention of making them feel valued and also confident 
that he has their best interests at heart. The thought that the Greeks‟ current allies 
will turn on them is fearsome, and perhaps plays on existing tension between Cyrus‟ 
Greek troops and barbarian troops, while reinforcing the idea that the barbarian 
troops are waiting for an opportunity to act. The choice to say „more hostile‟ rather 
than „stronger‟ also makes the threat more vivid. The Greeks presumably appreciate 
the hostility of those who fight for the king against them, and so ought to fear the 
possibility that Cyrus‟ barbarians could become even more hostile than their enemy. 
Cyrus is evoking fear about an imminent deadly suffering at the hands of people who 
have the desire to harm the audience. As we saw, Aristotle later recommends 
mentioning the nearness and the potential lethalness of a situation in his discussion 
of evoking fear, as well as outlining the intent of the enemy. Once more, this 
suggests that both Xenophon and Aristotle are drawing on existing rhetorical theory. 
 There are different moods within the audience before Cyrus begins 
speaking. Clearchus is angry (ἐραιέπαηλελ) with Proxenus (1.5.14) and Menon‟s 
troops. Clearchus‟ troops are also presumably angry with Menon‟s men, and 
Proxenus is concerned about the situation. Menon‟s men are initially angry with 
Clearchus but, when Clearchus advances with his troops against them, the narrator 
says that Menon and his men are panic-stricken (ἐθπεπι῅ρζαη), although some 
remain unconcerned by the matter (1.5.13). Cyrus seems to chiefly target Clearchus 
and Proxenus as the ones who are responsible. He presumably thinks that he 
primarily needs to counteract anger, and perhaps does not even recognise the 
emotions of Menon and his men or Proxenus. Buzzetti (2014, 50) argues that in 
addressing Proxenus, Cyrus demonstrates that he did not completely understand the 
facts of the situation, marring his success. However, Cyrus had to appraise the 
situation and the emotions of the audience on the instant. Cyrus attempts to 
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counteract anger by explaining the repercussions of the army‟s actions and ensuring 
that those present know that their own lives are at stake.  
 The narrator says that, after the speech, Clearchus came to his senses (ὁ 
Κιέαξρνο ἐλ ἑαπηῷ ἐγέλεην), and both sides stopped and went to their quarters 
(1.5.17). Thus, Cyrus was correct in targeting his appeal to Clearchus‟ emotions and 
correct in anticipating how to do this. The narrator does not specifically say that 
Cyrus evoked fear, but this is presumably what now restrains his audience. Cyrus is 
successful because he selected the appropriate emotion to evoke that made the 
audience understand what was at stake. Cyrus also presents himself as feeling fear 
for both himself and the Greeks, and so he is inviting the army to share his emotions. 
If he is concerned, the Greeks may believe that they should be too.  
 Cyrus could have become angry and ordered the Greeks to stop fighting. He 
could even have threatened to withhold their pay, because the Greeks are driven 
primarily by money in their relationship with Cyrus. However, these options may 
have instilled fear of Cyrus or hostile feelings towards him in the Greeks. Whereas 
Cyrus presents himself as being angry towards his Persians (for example, at 1.5.7-8), 
Cyrus‟ authority with the Greeks rests on positive feelings felt towards him, and so 
he evokes fear of others rather than fear of punishment from himself. He displays a 
favourable disposition towards the Greeks, especially when enjoying seeing them 
scare his barbarians (1.2.18). Thus, the character of Cyrus that the audience already 
recognises governs the emotional appeal that Cyrus selects. The Greeks know that he 
values them, does not get angry with them, and is concerned with his own mission. 
Cyrus also has an existing reputation with the Greeks for being generous with his 
money (see 1.9.17 and 6.4.8, for example) and magnanimous (we shall see this in the 
next example), and this also constrains him. He is unlikely to want to undermine his 
reputation by withholding payment or punishing the Greeks for their indiscipline. 
Further, he perhaps cannot risk making the Greeks feel negativity towards him 
because his relationship with them may still be slightly fraught after their recent 
mutiny against continuing with him at Tarsus (1.3.1ff.), and because he has recently 
told the Greeks that he deceived them over the aim of the mission (1.4.11-13). 
The prevailing mood in the audience further constrains his choice of emotion 
to evoke because the anger is strong and can only be combatted with equally strong 
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emotions. The situation also limits his choice because he needs those present to stop 
what they are doing immediately and to restore discipline, and so needs to appeal to 
an impactful emotion that will make the army act well and be obedient. Cyrus 
perhaps perceives that if he makes a strong appeal here, the effect on obedience 
could be long lasting. Indeed, there is no more infighting.   
Emotional Appeals Responding to Mixed Feelings about Leaders 
Cyrus’ Appeal to Anger, Fear, Confidence and Goodwill/Friendly Feelings (1.4.8) 
The generals Xenias and Pasion have deserted the army because a number of their 
soldiers went over to Clearchus when he claimed that he would follow his soldiers 
back to Greece during their mutiny against Cyrus. Cyrus let the soldiers stay with 
Clearchus, causing Xenias and Pasion to feel ambitious rivalry (θηινηηκεζέληεο). 
After Xenias and Pasion left, the narrator reveals that there were rumours that Cyrus 
had sent triremes after them. Cyrus calls the remaining generals together to address 
them (1.4.7). Neither the narrator nor Cyrus himself reveals Cyrus‟ aims and 
motivations. 
 In this speech, Cyrus indirectly appeals to anger, fear, confidence and 
friendly feelings. He opens by stating that Xenias and Pasion have deserted 
(ἀπνιεινίπαζηλ) „us‟ (ἡκᾶο). Not only does this clearly describe what the crime is, 
perhaps in case anyone in the audience thought that the pair were justified in their 
actions, but it also highlights that this is a crime against all the leaders, rather than 
just against Cyrus. This may create a feeling of unity between the audience and 
Cyrus, and may also make the audience feel both wronged and angry at Xenias and 
Pasion. Using an imperative, Cyrus says to let Xenias and Pasion know that they 
have not escaped, because he knows where they are and could attack their ship with 
his triremes. This may indirectly evoke some fear in the internal audience of Cyrus 
and his power to get revenge, by making the generals think of what might happen if 
they tried to desert Cyrus. However, Cyrus swears by the gods not to pursue Xenias 
and Pasion, and says that no one will say that he uses (ρξῶκαη) a person when that 
person is present, but that when the person wants to leave him, he seizes (ζπιιαβὼλ) 
him, treats him badly (θαθῶο πνηῶ) and strips (ἀπνζπιῶ) him of his possessions. 
Here Cyrus is presenting himself as generous, and perhaps is trying to evoke friendly 
feelings towards himself, while at the same time playing on fears of what some 
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leaders are known do. The generals can be confident that they would be treated in the 
same way as Xenias and Pasion, and that their own good service to Cyrus will stand 
them in good stead for the future. Cyrus tells the audience to let Xenias and Pasion 
go, knowing that they behaved worse (θαθίνπο) towards „us‟ than Cyrus and the 
generals did to Xenias and Pasion. Again, Cyrus is associating himself with the 
Greek generals. Here, he is asking the audience to take the moral high ground, and is 
perhaps trying to unite the different feelings that the generals have towards Xenias 
and Pasion, which I shall discuss below, so that the generals are firmly against them.  
Cyrus says that he has Xenias and Pasion‟s wives and children still, but that 
he will return these because of Xenias and Pasion‟s excellence (ἀξεη῅ο) towards 
him. Here, Cyrus is demonstrating his familiarity with and respect for Greek values. 
Without needing to say it explicitly, he is subtly representing himself as valuing 
ἀξεηή and understanding what it means to the Greeks. He knows that this will be 
important to the Greeks‟ character assessment of him, and that they will be inclined 
to think that he is a man of virtue because he recognises and appreciates this quality 
in others. Cyrus seems to understand what Anaximenes later advises; a speaker is 
judged on the language he uses, for example, if he uses shameful language about 
shameful deeds (Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 35.18, 1441b.20-2). Cyrus indicates his 
desire to reciprocate the good others have done for him without reciprocating the 
bad. Again, this may make the audience feel positively towards Cyrus. 
 The narrator indicates before the speech that some of the army hoped that 
Xenias and Pasion would be caught because they were cowards, but others pitied 
(ᾤθηηξνλ) them for what would happen if they were to be captured (1.4.7). It is clear 
that the generals expect Cyrus to go after Xenias and Pasion to obtain revenge for 
their desertion. While some think this is what they deserve, those feeling pity are 
perhaps questioning the rightness of the decision. The generals presumably feel pity 
because they believe that they may suffer the same punishment from Cyrus as 
Xenias and Pasion. This prefigures Aristotle‟s discussion whereby he argues that 
pity for others is felt by those who believe that they may experience the same pitiful 
circumstances (Rhetorica 2.8, 1385b.13-19). Thus, they perhaps fear Cyrus. Cyrus 
attempts to redirect the negative emotions towards Xenias and Pasion and the 
positive emotions towards himself by making it clear that he could punish Xenias 
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and Pasion for their poor behaviour towards them all but that he has chosen not to, 
and by explaining his reason for not pursing them.  
The narrator says that even those Greeks who had little heart (ἀζπκόηεξνο) 
for the anabasis proceeded more gladly (ἥδηνλ) and eagerly (πξνζπκόηεξνλ) when 
they heard of Cyrus‟ excellence (ἀξεηὴλ, 1.4.9). This suggests that report of his 
words spread throughout the army. While it does not reveal exactly what emotions 
the Greeks were feeling, it indicates that Cyrus succeeded in presenting himself well 
and making the men feel positively towards him, which made them in turn feel 
positively towards the march. It also indicates the extent of the unrest caused by the 
situation itself. Cyrus succeeds because he has recognised that the incident has 
caused some doubt about his leadership and character. He understands what kind of 
paymaster the men desire and, through his presentation of himself, he is able to 
evoke positive emotions.  
As we saw regarding the previous example, Cyrus constantly tries to have the 
Greeks think positively of him and so the choice of emotions to appeal to here fits 
with his other attempts at building an ethos. Previously, Cyrus has concentrated on 
convincing the Greeks of his financial generosity, and his magnanimity is a 
relatively new trait within his speeches. However, the Greeks are aware of this 
aspect of his character. The narrator says that some soldiers wanted to join Cyrus‟ 
mission because they had heard about Cyrus‟ excellence (ἀξεηὴλ, 6.4.8), and so he 
clearly cultivates this aspect of his reputation. Such respect for his reputed goodness 
and the fact that he has not displayed it particularly before now may explain why the 
leaders react with such positive feelings after this speech. They perhaps also still 
have in their minds Clearchus‟ warning that Cyrus is a good friend but a dangerous 
enemy (1.3.12). Cyrus‟ speech perhaps reassures the Greeks that he does not classify 
others simply as friend or enemy, but takes into account past behaviour. He appears 
to value good service over the need for revenge, to know when it is appropriate 
simply to be the bigger man and to be generous and kind rather than prone to anger 
and revenge, although he has the power to punish if he wishes. Cyrus clearly 
carefully manages his reputation and is concerned with what others think about him 
because, in this speech, he mentions what other people will say about his treatment 
of those who have worked for him. In Cyrus‟ obituary, the narrator dwells on some 
of the aspects the Greeks may have heard about Cyrus‟ reputation. He discusses 
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Cyrus‟ good treatment of friends (e.g. 1.9.10 and 1.9.24-8), and claims that Cyrus 
does not let good service go unrewarded (1.9.18). The narrator further indicates that 
Cyrus treats well those who were faithful (πηζηνὺο), kindly (εὔλνπο) and steadfast 
(βεβαίνπο, 1.9.30), as Xenias and Pasion formerly were. Cyrus is thus limited in his 
choice of emotional appeal by his carefully constructed existing reputation. Cyrus 
has to play on the positive feelings that such a reputation induces. A stronger appeal 
to fear might have left the generals in constant terror of Cyrus, which would alienate 
them. Cyrus is also constrained in his choice of emotions to appeal to by the 
situation, because he needs to unify and encourage the leaders, and the prevailing 
mood in the audience, because he needs to eradicate doubt about him. 
Cheirisophus’ Appeal to Goodwill/Friendly Feelings and Confidence (6.1.32-3) 
The soldiers want Xenophon to take the role of sole commander, but, after 
consulting the gods, Xenophon turns down the request (6.1.25-9). He tells the army 
that it is not advisable to elect him when a Spartan is present who could take the role. 
If the army elects him, he says, the Spartans external to the army would no longer aid 
the Cyreans and would persecute him. Also, he says that within the army, someone, 
presumably Cheirisophus, would be angry with the soldiers and with him. After this 
speech, more people want Xenophon to be the commander, and Agasias says that it 
is absurd (γεινῖνλ) if the case is as Xenophon says it is. Agasias facetiously asks if 
the Spartans will also be angry if at dinner parties a Spartan is not chosen to preside 
over affairs. He also says that this must mean that the Arcadians cannot be captains 
because of their ethnicity. The soldiers shout that Agasias is right (6.1.30), and 
Xenophon tells the army that the gods advised him not to take the role (6.1.31). Thus 
(νὕησ), the army choose Cheirisophus for the role (6.1.32). In acceptance, 
Cheirisophus gives a speech to the army. Neither the narrator nor Cheirisophus 
specifies why Cheirisophus speaks. 
 Cheirisophus indirectly appeals to goodwill/friendly feelings and confidence. 
He begins with a statement about his own character in relation to what would have 
happened if he had not been chosen. He is emphatic in his words, telling the army to 
„know this‟ (ηνῦην…ἴζηε), that he would not have caused discord (νὐδ'…ἔγσγε 
ἐζηαζίαδνλ) if the army had chosen someone else. In this, he is attempting to refute 
Xenophon‟s suggestion that he would be angry with the men. He is trying to evoke 
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confidence that he would not have caused trouble over something the army deemed 
best, and confidence that he does not prioritise Spartan politics over the army. From 
this, he may hope that the army will feel goodwill towards him, or friendly feelings.  
 Cheirisophus next goes on to explain why not choosing Xenophon as sole 
commander benefitted (ὠλήζαηε) Xenophon. He says that Dexippus, a Laconian, has 
been slandering Xenophon to Anaxibius by claiming that Xenophon preferred to lead 
the army with a Dardanian rather than with him. The detail of Dexippus‟ slander 
reinforces Xenophon‟s words about Spartans taking issue with non-Spartans having 
control of the Cyreans and blaming Xenophon for preventing Spartan leadership. 
This comment seems intended to give the army confidence that it has made the right 
decision over the leadership for its own and for Xenophon‟s chances of safety and 
success. Cheirisophus‟ words here may also evoke good feelings towards himself 
because he is not like other Spartans and, according to his account, has taken a stance 
against the criticism of Xenophon by trying hard (κάια) to silence Dexippus.92 
Cheirisophus may earn his audience‟s goodwill for representing himself as backing 
the soldiers‟ favourite leader and for hindering a man who previously deserted from 
the army.  
Finally, Cheirisophus says that since the army has chosen him, he will try to 
do whatever good (ἀγαζὸλ) he can. He then gives the men orders for sailing to 
Heracleia and says that they will take counsel when they arrive about the remainder 
of their journey. It is only here that Cheirisophus talks of himself as part of the 
audience. In the rest of the speech, he uses the first person singular and second 
personal plural. While this may make the speech seem adversarial, Cheirisophus is 
also asserting what he will do for the army, and so this is perhaps necessary. He must 
hope that the army feels goodwill towards him for his claim that he wants to benefit 
the soldiers, although he only says that he will try to aid them, rather than 
confidently saying that he will do this. Despite this, he may hope that his assertion 
makes the army feel confident that it has chosen the right leader. In the 
Hipparchicus, Xenophon directly links benefitting soldiers and working in their 
interests with producing friendly feelings (6.1-6). This is presumably part of the 
                                                             
92
 Cheirisophus does refer to the army as Clearchus’ (6.1.32), which may betray a tendency to 
assume that Spartans were the key leaders of the army and indicate that he is concealing his real 
feelings here. However, he may just be repeating what Dexippus said.   
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contemporary discussions about these two emotions. Aristotle seems to draw on the 
same idea when he says that men like those who they think want to do them good 
(Rhetorica 2.3, 1381a.13). Cheirisophus backs this up by assertively issuing 
commands, which may be designed to make the men feel confident that they have 
chosen an authoritative leader, as they desired. 
 Cheirisophus has to attempt to win the army‟s support and trust by evoking 
friendly feelings and confidence because his audience‟s mood is hostile towards him 
at the beginning of his speech due to Xenophon‟s and Agasias‟ speeches. Assuming 
the army believed Xenophon and Agasias, its members presumably think that 
Cheirisophus is an obstacle to them having Xenophon as their leader and believe that 
he would take out his anger on them. Cheirisophus is also a representative of the 
people who would deliberately hinder the army‟s journey because of their own 
dissatisfaction with the troops‟ choice of commander, and who believe they have a 
right to leadership without earning it. Xenophon‟s speech revealing that the gods did 
not approve of him taking the role may have convinced the army that it should not 
choose Xenophon as leader, but there is no indication that it softened the mood 
towards Cheirisophus. Cheirisophus thus tries to counteract the existing mood by 
positively representing the situation, his own character, and his intentions, and by 
projecting himself as the leader that they desire. 
No response is indicated, but the army do make the journey to Heracleia. 
Thus, Cheirisophus‟ audience has been persuaded enough not to argue with him 
immediately. His success is only partial and short-term, however, because in the 
longer-term, the mood of the army becomes apparent. Soon after the army arrives in 
Heracleia, Lycon criticises the generals for not providing the army with money or 
provisions (6.2.4). This suggests that Lycon at least is already upset with what 
Cheirisophus is providing for them, and that he does not feel confident that 
Cheirisophus will benefit them. Lycon proposes demanding money from the locals 
and the army nominates ambassadors to do this (6.2.4-6). Cheirisophus and 
Xenophon both object to the plan on moral grounds but are ignored (6.2.6-7). This 
indicates that the mood in the army is fractious and that the soldiers are unwilling to 
obey their sole commander or even the man they first wanted as sole commander. 
They clearly neither feel goodwill towards Cheirisophus, nor confidence in him. 
When Lycon‟s mission backfires, Lycon and Callimachus try to persuade the 
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Arcadians and Achaeans to break off into their own division so that they can make 
profit to take home themselves (6.2.7-12). Lycon and Callimachus clearly believe 
that Xenophon is the real leader of the army, because they say that it is shameful for 
Peloponnesians and Spartans to be under an Athenian who brought no troops 
(6.2.10). These speakers have now disregarded Cheirisophus. They clearly have no 
confidence in his command and do not feel enough goodwill towards him even to 
pretend that they recognise his authority. The subsequent division of the army 
suggests that these feelings towards Cheirisophus extend beyond these two men and 
that the troops have no loyalty towards him either. The narrator comments that 
Cheirisophus‟ sole command dissolved after six or seven days (6.2.12). 
Cheirisophus‟ speech, although it successfully brought the men to Heracleia, clearly 
did not succeed in engendering lasting goodwill towards himself or confidence in his 
command.  
Cheirisophus fails in evoking friendly feelings and confidence towards 
himself in the long-term because he cannot replace the army‟s negative opinion of 
him with a positive opinion. There are two key reasons for this. Firstly, he cannot 
live up to his claims that he will benefit the army because his speech after obtaining 
sole command indicates that he is already not going to give the soldiers what they 
want from a leader. The men have expressly elected a sole commander because they 
want to return home with profit and believe that one leader would be able to make 
decisions faster and better than if he had to consult with other generals (6.1.18). The 
troops may be frustrated that Cheirisophus is not simply making decisions for them 
but wishes to take counsel about the remainder of the journey when they reach 
Heracleia.
93
 Secondly, the Greeks have recently discovered to their cost what 
happens when they trust Cheirisophus and put their hopes in him after being 
persuaded by him. We can briefly examine this episode for its impact on his speech 
regarding the sole command. 
Cheirisophus’ Appeal to Hope (5.1.4) 
Having reached Trapezus, the soldiers have made it clear that they want to return 
home by ship (5.1.2-3). Cheirisophus speaks in response and says that he has a friend 
(θίινο) who happens to be the admiral of the Spartan fleet and, if the army sends him 
                                                             
93 See also Humble (1997, 84-5) for this interpretation of Cheirisophus’ suggestion to call a meeting.  
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to his friend, he thinks (νἴνκαη) that he can bring back triremes and merchant ships to 
take the army home. He says that if indeed the soldiers want to go by sea, they 
should await his return, and that he will return quickly (ηαρέσο). In explaining his 
personal relationship with such a high-ranking individual, Cheirisophus is giving the 
soldiers hope that he will be able to fulfil their wishes to return home, in ease and 
comfort, without them needing to act. His audience may even begin to dream of 
home. Cheirisophus himself seems confident in his ability to obtain ships, which 
may be designed to make the men feel confident in turn. In saying that he will return 
quickly, Cheirisophus gives confidence about the ease of his mission and arouses 
hope that the army will be home soon. Again, Cheirisophus speaks of „I‟ and „you‟ 
except when he mentions ships that will carry „us‟. Thus, in both speeches, he 
mainly discusses what he can do for the army and only once links himself with its 
other members.  
Before this speech, the army felt jaded, but Cheirisophus counteracted this 
mood through his own confidence in his friendship. In response, the narrator says 
that the soldiers are delighted (ἥζζεζάλ) and vote for Cheirisophus to set sail as 
quickly as possible. The soldiers are clearly confident that Cheirisophus can deliver 
on his claims. This is perhaps mainly because he is telling them what they want to 
hear and presents his friend as being likely to want to help. Xenophon, however, 
offers suggestions for what the army should do while waiting for Cheirisophus, 
including obtaining ships, because, he says, the army cannot be certain (ἄδεινλ) that 
Cheirisophus will return with enough ships. (5.1.10-11). If he does, they will have 
more to return home on, but if he does not, they can use what they have procured. 
Thus, Xenophon has not been completely convinced by Cheirisophus‟ words, and 
has to remind the army to be realistic. The army agrees with Xenophon‟s proposal 
(5.1.11). This may mean that the men are now doubting Cheirisophus too or simply 
that they can see the benefit of having more ships at their disposal.  
Cheirisophus does not return until 6.1.16. In this passage, the narrator says 
that the soldiers expected (πξνζεδόθσλ) that Cheirisophus would come back with 
something for them, suggesting that they still had hope in Cheirisophus upon his 
return. However, he only brings one trireme and a vague promise of future pay from 
Anaxibius. The narrator does not indicate how the soldiers reacted to this, yet his 
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statement that Cheirisophus brought nothing (ὁ δ' ἦγε κὲλ νὐδέλ) to meet the men‟s 
expectations with seems critical.  
Cheirisophus represents himself here as someone who has friends in high 
places, as being at the service of the army, as recognising that he has to gain the 
men‟s consent to be sent on a mission by them rather than choosing to go himself, 
and as being confident in his success. The army has little reason to doubt this. Before 
this speech, he led troops adequately (3.5.4, 4.2.8, 4.3.17 and 4.3.20-7), worked well 
with Xenophon (4.2.25-6 and 4.5.34), and acted beneficially for the army (4.5.9-10, 
4.5.22 and 4.6.23). Although Xenophon is superior tactically (3.4.38-42 and 4.7.2-8) 
and Cheirisophus rarely took the lead in making decisions, the only thing that 
Cheirisophus had done that was detrimental to the army was to strike, but not bind, a 
guide, leading to the guide‟s escape (4.6.2-3).94 His choice to evoke hope is therefore 
partly dependent on his previous reputation with the army and partly the character he 
projects in his speech. 
To return to Cheirisophus‟ speech after being given sole command, the 
soldiers may still bear Cheirisophus ill will from the incident where he failed to 
deliver on the hope he had evoked. Thus, Cheirisophus‟ choice of emotions to appeal 
to does not take into account his prior negative reputation in the eyes of the men of 
not living up to his words. In his speech regarding the sole command, Cheirisophus 
again represents himself as wanting what is best for the army. He also presents 
himself as being content to allow another leader to rule, as being concerned for 
Xenophon‟s well-being, and as having the authority to issue commands. However, 
for this positive presentation of his character and his evocation of positive emotions 
to be persuasive, his audience also has to believe that he is trustworthy, which they 
do not.  
Although he is limited in his choice of emotions to appeal to by needing to 
dismiss the current hostile mood against him, and limited by the situation which 
demanded giving the soldiers a reason to want to follow him, he did not necessarily 
have to try to evoke positive emotions towards himself. Cheirisophus might have 
been more successful playing on the fear of his anger that Xenophon the character 
                                                             
94 See further Nussbaum (1967, 116-17 and 131) for Cheirisophus’ “administrative” rather than 
“directive” leadership of the army, combined with his “spirit of disinterested public service”. 
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had evoked about him when he rejected sole command, backed by the threat of other 
Spartans hindering the army‟s return. Perhaps Xenophon the character recognised 
that this was the only way that Cheirisophus could persuade the men to follow him 
after his last attempt to raise hope. 
We can briefly compare Cyrus‟ and Cheirisophus‟ emotional appeals 
responding to doubt about themselves. While they both try to evoke friendly 
feelings, and both even try to use the behaviour of others (Xenias and Pasion, and 
Dexippus) to do this, Cyrus‟ appeal is a master class of successful emotional 
persuasion whereas Cheirisophus‟ is not. This stems from the very different ways in 
which the two speakers take into account their previous reputations and established 
characters, and perhaps Cyrus‟ identification with the leaders compared to 
Cheirisophus‟ distance from his audience. However, we shall see at the end of this 
chapter that this does not mean that Cyrus is a positive example to emulate and that 
Cheirisophus is entirely negative.   
Emotional Appeals Responding to Speeches by Outsiders 
Cleanor’s Appeal to Shame and Fear (2.5.39) 
After the Persians have tricked the Greek commanders to their deaths, Ariaeus, 
Artaozus, Mithridates, Tissaphernes‟ brother and three hundred Persians come to 
give a message to the remaining Greek leaders. Cleanor, Sophaenetus and Xenophon 
go to hear the message and are told that the king demands the Greeks‟ arms and that 
Clearchus has received the punishment he deserved. Cleanor responds on the 
Greeks‟ behalf but the narrator does not reveal Cleanor‟s aims or motivations. 
Cleanor directly appeals to shame. He asks Ariaeus and the other former 
friends of Cyrus if they are not ashamed (νὐθ αἰζρύλεζζε) before gods and men of 
what they have done. Cleanor here implies that the Persians‟ deeds have been 
witnessed by all and that they will be judged for them. Cleanor continues by using 
indirect appeals to shame during his description of his audience‟s actions. He passes 
negative judgement on Ariaeus‟ behaviour by calling him the worst of men (θάθηζηε 
ἀλζξώπσλ). Cleanor similarly criticises his audience‟s choice of ally, Tissaphernes, 
whom he calls the most godless (ἀζεσηάηῳ) and wicked (παλνπξγνηάηῳ) man. 
Through this, he attempts to evoke shame in his audience because of its members‟ 
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association with Tissaphernes. Cleanor refers to Ariaeus, Artaozus and Mithridates 
as being former friends of Cyrus. This reminds the trio of how they have turned their 
backs on this friendship. Cleanor twice mentions the betrayal that the Persians have 
carried out on the Greeks (πξνδόληεο… πξνδεδσθόηεο). This confronts the Persians 
with their immoral behaviour. He also twice mentions oaths that the Persians have 
broken (ὀκόζαληεο…ὤκλπηε). Breaking oaths is an offence against the divine, and 
this repetition may be designed to indirectly evoke fear in the Persians that the gods 
will punish them. The gods have the power to act, even if the Greeks do not. As 
Aristotle later discusses, this is the threat of impending destruction by those who 
want and are able to harm the audience.  
Cleanor reminds his audience of how it would have been proper to act. The 
Persians and the Greeks should have had the same friends and enemies, but the 
Persians did not adhere to this convention. Instead, the audience destroyed 
(ἀπνισιέθαηε) the Greek generals and brought enemies (πνιεκίνηο) against the 
remainder of the Greeks. This again confronts the Persians with their corrupt actions, 
which, Cleanor implies, they should regret. Cleanor‟s appeal anticipates Aristotle 
who argues that shame is a feeling of pain, or a psychological disturbance due to 
immoral actions that bring ill-repute (ἀδνμίαλ, Rhetorica 2.6, 1383b12-14).  
The narrator does not indicate Ariaeus‟ or his associates‟ mood at either the 
beginning or end of Cleanor‟s speech. However, when delivering the message from 
the king, Ariaeus seems confident in the rightness of the Persians‟ actions and the 
message he is delivering. Cleanor thus tries to counteract Ariaeus‟ mood by taking 
away the basis for Ariaeus‟ confidence. His methods are to recount what it is about 
the Persians‟ actions that render them shameful and what they have to fear because 
of their actions. After the speech, Ariaeus replies that it is clear that Clearchus had 
been plotting against Tissaphernes, Orontas and their followers for a long time 
(2.5.40). By further justifying the Persians‟ actions, Ariaeus appears confident still 
that the Persians acted rightly. Clearly, Ariaeus feels no shame, regret or fear and 
Cleanor‟s appeal has failed.  
Cleanor positions himself and the Greeks in general as critics of the Persians, 
and implies that the gods will also look unfavourably upon the Persians‟ actions. 
However, part of the reason for Cleanor‟s failure is that the Persians do not respect 
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Cleanor or believe that he is right. The again pre-empts Aristotle, who says that 
people feel shame in front of those they esteem (Rhetorica 2.6. 1384a.23-5). Cleanor 
takes it for granted that the Persians will be god fearing and will feel shame at what 
they have done. However, it is clear from Ariaeus‟ words before and after Cleanor‟s 
speech that the Persians blame Clearchus for breaking the truce and reneging on his 
oath, even if this is pretence. Therefore, the Persians present themselves as believing 
that there is no longer a truce and so no oaths preventing them from harming the 
Greeks. They thus do not fear divine retribution because they do not believe that they 
have done anything worthy of punishment. Cleanor fails to comprehend the Persian 
standpoint and that the Persians are trying to make the Greeks feel guilty for 
breaking their oaths.    
 Cleanor has previously spoken with several ambassadors from the Persians, 
led by Phalinus. He is represented as saying in oratio obliqua that the Greeks would 
prefer to die than hand over their arms (2.1.10). The ambassadors do not reply and 
Cleanor‟s statement, although brave, is ineffective. It is perhaps unlikely that the 
impression of Cleanor obtained from this meeting was relayed to the Persian 
ambassadors present for the speech under discussion. Thus, Cleanor is not 
constrained in his choice of emotions to evoke by his character as already known by 
his audience. He projects his character through the speech itself and presents himself 
as a morally upright man who knows the correct way to behave concerning friends 
and oaths, and who judges others on their actions. In this respect, shame and fear of 
punishment from the gods are appropriate emotional responses to try to evoke in 
relation to his projected character. However, it is clear that Cleanor‟s emotional 
appeal is not made more effective by his ethos. Rather than being constrained by his 
own reputation, Cleanor is limited in his choice of emotions to appeal to by Ariaeus‟ 
confidence and the situation itself. In the latter case, both the Persians and Greeks are 
aware that the Persians currently hold all the advantages.     
Xenophon’s Appeal to Shame and Fear (5.5.13-23) 
Hecatonymus, the spokesman for a group of Sinopean ambassadors, confronts the 
Greek army in the Greek camp about its behaviour towards certain communities that 
are Sinopean apoikoi and pay tribute to Sinope (5.5.8-12). After opening his speech 
with an attempt to gain goodwill, typical of a prooimion, Hecatonymus claims that, 
109 
 
as fellow Greeks and because they have done the Cyreans no harm, the Sinopeans 
deserve good treatment from the Cyreans. He then gets to the issue at hand and says 
that any harm done to the Cotyorites equates to harming the Sinopeans too. 
Hecatonymus then tries to evoke shame in the Greeks. He describes what he has 
heard about the Cyreans‟ behaviour towards the Cotyorites, particularly about them 
using force (βίᾳ) and not obtaining consent for their actions (νὐ πείζνληαο). 
Hecatonymus presents the Cyreans as thieves who go where they are unwelcome. He 
says that the Sinopeans do not think this is fitting behaviour (νὐθ ἀμηνῦκελ). 
Hecatonymus is judging the Cyreans as breaking cardinal codes of behaviour in 
harming friendly fellow Greeks. Thus, he presents the Sinopeans as judging the 
Cyreans‟ actions as being poor by Greek standards. Implicit in this criticism is the 
idea that the Cyreans‟ actions could affect the way the other Greeks who may hear 
about them will think of the Cyreans, and that their reputation may be affected. 
Hecatonymus ends his speech with a threat. He describes the consequences of 
continuing such shameful behaviour. If the Cyreans continue their actions, the 
Sinopeans will be forced to make friends with the ruler of Paphlagonia, the 
Paphlagonians and anyone else they can. Hecatonymus does not actually say that the 
Sinopeans and their allies would attack the Cyreans, but this is implied.
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Hecatonymus is linking the Cyreans‟ safety to their own choice of how to behave. 
The intended effect is surely that the Cyreans should fear a potentially dangerous 
situation and enemy. 
The mood of the Greek army before the speech is not specified, but there is 
no indication that it is feeling anything other than content with its actions. 
Hecatonymus is thus presumably trying to counteract this existing mood by trying to 
evoke emotions that will make the Greek army stop the actions that are 
disadvantageous to the Sinopeans. Xenophon responds for the soldiers, indirectly 
appealing to the same emotions in return. Xenophon is here speaking as one of the 
assembly rather than as someone who has been specifically addressed or as a 
nominated spokesperson. It is unclear how others in the army responded to 
Hecatonymus‟ attempts to evoke shame and fear, but, as Xenophon the character 
presents it, he evoked neither in Xenophon.  
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 In a second speech at 5.6.3, Hecatonymus backtracks and claims that he did not actually threaten 
war against the Greeks in his first speech but said that the Sinopeans would befriend the Greeks 
rather than the barbarians. 
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In the first part of the speech, Xenophon refutes the criticisms Hecatonymus 
implied. This may begin to make the Sinopeans feel uneasy. The Cyreans are happy 
just to be alive, Xenophon says, and they have not had to opportunity to gain plunder 
because they were too busy saving themselves. This challenges Hecatonymus‟ 
presentation of the army as thieves. Next, Xenophon describes how the army has 
acted since reaching Greek cities. The Trapezuntians, he says, provided a market and 
so the Cyreans bought provisions from them. Because the Trapezuntians gave the 
Cyreans honours and gifts, the Cyreans honoured them in return by not harming the 
Trapezuntians‟ barbarian friends, and by harming the Trapezuntians‟ enemies. 
Xenophon‟s tone is reasonable here but the Sinopeans can presumably guess at how 
Xenophon‟s argument will continue. Indeed, he seems to be attempting to make the 
Sinopeans feel shame at accusing the Cyreans of acting immorally.  
Xenophon tells the Sinopeans to ask the Trapezuntians what kind of people 
the Cyreans are, and this is possible because the Trapezuntians sent guides along 
with the Cyreans out of friendship. Xenophon is here offering proof that the army 
previously acted well, and again he may hope that the Sinopeans feel shame at the 
thought that they have accused good people. Xenophon next describes what happens 
when the Cyreans face barbarians or Greeks who do not provide a market: they take 
provisions because they need to, not through hubris. He lists the Carducians, 
Taochians and Chaldaeans who were not subject to the king and who were extremely 
fearsome (κάια θνβεξνὺο), but whom the Cyreans became enemies with because 
they needed provisions and because these people would not provide a market. The 
Macronians, he says, provided a market and so, even though they were barbarians, 
the Cyreans did not take anything from them by force. In describing the army‟s 
moral choices, Xenophon may be attempting to make the Sinopeans regret their 
judgements. In describing how the Cyreans overcame fearsome people who refused 
to help them, Xenophon may also be trying to evoke fear of what could happen if the 
Cyreans turn on the Cotyorites and Sinopeans. He may also be trying to shame the 
Sinopeans because they based their criticism of the Cyreans on the belief that Greeks 
should behave well to other Greeks, whereas the Cyreans base their behaviour on 
others‟ actions towards them, irrespective of whether they are Greek or not. Harming 
111 
 
enemies and helping friends is a particularly common refrain in Greek literature, and 
so the attitude Xenophon represents may be the more commendable one.
96
  
Xenophon next turns to the current situation. If the Cyreans have taken from 
the Cotyorites, he says, the Cotyorites are responsible (αἴηηνί) because they were not 
friendly to the Cyreans. Instead, they shut the Cyreans out of their city, refused to 
admit the Cyreans and would not send out a market. Indeed, he says, the Cotyorites 
claimed that the harmost sent by the Sinopeans was to blame (αἴηηνλ) for them 
carrying out these actions. This undermines the moral high ground that Hecatonymus 
claimed for the Sinopeans, and particularly his claim that Greeks should treat other 
Greeks well. Thus, Xenophon may be trying to evoke feelings of shame in the 
Sinopeans because they did not act in the way they claim others should. Xenophon is 
perhaps implying that such behaviour might bring dishonour to the Sinopeans, and 
we have seen that Aristotle links feeling shame with anticipating dishonour. 
Xenophon is positioning himself as judging the Sinopeans and presenting the 
Cyreans as being innocent of crimes that the Sinopeans are guilty of. This perhaps 
anticipates Aristotle‟s argument that people are ashamed in front of those who 
cannot be accused of the same poor deeds (Rhetorica 2.6, 1384b.1-2).  
Xenophon next directly challenges Hecatonymus‟ claim that the Cyreans 
entered the city by force. He says that the Cyreans asked the Cotyorites to take in 
their sick men, but that the Cotyorites did not open their gates. Instead, the Cyreans 
found their own way into the city. They did this without using force, he says, except 
for the fact that the sick are living in the Cotyorites‟ houses and paying expenses and 
that the Cyreans are guarding the gates so that the sick will not be subject to the 
Sinopeans‟ harmost and can be taken back when the Cyreans want. Again, 
Xenophon is indicating that the Sinopeans should be ashamed of their accusations. 
He continues by saying that the rest of the soldiers, as the Sinopeans can see, are 
encamped outside of the Cotyorites‟ houses, in formation, prepared, if anyone treats 
them well (εὖ), to treat these people well (εὖ) in return, and if anyone treats them 
badly (θαθῶο), to repay that too. In saying that the Sinopeans can see where most of 
the army is, Xenophon may be attempting to make the Sinopeans feel ashamed that 
                                                             
96 Dover (1974, 180-4) lists the most important passages portraying this attitude from Xenophon and 
his contemporaries. 
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they have deliberately ignored evidence about the Cyreans‟ actions that was before 
their eyes.  
Finally, Xenophon tries to evoke fear in the Sinopeans. He refers to 
Hecatonymus‟ threat (ἠπείιεζαο) to become allies with Corylas, the ruler of 
Paphlagonia, and the Paphlagonians, and says that the Cyreans are ready to take on 
the Sinopeans and the Paphlagonians together, because they have already fought far 
bigger enemies. Xenophon also says that the Cyreans might decide instead to 
become friends with Corylas, who, the Greeks have heard, desires (ἐπηζπκεῖλ) the 
Sinopeans‟ city and coastal strongholds. He claims that the Cyreans will be good 
friends to Corylas by helping him take what he wants. Here, Xenophon is making a 
counter-threat and confronting the Sinopeans with the possibility that they may 
imminently face a strong enemy that has the power and intent to ruin them. Again, 
this anticipates what Aristotle later says about evoking fear. Xenophon represents 
himself as being unconcerned by the threat posed by the Sinopeans and their allies. 
Thus, the Sinopeans may lose confidence in the power of their own threat. They may 
also recognise that the Cyreans have a better chance of becoming allies with the 
Paphlagonian than they do.
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The narrator says before Hecatonymus‟ speech that the Sinopeans are afraid 
(θνβνύκελνη) for the city of the Cotyorites, which they own and get tribute from, and 
for the territory around it, because they have heard that the Cyreans are ravaging it 
(5.5.7). However, they present themselves as confident, righteous and indignant. 
Xenophon appears to see through this false bravado and understand that the 
Sinopeans are bluffing. Thus, in his speech, he may be attempting to build on the 
Sinopeans‟ fear by undermining the reasons they presented for having confidence, 
namely that the Cyreans are in the wrong and that they could drive the Cyreans 
away.  
                                                             
97 Buzzetti (2014, 17-18, 206 n.76, and 207 n.78) argues that in this speech, Xenophon puts a 
particularly positive spin on the Cyreans’ dealings with the tribes he mentions, and even represents 
one tribe as fearsome when they were actually shown in the narrative to be weak. Thus, there is an 
element of deceit in Xenophon’s portrayal. Further, Hutchinson (2000, 59) highlights passage 5.5.2-
3, where the generals initially do not accept the Tibarenians’ friendly gifts because they wanted to 
attack the Tibarenian fortresses. The leaders consult the gods, who warn them not to attack. 
Hutchinson points to this as an episode demonstrating that the army’s “honour had slipped”. While 
this does suggest that the army were not always as devoted to the principles that Xenophon 
outlined, at least they consulted the gods about it before acting. Xenophon also does not use this as 
an example in his speech, and so does not lie. 
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Immediately after Xenophon‟s speech, the narrator states that Hecatonymus‟ 
fellow ambassadors made it clear that they were angry (ραιεπαίλνληεο) with 
Hecatonymus.
98
 One ambassador gives a speech and claims that the Sinopeans did 
not go to the Cyreans‟ camp to make war but to demonstrate that they were friends. 
This speaker promises the Cyreans gifts of hospitality and that the Sinopeans will tell 
the Cotyorites to aid the Cyreans (5.5.24). The Sinopeans fulfil their promises and 
the two sides are friendly to each other (5.5.25). It is not specified whether 
Xenophon actually evoked shame and fear in his audience. However, in dissociating 
themselves from Hecatonymus‟ criticism of the Cyreans and his threat to them, and 
claiming that they wanted friendship with the Cyreans, the ambassadors perhaps give 
away that they recognise, and indeed recognised before Hecatonymus‟ speech, that 
the Cyreans are not in the wrong and have the power to harm them. Thus, they may 
feel shame at having been called out on their false accusations. Also, if the 
Sinopeans feared for their territory beforehand, presumably they fear for their city 
more after Xenophon‟s speech.  
Xenophon is speaking in front of the rest of the army too. Their reaction is 
not given, but they do not interject to criticise his words or to stop him speaking. 
Xenophon has been successful in defending the army‟s actions and counteracting the 
Sinopeans‟ threat because he demonstrated that he believed that the Cyreans had no 
reason to be ashamed, whereas the Sinopeans did, and because he was able to present 
the army‟s threat as more fearsome than the Sinopeans‟.99 
Xenophon is unknown to the Sinopeans and so his choice of emotional 
appeal does not depend on what his audience already know about him. His ethos is 
                                                             
98 It is possible that the other Sinopean ambassadors are only dissociating themselves from 
Hecatonymus’ words because his appeal failed to shame or scare the Cyreans. Indeed, Hecatonymus 
gives a second speech to the Cyreans (5.6.3-10), which may suggest that the Sinopeans trusted him 
to speak on their behalf a second time, and therefore that he spoke as intended in his first speech. 
Rubinstein (forthcoming), however, notes that in Hecatonymus’ second speech, he speaks in the first 
person singular, on his own behalf. 
99 By contrast, Hecatonymus’ failure comes down to the ethos he has presented. Hecatonymus 
seems to believe that he and the Sinopeans in general are unknown to the Cyreans and that he does 
not have to take into account any prior reputation. Within his speech, Hecatonymus therefore 
creates his own version of the Sinopeans’ character. Xenophon appears to know enough about the 
Sinopeans and their situation, including their relationship with the Paphlagonians, to recognise that 
Hecatonymus is not representing the Sinopeans accurately. Although Hecatonymus is introduced as 
someone who was thought of as being a clever orator (προθγόρει δὲ Ἑκατώνυμοσ δεινὸσ 
νομιηόμενοσ εἶναι λζγειν, 5.5.7), his provocation of Xenophon, if not the rest of the army, indicates 
that he is far from this. 
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created through the speech itself. While he is not constrained by his reputation in his 
choice of emotional appeal, he is limited by the existing mood in his audience. He 
needs to choose emotions that will undercut Hecatonymus‟ projected confidence and 
exacerbate the Sinopeans‟ real feelings. The general demands of the situation also 
constrain Xenophon. Despite his claim that the army is willing to fight, he 
presumably does not want to make relations worse between the two sides and so has 
to attempt to evoke emotions that will persuade the Sinopeans to drop their 
opposition to the Cyreans without conflict.  
We can briefly compare Cleanor‟s and Xenophon‟s appeals to shame and 
fear. Both have no reputation with their audience, but whereas Cleanor cannot 
convince his audience of the rightness of his claims, Xenophon can. This is because 
Cleanor did not understand his audience‟s standpoint and so could not convince the 
Persians about the rightness of feeling shame and fear. By contrast, Xenophon 
recognises the Sinopeans‟ standpoint, sees through it, and is able to undermine it. He 
appeals to beliefs and knowledge that he knows his audience has, and is able to 
prove that he is right. The Sinopeans are forced to respect Xenophon‟s words and 
feel what he wants them to feel.  
Function of Emotional Appeals 
It is clear that Xenophon‟s readers can learn what makes a successful emotional 
appeal and what does not from the examples that Xenophon includes throughout the 
Anabasis. As well as particular methods of evoking an emotion, such as describing 
the consequences of an action to instil fear, we saw that a leader needs to judge the 
prevailing mood of his audience to see whether he would be most likely to succeed 
by building on the prevailing emotion or attempting to counteract it. A leader also 
needs some understanding of how emotional appeals have their effect and on what 
kinds of people. Further, if a leader has already established a character with his 
audience, he needs to make use of this to reinforce his emotional appeal, while also 
taking into account any prior reputation. The demands and opportunities of the 
situation must also govern the emotions that the speaker appeals to. By comparing 
and contrasting certain attempts at emotional persuasion, we were able to see even 
more clearly why certain appeals failed or were successful. This was especially the 
case with speeches that followed each other, such as Proxenus‟ and Cyrus‟ attempt to 
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stop the fighting within the army. Speeches that are further apart can also be 
compared in this way, such as Cleanor‟s and Xenophon‟s response to outsiders, and 
Cyrus‟ and Cheirisophus‟ attempts to engender positive feelings towards themselves.  
 However, there is more to the presentation of emotional appeals than 
simply representing success and failure. For example, Cleanor‟s and Xenophon‟s 
arguments about whether to face or avoid a particular enemy were both successful in 
evoking fear, but it is clear that one is superior to the other. Clearchus‟ and 
Xenophon‟s methods and degrees of success are similar when they confront leaders 
about their fears, as are Clearchus‟ and Cheirisophus‟ when they speak to soldiers 
who are afraid. However, these leaders have different levels of success in their 
generalships overall, and so their persuasion attempts should perhaps be judged 
differently too. To explore these subtleties, the reader needs to take into account the 
narrative connected to the speech, which changes the interpretation that emerges 
from the speeches we have examined significantly. Thus, the speeches cannot be 
taken out of their context.  
 Firstly, we can examine the short and long-term harm or benefit that the 
emotional appeal causes. When Clearchus evokes fear and confidence in the leaders 
by explaining their options, he immediately benefits himself and the leaders by 
giving them a plan of action and an authoritative figure to rally behind. The gods 
have recommended this option to Clearchus, although we only have Clearchus‟ word 
for this, and so it seems to be the correct option to take. However, in the longer term, 
joining with the friends of Cyrus proves fatal. This is because Clearchus leads the 
Greeks to their destruction when he trusts Tissaphernes enough to bring the leaders 
and soldiers into his trap. By contrast, Xenophon‟s speech to Proxenus‟ captains 
benefits himself, the captains and the whole army in both the short and long term. He 
has immediately given the captains purpose and made them act usefully, and over the 
longer course, has set the army on its way to escaping the king. Cleanor‟s speech 
trying to persuade the Greek leaders to attack the enemy immediately could have 
caused harm to the army if Xenophon had not stepped in to redirect the fear that he 
had most likely evoked. Xenophon‟s speech here benefits himself and his audience 
in the short term by stopping the army following Cleanor‟s plan, and in the long term 
by enabling the Greeks to overcome the enemy.  
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Clearchus‟ successful persuasion of the soldiers to stay with Ariaeus and 
Tissaphernes benefits the army and himself in the short term, in that they have not 
rashly departed and caused further problems for themselves. However, in the long 
term, the Persians do prove to be treacherous. Clearchus was not only wrong in his 
logic but himself facilitates this treachery. The consequences of this speech are 
ambiguous because staying might have been the most sensible option at the time, 
even if it was later to cause harm. Despite the ambiguity over Clearchus‟ actions 
here, he is elsewhere capable of unequivocally benefitting the army in the short and 
long term. I briefly mentioned him evoking confidence in the soldiers when they 
were panicking by giving the herald an announcement to make (n. 90), which keeps 
them from acting foolishly in the short term and prepares them for the forthcoming 
confrontation with the king‟s troops in the longer term. 
Because it is unclear whether Cheirisophus‟ appeal to a noble victory or a 
noble death has been persuasive, it is difficult to say whether he benefitted or harmed 
the army. He presumably did evoke confidence to face the enemy in certain members 
of his audience, in which case he brought benefit to them. However, the focus on 
death and the horrors that the king may inflict on the army perhaps actively harmed 
the mood of some of the audience.  
 Proxenus nearly makes the situation worse by failing to calm Clearchus. 
Thus, a speaker‟s failure to evoke an emotion can also be dangerous. Cyrus‟ speech 
evoking fear in the Greeks that he and they will be killed benefits himself and the 
Greeks immediately by breaking up the quarrel and keeping both himself and the 
Greeks alive. This benefit continues into the long term because there are no further 
quarrels between the divisions.  
Cyrus‟ evocation of anger, fear, confidence and friendly feelings in the wake 
of Xenias and Pasion‟s desertion brings benefits to both Cyrus and the leaders in the 
short term, because the leaders are more eager to continue with the journey. In the 
long-term, both parties suffer when Cyrus is killed at Cunaxa, and the Greeks are left 
to fend for themselves. Cheirisophus‟ speech following his election to the sole 
command benefits himself and the army in the short term, because the army proceed 
to Heracleia. In the longer term however, the army‟s lingering doubts about 
Cheirisophus cause harm to the army and may even cause the army to divide into the 
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three groups that go their separate ways. Cheirisophus‟ successful evocation of hope 
regarding his ability to obtain ships benefits the Greeks in the short term by lifting 
their spirits. However, in the longer term, Cheirisophus has perhaps harmed the 
morale of the army and delayed it, and also affected his standing with the army. This 
appeal indicates that a leader must be able to back up his claims with actions and not 
raise false hopes.
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 Cleanor‟s unsuccessful attempt at evoking shame and fear in Ariaeus 
brings no benefit or harm to the army because it fails. By contrast, Xenophon‟s 
appeal to the Sinopeans brought himself, the army, and the Sinopeans benefit in the 
short term by stopping Hecatonymus carrying through his threat. In the longer term, 
Xenophon also benefitted himself, the army, and the Sinopeans by causing the 
Cyreans and the Sinopeans to become friends.  
 By examining the outcomes, we have seen that it becomes easier to 
differentiate between whether an emotional appeal should be emulated or not. We 
see two key issues here. Effective emotional appeals can be lethal if the connected 
advice is bad. There is also a danger of failing to connect with an audience and 
consequently of failing to persuade it to accept good advice. Thus, it seems that 
Xenophon is offering a more complex message about how one should and should not 
persuade. I propose, therefore, that the presentation of such a didactic message may 
be one role for the speeches in the Anabasis. Such a message may be made even 
clearer by examining how the speakers‟ leaderships end in the work, and I shall 
explore these in more detail in the next two chapters. Cyrus, Clearchus and Proxenus 
are killed by the Persians, Cheirisophus dies of an illness after his sole command 
collapses, Cleanor continues in an uneventful command, and Xenophon is rewarded 
for his leadership by the army. These endings suggest that there is a difference in the 
way the reader should interpret these leaders‟ periods of command, including the 
emotional appeals they make. In the examples we have examined, only Xenophon 
unequivocally brings benefit through his emotional appeals and ends well in the 
work.  
 The reader must also take into account the speaker‟s motives for making an 
emotional appeal. For example, despite Cleanor nearly causing harm to the army 
                                                             
100 See Cyropaedia 1.6.19 for the dangers of raising false hope.  
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when trying to evoke fear, there is no evidence that he had anything other than a 
concern to benefit the army when he spoke. Similarly, although he is ineffective 
when trying to evoke shame in Ariaeus, he again seems to be motivated positively in 
attempting this. Cleanor is capable of evoking emotions, but can be characterised by 
his lack judgement in both of the appeals we examined. Proxenus likewise seems to 
have good intentions when trying to calm Clearchus, but, unlike Cyrus, he is unable 
to resolve the situation through an emotional appeal. This is a precursor of the 
narrator‟s later characterisation of Proxenus‟ ineptitude at evoking emotions. The 
narrator indicates in Proxenus‟ obituary that Proxenus is unable to inspire respect 
(αἰδῶ) or fear (θόβνλ) in his soldiers, and says that Proxenus feared making his 
soldiers hate (ἀπερζάλεζζαη) him more than they feared the consequences of 
disobeying him (2.6.19-20).
101
 Because of this fear, Proxenus is himself a mild 
leader, who does not get angry with his men when they act wrongly but simply 
withholds praise. Consequently, the bad amongst his men plotted against Proxenus 
(2.6.20). This is despite the fact that he trained under Gorgias (2.6.16) and so should 
have been an accomplished speaker, able to evoke emotions in his soldiers. This 
mention of Gorgias locates the Anabasis within a certain intellectual tradition by 
assuming that the reader will understand what training under Gorgias should mean 
for Proxenus‟ abilities.  
Again, there is no evidence to suggest that Cheirisophus was motivated by 
anything other than thoughts of the army‟s benefit in the three speeches we 
examined, although he may also have been concerned for his own power and 
reputation in his speech about his sole command. Like Cleanor, he can be successful 
in evoking emotions, particularly hope regarding obtaining ships, but in his speech 
appealing to noble death his success may only be partial, and his speech concerning 
his sole command does not achieve complete success in the longer term. This picture 
complements the characterisation of Cheirisophus elsewhere. He is often ineffectual 
and relies on Xenophon to provide direction for the army.
102
  
Cleanor, Proxenus and Cheirisophus can thus be characterised as meaning 
well but as being inconsistent in their abilities to persuade. If this was not dangerous 
                                                             
101
 Benardete (1963, 11) links Proxenus to Hector in the Iliad because of their shared inability to lead 
bad men and to evoke respect or fear.    
102 See Humble (1997, 81-91) for Cheirisophus’ unsuitability for leadership more generally. 
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enough, in some cases their persuasion attempts cause or nearly cause harm to the 
army. They are not positive exempla to emulate in terms of success or outcome, 
although they are not entirely negative exempla, because their motivations are 
positive.  
Ascertaining Cyrus‟ and Clearchus‟ motives is more complicated. The reader 
may be suspicious of Cyrus‟ motives for making a speech about Xenias and Pasion 
because all of his generous actions towards the Greeks, such as giving the soldiers 
more money and bonuses, can be linked directly to his aim of defeating his brother. 
His treatment of Xenias and Pasion, and his announcement about it, are thus likely to 
be motivated primarily by ensuring his own success rather than stemming from a 
genuine desire to be magnanimous. Indeed, by getting the leaders to feel positively 
towards him, Cyrus may deliberately be paving the way for telling the army the real 
aim of the mission, which follows shortly after and which is accepted with relatively 
little trouble, despite the Greeks learning that Cyrus has deceived them (1.4.11-13). 
When reading Cyrus‟ appeal, the reader may also think back to an incident in the 
earlier narrative, where Cyrus has two Persian officials who were accused 
(αἰηηαζάκελνο) of plotting against him killed without trial (1.2.20). This clearly 
demonstrates that Cyrus can be ruthless and is prone to anger and revenge, the 
opposite of the picture he is trying to present of himself. When discussing Cyrus‟ 
later trial of Orontas, Gray (2011b, 223-4) refers to Herodotus who states that 
Persians do not condemn a person the first time they commit a crime (1.137). While 
this can be seen in the case of Orontas, who Cyrus makes it clear he has been willing 
to forgive in the past and is now only reluctantly having killed (1.6.6-11), there is no 
indication that Cyrus gave the Persian officials a second chance. This may indicate 
that Cyrus‟ magnanimity in the Orontas trial was partly for show and that Cyrus was 
aware that Clearchus would report details of the trial back to the Greeks.
103
 Thus, 
with his words about Xenias and Pasion, Cyrus may be deliberately trying to project 
an ethos that would appeal to the Greeks in order to ensure their good behaviour and 
loyalty for his own benefit.  
The reader may also suspect that Cyrus‟ motives are selfish when he evokes 
fear in Clearchus and the other Greeks about his and their deaths. The reader knows 
                                                             
103 Keaveney (2012, 32) concludes that Cyrus was acting on both “instinct and calculation” with 
Orontas. 
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that Cyrus is primarily concerned with the success of his own mission here because, 
by deceiving the Greeks as to the real purpose of his mission, Cyrus has deliberately 
brought them on a far more dangerous mission than they realised. As a result, Cyrus‟ 
concern for the Greeks here rings hollow, and he is thus characterised as a selfish 
leader. Combined with the long-term harm that comes from being persuaded by 
Cyrus, the reader may question how right Cyrus was to persuade his audiences by 
playing on their emotions, even though he does so successfully.  
The reader may also have some suspicions about Clearchus‟ motives for his 
emotional persuasion. Regarding Clearchus‟ speech giving directions to the army, 
Buzzetti (2014, 87-8) argues that it is odd that Clearchus did not consult the gods 
about remaining where they are. He further argues that the evidence from the 
narrative suggests that there actually are provisions that could have sustained the 
army if it had remained, and that the information Clearchus provides about the Tigris 
is incorrect. Indeed, he demonstrates that Xenophon the character later recommends 
that the army remains where it is (3.2.24), indicating that it would be possible. 
Buzzetti links Clearchus‟ speech to Ariaeus‟ refusal to try for the Persian throne, and 
believes that Clearchus now just wants to return to Greece. If this interpretation is 
correct, Clearchus has misrepresented the situation to accord with his own desires.
104
  
Clearchus‟ appeal to confidence in order to persuade the army to remain with 
the friends of Ariaeus might also be selfishly motivated in part. When talking to 
Tissaphernes later, Clearchus offers him the Greek army (2.5.12-14), although the 
army currently believes that it is returning home. Clearchus has been exiled by 
Sparta (1.1.9), and the reader may believe that Clearchus has a need to keep the army 
at work, and that this was also his motivation when he appealed to the emotions of 
the leaders and the soldiers. Despite this, his evocation of calm when the soldiers 
were panicking seems to be motivated purely by what was best for the army at the 
time. Thus, Clearchus can be characterised as ambiguous in his use of emotional 
appeals. He can bring both benefit and harm and can be motivated selfishly and 
unselfishly. He is not always completely successful, but when he is, it can be 
dangerous for his audience.  
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 I also briefly mentioned Clearchus’ attempt to evoke pity (n. 88). In the speeches that follow his 
weeping, Clearchus deceives the soldiers for his own ends. Thus, there is supporting evidence for 
interpretations regarding Clearchus’ self-serving deception of others such as Buzzetti makes.  
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Although Cyrus and Clearchus are mostly successful in their emotional 
persuasion, the ambiguity of their motives clearly detracts from their success and 
prevents them from being positive exempla. In contrast, the narrator gives the reader 
no reason to doubt that Xenophon‟s motives for making emotional appeals are 
anything but positive in the speeches we examined. Xenophon is successful, brings 
benefits to his audience by his appeals and is motivated by the army‟s interests, 
although this naturally includes thoughts for his own safety. He thus seems to be a 
positive exemplum. Because the motives behind a speech can affect how the reader 
perceives the speaker, I propose that characterisation is another role for the speeches 
in the Anabasis. We shall see in the subsequent chapters that the audience of a 
speech can be characterised by whether or not they are persuaded too.  
 The nuances of the emotional appeals would not be possible if these 
speeches did not engage the reader with the speakers, their persuasion attempts and 
the outcomes. Often the emotional appeal is in response to a dangerous situation, 
which in itself involves the reader. The internal audience‟s emotions are usually 
heightened because of the current circumstances, and the reader‟s engagement might 
cause him to also be moved by a similar mood. For example, along with the soldiers, 
the reader may be suspicious of Ariaeus and Tissaphernes. If the reader identifies 
with the prevailing mood, he may be able to understand how effective the emotional 
appeals the speaker uses are, and why the speaker is successful or unsuccessful. 
Because the reader appreciates the situation and the mood of the audience, he may 
also recognise the need for the emotional appeal to be not only successful but also 
prudent, and anticipate the consequences if the prevailing emotions are not handled 
adequately. For example, the reader may fear what will happen to the soldiers if they 
act on the concerns they raise to Clearchus about the intentions of the Persians. The 
reader is thus likely to be concerned with understanding the outcomes of the 
speeches he has engaged with. The reader may himself also feel some of the 
emotions the speaker evokes. For example, when Cheirisophus raises hope about 
obtaining ships, the reader may feel positively towards him, like the internal 
audience, and later feel the blow when Cheirisophus lets them down. Through the 
appeals, the reader further engages with the speaker by understanding the emotions 
he typically tries to evoke, and why he makes the appeal. The reader also engages 
with the internal audiences by understanding what emotions do and do not move 
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them and whether the audiences can assess the quality of the advice given so that the 
decision they make will not be harmful for themselves.  
Some of the speeches we examined above have other dramatic effects and 
ways of involving the reader. For example, after Xenophon has redirected the fear 
that Cleanor evoked about attacking the enemy, the reader may briefly consider what 
would have happened if Cleanor had successfully convinced Xenophon and the 
leaders to follow his plan because of the fear he evoked. Such consecutive emotional 
appeals can also be particularly effective in making the reader tense. This is 
especially the case when Proxenus‟ emotional appeal to Clearchus fails and Cyrus 
has to rescue the situation. Cyrus‟ appeal to fear in this speech may also cause the 
reader some surprise. Cyrus claims that his barbarian troops would be a threat to the 
Greeks but the narrator has not previously presented any animosity between the two 
groups in the narrative, although they were clearly competing against each other. 
This may make the reader question whether Cyrus was presenting the situation 
accurately. Some speeches also have particularly vivid descriptions as part of the 
evocation of emotions, such as Xenophon‟s speech to Proxenus‟ captains, which 
includes the details of what Cyrus‟ brother did to Cyrus‟ dead body. There is 
suspense created by this speech too because we wonder whether Xenophon will be 
able to influence the mood of his audience despite not being a leader and perhaps not 
even being well known to them personally. In light of all this, I propose that reader 
involvement is an effect of the speeches in the Anabasis.  
In the following chapters, I shall analyse other speeches as successful and 
unsuccessful persuasion attempts, but also examine the didactic message, 
characterisation and reader involvement that stems from them to see further what 
Xenophon is attempting to achieve through the inclusion of his speeches. I next 
move to a different theme of persuasion: deception. It is clear that if a leader is 
skilled at verbal manipulation, he could use his skills for his own advantage. For 
example, he could mask that a decision could be harmful, or present his own 
character and motivations falsely. Indeed, we have seen that Clearchus, Cyrus and 
Xenophon all use elements of deception as part of at least one of the emotional 
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appeals we have examined.
105
 However, even from the examples in this chapter, we 
have seen that the issue is not as straightforward as the use of deception rendering a 
speaker a negative exemplum and always causing harm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
105 Clearchus deceives in his attempts to calm the panicking army and possibly in the speech where 
he gives orders to the leaders. Cyrus seems to deceive in his presentation of himself over the Xenias 
and Pasion affair and possibly regarding the danger the Greeks face from the barbarians in his army. 
Xenophon deceives in his presentation of how the army acted when talking to Hecatonymus.  
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Deceitful Speeches in the Anabasis
106
 
Before trying to persuade an audience, a speaker chooses whether to speak honestly 
or to deceive. Verbal deception can be particularly problematic in leadership 
contexts. In Athens, although the demos had the power to choose whether to follow 
proposals made by political leaders or not, such leaders could still successfully 
distort or misrepresent a proposal and what they foresaw as its outcome. This 
potential appears to have been so troubling, that a law was established ruling that 
anyone who deceives in his promises to the Assembly, Councils or law-courts should 
be punished by death (Demosthenes 20.100 and 20.135).
107
  
In an army context, private, conscripted soldiers are expected to obey the 
officers formally appointed by their city‟s Assembly or other decision making body 
while on campaign. However, these soldiers do have some control over the leaders. 
Hamel (1998, esp. introduction and 158-60) demonstrates that the Athenian demos 
could control their generals on military expeditions through their decision-making 
capabilities both in Athens and on the campaign, and through their ability to ruin the 
reputation of generals who opposed or neglected them after their term had ended. 
Despite this, the opportunity for leaders to deceive their soldiers still existed. As 
historiography represents it, during meetings convened by leaders to decide upon 
specific strategies and tactical moves, it is often the speeches that are decisive in the 
decision making process. On occasion, these are directed at private soldiers, who are 
asked for their opinion. While officers may feel constrained from deceiving other 
officers because of the specialised knowledge this type of audience possessed, 
deception can be extremely destructive when practiced on an assembly of soldiers 
who do not have the necessary knowledge to recognise it.  
                                                             
106
 This chapter will only consider the deception of friends or those on a speaker’s own side. For the 
deception of enemies, see Hipparchicus 4.12, 5.2-3, 5.8-12, 5.15 and 7.13, Agesilaus, 1.17, and 
Memorabilia 4.2.15. In these passages, Xenophon the author seems to use his characters and 
narrators to indicate that deceiving enemies is justified and that leaders should practice it. Danzig 
(2007) has investigated the deception of enemies in the Anabasis and demonstrates that the issue is 
not quite so straightforward in this work, however, because the narrator negatively portrays 
Tissaphernes, even though he skilfully deceives his enemies. Danzig concludes that it is the type of 
deceit used by Tissaphernes against enemies that Xenophon the author disapproves of, namely 
perjury, which is especially problematic because it has the potential to weaken a leader’s command. 
For further investigations of deceitful stratagems against enemies in warfare, see Wheeler (1988), 
Roisman (1993) and Krentz (2000). 
107 Hesk (2000, 51-5) highlights further references to this law: Demosthenes 49.67, Aristotle 
Athenaion Politeia 43.5, Xenophon Hellenica 1.7.35, and possibly Herodotus 6.104-36. 
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A leader of mercenary soldiers does not face the same threat of being held 
accountable upon his return to his home city, but the obedience of the soldiers under 
him is less secure. Because his soldiers can desert him at any time, he has to 
represent himself as someone that they can trust, as someone who has their desires 
and interests at heart, and as someone who is recommending what is best for them. 
Because of this, a mercenary leader may be more inclined to deceive than an officer 
in command of troops conscripted from his own city. This may particularly be the 
case because, as a mercenary himself, the leader may have his own desires and aims 
that diverge from those of his soldiers. To exacerbate this, there may be no clear 
hierarchy among the mercenary leaders, which may encourage jockeying for position 
through support of the soldiers or a paymaster. Such paymasters may also be 
inclined to misrepresent the nature of the employment opportunity that they are 
offering in order to ensure that troops will undertake the mission.  
Xenophon’s Narratorial Opinion on Deceit 
This potential for deceit clearly hangs over the speeches in the Anabasis, and, 
indeed, the narrator provides numerous examples. Thus, by investigating how the 
author confronts the issue of the verbal deception of friends, we may be able to 
understand his aims further. The issue is complicated though. The narrator openly 
condemns the deception of friends in his obituary for Menon by denouncing 
Menon‟s continuous and systematic deception of his associates (2.6.22-6). The 
narrator also represents Xenophon the character as saying that it is shameful to 
deceive friends (7.6.21). This comes in a speech where Xenophon is justifying why 
he is not ashamed to be deceived by Seuthes, however, and so it aids his defence to 
express these sentiments. Despite these two negative comments, the narrator 
represents Xenophon the character, as well as Cyrus, Clearchus and Timasion, 
verbally deceiving audiences who are on their side. We have seen that there is some 
ambiguity in the representation of Cyrus and Clearchus, but Timasion is a generally 
positive character and, so far, we have seen that Xenophon the character seems 
commendable in his verbal appeals. Thus, there appears to be a contradiction here 
between what the narrator indicates it is right for a leader to do and what even 
positive leaders do. We must ask whether there is a way to determine the author‟s 
actual standpoint on the deception of friends by leaders.  
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Looking for a consistent approach to the deception of friends elsewhere in 
Xenophon‟s oeuvre does not shed light on the issue. At Agesilaus 11.4, the narrator 
claims that Agesilaus classed the deception of those who trust the deceiver as unholy 
(ἀλόζηνλ). Because this comment occurs in an encomium, the reader can take for 
granted the narrator‟s endorsement of this view. Yet, in the Hellenica, the narrator 
explicitly approves of Agesilaus deceiving his troops because it stops them deserting 
and allows them to win a particular battle (4.3.12-14).
108
 Between these two 
comments there seems to be a contradiction similar to the one we find in the 
Anabasis.
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Because there is no definitive narratorial comment on deceiving friends, and 
because the leaders that deceive in the Anabasis are all either explicitly or implicitly 
characterised well at some point in the work, we must examine each occasion of 
verbal deceit in order to ascertain what Xenophon the author‟s view on the topic is. 
Cyrus deceives his brother (1.1.8), subordinates, friends (including, indirectly, the 
soldiers working under them, 1.1.6 and 1.1.11), and the Greek army (1.3.20), while 
Clearchus deceives the soldiers (1.3.5-6, 1.3.9-13 and 1.3.15) and Cyrus (1.8.13). 
Timasion, who becomes a general after the death of the original commanders, 
deceives friendly Heracleot and Sinopean merchants (5.6.19-20), while Xenophon 
deceives the Greek army (3.2.18-19, 3.4.46, 4.8.14, 6.1.25-9 and 7.1.22) and the 
Greek army, two Spartan ambassadors, a Thracian leader and his aide (7.6.41). 
Again, we must examine the speeches as persuasion attempts and link the speech to 
the narrative, in order to examine how the narrator guides the reader‟s interpretation 
                                                             
108 For further deception in the Hellenica, see 1.6.36, 4.1.2-15, 5.4.13, and 6.4.22-5. See also Gray 
(1981) who argues that Xenophon displays an interest in the manipulation of others within the 
dialogues of the Hellenica.  
109 This inconsistency is also reflected generally in Greek literature. On the one hand, deceit is often 
condemned. For example, see Achilles’ denunciation of Odysseus’ deceit (Iliad, 9.312-13). 
Particularly in Greek oratory, we find warnings for the audience to be on guard against the 
deception and insincerity of the speaker’s opponents, as well as outright accusations of deception 
(for instance, Aeschines 3.168). See further Kremmydas (2013) for ‘the discourse of deception’ in 
fourth century Athenian oratory, as well as Hesk (2000, 220-91). Nevertheless, there are also 
depictions of speakers who deceive friends but who are not outright villains. Odysseus, for example, 
deceives his friends and family but receives praise as well as condemnation in ancient and modern 
times. See further Pratt (1993, 58 and 85-94) for the moral concern Odysseus’ deceit of others 
occasions, as well as Stanford (1950 and 1968, 22), who defends Odysseus’ lies against friends. 
Similarly, we find references to special circumstances under which it is acceptable to deceive friends. 
Plato’s Socrates advocates the ‘noble lie’ by which leaders in the city can deceive the populace in 
order to make them care for the state and each other more (Respublica 414b.8ff.). See Hesk (2000, 
163-99) for further passages relating to the noble lie. 
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of the deception. We must also compare and contrast how the different leaders 
deceive their friends. 
How does the Narrator Present Deceptive Speeches and How is the Reader Made to 
Detect Deception? 
Narratologists routinely discuss the unreliability of the narrator, but, in the case of 
deceptive speeches, it is the characters that are unreliable. Chatman (1990, 149-53) 
devised the term “fallible filtration” to describe incidents when the thoughts or 
speeches that characters are made to present are at odds with what the narrator tells 
the reader elsewhere. These thoughts or speeches can be “inaccurate, misled, or self-
serving”. On some occasions, writes Chatman, the narrator draws attention to the 
filter character‟s „fallibility‟; on others, the narrator does not guide the reader 
explicitly, but the reader is still able to recognise that a thought or speech is fallible. 
Chatman believes that the intended effect on the reader is that the narrator is inviting 
him to share in the irony that they both know that a certain character is fallible. 
Chatman is primarily discussing moments when characters are mistaken, but in the 
Anabasis, deliberately deceptive speeches are presented similarly.
110
  
Xenophon the narrator sometimes directly draws attention to the deceit and, 
on other occasions, simply provides enough information so that the reader 
understands that a character is being deceitful without being told this explicitly. In 
both cases, but above all in the second case, the reader must actively compare the 
                                                             
110 Chatman does not take his concept further, and the idea has been largely undeveloped since. 
Nünning (2008, 66) commented that the question was not with the existence of fallible filtration 
(also called ‘unreliable focalization’ or ‘fallible focalization’) but with what benefit recognising a 
fallible character brings to the reader. He refers to two articles which discussed Chatman’s idea 
(Jahn 1998 and Schubert 2005) but which failed to advance a theory for this concept. Indeed, Jahn is 
concerned with making slight refinements to the model and with placing it in relation to prior 
scholarship, rather than explaining how and why it is used. Schubert applies the concept to analysing 
fictional texts in which a focalizer is restricted from fully perceiving his environment due to 
hindrances such as bad lighting. He concludes that this device is used for atmospheric and 
entertainment purposes, including retardation and suspense. Both Schubert (2005, 207) and Olson 
(2003, 101-5) work from the premise that fallible focalizers fail to perceive correctly due to external 
restrictions rather than “intellectual” or “ethical” reasons. Olson categorises such deliberate 
misperception as untrustworthy narration. Chatman (1990, 150), however, states that fallible filters 
are not aware that they are acting as narrators and so cannot be classed as such. Further, Chatman 
perceives the narrator to be a separate entity that can directly comment on or imply the fallibility of 
the character in question. In the case of the Anabasis, then, the closest term to apply may be ‘fallible 
filtration’ rather than ‘unreliable narration’. This chapter will extend the discussions surrounding this 
concept by focusing on deliberate rather than mistaken focalizations in non-fiction, and by 
suggesting what the reader can learn from them.  
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speeches with the earlier and later narrative. For some deceitful speeches, the 
narrator indicates that a speech will be deceitful before the speaker gives it, which 
allows the reader to see the deceit unfold. On other occasions, the narrator confirms 
or reveals the deceit after the speech. By exposing the deceit, the narrator places the 
reader in a privileged position compared to that of the internal audience. In some 
cases, the reader has to recognise the deceit without any explicit help from the 
narrator, and he remains on the level of the internal audience. The reader may 
assume that a speech is deceitful, based on contradictions between what he believes 
the speaker knows and what he says, and between what he believes the speaker‟s 
motives are and what he claims. If the reader has judged correctly, this is confirmed 
later in the narrative. 
Methodological Approach 
The selection of deceptive speeches directed at friends in this chapter is based on the 
definition that a speech is deceptive when a speaker deliberately uses words to make 
his audience believe something that he knows is false. The speaker must intend to 
deceive when he speaks. Consequently, this chapter does not discuss situations 
where characters are forced to go back on an agreement originally made with honest 
intentions because circumstances have changed.
111
  
After examining the speeches as successful and unsuccessful attempts at 
deception, I examine the speeches according to the three roles and effects proposed 
in the previous chapter. It is clear that the variety of different ways to present the 
deceptive speeches to the reader creates reader involvement and encourages him to 
examine the speeches, speakers and outcomes further. Again, the speaker is 
characterised by exploring his motives for deceiving his friends and the type of 
deception he uses. Sometimes the narrator will reveal a speaker‟s motivations before 
a speech, and these can then be compared to the motives the speaker claims. When 
the narrator does not reveal a speaker‟s motives, the reader has to attempt to 
reconstruct them based on prior characterisation. The reader may form a judgement 
about the leader‟s trustworthiness based on how his motives and words match. An 
evaluation as to the advisability of the deception attempt may also be made when the 
                                                             
111 See Bolmarcich (2007) who discusses the inbuilt flexibility of treaty-oaths to cover unforeseen 
future conditions that may make agreements impossible to adhere to. 
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reader understands the outcome of the deception and whether it brought benefit or 
harm. Further, the way the speaker‟s leadership terminates in the work can be linked 
to his deceptive speeches and again this elicits judgement about how justified the 
leader‟s deception of others was. In these key areas, the leaders who deceive can be 
compared and contrasted. This again prompts an evaluation on who acted rightly and 
who acted wrongly, and the author‟s own standpoint on the deception of friends is 
revealed. In the final analysis, only Xenophon emerges as a positive leader in respect 
to his deception of others.  
Examples 
Cyrus’ Deception of Friends and Subordinates (1.1.6 and 1.1.11) 
Cyrus deceives Greek commanders who are his friends when he faces the problem of 
how to get troops to work for him, and he also deceives garrison commanders within 
the cities that he has under his command. After the death of Cyrus‟ father, Cyrus‟ 
brother Artaxerxes becomes king (1.1.3). Tissaphernes soon accuses Cyrus of 
plotting against his brother, yet Cyrus‟ mother saves Cyrus and supports him over 
Artaxerxes (1.1.3-4).
112
 The narrator says that Cyrus returns from danger and 
dishonour (θηλδπλεύζαο θαὶ ἀηηκαζζείο) and aims never to be controlled by his 
brother again, and to replace him as king (1.1.4). The narrator states that Cyrus goes 
on to collect a Greek force with as much secrecy as possible so that he might take the 
king as unprepared as he could (ἀπαξαζθεπόηαηνλ, 1.1.6). 
The narrator places the reader in a privileged position compared to the 
internal audience because he makes the reader aware of Cyrus‟ real aims from the 
start. Thus, when the narrator presents Cyrus telling his garrison commanders to 
enlist men because Tissaphernes was plotting against their cities (1.1.6), the reader is 
immediately aware that Cyrus‟s aims and words do not match and that he has chosen 
to deceive others as to the real purpose of his mission. At 1.1.11, the narrator reveals 
                                                             
112 Danzig (2007, 31) argues that the narrator’s use of διαβάλλει in relation to Tissaphernes’ report 
means ‘hostile’ rather than ‘false’. This suggests that the narrator is remaining neutral in his 
judgement on Cyrus’ guilt. Other accounts, such as Plutarch’s Artaxerxes, suggest that rumours 
existed during Cyrus’ lifetime that Cyrus attempted fratricide without any cause in a sacrilegious plot 
(3.1-5). Xenophon’s readers may be aware of these rumours but the narrator does not mention the 
past negative behaviour of Cyrus or Clearchus. These characters start with a relatively clean slate in 
the Anabasis. See Braun (2004) for details of Cyrus’ and Clearchus’ behaviour before the events of 
the Anabasis. 
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that Cyrus ordered Proxenus to bring men to fight against the Pisidians, while he 
directed Sophaenetus and Socrates to bring men for a war on Tissaphernes. The 
narrator also says that when Cyrus wanted to begin his march, he claimed a desire to 
drive the Pisidians from his land, although the narrator does not specify whom the 
audience of this particular assertion is (1.2.1). Cyrus also uses the cover of restoring 
the Milesian exiles to Miletus for gathering troops (1.1.7).
113
  
Cyrus‟ speeches are presented in oratio obliqua, so there is little chance to 
see how Cyrus presents his ethos and appeals to his audience‟s emotions. Cyrus must 
feel, however, that he has enough authority to tell the garrison commanders what to 
do and strong enough relations with his friends that they trust him and would want to 
work for him, or at least would feel obliged to do so. Thus, his existing ethos and 
reputation back up his deception. Cyrus clearly believes that the reasons he offers for 
undertaking a mission with him are appealing, or at least not deterring, particularly 
because he tailors them for different audiences.  
Because Cyrus‟ aims and words do not match, the reader may expect Cyrus‟ 
actions not to match his words either. Indeed, confirmation that the various aims he 
gives for the mission are deceptive is provided by following the progress of the 
army. The army neither proceeds against Tissaphernes nor the Pisidians. Thus, the 
type of deception Cyrus uses is to invent untrue pretexts (πξνθάζεηο).114 No response 
is indicated from the garrison commanders or Cyrus‟ friends but they appear to do as 
Cyrus requested (1.1.11 and 1.2.1). This does not confirm that they believed Cyrus‟ 
deceit, but that they complied without question seemingly because the request is 
attractive to them in some way.
115
 
 
                                                             
113 Cyrus similarly deceives his brother by focusing on the conflict between himself and Tissaphernes 
when he sends Artaxerxes a message at 1.1.8. The narrator’s subsequent comment clearly defines 
Cyrus’ message as deceitful; he says that because of this message the king did not perceive the plot 
(ἐπιβουλὴν) against him. 
114 So called by the narrator at 1.1.8 and 1.2.1, and by Clearchus at 2.3.21. 
115 There are parallels here with Seuthes, whom the army later works for. Like Cyrus, Seuthes may 
also deceive the Greeks about his true aim. Dillery (2001, 566) provides a reference to Archibald’s 
(1994, 458) argument that Seuthes “was trying in fact to establish an independent kingdom” rather 
than recover his ancestral land, as he claims. Unfortunately, neither Archibald nor Dillery explain 
how they arrive at this from Xenophon’s text at 7.2.31-4. It is possible that the original reader saw 
Seuthes’ claim as being  self-evidently deceptive, but I shall not examine this speech. 
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Cyrus’ Deception of the Greek Soldiers (1.3.20) 
At Tarsus, the soldiers refuse to go on when they guess the real aim of Cyrus‟ 
mission (1.3.1), but Clearchus rescues the situation for Cyrus, who is perplexed 
(ἀπνξῶλ) and distressed (ιππνύκελνο) by the mutiny (1.3.3-20), as we shall see in 
the next example. Clearchus finally makes the soldiers back down when he and his 
associates persuade them to send ambassadors to question Cyrus about his 
intentions. The narrator indicates no motive for Cyrus‟ subsequent deception of the 
soldiers. Cyrus must still have the motive of secrecy, but his choice to deceive may 
also be affected by the strong feelings of the men against continuing with a mission 
that they were not hired for. 
The narrator presents Cyrus telling the ambassadors in indirect speech to 
report to the soldiers that they are going against Abrocomas, his enemy, who is close 
by. In direct speech, the narrator then presents Cyrus as saying that if Abrocomas has 
already departed, he and the army will deliberate about the matter (1.3.20-1). Cyrus 
must believe that his claim will pacify the soldiers and that they will be willing to 
undertake such a mission. Cyrus‟ assertion that he will deliberate with the army if 
Abrocomas has fled seems to represent him as wanting to give some decision-
making power to the soldiers, which may be designed to appease them further and to 
demonstrate that he values their opinions.  
The narrator does not explicitly signal to the reader that Cyrus‟ words are 
untrue, but the reader knows that Cyrus‟ main mission is against the king. Thus, 
Cyrus‟ aims and words do not match. In fact, the army does go against Abrocomas, 
but only in the process of going against the king (1.4.1ff.). Thus, the type of 
deception that Cyrus uses here is to be economical with the truth by omitting to 
reveal the long-term aims of the mission. The narrator says that, while the soldiers 
suspected Cyrus‟ real aim, they still decided to follow him (ηνῖο δὲ ὑπνςία κὲλ ἦλ ὅηη 
ἄγεη πξὸο βαζηιέα, ὅκσο δὲ ἐδόθεη ἕπεζζαη., 1.3.21; c.f. 3.1.10 where the narrator 
confirms this). Thus, they do not believe the ethos he presents. The soldiers request 
more pay, which Cyrus gives them (1.3.21). This perhaps indicates that they were 
persuaded to continue the mission because they know from Cyrus‟ prior reputation 
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that they are likely to be able to gain further financial reward from Cyrus. By 
continuing with Cyrus, the soldiers react as if his deception had worked.
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Clearchus’ Deception of the Greek Troops (1.3.5-6, 1.3.9-13 and 1.3.15) 
As mentioned above, Clearchus deceives the troops when the army has refused to 
proceed at Tarsus. This takes place over the course of three speeches, and the first 
speech is addressed only to Clearchus‟ own troops. Before Clearchus‟ speech, he 
tried to force his troops to continue with Cyrus, but they became angry and tried to 
stone him, and he only just escaped with his life (1.3.1-2). At this point, the narrator 
reveals Clearchus‟ inner thoughts; when he realised that he could not succeed with 
force (ἐπεὶ ἔγλσ ὅηη νὐ δπλήζεηαη βηάζαζζαη), he called a meeting of his troops 
(1.3.2). There is no indication that Clearchus has altered his aim of getting the men 
to continue with Cyrus, and so the reader must assume that Clearchus is simply 
trying a new approach- persuasion- rather than reconsidering his position, as he goes 
on to claim. This aim also drives his subsequent two deceitful speeches.  
Clearchus‟ deception of his troops is revealed when his words do not match 
his motivation to continue the march. Thus, the reader comes to understand as he is 
reading the speech that Clearchus is being deceptive. Before the speech, Clearchus 
weeps, which throws the soldiers off-guard and makes them wonder (ἐζαύκαδνλ) 
and be silent (ἐζηώπσλ, 1.3.2). This is because the soldiers know Clearchus as 
someone more likely to punish others than make them pity him. Clearchus is perhaps 
trying to stun the soldiers out of their anger. He may also be attempting to lessen any 
suspicious about the complete change of mind he goes on to present. Because the 
reader knows that Clearchus is simply changing tactics, he might be sceptical about 
the sincerity of Clearchus‟ tears and assume that he is trying to manipulate his 
audience‟s emotions. Tuplin (2003a, 126) and van Wees (1998, 16) observe that 
Clearchus‟ weeping is reminiscent of Agamemnon‟s tears at Iliad 9.13-15, when 
Agamemnon has given up hope and wants the army to go home. The reminder of 
Agamemnon at his most honest and vulnerable, if the soldiers make this connection, 
                                                             
116
 Buzzetti (2014, 63) argues that Cyrus also deceives the army at 1.8.15 when he tells Xenophon to 
announce that the sacrifices and omens were favourable, because there was no time for him to 
actually have conducted the sacrifices. There is no evidence to confirm this, however.  
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may be designed to add an air of earnestness to Clearchus‟ portrayal of himself even 
before he begins to speak.
117
  
During his speech (1.3.3-6), Clearchus talks about how he became friends 
with Cyrus and what he and his soldiers did before joining with Cyrus. Everything 
Clearchus says seems geared towards appeasing the men and winning back their 
trust, friendly feelings and gratitude. He presents himself as someone who has 
previously provided for them when he could have frittered away the money given to 
him by Cyrus, and also as someone loyal to the Greeks rather than barbarians, 
because he involved his men in a war on behalf of Greece (ὑπὲξ η῅ο Ἑιιάδνο). He 
depicts himself as distressed and as being caught between loyalties to two different 
parties, perhaps attempting to make the men feel pity for the predicament he faces.  
Clearchus specifies that he has the choice between deserting his men and 
retaining Cyrus‟ friendship or playing false (ςεπζάκελνλ) with Cyrus if he follows 
his men. He claims that he wants to repay Cyrus for the benefits (εὖ ἔπαζνλ) Cyrus 
gave to him, which depicts him as a good man trying to do what is right by everyone. 
He says, however, that he chooses to follow his men, even though he does not know 
if this is right (δίθαηα), and that he will suffer for it if necessary. Thus, he presents 
his loyalty to his soldiers as overcoming both moral issues and fear. He also declares 
that never will anyone say that he abandoned (πξνδνὺο) the Greeks and chose 
barbarian friendship instead, reiterating his devotion to Greece.  
Clearchus next reconfirms that he will follow the men, because they are 
fatherland, friends and allies to him. This emphasises the depth of his feeling for his 
soldiers and may be designed to evoke friendly feelings for him. Clearchus goes on 
to say that he will be honoured if he remains with the men, while without them he 
would be unable to help a friend or harm an enemy. In this, he depicts himself as 
someone who recognises the power that the soldiers give him and treats others as 
they deserve. Finally, he reiterates that he will go wherever his men lead. Overall, 
Clearchus tells the men exactly what they want to hear. So far in the work, the reader 
                                                             
117 See further Föllinger (2009), Suter (2009) and Lateiner (2009), who discuss weeping in Homer, 
tragedy and historiography. Xenophon’s portrayal of characters crying is probably influenced by the 
representation of weeping in all of these genres. Other cases of crying in Xenophon’s works may well 
indicate the heroic nature of the weeper’s choices, as Lateiner believes, but he does not consider 
Clearchus’ tears, which are more sinister. 
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has next to no information to go on regarding Clearchus‟ relationship with his men. 
Thus, it is difficult to know whether they would believe his character projection here. 
Presumably, Clearchus based his ethos in this speech on the same character that he 
had presented to them when they fought under him. 
 Shortly after the speech, the narrator confirms that Clearchus‟ actions do not 
match his words and that he deceived his men (1.3.8).
118
 He describes Clearchus 
communicating with the perplexed and distressed Cyrus, unknown to the soldiers 
(ιάζξᾳ δὲ ηῶλ ζηξαηησηῶλ). Clearchus reassures Cyrus that he will bring about what 
is necessary (ἔιεγε ζαξξεῖλ ὡο θαηαζηεζνκέλσλ ηνύησλ εἰο ηὸ δένλ). Clearchus also 
advises Cyrus to keep sending for him but says that he will refuse to go. The reader 
can now pick out the deceit in Clearchus‟ speech. Clearchus has not chosen his men 
over Cyrus but is trying to retain the friendship of both. His statement that no one 
will accuse him of abandoning the Greeks in favour of barbarians is proven to be 
false too, because, by highlighting that Clearchus is still furthering Cyrus‟ plans, this 
is what the narrator is claiming. The word the narrator represents Clearchus using to 
mean abandon, πξνδνὺο, describes a capital crime. For Clearchus‟ internal audience, 
this choice of word indicates the force of his conviction and makes it sound as if 
Clearchus could never contemplate doing such a shocking thing. However, because 
the reader comes to know that Clearchus is deceiving here, in hindsight this word 
actually condemns Clearchus and his choice to put Cyrus‟ interests and his own aim 
first, without the narrator explicitly having to do so. The narrator‟s comments may 
also confirm to the reader that Clearchus‟ tears were false. Further, Clearchus‟ words 
about his soldiers being fatherland, friends and allies to him may take on a new 
meaning. Tsagalis (2002, 103 and 126) argues that these words, and the whole 
framing of the speech, should remind the reader of Hector and Andromache‟s 
exchange at Iliad 6.392-502.
119
 Tsagalis contends that by evoking Andromache and 
Hector, Xenophon is making a tragic allusion to Clearchus‟ death. However, because 
Clearchus is deceiving, there may be a more sinister interpretation. Discussing this 
                                                             
118 It seems impossible to take the view of Pearson (1962, 153) that Clearchus was being genuine in 
this speech. 
119 This is despite the fact, Tsagalis argues, that in antiquity Pseudo-Dionysius linked Clearchus’ 
speech to Phoinix’s attempts to persuade Achilles to return to the fighting at Iliad 9.433-605 (Ars 
Rhetorica, 302-3). Tsagalis argues that Pseudo-Dionysius only links the two speeches because both 
Clearchus and Phoinix say one thing while having another aim in mind. Thus, this allusion would 
have no effect on the soldiers who do not realise that Clearchus is deceiving them. 
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allusion, Tuplin (2003a, 126) argues that “exploit[ing] a classically affecting scene 
as a strategy for manipulation is surely shocking”. If Xenophon the author did intend 
for this link to the Iliad scene to be made, and if the reader is meant to believe that 
the soldiers also made the connection, it might indicate to the reader Clearchus‟ 
cynical manipulation of his audience‟s emotions.  
 The narrator states that when the soldiers from Clearchus‟ own contingent, 
along with soldiers from other contingents, hear that Clearchus will not go on, they 
commend (ἐπῄλεζαλ) him and more than two thousand troops commanded by other 
leaders come over to him (1.3.7). This reaction shows the strength of the soldiers‟ 
desire not to go on and is a complete volte-face from the men wanting to stone him 
before the speech. The reader, having recognised Clearchus‟ deception of the men, 
may not have such positive feelings towards him.  
Because Clearchus arranged that Cyrus will call for him, but that he will not 
go, the reader is aware that Clearchus plans to make it appear to his soldiers that he 
is adhering to his choice to follow them. Thus, the reader will suspect that Clearchus 
is going to continue his deceit. Indeed, soon after, Clearchus makes a second speech 
to his soldiers and the others that had joined him or wanted to be present (1.3.9-12). 
Contrasting his first speech, the reader understands that Clearchus‟ audience now 
feels positively towards him. Clearchus claims that Cyrus feels wronged (ἀδηθεῖζζαη) 
by the Greeks and that he personally declines Cyrus‟ requests to go to him primarily 
because he is ashamed (αἰζρπλόκελνο) at being proved false (ἐςεπζκέλνο) to Cyrus 
and also because he is afraid (δεδηὼο). Clearchus‟ message to Cyrus has indicated 
that shame and fear are not the reason Clearchus refuses to go to Cyrus and that 
Cyrus is feeling bewildered rather than wronged. Thus, the reader knows that 
Clearchus‟ representations of himself and Cyrus are both false in the immediate 
situation. Clearchus here continues his pretence that he is concerned by thoughts of 
what is right and wrong.  
Clearchus next recommends that the soldiers consider what they should do to 
remain safe because, although Cyrus is a good friend, he is also a fearsome enemy 
(ραιεπώηαηνο δ' ἐρζξὸο ᾧ ἂλ πνιέκηνο ᾖ). Again, the narrator‟s previous description 
of Cyrus‟ confusion confirms Clearchus‟ deception of the troops. The narrator does 
say in Cyrus‟ obituary that Cyrus is ferocious in punishing wrongdoers (1.9.13), and 
136 
 
we saw that some leaders feel pity for Xenias and Pasion should they be caught by 
Cyrus (1.4.7), and so it may be that Clearchus anticipates that the soldiers do think of 
Cyrus as fearsome. However, Clearchus is aware that his description of Cyrus is not 
an accurate reflection of Cyrus at the particular time that he presents it. Regarding 
his own character, even though Clearchus is not described as fearless to the reader 
until his obituary (2.6.7), the internal audience knows this about Clearchus. Thus, if 
Clearchus is afraid of Cyrus, this suggests that the soldiers should be too. Clearchus 
falsely presents himself as a voice of warning and as someone who has the soldiers‟ 
safety in mind. He concludes by saying that others should propose plans for what to 
do next. Here he falsely presents himself as someone who is willing to listen to 
others and be led by them, and as someone who has relinquished control to the men, 
but in reality, it facilitates his next deception.  
 Following straight on from this speech, people whom Clearchus has 
prepped (ἐγθέιεπζηνη) control the subsequent debate and demonstrate the difficulties 
of leaving without Cyrus‟ consent (1.3.13-19). The reader must assume that 
Clearchus arranged this intervention before his second speech, and this demonstrates 
further that Clearchus is carefully stage-managing his deception of the soldiers. 
Having seemingly unconnected people back up his argument helps to persuade the 
audience by illustrating that Clearchus is not the only one to have such fears. One of 
these men, who is pretending (πξνζπνηνύκελνο) to be in a hurry to return home, says 
that other generals should be chosen if Clearchus does not want to lead them 
(1.3.14). In response, Clearchus modestly declines to lead the men because he sees 
many reasons why he should not do so and claims that he will obey (πείζνκαη) 
whomever they choose (1.3.15). Here Clearchus is presenting himself as someone 
who has the best interests of the men at heart and who wants the person who is most 
fitting to lead them. This furthers the presentation of himself as bowing to the men‟s 
decisions. The reader may suspect deception here because the man who made the 
suggestion has been set up to speak by Clearchus, and because Clearchus has thus far 
retained his control over the men by deceiving them, despite him apparently 
relinquishing his power to the soldiers in his first speech. Kelly (1977, 29-30) argues 
that by not leading the retreat, Clearchus is deliberately trying to make the situation 
seem harder for the soldiers, because they will be disillusioned by him not 
commanding them. Thus, they may be more inclined to continue with Cyrus.  
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 It is not until later in the narrative that the narrator confirms Clearchus‟ 
words here to be false. He reveals that Clearchus desired to have the army for 
himself (2.5.29) and that Clearchus does not like to be led by others (2.6.15). Indeed, 
it may be noticed by the reader that in his speech Clearchus only says that he will 
obey whomever the army chooses as best he can (ὡο δὲ ηῷ ἀλδξὶ ὃλ ἂλ ἕιεζζε 
πείζνκαη ᾗ δπλαηὸλ κάιηζηα). Perhaps he will not try very hard. Another speaker 
follows Clearchus and argues that the army cannot trust Cyrus and that ambassadors 
should ask Cyrus what he wants the army to do for him (1.3.16-19). The narrator 
does not confirm whether this man‟s speech was arranged by Clearchus or not, but 
because it accords with Clearchus‟ aims, the reader may suspect that it was.  
With these speeches, Clearchus has carefully stage-managed his deception of 
others. After Clearchus‟ series of deceptions is complete, the men agree to go to 
Cyrus to ask what he wants from them (1.3.20), and the army eventually follows 
Cyrus again, as Clearchus wanted. The types of deception that Clearchus uses are 
active falsehoods, misrepresentations of himself and Cyrus, aspects of performance 
to back up his words, such as weeping, and getting others to speak for him. The 
soldiers are persuaded because they have no reason to doubt the words of Clearchus 
and his associates and believe that they are concerned for the army‟s well-being. 
Clearchus’ Deception of Cyrus (1.8.13) 
Clearchus deceives Cyrus before the battle of Cunaxa over Cyrus‟ orders to lead the 
Greeks against the centre of the king‟s army (1.8.12). The narrator states before 
Clearchus‟ reply that Clearchus did not want to follow Cyrus‟ instructions because 
he was afraid that the troops would be encircled (1.8.13).
120
 
 In response to Cyrus‟ orders, the narrator presents Clearchus telling Cyrus 
in oratio obliqua that he is taking care that all goes well (αὐηῷ κέιεη ὅπσο θαιῶο 
ἔρνη). Here, Clearchus presents himself as being concerned to work in Cyrus‟ 
interests, perhaps attempting to evoke trust and friendly feelings. Indeed, Cyrus 
already appears to trust Clearchus, perhaps because Clearchus resolved the mutiny at 
Tarsus for him. After the mutiny, Cyrus invites Clearchus to be present at Orontas‟ 
                                                             
120 There is debate over how individual words in this passage should be translated. See Knapp 
(1916), Bridgham (1917), Scoggin (1917) and Mather (1917). 
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trial and asks for his opinion first (1.6.5-10), and also give Clearchus a position of 
power, leading the right wing of the army (1.7.1).  
 Because the reader knows that Clearchus does not intend to follow Cyrus‟ 
orders, the deception is revealed. Clearchus does not actually lie, but words his 
answer so that he gives the impression that he will act in a way that he will not. 
Cyrus does not respond to Clearchus, but Clearchus presumably convinces Cyrus 
that he is going to follow Cyrus‟ instructions. The trust Cyrus feels for Clearchus 
explains why Cyrus believed Clearchus‟ vague response. 
Timasion’s Deception of the Heracleot and Sinopean Merchants (5.6.19-20)
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During the return journey, Timasion deceives the Heracleot and Sinopean merchants 
after Silanus the soothsayer tells the army that Xenophon wants to make the army 
settle down where it is to win himself a name and power. The narrator says that some 
of these merchants are present at the time when the soldiers learn about Xenophon‟s 
inquiries regarding settling the men where they are. This suggests that these people 
are friendly with the Cyreans and able to pass freely amongst them. While some 
soldiers think that the army should settle down, most think that they should not 
(5.6.19). The narrator provides no motives or aims for Timasion‟s deceitful speech.  
 Timasion and Thorax tell the merchants that if they do not pay the Cyreans 
enough to provision themselves for the journey, they may stay where they are. The 
actual deception occurs when Timasion and Thorax claim to quote what Xenophon 
has told them to say to the soldiers when the ships arrive: the army has no means of 
getting provisions for the journey or of taking anything back for those at home, and 
so the soldiers should choose a place around the Euxine to land the ships and make 
an attack. Afterwards, the soldiers have the choice to return home or remain there. 
Timasion and Thorax present themselves as being concerned for the local people. 
They play on the locals‟ fear that the Cyreans will either ravage the area or 
permanently settle there, and they rely on the locals‟ desire to get the Cyreans to 
leave. Timasion and Thorax tell an active falsehood and the audience has no 
opportunity to check the accuracy of their statement or confirm the character they 
                                                             
121
 The narrator indicates that Thorax jointly makes the speech with Timasion, but it is unclear 
whether he is a leader or not. He is unknown to the reader before this episode and does not appear 
again after. 
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present. The reader has more knowledge than the internal audience does, however. 
This is not because the narrator has provided access to the thoughts of Timasion and 
Thorax. Rather, it is because the narrator has not reported Xenophon telling anyone 
to say to the soldiers what Timasion and Thorax claim he did. Indeed, it would seem 
unlikely to have happened because the reader knows that Xenophon has only 
enquired of the gods as to whether he should broach the subject of settlement with 
the men at this stage (5.6.19-20). The merchants take the message to the cities and 
Timasion sends Eurymachus and Thorax with them to make the same report. The 
Sinopeans and Heracleots urge (θειεύνπζη) Timasion to arrange for the army to 
leave and give him money (5.6.21). They perhaps believe him because their fear 
overrides any scepticism.    
Xenophon’s Deception of the Army (3.2.18-19, 3.4.46 and 4.8.14) 
Xenophon‟s first three deceptions can be discussed together because they are of a 
similar type. He first deceives the soldiers when he is trying to persuade them to act 
after the Persians have killed the majority of the leaders. We saw in the last chapter 
that the soldiers are completely dejected at this point. Xenophon the character seems 
to have articulated the aims and motives for his first deception at 3.1.39-44. Here, 
Xenophon recommends to the new leaders that they should gather the soldiers 
together to encourage them (παξαζαξξύλεηε), make them more cheerful (πνιὺ 
εὐζπκόηεξνη), and inspire goodness (ἀγαζνὺο) in them. He recommends doing this 
so that the men will be more confident going into battle and will be more likely to 
succeed.  
 During Xenophon‟s speech to the assembly, he says that the army does not 
need to fear the enemy horsemen (3.2.18-19). He says that horsemen are really just 
men because no-one has ever been killed by horses biting or kicking them. The 
horsemen, he says, are afraid both of the Cyreans and of falling off their horses, 
while the Greeks are on safer ground. Because of this, the Greeks will be able to 
strike more strongly and are more likely to hit their targets. He concludes this topic 
by saying that the only advantage the horsemen have over the foot soldiers is that it 
is safer for them to flee. The reader may suspect at the time of reading the speech 
that this is a deception because the narrator has previously revealed that part of the 
army‟s despair is caused by the lack of horsemen (3.1.2). Soon afterwards, the deceit 
140 
 
is confirmed when the enemy horsemen cause the army trouble (3.3.9-10). Indeed, 
Buzzetti (2014, 138) notes that it is only a day later that Xenophon puts together a 
company of horsemen (3.3.16-20). Xenophon is not simply mistaken here or being 
hopeful, but deliberately deceiving the men through false assurances. The readers 
would know Xenophon as an experienced cavalryman who would recognise the 
dangers of the enemy cavalry. Perhaps the internal audience would also know of 
Xenophon‟s background in the cavalry, although we cannot assume this. If they do 
know this about him, Xenophon would be using his reputation to present a 
persuasive ethos. As the narrator presents it, Xenophon and the soldiers have not 
interacted thus far and so he cannot build on any pre-established character that they 
would recognise. Xenophon presents himself as knowledgeable about cavalry battles 
and the advantages various types of troops have over each other, and as being 
confident that the Cyreans do not need to be concerned. He also characterises the 
horsemen as fearful, perhaps evoking some contempt of them. They are the opposite 
of the Cyreans, whose confidence he tries to evoke.   
 Xenophon performs his second deception when the Greeks are fighting 
Tissaphernes‟ army and both sides are racing to be first to the top of a mountain. The 
narrator describes the Greek soldiers urging each other on (3.4.45), and so they 
appear eager. Again, it is clear that Xenophon speaks in order to get the men to act in 
a certain way, because the narrator says that Xenophon exhorted (παξεθειεύεην) the 
men. Xenophon tells the men to strive for Greece, children and wives, and that they 
only need to put in a small amount of effort in order to be able to complete the 
remainder of the journey without further resistance (3.4.46). He seems to be trying to 
evoke confidence and relief that the army is nearly safe. Xenophon presents himself 
as someone who values his country and family and as someone who is confident that 
the army‟s plight is nearly at an end. This does not appear to draw on any particular 
presentation of his character thus far, except his repeated demonstrations that he is 
keen to lead the army home. He may simply be identifying his desires with the 
army‟s, while encouraging the soldiers to remember these desires too. The reader 
may be suspicious about how true Xenophon‟s statement is when reading this speech 
because he knows the extent of the trouble the Cyreans faced. Indeed, Xenophon‟s 
assurance is shown to be false when the army faces further enemies.  
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 Xenophon‟s third deception comes when the Greeks encounter a fully 
formed up Colchian army. Neither Xenophon the character nor Xenophon the 
narrator reveals the aims or motivations for this speech, yet it closely resembles his 
second deception and so the reader might assume that Xenophon intended to exhort 
the men again. The soldiers are not directly characterised, although they have formed 
up ready for battle (4.8.14). Xenophon again says that only the current enemy is 
blocking the soldiers‟ way to the place that they have long been trying to get, and 
that they should eat the enemy raw if possible (4.8.14). He is seemingly trying to 
evoke desire for home, confidence that the army will be there soon, and hatred of the 
enemy. Xenophon again presents himself as knowledgeable about the situation, as 
understanding that the men have long been desiring to go home, as desiring this 
himself, and as believing that the enemy is an obstacle that needs to be destroyed. 
Between his last deceptive speech and this speech, Xenophon has established himself 
as acting well for the army, as giving good advice, and as demonstrating excellent 
judgement.
122
 Thus, in this speech, the ethos that he has drawn from these actions 
may reinforce his recommendation. Again, the reader may be suspicious that this 
will not actually be the end of the army‟s troubles, and he may also be reminded that 
the last time Xenophon made this assurance, he was wrong. Again, the narrative 
demonstrates that there are further enemies for the army to face.  
 There are no specific responses that indicate whether Xenophon has 
successfully deceived the men or not on these three occasions, or even whether he 
has successfully encouraged them. The soldiers later believe that Xenophon is 
deceiving them on several occasions, but these accusations stem from different 
incidents, and there is no indication that the soldiers have noticed Xenophon‟s earlier 
deceptions. The soldiers are certainly not afraid to express their suspicions of 
Xenophon later, and already one man has criticised him at 3.4.47. Thus, perhaps we 
would have expected the soldiers to accuse Xenophon over these three deceptions, if 
they had suspected him of trying to deceive them, especially because he is a new 
leader. For all three of these deceptions, the reader remains on the level of the 
internal audience. He may be taken in by Xenophon‟s false assurances, or may be 
suspicious about Xenophon‟s ability to predict the future and whether Xenophon 
reveals the full extent of his knowledge about the cavalry. The narrator does not 
                                                             
122 See 4.3.10-13, 4.3.20ff., 4.4.11-13, 4.5.7-9, 4.5.15-19, 4.7.3-7 and 4.8.10-13. 
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suggest that the reader is particularly meant to recall Xenophon‟s deceptions when 
the Cyreans do have trouble with the enemy cavalry and when they meet further 
enemies whom they have to fight. Thus, the reader may question whether the 
narrator wants him to judge these speeches as deceitful at all, or whether the 
assertions are simply motivational rhetoric that is not really meant to convince 
anyone.   
Xenophon’s Deception of the Army (6.1.25-9) 
Xenophon also deceives when the soldiers offer him the role of sole commander. 
The narrator reveals that all the speakers in the assembly want a sole commander and 
that they nominate Xenophon (6.1.25). Xenophon has learnt in advance that he will 
be offered the role, and the narrator has provided Xenophon‟s inner thoughts about 
whether to accept the role or not. Xenophon wants to accept the role because it 
would increase his honour amongst his friends, because his name would be greater 
when it reached his city, and because he could use his position to do good things for 
the army. Conversely, he is worried that he will lose the good repute that he has 
already won because of the role (6.1.20-2). Because Xenophon is unable to decide, 
he consults the god who says that Xenophon should neither ask for the role nor take 
it if he is offered it (6.1.22-4). Thus, Xenophon‟s aim in his speech to the army is to 
refuse the sole command, although the narrator does not reveal why Xenophon chose 
to deceive the army in the process.  
 When the soldiers nominate Xenophon, he does not reveal that the gods 
told him not to take the role. Instead, he says that it would not be beneficial 
(ζπκθέξνλ) to either himself or the army for him to be elected as sole commander 
when a Spartan is present. If he were in charge, the army would be less likely to 
receive favours from the Spartans, and it would not be safe (ἀζθαιὲο) for him 
because the Spartans are likely to punish him personally for nullifying their 
authority. He claims that he will not be at variance with the leader they choose but 
that, if they choose him, someone will be vexed (ἀρζόκελνλ) with them and him 
(6.1.26-9).  
 Xenophon presents himself as happy and grateful to the army for honouring 
him, and prays that he will be able to return the benefit in the future. He therefore 
appears to value the army and what it offers him, and to recognise that the soldiers 
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have the power to give him honour and a leadership position. He also comes across 
as someone who wants to benefit the army and as someone who is concerned with 
what it is right and advisable for the army to do. Further, he represents himself as not 
planning to act factiously if the army chooses another commander and as being 
concerned that whoever is elected is best for the army. Thus, he seems to have the 
army‟s interests and safety at heart, and to understand what the army will need from 
the Spartans. By this point in the narrative, Xenophon has further established himself 
as someone who prioritises the army‟s interests and so his ethos would ring true.123 
The army seems to recognise this part of his character because they want him to be 
the sole commander in order to further their own interests. Xenophon also presents 
himself as being concerned with his own safety, which perhaps makes his concerns 
seem more realistic. He gives a historical example as to why it is likely that the 
Spartans will not accept an Athenian as the leader of the army and thus presents 
himself as being politically aware and as knowing what effect the army‟s actions will 
have on the political landscape. By providing evidence to back-up his argument, 
Xenophon‟s audience may be more inclined to believe his words and his ethos.  
 Xenophon may be trying to evoke the friendly feelings and gratitude of the 
soldiers for trying to act in their interests. He also perhaps tries to evoke fear of what 
the Spartans will do to the army in the future, as well as fear of their wrath from 
inside and outside of the army. Xenophon may further be trying to evoke confidence 
in the soldiers that they can employ someone else in the role without Xenophon 
causing trouble.  
 In this speech, Xenophon is suppressing the truth by omitting to reveal what 
really motivated his decision. The reader is raised above the knowledge of the 
internal audience here, because the narrator has presented Xenophon‟s inner 
thoughts and the god‟s reply, and has not mentioned the Spartans as influencing 
Xenophon‟s decision. Thus, the deception is revealed. Xenophon fails to persuade 
the soldiers that they should elect Cheirisophus, and the narrator says that more 
people want Xenophon as leader. Agasias says how unfair the situation is if Spartans 
automatically expect leadership roles, and others back him up (6.1.30). Xenophon 
                                                             
123
 See 5.1.5-14, 5.2.16-19, 5.2.24-7 and 5.4.16-21 for the good Xenophon has recently done for the 
army, although Xenophon has also had to deal with criticism and distrust from the army (5.6.17-19, 
5.7.1-4 and 5.8.1-11). 
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has aroused anger at the Spartans rather than fear.
124
 Xenophon speaks again and 
reveals that the gods advised him not to take the role, which persuades the army not 
to elect him (6.1.31). If anyone in the audience recognises that Xenophon initially 
tried to suppress his real reasoning, no one comments on it. After this, the men 
follow Xenophon‟s recommendations and choose Cheirisophus (6.1.32). Thus, 
Xenophon achieves the same result as if he had persuaded the army with his 
deceptive speech.  
Xenophon’s Deception of the Army (7.1.22) 
Xenophon also deceives the army over his intentions. Anaxibius, the Spartan 
admiral, has told the Cyreans that he will not pay them and that they must leave 
Byzantium, but that he will send them home and make a record of them. The soldiers 
are angry because they have no funds with which to buy provisions (7.1.7). When 
the army has left Byzantium, the gates are barred and Anaxibius tells the Greek 
leaders to get their provisions locally and then to go to the Chersonese, where 
Cyniscus will employ them (7.1.12-13). When word reaches the army, the soldiers 
attempt to get back inside the gates, but these are shut before the soldiers reach them. 
The soldiers hammer on the gates, claiming that they have been treated unjustly in 
being thrown out to the enemy, and threaten to break them down. Some of the 
soldiers scale the walls and those who happen to be inside the walls still open the 
gates to allow the rest of the army in (7.1.14-18). When the men see Xenophon, they 
say that he has the opportunity to be a man. They remind him that he has a city, 
triremes, money and many soldiers. They claim that he could help them and that they 
would make him great (7.1.21). Before Xenophon deceives in response to this, the 
narrator has revealed that Xenophon has gone into Byzantium with the men after the 
gates have been opened because he was afraid (δείζαο) that the army would turn to 
plunder (ἁξπαγὴλ) and cause damage to the city, himself and the soldiers (7.1.18). 
This suggests that when Xenophon replies to the soldiers, he is motivated to try to 
stop the army attacking the city somehow, but it does not explain why he chooses to 
deceive his audience.  
                                                             
124 Strauss (1975, 141) writes “whether and to what extent the anti-Spartan reaction was intended 
by Xenophon perhaps as a warning to the irascible Spartan candidate against misuse of his power in 
case of his election, it is impossible to say”. There is no evidence, however, that Xenophon intended 
to do anything other than convince the army to elect Cheirisophus.  
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In reply to the men‟s request and offer of greatness, Xenophon gives the 
impression that he will lead the soldiers to sack Byzantium by telling them that he 
will do the things they said (πνηήζσ ηαῦηα) and by telling them to form up ready for 
battle (7.1.22). Xenophon presents himself as someone who values the opportunity 
the soldiers give him, and as the kind of leader who follows what his men tell him to 
do. Xenophon has continually demonstrated that he works in the interests of the 
soldiers,
125
 and so his audience may believe this ethos. Particularly, Xenophon‟s 
renunciation of his thoughts about settling the army when the soldiers objected to it 
(5.6.31) may have demonstrated this to them. He is perhaps trying to evoke the 
emotions of gratitude and friendly feelings towards himself. Indeed, the men are 
angry and so cannot immediately be reasoned with. Xenophon is not actually lying 
here because he only agrees to help the soldiers rather than agreeing to lead them.
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In fact, he does go on to help them by stopping them sack Byzantium. He is 
suppressing the truth of what he plans to do by carefully choosing his words. 
Because the narrator earlier revealed Xenophon‟s inner thoughts, the reader 
recognises that Xenophon‟s words do not match his motivations and aims. Again, 
the reader has more knowledge than the internal audience. The narrator also reveals 
that Xenophon wanted to calm the men down (βνπιόκελνο αὐηνὺο θαηεξεκίζαη). 
Some editors of the Anabasis place this clause before Xenophon‟s deceitful response 
to the men, and some place it after.
127
 The positioning of this clause has different 
effects on the reader in terms of understanding the speech as deceitful. If placed after 
Xenophon‟s response to the men‟s request for help, the reader might wonder as he is 
reading the speech whether Xenophon the character has changed his mind since 
7.1.18 about the advisability of storming Byzantium. The narrator would then be 
confirming Xenophon‟s deceit, as well as his intentions. Placed before this speech, 
the clause makes Xenophon‟s motives clearer, although it is perhaps unnecessary 
                                                             
125 See 6.2.6, 6.3.10-24, 6.4.12-26, 6.5.9-10, 6.5.14-21, 6.5.23-4 and 6.6.5-35 for recent examples. 
126 See also Higgins (1977, 88), who argues that Xenophon plays down dangers but does not lie. 
127 The Loeb edition locates the clause before Xenophon’s words, but a note by Dillery reveals that, 
in the manuscripts, this clause appears after Xenophon’s response. Dillery writes that the move was 
proposed by Schenkl and followed by Gemoll and Peters. Schenkl (1868, 628) suggested moving this 
clause to a location before the speech because he believed that its connection to the surrounding 
text was loose if located after the speech. He argues that it fits better grammatically following 
ἀπεκρίνατο and allows καὶ αὐτόσ to follow ὡσ τάχιςτα more appropriately. This clause has evidently 
caused editors much trouble because Cobet (1898) even goes as far as to delete it. 
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because of the inner thoughts provided at 7.1.18.
128
 In any case, the men appear to 
believe that Xenophon will lead them against Byzantium because they start to follow 
his orders to prepare for battle (7.1.23). He is successful because he tells the men 
what they want to hear and because they have no reason to doubt him. 
Xenophon’s Deception of the Army, Charminus, Polynicus, Heracleides and 
Seuthes (7.6.41) 
When the Cyreans agree to undertake an offer of employment from the Spartans, an 
Arcadian blames Xenophon for leading them to the region and for arranging for 
them to fight under Seuthes, while also accusing Xenophon of being enriched by 
Seuthes and defrauding the men of their pay. The Arcadian wants Xenophon stoned 
to death for this, and others back this speaker up (7.6.8-10). After Xenophon defends 
himself (7.6.11-38), the Spartan ambassador Charminus says that the soldiers are 
being unjust about Xenophon (7.6.39), and Eurylochus says that the Spartans should 
lead the army in trying to obtain the money that Seuthes owes (7.6.40). After 
Eurylochus‟ speech, Polycrates, whom the narrator reveals is incited (ἐλεηὸο) by 
Xenophon, speaks. He blames Heracleides for stealing the proceeds from the sale of 
the booty that the Cyreans had won and says that the army should take hold of 
Heracleides because he is a Greek wronging other Greeks (7.6.41). The whole 
deception is revealed in the word ἐλεηὸο.129 Thus, the narrator again gives the reader 
more knowledge than the internal audience. The type of deceit that Xenophon uses 
here is to pass off his words as someone else‟s. Immediately after the speech, 
Heracleides reacts as if he is guilty by telling Seuthes that they need to ride away 
(7.6.42). This suggests that Polycrates, on behalf of Xenophon, was speaking 
truthfully, and indeed, the accusation accords with the narrator‟s previous 
presentation of Heracleides‟ scheming character. There is no response in word or 
deed from the army, and so it is unclear whether they were persuaded to blame 
Heracleides. 
 
                                                             
128 Because the manuscripts place the clause after Xenophon’s speech, I am inclined to follow this. 
129 The term is not necessarily negative. At Cyropaedia 1.6.19, Cyrus’ father uses this term when 
recommending that Cyrus should have others speak for him when he is unsure of the truth of a 
statement, so as not to lose the trust of his men. This is again a form of deceit, but it is part of 
Cambyses’ recommendations for good leadership. I am not suggesting, however, that Xenophon is 
presenting a false message through Polycrates.  
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Similarities between the Deceptions of Friends 
In these deceptions, there are many similarities in context, character projected by the 
deceiver, character perceived by the deceiver‟s audience, and the methods used. 
Xenophon‟s and Clearchus‟ deceptions are particularly comparable. For example, 
both deceive by carefully choosing their words. Xenophon does this when he allows 
the soldiers to think that he is going to do as they have asked of him at Byzantium, 
and Clearchus does this when he deceives Cyrus and at times during his deception of 
the soldiers. Both project themselves as being at the service of the soldiers and the 
soldiers believe them. Both leaders also misrepresent the enemy, although they do 
this in opposite ways. Clearchus makes the men fear Cyrus and represents opposition 
against the soldiers increasing, while Xenophon tries to alleviate the fear of the 
enemy cavalry and play down the number of enemies the army will encounter in the 
future. Both project themselves as being knowledgeable, confident and as 
understanding how others think. They also similarly arrange for people to speak on 
their behalf to the army. Further, they both refuse sole command, and in the process 
of this, project themselves as being concerned with what is best for the army.  
Cyrus‟ and Xenophon‟s deceptions of friends can also be compared. Both use 
deception to make the mission seem easier, Cyrus by misrepresenting who the 
opponents are and Xenophon by making the cavalry seem less fearsome and the 
enemies seem fewer. Also, both omit information or present half-truths, Cyrus to the 
soldiers about the mission and Xenophon as to why he is refusing sole command. 
Both ultimately have to reveal the truth.  
Clearchus and Cyrus deceive the soldiers to make them continue into Persia 
when they have stopped. Xenophon also uses deceit to persuade the army to move 
on, but this is when they are in immediate danger. Timasion also tries to get the 
entire army to move, but in the direction of home. Although Timasion deceives 
people outside of the army, his deception resembles Clearchus‟ deception about 
Cyrus‟ character and feelings towards the Greeks. Both leaders misrepresent what 
another thinks because they want their audiences to think that a particular course of 
action would be best for them. Both Timasion and Clearchus project themselves as 
accurately representing others for the audience‟s benefit, and their audiences believe 
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them. Timasion‟s deceit is also like Cyrus‟ because both use deception in order to 
encourage the army to follow them as leaders.  
Function of the Deceitful Speeches 
Given that there are various similarities between the deceitful speeches, we should 
examine the surrounding narrative in more detail to establish where the real 
differences lie. To do this, I shall examine the deceitful speeches under the three 
heads identified in the last chapter.  
Reader Involvement 
The dramatic effects arising from the deceitful speeches do not differentiate between 
the leaders‟ use of deception, but once the reader has been drawn to noticing the 
deceit, he begins to form an opinion about the character of the deceiver and what 
lesson he can learn from the persuasion attempt. When the reader is made aware that 
a speaker will be deceitful in advance of a speech, the reader engages with the text in 
paying attention to how the speaker deceives and how the internal audience reacts. If 
the reader only suspects that a speaker may be deceiving, the reader again pays close 
attention to uncovering the deceit. When the reader discovers after a speech that a 
speaker was being deceitful and that he was taken in along with the internal 
audience, the reader may feel personally affected by the speaker‟s use of deceit and 
react emotionally to it. Thus, the method the narrator uses to reveal the deceit to the 
reader engages the reader through different effects. Once a speaker has deceived an 
audience, the reader is suspicious of further deceit and thus closely involved in 
interpreting the subsequent speeches.
130
 
Other dramatic effects stem from the deceitful speeches, including suspense 
at what might happen if the internal audiences discover that they are being deceived. 
This question particularly hangs over Cyrus‟ deceitful speeches because he is 
deceiving the army about the aim of the entire mission and because there are several 
occasions on which the soldiers suspect Cyrus‟ real aims and will not go on. The 
reader presumably knows that ultimately the soldiers will continue with Cyrus but 
engage with finding out how he persuades them to do so. Regarding Clearchus‟ 
                                                             
130
 See Wencis (1977) who highlights how the characters’ suspicions also serve to involve and create 
tension for the reader. See further Kingsbury (1956) who briefly examines the dramatic nature of the 
Anabasis, including the drama created by speeches. 
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deception of the army, the reader is kept in suspense over what would happen if the 
soldiers realise that Clearchus is deceiving them into continuing with Cyrus, given 
that they were prepared to stone him earlier for trying to make them proceed. 
Similarly, before Xenophon‟s deception of the soldiers at Byzantium, the men are 
angry and therefore may take their emotions out on someone who attempts to 
deceive them. Again, if the men thought that Xenophon was trying to clear his own 
name by having Polycrates speak for him, they might have attempted to stone him, 
as the Arcadian who speaks to accuse Xenophon wants to do. The narrator has 
shown that the soldiers are repeatedly suspicious of Xenophon and believe that he is 
deceiving them, although they believe this at times when he is not actually deceiving 
them. If they actually caught Xenophon in deception, their anger might lead them to 
rash actions.
131
  
The narrator creates surprise for the reader through the deceitful speeches. 
For example, the reader recognises that the soldiers end up doing what Clearchus 
wanted in the first place and are perhaps surprised that the men fail to spot 
Clearchus‟ deception, even though they are already aware that he is trying to get 
them to proceed. The reader may also have expected Xenophon to say that the gods 
told him not to take sole command immediately and be surprised when he talks 
about the Spartans objecting to his appointment.
132
 Further, when the soldiers 
recognise that Cyrus is actually leading them against the king but follow him despite 
his deceit, the reader might be surprised that the soldiers did not react angrily. There 
is also some surprise in Timasion‟ deceit of the merchants, because there has been no 
indication that he would tell such a blatant lie. 
                                                             
131 See, for example, 5.7.2. The men suspect that Xenophon is deceiving them into leading them back 
to the Phasis and the narrator says that it was to be feared that the men might do what they had 
done to the Colchian heralds and market-clerks, i.e. stone them to death. 
132 The narrator may also further play with the readers’ expectations in Xenophon’s deception over 
the sole command. Here, the reader may recall Nicias’ attempt to exaggerate the cost of the 
expedition to Sicily (Thucydides 6.20-3). Like Nicias, Xenophon’s attempt to prevent his audience 
from doing as they wanted backfires and their respective audiences are more eager to attack Sicily 
and have Xenophon as leader. In Thucydides, Nicias is ultimately forced to take command of the 
expedition. Similarly, at 4.27-8, Cleon attempts to distract from awkward questions by taunting his 
opponent. He says that if he were in command he would undertake a mission against Sphacteria. 
This again gets an unintended response. His opponent resigns his command and the audience urges 
Cleon to take on the leadership and carry out the mission. Again, Cleon is forced to accept the 
command. Xenophon’s readers who are familiar with Thucydides may suspect that, like Nicias and 
Cleon, Xenophon will also have to take the command, but he is able to escape from it. 
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 As well as being surprised, the reader may also be shocked that Clearchus is 
risking confusing Cyrus in the middle of battle by disobeying Cyrus‟ orders. 
Alternatively, the reader may not be surprised because he has already seen 
Clearchus‟ extensive deception of others. The reader may still feel suspense after this 
deception, because he knows that Cyrus is expecting Clearchus to act in a certain 
way but that he will not do so. The reader has to anticipate how this will affect the 
battle. The narrator emphasises Cyrus‟ ability to make others loyal to him, and so it 
makes it all the more surprising that Clearchus was ultimately disloyal to Cyrus. 
Xenophon‟s deceptive speeches are less clearly deceitful than Cyrus‟ and 
Clearchus‟. The ambiguity concerning whether some of them should even be 
regarded as deceptions may actually engage the reader further into the narrative. 
Purves (2010, 159-95) interprets the narrative after the Greek leaders are killed as 
reflecting the disorientation, sense of being lost, lack of end-point, and hopelessness 
of the soldiers. Xenophon‟s deceptions occur during this stage and so may similarly 
reflect the increased difficulty of separating truth from lies that the men might be 
feeling at this stage of the march, especially because the men have to rely even more 
heavily than usual upon their leaders while they are in danger. The lack of clarity 
over Xenophon‟s deceptive speeches may encourage the reader to think even more 
about the relation of the speech to narrative.  
Characterisation 
Cyrus, Clearchus, Timasion and Xenophon all use verbal deception in their first or 
one of their first speeches in the work. Thus, their deception of others reflects on 
their entire characterisation. Rather than the use of deception itself or even the form 
the deceit takes simply condemning the leaders, it is the motives behind the 
deception of others that really allow the reader to form a true picture of the leaders‟ 
character from their deceptive speeches.
133
  
 
 
                                                             
133 Kremmydas’ (2013) argument that accusations of deception in Attic oratory are partly used to 
characterise the accuser positively reminds us that, by drawing attention to deception, Xenophon 
the narrator may be projecting his own ethos as someone who is honest, reliable, has integrity and is 
the only one who can reveal the truth about the characters to the reader.  
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Cyrus 
Cyrus takes a risk that the Greeks would turn back from his mission if they 
discovered his deceit, but his far-sightedness, calculation and stage-management 
ensure that this does not happen. While Cyrus‟ success at deceiving his audience 
indicates his skill at persuasion and a good understanding of his audience, his 
motives for using deceit are problematic. The narrator indicates that Cyrus deceived 
when gathering his army because he wanted to keep the mission a secret. Secrecy is 
often a necessary and acceptable reason for deceiving friends and constitutes an 
aspect of good leadership, but not the way Cyrus uses it.
134
 Ultimately, Cyrus‟ 
secrecy is self-serving, rather than being for the good of the men who work for him, 
and is geared towards getting others to do as he needs. Cyrus is fixated with killing 
his brother and taking the throne because he has been maltreated, rather than because 
it is just and right. His selfish aims drive him to deceive others and make promises 
that he cannot keep. His deception of others makes the mission safer for him but 
more dangerous for them.  
The soldiers‟ reaction when they find out the real aim of the mission 
indicates that they would have been unwilling to join Cyrus without the pretexts he 
offered. The narrator says that the men were fearful (θνβνύκελνη) of the journey and 
unwilling (ἄθνληεο) to go on, although the majority continued out of shame 
(αἰζρύλελ) before each other and Cyrus (3.1.10).135 As mercenaries, the soldiers 
need to know that they are likely to survive the mission and that they are not taking 
excessive risks. We have seen that Cyrus understands what drives people. Thus, 
Cyrus might have anticipated that deception was the only way to persuade the men to 
undertake a mission voluntarily against the king and his allies. Indeed, in Diodorus‟ 
account, which draws on Ephorus, this is made explicit; Cyrus‟ reason for not telling 
the troops the real aims of his mission stems from a fear that the troops may abandon 
his mission if they knew its magnitude (Bibliotheca Historica 14.19.9).  
When the soldiers do find out the truth in the Anabasis, they ask for more 
money to continue (1.4.12). Again, Cyrus may have anticipated that if the 
mercenaries had agreed to fight the king at the beginning of the mission, they would 
                                                             
134 Cyrus the Great uses secrecy to good effect at Cyropaedia 2.4.17ff.  
135 Clearchus also claims that shame motivated the army to continue (2.3.22). 
152 
 
have requested more wages from the start. Cyrus‟ inability to pay an increased wage 
may be another reason why he chose to use deceit. By 1.2.11, Cyrus already owes 
the soldiers more than three months‟ pay, but if his lack of funds had become known 
sooner because he was paying them a higher wage, the soldiers may have been able 
to abandon Cyrus successfully.
136
 This inability to pay the men until aided by the 
Cilician queen throws into doubt Cyrus‟ ability to back up his later promises of pay 
and his reputation for generosity.  
When the soldiers hear the real aim of the mission, they assume that the 
generals all knew the truth from the beginning and deliberately kept it from them 
(1.4.11-12). Indeed, in Diodorus‟ account, all the commanders were aware of the real 
aim from the beginning. In the Anabasis, however, only Clearchus knows the real 
aim (3.1.10), even though the commanders were mostly handpicked friends.
137
 Thus, 
Cyrus must believe that the leaders, as well as the soldiers, have reasons not to want 
to attack the king. Examining why Cyrus only informed Clearchus of his aim further 
demonstrates why the Greeks might not have wanted to attempt a mission against the 
king and that Cyrus is being more than just cautious for the good of his army.  
By the time the narrator reveals that Clearchus knew Cyrus‟ aim, the reader 
has heard that Clearchus is fearless, has been given money by Cyrus, and is an exile. 
Thus, Clearchus would not object to the mission because he was afraid, or because 
he has not been paid enough, as we have seen that the others might have done. He is 
also in constant need of employment and would not fear political repercussions in 
Sparta caused by fighting against the king. This suggests that the other leaders, and 
perhaps also the soldiers, might have less of a pressing need to fight and might have 
political reasons for not wanting to attack the king. Indeed, Socrates warns 
Xenophon of the possible implications of befriending Cyrus (3.1.5), and Xenophon 
                                                             
136 Higgins (1977, 84) argues that Cyrus shrewdly prolongs his deceit until the men had come too far 
to return alone and had no choice but to continue with him. See also Brennan (2005, 37-8), who 
argues that Cyrus may have decided that the longer he could spin out the deception, the more 
chance he would have of talking the Greeks into continuing. There is no evidence in the narrative to 
confirm either argument, but both are possible. 
137 Some scholars argue that Xenophon is deliberately misrepresenting events here. Bassett (2001, 
12), for example, says that Cheirisophus as least would also have known because he was sent 
officially by Cyrus’ Spartan allies. See Herman (1987, 100), however, who notes that the text only 
states that Cheirisophus was responding to Cyrus’ call (μετάπεμπτοσ ὑπὸ Κφρου, 1.4.3). This may not 
have been the summons made officially to Sparta but a private call. 
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may even have been exiled for his part in Cyrus‟ expedition.138 The current political 
situation was complicated. The Spartans had previously surrendered the Ionian cities 
to the Persians in return for Persian support against the Athenians. Cyrus had been 
sent by his father to oversee the Ionian coast and to help the Spartans against the 
Athenians, and he formed a close bond with the Spartan leader Lysander and gave 
the Spartans his own money for the war effort. Because of the treatment by 
Tissaphernes of the Ionian cities, all but Miletus successfully revolted and went over 
to Cyrus. Cyrus treated them well and looked after the Milesian exiles, yet 
Artaxerxes did not back the Spartans or approve of Cyrus‟ relations with the Ionians. 
When Cyrus asked for help for an expedition, the Peloponnesians may have been 
inclined to aid him because the best chance for the Ionian cities to regain their 
freedom was to place Cyrus on the throne. The Peloponnesians may also have felt 
obliged to help Cyrus after his personal involvement in their affairs. However, they 
would also fear fighting against the king and evoking his wrath.
139
 Cyrus‟ real aims 
would be high risk for the Greek cities to be involved in, and even mercenary leaders 
and soldiers may have appreciated this.
140
 Cyrus is thus professing lower risk aims to 
gain support.
141
  
It is questionable whether anyone in the Greek cities would believe that the 
soldiers and leaders had been duped by Cyrus into going on the mission. Thus, while 
Cyrus benefits by gaining himself an army, he leaves the Greeks to face 
condemnation at home later. Cyrus also does not appear concerned about the impact 
of the deceit on the relationship between the soldiers and the leaders when he asks 
the commanders to reveal the truth to the men. By revealing the truth in this way, he 
allows the soldiers to blame the generals, and his own reputation does not seem 
affected.  
Despite Cyrus‟ selfish motives, no character blames Cyrus for his deceptions 
of others. Likewise, the narrator does not explicitly condemn him. Πξνθάζηο can be 
                                                             
138 See Tuplin (1987) and Badian (2004, 40-2).  
139 For fuller treatment of these events see Lewis (1977, 119-23 and 130-9), Dillery (2001, 22-4) and 
Stronk (1990-1). See also Hellenica 1.4.3-7, 1.5.2-3 and 3.1.1-3. 
140 See Brennan (2005, 37-8), who also argues that Cyrus’ secondary reason for deceiving the army 
was that the Greeks would not have undertaken the mission. He argues that this is primarily because 
they still recalled Xerxes’ destruction of Athens, though. 
141 English (2012, 55) even argues that Cyrus tailored the pretexts he offers to where the 
mercenaries were recruited from or first stationed. 
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translated with a variety of words such as „explanation‟, „pretext‟, „cause‟, or 
„excuse‟,142 but, as Hirsch (1985, 23) comments, the term is neutral in tone and does 
not constitute a judgement by the narrator. The narrator does make it clear that 
Cyrus, through Proxenus, deceived Xenophon the character (3.1.10). This may 
suggest that the narrator wants to distance Xenophon as far as possible from 
perpetrating this deception, because it is negative in some way.  
Clearchus 
Clearchus‟ deception of others characterises him as willing and able to use a variety 
of techniques to persuade others. Like Cyrus, his deception is not a spontaneous 
response to a desperate situation, but is carefully pre-planned. The complexity and 
stage-management of his deception demonstrates how skilled he is in forethought 
and anticipation of what will persuade others. He knows what ethos will best make 
his audience trust him and which emotions to manipulate. Testament to this is the 
strong reaction he receives to his first deception. Clearchus‟ deceptions of others 
reveal him as wanting to be in control, and wanting to have others follow and rely on 
him. Using deception, Clearchus gets others to do what he desires, makes others trust 
him, and strengthens his leader position.  
Xenophon the author, via the narrator, has rendered Clearchus‟ deception of 
others a central part of Clearchus‟ characterisation and leadership. Indeed, it is 
unclear how Xenophon himself knew about certain aspects of Clearchus‟ deception, 
such as Clearchus‟ secret message to Cyrus or that Clearchus had prepped men 
before the debate at Tarsus. Kelly (1977, 166, n. 201) even notes that Cyrus settles 
the mutiny at Tarsus in Diodorus‟ account (14.20.4-5), again demonstrating that 
Xenophon the author has the narrator foreground Clearchus‟ deception of others. It 
may be that Xenophon is playing on the fifth and fourth century Athenian stereotype 
of Spartans who say one thing and think another.
143
 Indeed, Millender (2012, 388) 
                                                             
142 See in particular Hornblower (1991, 64-5), Heubeck (1980), Rawlings III (1975), Pearson (1972 and 
1952), and Gomme (1945, 153) who investigate its meaning.  
143
 This challenges the categorisation of Xenophon as a Laconophile. Much work has been done 
recently to combat this perception of Xenophon. See Millender (2012, esp. 417), Gish (2009, esp. 
339 and 342), Kroeker (2009, esp. 216), Humble (1997) and Tuplin (1994, 163 and 1993, 41).  
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makes this connection between Clearchus and duplicitousness, as well as seeing 
other Spartan typecasts in the portrayal of Clearchus.
144
  
Clearchus‟ deceptive speeches may actually be unnecessary, perhaps 
characterising him as someone who relishes deceiving. To persuade the men to 
continue at Tarsus, Clearchus could have bargained with the distressed Cyrus to get 
him to pay the men more money, because the soldiers request more money from 
Cyrus when they discover the real aim anyway (1.4.12). Clearchus could also have 
appealed to the benefits the army could get from Cyrus, and his good nature. Even 
the unscrupulous Menon persuades his men to continue by saying that they will get 
rewards from Cyrus (1.4.13-16). Likewise, Clearchus could have appealed to the 
shame the Greeks would incur at abandoning their friend, because both Clearchus 
and the narrator claim this as a motive for the army continuing, as we saw. 
Regarding Clearchus‟ deception of Cyrus, Clearchus could have raised his concerns 
with Cyrus, given that they were on good terms, and that Cyrus had previously 
requested input from the Greek leaders (1.7.2). 
To complicate the picture, on other occasions, Clearchus‟ deception of others 
is straightforwardly positive. We saw in the last chapter that at 2.2.19-21, Clearchus 
stops the army panicking by deceiving them. At 2.3.9, Clearchus explains to the 
other generals that he is going to delay reporting to the king‟s messengers that the 
army has decided on a truce, in order to make the messengers fearful. He says that he 
supposes that the Greek soldiers will also be afraid. While this confirms that 
Clearchus has no qualms about deceiving friends as well as enemies, the deception 
Clearchus practices is primarily to give the Greeks a psychological advantage.  
 Neither the narrator nor Clearchus himself reveal Clearchus‟ motives for 
deceiving the soldiers, and so the reader is left to speculate over what makes 
Clearchus choose Cyrus over the men. The reader may assume that, because 
                                                             
144 These she identifies as being ‘severe’, being concerned with warfare and discipline, being violent 
towards other Greeks, and abandoning the Spartan upbringing in favour of wealth, power and 
foreign rule. She also argues (2012, 401-93) that the portrayal of the Spartan Anaxibius is similar 
because he prefers helping Pharnabazus over Cheirisophus, although he does aid the Greeks later. 
Tuplin (1994, 133 and endnote 9) sees some more positive Spartan stereotypes in the Anabasis, but 
stereotypes none the less. See also Hesk (2000, 21-39 and 64ff.) and Bradford (1994) for Spartans 
who think one thing and say another, although neither scholar connects Clearchus to this. See 
Powell (1994 and 1989) for the Spartan state’s official use of deceit, particularly in their visual 
images, and their use of lies and secrecy. Powell argues that this aided Spartan success, particularly 
by projecting a controlled image. Deception, it seems, was part of Spartan political rule. 
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Clearchus is an exile, he is desperate to maintain employment. For Clearchus to do 
this, he must continue being useful to Cyrus by maintaining control over the men and 
keeping them happy, as Dillery (1995, 66) argues. Clearchus may also be concerned 
that his troops will leave him if he begins to lead them home, and so he needs to 
keep them employed. Alternatively, perhaps Clearchus really did feel that he had a 
duty to Cyrus and needed to reciprocate the money and honour that Cyrus had given 
him. This last interpretation is quickly rendered unlikely, however, by Clearchus‟ 
lack of care for Cyrus‟ interests when he does not explain to Cyrus how he is going 
to get the men to continue at Tarsus, even though Cyrus is distressed, and in his 
deception of Cyrus.  
 The narrator explains that concern for the troops motivated Clearchus‟ 
disobedience of Cyrus‟ orders, and there has been much discussion over whether 
Clearchus was right to disobey Cyrus here.
145
 Irrespective of whether it was better 
for the Greeks to disobey the order, he could have questioned Cyrus over it, as we 
saw, for the benefit of all concerned. The reader will perhaps conclude that 
Clearchus did not care enough for Cyrus‟ concerns. The reader has earlier seen that 
Clearchus believes that he has the power to make decisions over other leaders, when 
he thinks he has the power to punish Menon‟s men (1.5.11).  
 Clearchus‟ concern for the Greeks‟ safety here, may suggest that when he 
deceived the soldiers he was genuinely concerned for the army and really did believe 
that it would be safer for the soldiers to stay with Cyrus because Cyrus really would 
punish them if they defected.
146
 The narrator‟s representation of Cyrus‟ confusion at 
Tarsus perhaps renders this unlikely, despite Cyrus‟ reputation for harming 
                                                             
145 Plutarch says that Clearchus was mistaken in not wanting to lead the Greeks against the king 
because he put Greek safety over the interests of his employer. He argues that Clearchus abandoned 
the plans and the aim of the march because of fear, and that the Persians would not have faced the 
Greeks if the original plan had been followed. Plutarch holds Clearchus’ caution (εὐλάβειαν) to 
blame for the destruction of Cyrus and the entire aim of the mission (Artaxerxes 8.3-7). See, 
however, Rood (2005, xxiii), who comments that many ancients believed that Clearchus acted 
rightly. Mather (1917, 594) also believes that Clearchus was actually following the Greek practice of 
not exposing the right side. Anderson (1974, 104-5) argues that Clearchus had no choice but to act 
as he did because of the position of the other contingents in the battle and the logistics of how the 
two armies were set up. He blames Cyrus instead. 
146 Braun (2004, 101), for example, appears to believe that Clearchus’ deception of the men was for 
their own good, when he compares it to “Odysseus’ white lies, which the goddess Athena 
commended with amusement, even admiration”. Likewise, Roisman (1985-8, 36) argues that while it 
was in Clearchus’ best interests to continue the march, he also did the best for the men in their 
difficult situation. 
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wrongdoers. It is also perhaps unlikely that Cyrus would turn on the whole Greek 
army, which he knows is capable of scaring his barbarian troops (1.2.18). Indeed, as 
the narrative progresses, it becomes more apparent that Clearchus may be more 
concerned with his own leadership than with Cyrus‟, and his own interests rather 
than the troops‟.   
At 2.5.11, Clearchus says to Tissaphernes that he wanted to be friends with 
Cyrus because Cyrus was the most capable person at the time of benefitting 
whomever he wanted. This suggests that Clearchus‟ desire to repay Cyrus stems 
from thoughts of his own interests, rather than Cyrus‟, although Clearchus may be 
misrepresenting himself to Tissaphernes in order to appear as a typical mercenary 
and as no threat to Tissaphernes. Indeed, Clearchus benefitted by gaining a position 
of trust with Cyrus after Tarsus. Clearchus‟ general self-interest is highlighted 
elsewhere by the narrator who reveals that Clearchus insists on taking the leaders to 
Tissaphernes because he thought that Tissaphernes was going to accuse Menon of 
slandering the Greeks. Clearchus wanted no one to stand between himself and 
having the entire army under his control, the narrator says, and saw this as a way to 
remove Menon, who was trying to win support for his own leadership (2.5.27-9).
147
 
As Dillery (2001, 199) notes, Xenophon the author has here rejected Ctesias‟ 
account that Clearchus was unwilling to go to Tissaphernes (F. Gr. Hist. 688, F27) 
and instead emphasised Clearchus‟ selfish aims. As Danzig (2007, 35) points out, 
even some of the soldiers realised what Tissaphernes was planning, which suggests 
that Clearchus was naïve or blinded here. Partly because of the power his deception 
of others has gained him, Clearchus has the authority to get an agreement from the 
army that a certain number will go to Tissaphernes (2.5.29-30). Such self-interest 
suggests that Clearchus‟ own leadership powers were firmly in his mind when he 
persuaded the soldiers to continue with Cyrus. 
In Clearchus‟ obituary, the narrator mentions that Clearchus loves war 
(θηινπόιεκνο) and constantly seeks it (2.6.2-6). Thus, the reader might think that 
                                                             
147
 Buzzetti’s (2008, 16) claim that Clearchus trusted Tissaphernes because of his “rash hopefulness” 
and his trust in both “virtue and Tissaphernes’ belief in the divine” seems to contradict the motive 
provided by the narrator.   
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this is why he wants to stay with Cyrus.
148
 The narrator also says that soldiers 
usually abandoned Clearchus when they were no longer in danger or fighting an 
enemy (2.6.11-14), suggesting that Clearchus may have been concerned about 
whether the soldiers would stay with him if he led them home.  
That Clearchus thought it acceptable for Cyrus and himself to deceive the 
soldiers and lead them on an extremely dangerous mission which they would 
otherwise not have agreed to go on suggests that Clearchus is an excessive risk taker 
and that the safety of others was not his primary motivation when deceiving the men 
at Tarsus or even when he deceived Cyrus. When the narrator reveals that Clearchus 
knew Cyrus‟ true aim, this indicates further verbal deception by Clearchus. Kelly 
(1977, 11) and Laforse (2000, 82 n. 18) observe that the reader may think back to 
Clearchus‟ speech to the Persian messengers and Tissaphernes at 2.3.21-3. Here, 
Clearchus says that the army did not form to go against the king and was not 
intentionally marching against him, but that Cyrus kept presenting pretexts that 
encouraged the mercenaries to continue. The first part, of course, is not true in 
Clearchus‟ own case. While Clearchus‟ motives for deceiving the soldiers remain 
uncertain, the narrative points to self-interest ultimately driving him.
149
 Clearchus‟ 
deception of others and lack of explicitly explained motives render him an 
                                                             
148 Particularly because the narrator presents Clearchus as loving war, Tritle (2004) believes that 
Xenophon understood that Clearchus had been affected by the long years of fighting and that in 
modern terms he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. However, Clearchus’ status as an 
exile seems just as likely a reason for him seeking war constantly.  
149 Several scholars comment that Clearchus is self-interested, and some specifically link this to his 
deception of others. Millender (2012, esp. 382-95) argues that Clearchus used the soldiers and Cyrus 
against each other and came out of the situation as the only one to benefit, and that he was 
concerned for himself when disobeying Cyrus. Seelinger (1997, 27) argues that the presentation of 
Clearchus’ deception of the soldiers may make the reader think that Clearchus had his own interests 
at heart. Rood (2005, xxiv) argues that Clearchus only pretends to be concerned for the interests of 
the men and in reality has his own interests, as well as Cyrus’, in mind. Humble (1997, 76-9) argues 
that Clearchus puts himself and his desires first and only works in the interests of the army when 
their interests overlap, particularly in remaining working for Cyrus. Nussbaum (1967, 59, 127 and 
139) writes that if Clearchus did help the army in any way it was because it fitted in with his own 
plans and that he would stop at nothing to see these fulfilled. Hirsch (1985, 28) says that Xenophon 
criticises Clearchus’ “self-serving ambition and poor judgement”. 
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ambiguous character.
150
 Despite this, neither the internal characters nor the narrator 
overtly criticise Clearchus for deceiving the troops or Cyrus. 
Timasion 
Timasion‟s deception of the merchants characterises him as recognising which 
emotions to arouse to persuade his audience and what ethos to present to be 
convincing. He is also characterised as being proactive in trying to get the army to 
sail away. However, neither the narrator nor Timasion make it clear whether 
Timasion is motivated to act because sailing away is what the army wants, or 
because it is what he wants. Indeed, some of the army wants to remain, so the reader 
may suspect that Timasion‟s own desires carry more weight here, particularly 
because Timasion would also gain more authority as the primary leader of the 
army.
151
 Much later in the work, the narrator reveals that, although other leaders 
want to take the army elsewhere, Timasion wants to lead the men back to Greece, 
because he desires to go home himself (7.2.2). The narrator reveals that Timasion‟s 
desire to go home coincides with what the soldiers wanted on this occasion, as it did 
when he deceived the merchants. Thus, while it seems that Timasion is driven 
primarily by his own interest, what he is trying to achieve with his deception is at 
least desirable to most of the army, unlike what Cyrus‟ and Clearchus‟ deceptions 
aim at. 
 From the characterisation of Timasion before and after this incident, lying 
seems out of character for him. Before his speech, he has been elected to replace 
Clearchus as general (3.1.47) and so must be highly regarded despite being one of 
the younger leaders. Thus, the reader may believe that Timasion acted with poor 
judgement when he lied, and may lose some trust in him. However, Timasion may 
                                                             
150 There are similar mixed interpretations of the character of Cyrus the Great and the deceit he uses 
in the Cyropaedia. See Whidden (2007) for the opinion that Cyrus is practicing deceit at every turn, 
and Field (2012, 729-30) for a dark interpretation of Cyrus’ leadership. By contrast, see Gray (2011b, 
28-30 and 246-63) for a more balanced picture, Gera (1993, 286-99) for interpretations explaining 
certain elements of Cyrus’ deceit in positive terms, and Danzig (2012), who argues that Xenophon 
shows that deception can be used for self-interested motives in certain cases.  
151 Dillery (1995, 88), for example, believes that Timasion wants gain for himself and is greedy. 
Nussbaum (1967, 175 and 178) argues that Timasion wanted the chief leader role and to end his 
exile, while pretending that he was benefitting the army. Buzzetti (2014, 211) believes that Timasion 
wanted to use the army to become tyrant of his city. However, the narrator does not specify this, 
and indeed Timasion says that his city will receive him readily (ἑκόντεσ), even though he admits to 
being an exile (5.6.23). 
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regain this trust by his actions after this episode, because he acts in the interests of 
the army and supports Xenophon. For example, he demands provisions for the army 
from Coeratadas, who wants to lead the Cyreans (7.1.40), and when Heracleides tries 
to get the generals to leave Xenophon‟s leadership in return for pay, Timasion replies 
that he would not undertake a campaign without Xenophon even for five months‟ 
pay (7.5.9-10).
152
 Considering all the information about Timasion, the reader may 
believe that Timasion‟s deception of the merchants is partly selfish but also that he 
wants to do something positive for the army, although he goes about it in the wrong 
way.
153
 Like Cyrus and Clearchus, Timasion is not blamed by any character or by the 
narrator. 
Xenophon 
Xenophon‟s deception of the army reveals that he is perceptive about situations, 
particularly understanding fears and potential repercussions, that he can improvise, 
and that he can check volatile situations. He appears to understand the army‟s 
concerns, and he is successful on all but one occasion. We saw that Xenophon‟s 
motives for deceiving others are sometimes clear and sometimes unclear. 
Straightforwardly, we saw Xenophon deceive the men on three occasions in order to 
encourage them to fight on, and we also saw him calm a potentially catastrophic 
situation at Byzantium because he was concerned for all parties involved. Of course, 
Xenophon is anxious for his own safety as well as the army‟s safety on these 
occasions, but we can see the differences here with the other leaders‟ deceptions. 
Xenophon gives the army confidence about the enemy for their own benefit, while 
Clearchus, in misrepresenting Cyrus as someone who will oppose them, takes away 
the confidence of the army for his own benefit. When Cyrus makes the mission seem 
easier, it is primarily for his own interests, in contrast to Xenophon. All the deceivers 
try to get the army to move on when they have stopped, but only Xenophon does this 
for the soldiers‟ own good. When Xenophon allows the soldiers to think he will do 
                                                             
152 Stronk (1995, 243) sees further selfishness in this, however, and argues that Timasion might have 
doubted Heracleides’ ability to pay and was concerned that he and the other leaders would face 
blame for this.  
153 See also Nussbaum (1967, 133-4) who refers to this incident as a “lapse” due to Timasion’s desire 
to return home. He says that Timasion is “rash and perhaps headstrong”, had “moderate ability” and 
was “willing and generous enough”. Nussbaum also argues that Timasion’s good behaviour after this 
incident suggests that Timasion is a generally good character who may even be seeking to make 
amends for his actions. Nussbaum similarly questions whether Timasion later wants to return to 
Greece because the men do, or whether it was his own desires that drove him.  
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as they wish at Byzantium for everyone‟s interests, he contrasts Clearchus who 
allows the soldiers to think he is doing as they desire at Tarsus for his own interests.  
Xenophon‟s motives for rejecting the sole command by warning the army of 
the troubles it will face with the Spartans need further investigation. Because 
Cheirisophus backs up Xenophon‟s warnings about the Spartans in his acceptance 
speech (6.1.32), the reader might think that Xenophon has taken the opportunity to 
try to teach the army about how its actions will be perceived by others and will affect 
their safety. This is a valuable lesson both for now and for the future. Xenophon 
misjudges how the army would receive such advice, however. Either the soldiers 
think that Xenophon is exaggerating, or they want Xenophon as sole commander so 
strongly that they are willing to suffer Spartan anger in order to have him lead them. 
Dangerously, they seem to believe that they can choose a leader without any 
repercussions. The army‟s disregard of Xenophon‟s good advice demonstrates how 
valuable it is that the army has a leader who understands the wider political 
landscape and attempts to keep the army well regarded.  
In this example, Xenophon does not conceal the fact that he is concerned for 
his own well-being, as well as that of the army. Indeed, his inner thoughts about 
taking the sole command demonstrate that he is particularly concerned with his own 
reputation. However, in trying to turn the situation into a lesson for the army, he is 
working in the army‟s interests. The offer of the role itself suggests that the soldiers 
believe that Xenophon would achieve for them what they desire and that he has their 
interests at heart. Strauss (1975, 141) argues that the gods did not indicate who 
should be sole commander instead of Xenophon and so Xenophon had to assess the 
situation for himself. This may be when he realised the political implications of the 
soldiers‟ choice and may explain why Xenophon did not consider the political 
implications as part of his musings on whether to accept or reject the sole command. 
Again, the differences between the leaders can be seen when compared to Clearchus‟ 
deceptive claims that he should not lead his troops home, and also with Cyrus‟ 
deception of the soldiers. Clearchus rejects the command in the process of 
deceptively increasing his authority over the soldiers, whereas Xenophon declines 
more power honestly. Both Xenophon and Cyrus present half-truths and omit 
information but Cyrus does it to gain and retain his leadership over the army, in 
contrast to Xenophon.  
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The reason that Xenophon deceives by having Polycrates speak for him can 
only be hypothesised based on how Xenophon has been motivated before. By this 
late stage, the narrator has shown that Xenophon consistently acts and also deceives 
with the interests of the army in mind, and so it is unlikely that he would undercut 
this picture now. Xenophon presumably uses Polycrates because the soldiers were 
not as suspicious of Polycrates as they were of Xenophon, whom they recently 
believed was receiving money from Seuthes and defrauding them of their pay. The 
alternative interpretation is that Xenophon is selfishly trying to clear his own name, 
and is using Polycrates because he is aware that his audience will believe that he is 
trying to pass the blame onto another. However, the reader knows that Xenophon is 
not to blame and also that what he has Polycrates say is correct. Thus, the reader may 
judge that Xenophon was positively motivated here and that this was the only way to 
correct the audience‟s misconceptions during a tense situation. The narrator may also 
be making a deliberate contrast with Clearchus who primed others to speak, but for 
his own interests.  
Of the four leaders, only Xenophon‟s motivations for deceiving stand up to 
scrutiny. Xenophon‟s deceptions of the army reveal his repeated consideration of the 
army‟s morale, interests, safety and understanding. Xenophon does not use deceit to 
increase his power or to gain control over others, unlike Cyrus, Clearchus and, to an 
extent, Timasion. He does not deceive about the fundamental aim of the mission, but 
attempts to ensure that the army can proceed with their mission as safely as possible. 
He is concerned with his own safety and reputation, but these thoughts never 
compromise the interests of the men.
154
 As with the other deceivers, the narrator and 
characters do not blame Xenophon for any of his deceptions of others, although the 
soldiers suspect him of deception on other occasions. 
Audiences 
The audiences of the deceptive speeches are also characterised. Cyrus‟ friends are 
too trusting of him, and the soldiers allow themselves to be deceived because of 
shame, fear and the desire for more money. They must take some responsibility for 
their own predicament after Cyrus dies. Again, both the soldiers and Cyrus are too 
                                                             
154 Humble (1997, 46-62) also argues that Xenophon is shown as having the best interests of the 
army at heart.  
163 
 
trusting of Clearchus and too eager to believe that he is doing as they want. The 
merchants can be characterised by their willingness to believe strangers, when 
Timasion deceives them, because of fear. Through Xenophon‟s deceptions, the 
soldiers can be characterised as being prone to strong emotions such as despair and 
anger, as well as making rash decisions, and believing that they are right and able to 
act as they please. However, they can be encouraged, calmed and made to see sense.  
Didactic Function 
As we saw in the last chapter, the speeches present the reader with an indication of 
how to persuade others successfully, here by using deception. For example, as part of 
his deception of others, Cyrus recognises what he needs to say and do to make 
himself seem attractive to work for and seem able to fulfil his promises. Testament 
to the strength of the affiliations he is able to make, the narrator concludes that Cyrus 
had the largest (πιεῖζηνη) following of anyone (1.9.12) and that no one was loved 
(πεθηι῅ζζαη) by more people (πιεηόλσλ, 1.9.28). Cyrus has a carefully engineered 
method of attracting and retaining followers that allows him to deceive people. He is 
clearly a master at representing his own ethos and manipulating the feelings of 
others, and he has evidently worked hard to establish a positive reputation. The 
narrator presents the desirability of working for Cyrus as being well known to the 
Greeks and even Cyrus‟ enemies.155 Because of his good repute, he makes friends 
whom he can manipulate later. When he needs Greek troops, he already has a 
network of friends to call on.
156
 Cyrus makes friends with leaders by giving them 
money (1.1.9) and political support (1.1.10). Cyrus also treats his brother‟s courtiers 
well, with the intention of making them more friendly (κᾶιινλ θίινπο) to himself 
than to the king. He also makes sure that those in his own province feel goodwill 
(εὐλντθῶο) towards him (1.1.5). The basis of Cyrus‟ leadership over the Greeks is 
                                                             
155 See 1.4.3, 1.4.15, 1.7.2, 1.9.17, and 6.4.8. 
156 See further Azoulay (2004a, 300), Mitchell (1997, 119-20) and Herman (1987, 99) for Cyrus’ 
xenos-relationships with the Greek leaders. See also Millender (2012, 390-2) who discusses how 
Xenophon the author does not refer to Clearchus as a xenos of Cyrus. She argues that Clearchus later 
claims that they have this relationship but also a unique relationship of philia. 
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what he can offer them and how he makes them feel.
157
 Having attracted the Greeks 
by his reputed generosity and virtue, once on the march, Cyrus promises that he will 
give out more pay (1.3.21) and special bonuses (1.4.12) to the men, and offers the 
leaders satrapies and gold crowns (1.7.7). This keeps the Greeks motivated. We do 
not see these promises fulfilled, but they clearly satisfy the Greeks at the time. Cyrus 
also further presents himself as having a virtuous character, as we saw in the last 
chapter. Because the Greeks feel so positively towards him, he is able to deceive 
them, and even persuade them when they recognise that he is deceiving them.  
Despite the fact that almost all the verbal deception is successfully carried 
out, the harm and benefit that the deceptions bring serves to demonstrate to the 
reader whether the deceit was warranted or not. The way the leader ends in the work 
further confirms how the speakers and their deceit should be judged. In the short 
term, Cyrus‟ deceptions against others benefit himself by both gaining him an army 
and ensuring it continues to work for him, and benefit the army by keeping it in 
employment. In the longer term, however, the army go on to fight against the king. 
The Greeks lose no one in the battle but they suffer greatly in their attempts to return 
home afterwards, and their original leaders are executed. As for the deceiver, Cyrus 
is killed in the battle, having himself been deceived by Clearchus over tactics.  
Regarding Clearchus‟ deception of his troops and the wider army, in the short 
term, both speaker and audience seem to benefit from the decision to continue with 
Cyrus. Firstly, Clearchus appears to gain standing with Cyrus and the army. Indeed, 
some scholars argue that Cyrus did not initially regard Clearchus as the foremost 
Greek leader, because Cyrus did not give as much money to Clearchus as to 
Aristippus and because Menon led the right wing, and that Clearchus won his 
position of honour with Cyrus through his actions at Tarsus.
158
 The soldiers benefit 
from continued employment and more money, and Cyrus benefits by having an army 
to continue his mission with. In the longer term, continuing on the mission proves 
                                                             
157 Cyrus has a similar basis to his leadership with others. He can draw on his previous good 
treatment of the Milesian exiles to encourage them to enlist with him (1.2.2), and many Persians 
have a strong personal attachment to Cyrus which was gained and maintained by rich rewards 
(1.8.27-9 and 1.9.30-1). His leadership over the garrison commanders is different. Because the 
Ionian cities have voluntarily aligned with him, he can order the garrison commanders there to act 
(1.1.6). 
158 See Bassett (2001, 10), Laforse (2000, 80), Rood (2010a, 126) and Roisman (1985-8, 33). 
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disastrous for the Greeks and Cyrus because of the dangers the army faces at the 
battle of Cunaxa.  
Regarding Clearchus‟ deception of Cyrus, the short-term effect is Cyrus‟ 
death.
 
Cyrus attacks the king when he fears that the king is going to get behind the 
Greek troops and kill them (1.8.24). The king is able to attack because there is no 
one giving battle to him, although Cyrus asked Clearchus to do this. Cyrus soon 
becomes isolated with only a few attendants and, when he sees the king, he loses 
control and rushes at him. Cyrus is killed after wounding the king (1.8.25-6).
159
 
Clearchus is not entirely to blame, because Cyrus did act rashly. However, Clearchus 
created the situation in which Cyrus acted impulsively. Clearchus‟ deception of 
Cyrus benefits Clearchus in the short-term because after Cyrus‟ death, he takes 
control and the army voluntarily look to him, as we saw in the last chapter. In the 
longer-term, Cyrus‟ death leaves the army alone and vulnerable to Persian attack and 
treachery, which is particularly suffered by Clearchus. Clearchus‟ leadership ends in 
the work when he allows himself to be deceived by Tissaphernes (2.5.24-32). This 
causes his own death, as well as the death of others, and throws the army into 
chaos.
160
 Hirsch (1985, 28-9) suggests that Xenophon the author may partly have 
used Clearchus as a scapegoat because he was ashamed that the Greeks fell into the 
trap set by Tissaphernes so easily. He admits, however, that this conflicts with the 
Cyropaedia narrator‟s claim that relying on the Persians‟ trustworthiness got the 
generals killed by Tissaphernes and the king (8.8.2-3). Clearchus knows that Cyrus 
deceives, however, suggesting that he at least is aware that one cannot blindly trust 
the Persians. In this case, he must accept responsibility for trusting Tissaphernes. 
Thus, both Clearchus and Cyrus ultimately bring death, harm and suffering to 
the army, and leave it at a loss, rendering them both blameworthy. Both are 
                                                             
159 In Ctesias’ account, Cyrus dies in the battle because he did not take the advice given by Clearchus 
(ἀπεικοῦντοσ Κλεάρχωι, F. Gr. Hist. 688, F16). Certain ancient and modern critics believe that Ctesias 
received some of his information from Clearchus himself (see Plutarch, Artaxerxes, 18.1-4, Photius F. 
Gr. Hist. 688, F27, Bassett, 2002, 454 and Bigwood, 1983, 345). This might explain why Clearchus’ 
deceptions of others are concealed in Ctesias’ account. See Bassett (1999) for the other accounts of 
Cyrus’ death. 
160 See Rood (2010a, 132-3) who links the situation and feeling amongst the army after the death of 
the generals to the situation that Clearchus and those he had prepped to speak envisioned if they 
were to desert Cyrus. Rood bases this on certain similar words and themes. Rood argues that the link 
demonstrates that what the soldiers most feared happening to them at Tarsus if they abandoned 
Cyrus has actually happened, although under different circumstances. This illustrates the horrors 
that Clearchus’ deception caused. 
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themselves led to their death by deception practiced on them by another.
161
 
Combined with their selfish motives, the presentation of Clearchus‟ and Cyrus‟ 
deceitful speeches renders them negative paradigms and leaders who should not be 
emulated, especially in their persuasion attempts. Clearchus is sometimes viewed as 
a positive leader,
162
 and indeed the narrator presents some positive elements to his 
leadership.
163
 However, the many negative elements, including his deception of 
friends, clearly detract from these. He is clearly untrustworthy, and, because of this, 
the reader may even suspect Clearchus of deceit where he may be innocent. In 
Clearchus‟ obituary, Clearchus persuaded (πείζαο) his state that the Thracians were 
injuring the Greeks and needed to be stopped (2.6.2), perhaps suggesting some 
degree of manipulation. He has also been exiled because he was disobedient towards 
the Ephors (2.6.3). Although this passage does not indicate that he deceived the 
Ephors or pretended to go along with their orders, Clearchus‟ disobedience of Cyrus 
parallels the disobedience that got Clearchus exiled, as Humble (1997, 65) notes. 
This, she argues, demonstrates that Clearchus is a “liability”. Even the narrator‟s 
reference to the arguments Clearchus used to persuade Cyrus to employ him, which 
the narrator erroneously claims have been recorded elsewhere, suggest an element of 
deceit (2.6.4), especially when compared to Clearchus‟ own account of Cyrus 
voluntarily giving him money. 
More seriously, when Ariaeus tells the Greeks that Clearchus was perjuring 
himself and breaking his oath with them (2.5.38), the reader might wonder if this is 
true, rather than understanding it to be a false accusation to justify killing the Greek 
                                                             
161 Danzig (2007, 41) argues that the narrator does not link the deceit practiced by Clearchus and 
Cyrus to their deaths, but this view is surprising considering that it is deception by another that leads 
to their deaths.   
162 See Kelly (1977, 35) who argues that Clearchus’ deception of the soldiers is a “a masterpiece of 
persuasion” and illustrates Clearchus’ excellent ability to handle such a volatile situation, as well as 
his resourcefulness  and ability to reverse the situation so that it is to his advantage. Kelly argues 
that Xenophon is providing a “personal tribute” to Clearchus’ leadership abilities. Kelly (1977, 95) 
also  argues that Xenophon offered Clearchus (and Menon) to the reader as characters to learn from 
because of their success, even though their methods of achieving success may have been 
“deceptive, untrue, or morally reprehensible”. Lendle (1996, 151-2) argues that Clearchus and Cyrus 
are mirrors of princes to Menon and Proxenus’ failed leaderships. See also Roisman (1985-8, 35) 
who argues that Clearchus’ speeches to the men at Tarsus reveal him “as a shrewd and skilled 
demagogue”. Roisman further argues (1985-8, 50) that Clearchus’ leadership is “based on 
compromise and responsible leadership more than self-regard, coercion or intimidation”. Humble 
(1997, 67 n. 84) criticises Roisman’s argument.  
163
 At 2.3.10-13, he sets the example of hard work when bridges need to be built, and in his obituary, 
the narrator says that Clearchus displays presence of mind in terrible situations, is fit for command, 
is skilled in getting provisions and is competent in stressing that he must be obeyed (2.6.1-15). 
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leaders. The narrator does not help to clarify Clearchus‟ innocence. Xenophon the 
character says that if Clearchus was guilty, he has been duly punished (2.5.41), 
which sounds non-committal about whether he believes Clearchus‟ guilt. However, 
Xenophon is concentrating on getting Proxenus and Menon, who are apparently still 
alive, returned to the Greeks. Proxenus‟ involvement in accusing Clearchus throws 
further doubt on the situation, because he is a relatively positive, if ineffective 
character, and Xenophon‟s friend. It may be that the Persians are lying about what 
Proxenus said, because it becomes clear that they are lying about him still being 
alive. In sum, although the characters and the narrator repeatedly blame the Persians 
for betraying the Cyreans, some doubt may remain as to Clearchus‟ guilt.164 
Presumably, when Ariaeus accuses Clearchus, he believes that the Greeks would be 
persuaded that Clearchus was guilty. In this case, it can be assumed that Clearchus 
did not have a reputation for trustworthiness, even amongst the Greeks.  
Cyrus is also often regarded as an ideal leader,
165
 and in certain other aspects, 
he is extremely positive, as evidenced by his obituary. However, even here, not all 
the praise is straightforward. The narrator praises Cyrus in terms of his 
trustworthiness, for example, which seems to contradict the picture of Cyrus as 
deceitful. The narrator says that cities, individuals and former enemies all trusted 
Cyrus (ἐπηηξεπόκελαη, ἐπίζηεπνλ…ἐπίζηεπε, 1.9.7-10), and that Cyrus firmly 
believed it of the greatest importance not to deceive (κεδὲλ ςεύδεζζαη) when 
making treaties, agreements or promises. Indeed, as well as being thought to be 
trustworthy, the narrator claims that Cyrus demonstrated this trustworthiness 
(ἐπέδεημελ…ἐπεδείθλπην). The trustworthiness that Cyrus has cultivated explains 
partly why the Greeks initially believed in Cyrus‟ good character and that he would 
reward them, as well as the pretexts he offered. As Hirsch (1985, 24, n. 40) and 
Rood (2005, xxiv) argue, it may be that the narrator has made Cyrus‟ trustworthiness 
more prominent in order to exculpate Xenophon and the Greeks from some blame 
                                                             
164 There is some scholarly suggestion that the Greeks broke the truce by taking from the land and 
that Clearchus was responsible for this, as well as that Clearchus offended Tissaphernes by offering 
the Greek troops to Tissaphernes to use to become king (see Bassett, 2002, 460-1, Waterfield, 2006, 
120 and Jansen, 2014, 122-7). However, there is little evidence to implicate Clearchus directly in 
breaking the truce and no sign that he offended Tissaphernes. These arguments also do not explain 
why Ariaeus accuses Clearchus of having plotted for a long time (2.5.40). Nevertheless, these 
particular interpretations demonstrate that certain modern readers have trouble accepting 
Clearchus’ innocence. 
165 See Dillery (2001, 11) and Sears (2007, 15-16), for example. However, see Braun (2004), Flower 
(2012, 189-94) and Higgins (1977, 83) who argue that Cyrus is not an ideal leader. 
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for following him. In any case, Cyrus‟ deception of the army demonstrates that 
Cyrus‟ trustworthiness is a façade.  
Indeed, the wording of the passage about Cyrus‟ trustworthiness in his 
obituary does not actually say that Cyrus would not deceive friends and soldiers into 
undertaking a mission that they did not enlist for. This demonstrates that there is not 
a conflict between the obituary and the details that the narrator has previously 
presented. Rood (2005, xxiv) suggests that Xenophon points out Cyrus‟ lack of 
truthfulness in the obituary and that this reflects on Cyrus‟ earlier deception of 
others. Rood argues that the narrator only praises Cyrus for his attainment in two of 
the three key aspects of Persian education that Herodotus discusses (1.136) - riding 
and shooting- but does not link Cyrus with the third, telling the truth.
166
 Truthfulness 
was central to Persian culture (see Hirsch, 1985, 18), and we saw that the 
Cyropaedia narrator argued that relying on Persian trustworthiness got the Greek 
leaders killed. The Anabasis suggests an extension to this; relying on Cyrus‟ 
trustworthiness put the Greeks in serious danger.  
 In the short term, Timasion‟s deception of the merchants seems to benefit 
the army, because he gains money for the soldiers. When he returns to the army, 
Timasion speaks to the soldiers in the assembly and offers them pay, a return home, 
and plunder once they get there, while Thorax in turn offers the men pay and a return 
home (5.6.22-6). The army does not respond to these offers, even though most of the 
soldiers want to return home, but the assembly continues and further criticism is 
made of Xenophon, who defends himself (5.6.27-33). During Xenophon‟s speech, he 
recommends that the army follows the leaders who are offering pay and a return 
home. However, when the Sinopeans and Heracleots hear that Xenophon, who 
supposedly wanted the army to stay, has recommended that the army departs, they 
fail to give the money they had promised (5.6.35). Thus, Timasion‟s lie catches up 
with him. To hide that they now cannot pay the army or obtain provisions, Timasion 
                                                             
166 Tuplin (1994, 158) also highlights that the narrator does not mention that Cyrus told the truth in 
his obituary, but also that truth-telling is not specifically mentioned in the discussion of Persian 
education in the Cyropaedia or elsewhere in the work. See further Hirsch (1985, 22-4, endnote 40, 
and 158-9), who questions whether it is “in part ironic” that no one in the work states openly that 
Cyrus has acted badly in any respect, and whether Xenophon really wanted his readers to 
understand that Cyrus did deceive and endanger the Greeks. He struggles with this idea, however, 
because words from pistis are regularly associated with Cyrus and form part of his characterisation. 
He also argues that the pretexts Cyrus uses may have contained an element of truth and so may not 
have been seen as reprehensible.   
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and Thorax try to persuade the other generals to go back to the Phasis (5.6.36-7).
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When Neon blames Xenophon for trying to trick the army into going to the Phasis, 
the soldiers become angry and nearly riot (5.7.1-2).
168
 Thus, in the longer term, 
Timasion and Thorax‟ deception has brought unrest to the army, which Xenophon 
goes on to recover.  
 As Hirsch (1985, 33) highlights, the narrator describes the Heracleots and 
Sinopeans as deceiving (ἐςεπζκέλνη) when they realise they had been lied to. Thus, 
as we saw with Cyrus and Clearchus, Timasion also receives his comeuppance 
through being deceived, although this does not lead to his death. The failure of the 
Sinopeans and Heracleots to pay is Timasion‟s punishment for deceiving. He does 
not get to lead or return home, and becomes panicked and afraid of the army 
(5.6.36). Timasion should not be emulated because his deception backfires, but he is 
not entirely a negative paradigm because of his later positive behaviour. Timasion is 
perhaps not as skilled at deception as the other leaders, and thus represents the 
dangers and difficulties of deceiving. 
 After Xenophon‟s first three deceptions, the soldiers go on to succeed in the 
three actions that they are undertaking. Although there is no specific response 
indicated, the reader might assume that Xenophon has had a positive effect on the 
army‟s state of mind. Thus, Xenophon‟s audience appears to have benefitted from 
these deceptions in both the short and long term. Regarding his deception of the 
army over the sole command, in the short term, soon after Cheirisophus‟ 
appointment, the army splits into three groups, as we saw in the last chapter, which 
seems to be harmful. We saw, however, that in his speech to the army after his 
appointment, Cheirisophus confirms that Dexippus has been slandering 
Xenophon.
169
 We also saw that some sections of the army believe that Xenophon 
                                                             
167 Farrell (2012, 259) argues that this is an attempt to undermine the decision-making power of the 
soldiers, and that Xenophon the character has advised Timasion and Thorax to discuss the matter 
with the soldiers. Farrell notes that, instead, Timasion tries to get the other generals to persuade 
their captains. Nussbaum (1967, 179-80) also comments that Timasion uses “private persuasion” 
here, which is what the men were critical of Xenophon for. 
168 Nussbaum (1967, 179-80) argues that the outrage directed at Xenophon for supposedly intending 
to lead the army back to the Phasis was actually caused by the private ambition of Timasion, Thorax 
and Neon to take control of the army rather than benefit of the army. 
169 Dexippus is a perioecus (5.1.15), technically not a citizen of Sparta. Whereas Xenophon has 
suggested that full-citizen Spartans, and presumably only ones in positions of power, such as 
Anaxibius, might be unhappy, this report shows that everyone connected with Sparta is liable to feel 
aggrieved. 
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actually leads the army and that it is shameful to be under his rule. This indicates that 
it is not just the Spartans who do not want Xenophon as sole commander. Given the 
trouble that just the suspicion of Xenophon‟s ultimate control of the army caused, it 
is perhaps a benefit to the army that Xenophon was not elected as sole commander. 
Perhaps Xenophon‟s refusal of the position served to head-off some of these 
rumours, externally at least. In the long-term, the narrator indicates that the Spartans 
do have the potential to cause the Cyreans serious trouble, especially if they believe 
that Xenophon is the army‟s sole commander. When the Spartan Cleander becomes 
involved in the affairs of the army, Xenophon the character says that even one 
Spartan could make life extremely difficult for the army (6.6.12-14). Indeed, the 
army has to stop Cleander from ordering cities not to receive the Cyreans. At 6.6.34, 
Cleander says that he has heard that Xenophon has been trying to make the army 
disloyal to the Spartans, but sees that this is not the case. Later, when the men 
attempt to return to Byzantium once they have been ejected, Xenophon outlines the 
dangers of starting a war with the Spartans and advises obedience (7.1.25-30). The 
army is even deceived and sold as slaves by the Spartans Anaxibius and Aristarchus 
(7.1.7ff. and 7.2.5ff.). The Asinaean Neon also has ambitions to be the leader of the 
entire army and thinks he will be given this role if the army falls in with Spartans 
(7.2.2), even though he is not a full Spartan citizen. This indicates that he believes 
that the Spartans would want Spartans or those connected with Sparta to control the 
army. Thus, Xenophon‟s rejection of the role may ultimately have prevented more 
trouble than the army received.  
In terms of his deception of the army at Byzantium, once the men have 
formed up as a result of his deception, Xenophon is able to talk them out of storming 
the city and no harm is done (7.1.25-31). The narrator does not give the thoughts of 
the men after it becomes apparent that Xenophon deceived them. Nevertheless, they 
do agree with Xenophon‟s recommendations to send a message to Anaxibius 
(7.1.32), suggesting that they are not angry with Xenophon and see the sense in his 
suggestions. This tells the reader that Xenophon was successful in calming the 
soldiers down. In his speech after the soldiers have formed up, he describes what 
could happen to the army if they proceeded to destroy Byzantium. He warns that if 
they take and pillage an innocent Greek city, they would be made enemies of the 
Spartans, who have recently defeated the strong Athenians and now have them as 
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allies, as well as retaining their original allies. As well as this, the barbarians on the 
coast are hostile to the army, along with the king in the interior. With all these 
groups against the Cyreans, there would be no chance of them winning, and they 
would die shamefully as enemies of their homeland, friends and families. This list of 
potentially disastrous consequences encourages the reader to think that Xenophon 
acted in a way that was beneficial to the army in the longer term by ensuring that the 
army avoided these repercussions. The narrator does nothing to suggest that 
Xenophon‟s account of the potential dangers is untrue. Finally, in revealing the truth 
of who was to blame for the soldiers not receiving their wages from Seuthes, 
Xenophon and Polycrates seem to end the hostility amongst the Cyreans in the short 
term and the army begins to prepare to journey to the coast (7.7.1). In the long term, 
the men seem to accept Xenophon again and he benefits them by obtaining the 
money that Seuthes owed them (7.7.55). 
As well as ultimately benefitting the army with his deceptions, Xenophon 
receives a particularly positive ending in the work. After Xenophon leads the army 
on a final mission, the Spartans, captains, other generals and soldiers arrange for 
Xenophon to have the pick of the booty (7.8.23).
170
 Thus, Xenophon the character 
receives a reward for his leadership, which includes manipulation of the army. 
Despite this, the army has an erratic relationship with Xenophon. The soldiers can be 
supportive of Xenophon (see 3.4.48-9, 4.5.30 and 7.6.38) but can also believe that 
Xenophon is deceiving them or not working in their best interests on occasions when 
this is incorrect. At 5.6.17ff., Silanus causes the men to believe that Xenophon is 
planning for the soldiers to settle down without consulting them. At 5.7.1ff, Neon 
accuses Xenophon of trying to deceive the soldiers into going back to the Phasis and 
having persuaded the generals to follow this plan. At 6.4.14-15, some members of 
the army say that Xenophon wanted to found a city at Calpe Harbour and that he 
bribed the soothsayer to say that the sacrifices did not prove favourable for leaving. 
At 7.6.9-10, an Arcadian accuses Xenophon of talking the army into working for 
Seuthes, of being enriched by Seuthes and of defrauding the soldiers of their pay. 
                                                             
170 This last mission is sometimes criticised for being a plundering raid (see Hutchinson, 2000, 92, for 
example). However, Bradley (2011, 304) argues that it is acceptable because it constitutes 
Xenophon’s return for propitiating Zeus Meilichos. Delebecque (1957, 294-5) also argues that this 
episode demonstrates that Xenophon gains honourably and that this fits with the emphasis in the 
Anabasis on Xenophon not enriching himself dishonourably. 
172 
 
The reader knows that all these accusations are untrue, and Xenophon the character 
successfully clears himself of them all. Because Xenophon joined the army without a 
position of command (3.1.4), he has to build his reputation for trustworthiness from 
scratch through what he says and does. His leadership is not based on any existing 
role, previous experience, age, ethnicity or ability to pay the men or find them 
employment. Instead, it is based on his good suggestions, his ability to persuade and 
motivate, and because he had the strength of character to act when everyone else was 
despairing. His relationship with the army is made all the more difficult because the 
men have already been deceived by Cyrus, and may have been made wary of other 
leaders, especially unknown ones. Xenophon does not entirely succeed in winning 
the men‟s trust, but the reader sees that it is part of the integrity of Xenophon‟s 
leadership that when he does deceives the army, he does it for good reasons, and not 
with his own benefit in mind, as the men mostly accuse him of. Through 
Xenophon‟s deceitful speeches, the reader sees that Xenophon proves to be 
trustworthy and puts the army first. 
 Because Xenophon deceives his friends but is still a positive character, the 
Anabasis seems to demonstrate that it is a reality that during war, deceit of those on 
one‟s own side becomes almost inevitable and that all leaders will have to deceive 
their friends, sometimes just to survive. Xenophon‟s ends justify his means and he is 
a positive exemplum in the work in terms of how he deceives. The reader should 
clearly emulate him. Perhaps the very lack of attention drawn to Xenophon‟s 
deceptions suggests that they are not as problematic as Cyrus‟ and Clearchus‟.171 
Examining the speeches has demonstrated that it is possible to distinguish when it is 
acceptable and even praiseworthy to deceive friends and when it is not. The elements 
                                                             
171
 Buzzetti (2014, 16-19) highlights other possible deceptions by Xenophon. For example, he says 
that at some points in the narrative Xenophon claims that luck or chance is responsible for certain 
events, but that in speeches discussing the same events, Xenophon assigns responsibility to the 
gods. Buzzetti argues that this “repetition” is a technique by Xenophon the author to demonstrate 
how Xenophon the character modified his own opinions to fit with the beliefs of the soldiers, 
“oftentimes, to lift their spirits”. Buzzetti argues that Xenophon is “helping his reader to explore 
whether truthfulness is consistent with prudent rule”. Thus, we reach similar conclusions. Buzzetti 
gives several other less convincing examples where Xenophon twists facts. For example, he argues 
(2014, 18) that when talking to Proxenus’ captains, Xenophon mentions that Artaxerxes would 
certainly harm the Greeks because the Greeks wanted to make him a slave and kill him, even though 
the narrator claims that the army followed Cyrus because of shame when his real intentions were 
revealed. I would argue, however, that Xenophon is presenting this argument from the point of view 
of the king, rather than recounting the Cyreans’ intentions.  
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of deception that we saw in the speeches in the last chapter fit with the same 
interpretation of character and message that we have seen in this chapter.   
Thus, the Anabasis presents a wider lesson about deceit and trustworthiness. 
Sometimes, deceiving friends is the necessary, most expedient, safest, kindest and 
most practical thing to do.
172
 A passage from Xenophon‟s Memorabilia backs up this 
conclusion (4.2.14-17). Here, Socrates claims that it is acceptable to deceive others 
when it is for their own good, for example, when a general uses deceit to contain 
discouragement in his soldiers.
173
 Particularly in wartime or when in a crisis, the 
general Greek distaste for deceiving friends clearly has to be adapted.
174
 However, a 
leader still needs to follow a moral code in recognising when it is acceptable to 
deceive. Xenophon‟s deceptions occur when the men are in danger, with the 
exception of his words about the sole command and his use of Polycrates to speak 
for him. However, these two deceptions prevent danger for the army. By contrast, 
Cyrus‟ deception of his friends occurs in peacetime and his deception of the soldiers 
occurs when they are in no danger, although he is in danger of losing his army. 
Clearchus‟ deception of the soldiers also occurs when the army is not in danger. His 
                                                             
172 Other scholars make general comment along the same lines. Humble (1997, 52) argues that 
“Xenophon approves of the use of deception of one’s own troops if it is in their own best interests; 
for example, his comments about the superiority of hoplites over cavalry are clearly only meant to 
encourage, as the need for cavalry is demonstrated almost immediately after the army sets out”. 
Wood (1964, 65) argues that Xenophon believes that a person may deceive friends with good reason 
but not excessively. 
173
 See also Cambyses’ words to Cyrus the Great in the Cyropaedia (1.6.27-34). Cambyses tells Cyrus 
that the teacher of a previous generation tried to teach the distinction between deceiving friends 
and enemies but that children took advantage of this knowledge and harmed friends. This teacher 
also taught that one could distinguish times when it was right to deceive friends as long as it was for 
good ends. Cyrus goes on to deceive his friends, suggesting that he may have learnt this lesson. See 
Hesk (2000, 122-42) for the difficulties of this passage, and his argument that Xenophon highlights 
the problems with systems of deceit whereby it is acceptable to deceive friends, and that correct 
education about the subject is vital. Hesk argues that Cambyses does not recommend deceiving 
friends to Cyrus and in fact implies that it is dangerous, but that he still gives the information for 
Cyrus to digest and use as he will. 
174 Hesk (2000, 21-49 and 85-142) argues that “boundaries” are often “renegotiated” to allow deceit, 
especially in wartime. Regarding deceit in the Hellenica, Higgins (1977, 105-7) comments that “it 
may be wondered…whether Xenophon thinks men always recognise when deceit is permissible and 
when it is not. He may, in fact, suggest that the very atmosphere of war is conducive to the blurring 
of necessary distinctions”. A concern with how warfare affects the way deceit is used and perceived 
also appears in Thucydides’ analysis of stasis (3.82-4). Here Thucydides describes how under the 
conditions of warfare people are driven by different necessities and that morals degenerate. 
Included in his account are comments about how plotting becomes a means of self-defence and a 
necessary requirement for party members, how treachery becomes admired and how there 
develops a lack of respect for oaths. Whereas Thucydides pauses to describe and comment on this, 
in the Anabasis, analysis is integrated into a combination of the deceptive speeches and the way the 
narrator feeds information about motivations and outcomes to the reader. 
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deception of Cyrus occurs when the army faced danger in the battle at Cunaxa, but 
Clearchus serves to exacerbate this. Timasion‟s deceit occurs when the army is not in 
danger, although there is internal dissention. 
The reader also learns about the importance of trustworthiness. Cyrus had a 
reputation for trustworthiness, but abused this. His death proves how dangerous it 
was to trust him, particularly for the commanders who are killed by Cyrus‟ former 
friends. It is also particularly pointed that Cyrus himself has a habit of trusting 
people who do not deserve trust, namely Orontas, Ariaeus, Tissaphernes and 
Clearchus. Trusting Clearchus also proves disastrous for the other leaders and 
soldiers, and he similarly abuses the faith put in him. As the narrator presents it, the 
reader and internal audience have no particular reason to trust Timasion, but the 
episode where he lies may negatively affect his trustworthiness. Xenophon is not 
trusted by the army, although he does everything he can to earn their trust, yet the 
narrator demonstrates that Xenophon can be trusted to work in the interests of the 
men. It is clearly important for a leader to cultivate a reputation for trustworthiness 
but he has to use this for the good of others. A leader must be rather than seem 
trustworthy.
175
 Hirsch (1985, 36) draws attention to the speech in which Xenophon 
the character tells Seuthes that a leader should show himself to be trustworthy 
(7.7.23-6). Here, Xenophon the character is echoing the message that the narrator is 
teaching. 
One final lesson is that, although Clearchus and Cyrus act reprehensibly in 
deceiving the army, their internal audience must also take some responsibility for 
trusting these leaders without adequately testing that they will choose to benefit the 
army and work in the army‟s interests. In the case of Cyrus, the soldiers can 
particularly be blamed for not following up on their doubts about Cyrus‟ aims, and 
later for recognising his deceit but choosing to pretend that they had been deceived. 
Of course, it is harder to detect deceit in the form of outright lies than in the form of 
omission and suppression because alternative sources of information need to be 
found, and this may affect the culpability of the deceivers. While the soldiers need to 
be able to rely on their leaders, as mercenaries they have the power to mutiny against 
                                                             
175 Cyrus the Great learns the importance of leaders being rather than seeming at Cyropaedia 1.6.22. 
See also Memorabilia 2.6.39. See further Agesilaus’ trustworthiness, particularly at Agesilaus 1.12 
and 3.2-5, and the importance Cyrus the Great assigns to projecting a belief that truth is important 
to him (Cyropaedia 3.1.9, 3.1.31, 4.2.8 and 5.2.9-11). 
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incompetent or corrupt leaders. Yet they allow themselves to be persuaded to go on 
each time they pause. There was less opportunity to put Xenophon to the test, 
because the army was in an extremely precarious situation when he took over. 
However, the men perhaps begin to learn that they should test their leaders because, 
when they are out of immediate danger, they repeatedly question Xenophon‟s 
actions. Perhaps even more than the soldiers, other leaders should have been 
responsible for testing Cyrus and Clearchus rather than trusting them implicitly. 
Because they are in a position where they are responsible for the welfare of soldiers, 
they should have been more vigilant and questioned them both on any information 
they may have omitted or suppressed. Again, this is something that the other leaders 
also do with Xenophon during his period of leadership, suggesting that they also 
learnt from the army‟s dealings with Cyrus and Clearchus.  
Conclusion 
The Anabasis narrator has not contradicted himself by condemning the deceit of 
friends and then showing otherwise positive leaders deceiving those on their side. 
Instead, he has used deceitful speeches as well as the accompanying narrative to 
involve the reader in a complicated issue, to characterise the leaders positively or 
negatively, and to make a subtle distinction in how the verbal deceit of friends can be 
practiced acceptably and unacceptably. For the most part, the lessons on how to be a 
good leader presented in the Anabasis are for the reader to discover rather than being 
explicitly described.
176
 Indeed, there are perhaps too many shades of grey regarding 
the deception of friends to make it possible for the narrator to pass a simple 
judgement on it.
177
 One aspect that deserves further comment is the soldiers‟ request 
for more money when they continue with Cyrus despite knowing that he is deceiving 
them. It seems that the thought of financial gain has helped to override their 
repugnance at being deceived. Thus, it may be instructive to examine how leaders 
make use of appeals to financial gain, as well as to another important desire, honour, 
and also how the leaders represent their own attitudes towards these concepts.  
                                                             
176 See Grethlein (2013, 64-9), who notes that the speeches in the work allow the narrator to hide his 
presence and the reader to judge the characters without the need for explicit comment. 
177 See Pownall (1998, esp. 272) who argues that Xenophon the author uses negative paradigms 
rather than direct comment to indicate that impiety is reprehensible in the Hellenica. This is similar 
to my argument that Xenophon uses exempla to indicate where deceit is acceptable and 
unacceptable.  
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Κέξδνο and Τηκή as Persuasive Concepts in the Anabasis 
Any speaker needs to understand his audience‟s desires, motivations, attitudes and 
expectations and be able to link these to what he wants to persuade his audience to 
do or think. Typically, soldiers and leaders desire θέξδνο (profit) and ηηκή (honour). 
For soldiers and leaders in armies drafted from citizens, earning ηηκή for their actions 
is a primary motivation, although they also want to return home with a personal 
profit. In a mercenary army, the reverse is true, and the soldiers primarily desire 
profit. According to Trundle (2004, 43, 63-6, 99 and 101), mercenaries want 
financial gain in order to bring something back for their relatives at home, but also to 
supplement their meagre pay (especially if a paymaster reneged on his agreement), 
to obtain food, to save enough to leave service, and to have something for the future. 
While many ancient writers disparaged mercenaries for preferring profit to honour 
and state,
178
 a mercenary‟s desire for gain gave him a reason to fight in battles that 
often did not affect him personally, and to conduct himself well. The desire for 
financial gain or profit is not intrinsically reprehensible but it becomes problematic 
when it turns to unregulated greed, is motivated by hubris, and overrides the 
constraints of acting acceptably. Indeed, the Greeks regarded a love of money, 
θηινρξεκαηία, as particularly dishonourable, and drew attention to base 
covetousness, αἰζρξνθέξδεηα, when they saw it.179 
Mercenaries did desire ηηκή too, although not as strongly as they desired 
profit, or as strongly as citizen armies desired ηηκή. The term itself has connotations 
of esteem and a person or object having a value or worth.
180
 It could be obtained 
from leaders within the army, from paymasters, from people the army encountered or 
from those in Greece. Τηκή may come in such forms as positions within the army or 
in Greek communities, preferential treatment, and a greater cut of the rewards. 
Unfortunately, the desire for ηηκή can cause tensions between members of the same 
army if they jockey for favour and put their interests before those of the group. 
Φηινηηκία is literally the love of ηηκή, and the word is sometimes translated as 
ambition. It also encompasses the notions of self-interest, rivalry, competition and 
                                                             
178 See Trundle (2004, 2, 29 and 42), Roy (2004, 276), von Reden (1998, 271) and Perlman (1976-7, 
251) for references and discussion. 
179 See further Dover (1974, 109-11 and 171-2) and von Reden (1995, 99). 
180 See Chantraine (1980, 1119-20), Liddell and Scott (1996, 1793-4) and Cairns (2011, 29). 
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jealousy.
181
 Thus, it is clear that the desire for honour can be as problematic as the 
desire for profit.  
The potential for these concepts to prove problematic within a community 
can clearly be seen in the Athenian polis. Scholars argue that by the fourth century, 
elite θηινηηκία was so problematic to the ideals of the democratic polis in Athens that 
the demos acted by appropriating θηινηηκία. They made it useful to themselves by 
controlling who could be honoured and what actions merited honour.
182
 Similarly, 
Waterfield (2006, 192-4) comments that greed was a problem in Greece after the 
Peloponnesian war, where wealth and increase were highly sought. A love of gain 
was particularly associated with the elite, and Engen (2010, 39-40 and 49) describes 
how the Athenian demos again attempted to make this more useful to the city. The 
demos established an ideology where money‟s value as wealth was replaced by its 
value as honour, status and reputation, and where the elite were encouraged to use 
their wealth to benefit the community. The Greek army in the Anabasis is often 
likened to a democratic polis on the march,
183
 suggesting that both a polis and the 
army may face similar issues with profit and honour. However, it also suggests that, 
like in Athens, the problems these concepts cause can be mitigated.  
Appealing to these desires is common within a mercenary army setting. 
Aristotle includes desire (ἐπηζπκίαλ) as an emotion in his Rhetorica (2.12, 
1388b.33), and there is nothing morally wrong about tapping into an audience‟s 
desires.
184
 However, there are particular difficulties associated with doing this. A 
leader must find the right balance between appealing to the desire for profit and 
honour in order to persuade the soldiers to undertake beneficial and honourable 
behaviour, without allowing the desires for these concepts to encourage disreputable 
behaviour that could jeopardise the army‟s safety or bring it disgrace. Here an 
                                                             
181 See Liddell and Scott (1996, 1941) and Whitehead (1983, 55).  
182 See further Whitehead (1983, 59-68 and 1986, 242-3), von Reden (1995, 83-4), Johnstone (1994, 
223-5), Ober (1989, 219-20, 230, 246-7 and 291-2) and Engen (2010, 41-9). Such a progression would 
not have been as seamless and complete as it is often presented, however, and must also have 
occurred at different times in different democratic poleis. 
183 See Farrell (2012, 209-25), Trundle (2004, 2), Hornblower (2004, 243-9 and 262), Dillery (1995, 
92-3), Stronk (1995, 34-5), Dalby (1992, 17-23 and 30), Perlman (1976-7, 284), Nussbaum (1967, esp. 
2-10 and 30-93) and Bonner (1912, 354-60). See also Lee (2007, 9-10), Hutchinson (2000, 62) and 
Higgins (1977, 90-1) for objections to the polis model.  
184 Desire does not have its own section in the Rhetorica, unlike the other emotions. See Cooper 
(1996), Striker (1996, 289), and Leighton (1996, 222-8) who attempt to explain why this is the case. 
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army‟s short-term goals, such as making a profit, may come into conflict with its 
long-term goals, such as being received well upon their return home. Κέξδνο and 
ηηκή are often considered to be in tension with each other (see Dover, 1974, 172 and 
231, for example), with ηηκή being the nobler motivation of the two. In Plato‟s 
tripartite division of the soul, the spirited part desires honour, while the appetitive 
part desires money. Socrates argues that the rational part of the soul should work in 
tandem with the spirited part to rule the appetitive part, or else it will lead to vice 
(Respublica 435a.5ff.).
185
 On some occasions, however, appealing directly to others‟ 
desire for profit is what is best for the army, because it encourages the soldiers to 
overcome a dangerous situation, for example. Thus, a leader needs to be able to 
judge when an appeal is appropriate and when it is not. A mercenary leader‟s role is 
made harder by the fact that in coalition warfare, different leaders and soldiers in the 
same army will be motivated to different levels by the same desires or even have 
completely different motivations, as well as different beliefs as to where θέξδνο and 
ηηκή should be obtained from. A leader may also need to interact with outsiders to 
the army who have their own attitudes and desires concerning θέξδνο and ηηκή.  
Fulfilling the soldiers‟ desire for profit and honour is particularly important 
for a mercenary leader, because if the soldiers think that a leader is not satisfying 
their desires, they can follow others to obtain these. Indeed, soldiers will not follow a 
leader who lectures them that they should not pursue financial gain, even if this is for 
their own advantage, while they are more likely to follow someone who appears to 
be fulfilling their desires. This puts the leader in a difficult position. If he wants to 
educate an audience about how to behave, he needs to set a good example of how to 
control his desires. Soldiers will imitate their leaders‟ actions rather than their words 
and will not stay with leaders who do not live up to their words. Leaders can also 
make examples of others‟ poor behaviour concerning these two concept.  
Behind a leader‟s appeals to the desire for θέξδνο and ηηκή in others lie his 
own values, sometimes articulated honestly and sometimes deceptively. He may 
have an ulterior motive that influences whether he harnesses appeals to θέξδνο and 
ηηκή for the benefit of others or causes harm in the process of benefitting himself. 
Mercenary leaders particularly require honour from the soldiers in order to ensure 
                                                             
185 See Plato Phaedrus 253d.1ff. and Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1098a.3ff. for more about these 
desires being located in different parts of the soul. 
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that they remain in command, although they can also get honour from others external 
to the army too, sometimes causing a conflict in their duty. For example, in the 
Anabasis, we see examples of paymasters appealing to the desire for θέξδνο and ηηκή 
in the leaders, as well as the soldiers.  
The Anabasis Circumstances and Xenophon’s Narratorial Opinion 
In the Anabasis, the army‟s motivations alter over time and so its leaders need to re-
evaluate constantly what the army wants. For example, the narrator reveals the 
soldiers‟ and leaders‟ initial motivations. The soldiers were motivated to join Cyrus‟ 
mission either because of Cyrus‟ noble character or because they had heard that 
people had been enriched by him previously (6.4.8). The leaders joined Cyrus to 
make money but learnt that loyalty could obtain them more than just pay (1.9.17).
186
 
Once Cyrus has died, the aims of the mission evolve constantly, as do the army‟s 
desires. While the army is trying to escape its immediate danger, safety is the 
foremost motivation and it is to the army‟s benefit to obey the commander without 
considering what gain can be made from doing so.
187
 When on safer ground, the 
army is driven more by thoughts of θέξδνο and ηηκή.188 Here, the soldiers are in no 
desperate need to follow their leaders in order to obtain safety, and can begin to 
question their leadership. Thus, carefully judging what to appeal to, and also 
presenting an attitude towards θέξδνο and ηηκή that the soldiers find acceptable are 
important for a leader‟s success.  
The amount of mentions of θέξδνο and ηηκή by leaders in the Anabasis 
demonstrates that the author is deliberately representing leaders as making use of 
these concepts in their persuasion attempts. However, the narrator offers no explicit 
advice for how a leader should tread the fine line between referring to θέξδνο and 
ηηκή as encouragement for others to act positively, and such references bringing 
harm to the army. There is no such instruction elsewhere in Xenophon‟s oeuvre 
                                                             
186 See Roy (1967, 317), who argues that this comment might only refer to the motives of Proxenus’ 
division. 
187 Tuplin (2014, 81-2 and 114) demonstrates that the lowest amount of speech occurs in book 4 
(11.72%) because the army is in desperate danger and so does not need persuading to follow its 
leaders.  
188 Scholars such as Nussbaum (1967, 147-52) and Dillery (1995, 61-90) divide the Anabasis into 
different sections relating to the army’s employment, aims and safety. Although they do not always 
divide the work in the same places, they all argue that there is a period where the men’s desire for 
gain increases and discipline consequently breaks down.  
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either. In these other works, characters and narrators refer to an extreme love of 
profit negatively,
189
 and present θηινηηκία as being both constructive and 
destructive.
190
 Thus, there is some point of reference for Xenophon the author‟s 
probable opinion on appeals to these two concepts. Nevertheless, the mentions of 
profit and honour by leaders in the speeches in the Anabasis must be analysed 
individually in order to determine how a leader should make use of these concepts.
191
 
I shall investigate speeches by Cyrus, Seuthes, Xenophon, Clearchus, Menon, 
Ariaeus, Cleanor, Timasion, Lycon and Callimachus.  
Methodological Approach 
References by leaders to θέξδνο and ηηκή as part of their persuasion attempts, as well 
as the opposite concepts, loss of profit and disgrace, can be divided into categories 
based on who is mentioned as providing and gaining honour and profit, and who is 
representing their attitude about these concepts to whom. These can then be 
examined in a logical order.
192
 Firstly, I briefly examine instances of paymasters 
offering θέξδνο and ηηκή to the Greek leaders, because this will influence the Greek 
leaders‟ appeals to the army. Secondly, I touch on the references by two Greek 
leaders to the θέξδνο and ηηκή they can make from both paymasters and the army. 
This demonstrates where certain leaders‟ loyalties lie and again how the appeals they 
make may be affected. Thirdly, I briefly analyse how certain leaders discuss θέξδνο 
and ηηκή with those outside the army. These appeals and representations of particular 
attitudes give an indication of what is acceptable in relation to θέξδνο and ηηκή, 
                                                             
189 See Hellenica 1.4.13, Memorabilia 1.5.6, 2.1.25, 2.6.4 and 3.5.16, Symposium 4.34-44, 
Oeconomicus 14.5-10, Agesilaus 8.8 and 11.3, Cynegeticus 13.10-16 and Cyropaedia 1.6.45-6 and 
8.8.18. See also the example of the Thirty Tyrants (Hellenica 2.3.21-2, 2.3.43, 2.4.21 and 2.4.40).  
190 Constructive: Agesilaus, 10.4, Cyropaedia 1.2.1 and Hellenica 7.5.18-19. Destructive: Memorabilia 
1.2.12-25 and Oeconomicus 1.21-3.  
191
 Some scholars have already discussed Xenophon’s interest in these concepts. For example, 
Higgins (1977, 126) argues that Xenophon and Thucydides recognised that the πλεονεξια (greed, 
although not necessarily for financial gain) and φιλοτιμία of those involved in politics is “the primary 
cause of political evil, especially in war”, but he does not carry out a sustained investigation of this. 
Sandridge (2012) has investigated φιλοτιμία in the Cyropaedia, and Figueira (2012) has investigated 
Xenophon’s concern with economic matters generally. However, these scholars do not examine the 
role of these concepts in leaders’ persuasion attempts. Azoulay (2004b) argues that lavish spending 
and giving distinctive honours are particular benefits that a charismatic leader must give in order to 
receive charis. However, because the particular circumstances in the Anabasis mean that the Greek 
leaders have little power in personally bestowing money and honour on their subordinates, there is 
little overlap in our investigations. 
192 While I only examine uses of the word τιμι, I analyse further terms for profit/gain than just 
κζρδοσ. 
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which will also aid in the investigation of appeals made by Greek leaders to the 
army. In the subsequent sections, I examine in detail examples of commanders and 
paymasters offering θέξδνο and ηηκή to the army, commanders appealing to the idea 
of outsiders offering θέξδνο and ηηκή to the army, and leaders recalling how the 
army and others previously acted in relation to θέξδνο and ηηκή, in order to provide 
lessons for their audiences.  
As in the last chapter, I analyse the speeches as persuasion attempts in the 
first instance, and then examine them in terms of the three proposed roles and effects 
of the speeches in the work. In this chapter, it will be particularly important to pay 
attention to whether the speaker‟s promises link up with his actions and whether a 
leader‟s self-representation matches his actions. From a speaker‟s ability and intent 
to fulfil his promises, as well as the honesty of his self-representation, the reader can 
particularly learn whether the leader is trustworthy or not, and whether he has his 
own desires chiefly in his mind when he mentions honour and profit. Comparing 
similar passages in Xenophon‟s other works, as well as in Greek literature generally, 
helps to distinguish what is acceptable and unacceptable regarding appeals to θέξδνο 
and ηηκή. Again, we shall see that only Xenophon masters appealing to the desire for 
θέξδνο and ηηκή in a way that does not compromise the army‟s interests, and is the 
only one to have a praiseworthy attitude towards these concepts. 
Examples 
Paymasters Offering Κέρδος and Τιμή to Greek Leaders 
When Cyrus believes that the Persian king is about to attack his army, he calls a 
meeting of the Greek leaders (1.7.2). He encourages them by claiming that if his 
mission goes well, he will make those who want to return home objects of emulation 
(δεισηὸλ) to those already there, although he says that he is confident that many will 
prefer to stay with him (1.7.4). When questioned by Gaulites, who is „faithful‟ 
(πηζηὸο) to Cyrus (1.7.5), Cyrus reassures the leaders that he will be willing and able 
to fulfil his promises, and says that he will give each Greek leader a wreath of gold 
(1.7.6-7). The narrator states that when the Greek leaders heard this, they were far 
more eager (πνιὺ πξνζπκόηεξνη) and reported this back to the other Greeks (1.7.8). 
Some Greeks ask Cyrus what they will personally receive if he is victorious and the 
narrator states that Cyrus satisfies them all with his response (1.7.8). Perhaps before 
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this speech there were some doubts about Cyrus‟ intentions, which he successfully 
overcomes.  
 Seuthes, who later becomes the second paymaster of the Greek army, tries to 
get the army to work for him by attempting to persuade Xenophon to bring the army 
over to him. Twice while the army is in Asia and trying to decide on its next move, 
Seuthes sends Medosades to Xenophon to make vague promises about what 
Xenophon would receive in return for bringing the army to him (7.1.5-6 and 7.2.10), 
which Xenophon declines to do on both occasions. The narrator also indirectly refers 
to an unspecified occasion on which Seuthes offered other Greek leaders benefits to 
bring the army over to him (7.2.2). This is revealed when the army is trying to decide 
what to do next, and the narrator mentions that the generals all wanted to lead the 
army to different places. He says that Cleanor and Phryniscus wanted to take the 
army to Seuthes because he had appealed to them to do this and given one a horse 
and one a woman. Unlike Xenophon, these leaders have accepted gifts from Seuthes 
and want the army to go to Seuthes without consulting the soldiers.
193
  
When Xenophon and certain other leaders later go to consult Seuthes about 
what use he would make of the army if the Greeks were to go over to him, Seuthes 
offers the army pay, and the generals land, oxen and forts (7.2.35-8). Seuthes 
promises that even if the army is prevented from helping him by the Spartans, he 
will accept the army into his community, and he offers Xenophon a coastal 
residence, his daughter to marry, and offers to marry Xenophon‟s daughter (7.2.38). 
The narrator indicates that Seuthes and the leaders present gave pledges (7.3.1), and 
so the leaders presumably accept these offers of ηηκή and θέξδνο should the army go 
on to work for Seuthes. The Greek leaders report back to the rest of the generals and 
Xenophon advises the soldiers to listen to what Seuthes has to offer them (7.3.3-6). 
Much later, after Xenophon has arranged for the pay owed by Seuthes to be given to 
the army, Seuthes tries to persuade Xenophon to stay with him by reoffering 
Xenophon the fortresses and the other gains that he promised (7.7.50). Again, 
Xenophon refuses (7.7.51).  
                                                             
193 See Farrell (2012, 273) who argues that these leaders are undermining the soldiers’ decision-
making role.  
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 These speeches engage the reader. He already knows that Cyrus has had 
difficulty paying the army and so, like the leaders, may need further reassurance to 
allay his suspicions about how Cyrus intends to reciprocate the army‟s aid. Given 
Gaulites‟ relationship with Cyrus, the reader may suspect that it has been arranged 
that Cyrus will elaborate on exactly how he will pay, and that the army is being 
carefully manipulated. Concerning Seuthes‟ appeals to ηηκή and θέξδνο, the reader 
may wonder whether Xenophon will be tempted by Seuthes‟ offers, whether this 
would be beneficial for the army, and what the army would do if Xenophon did 
make an arrangement without consulting them. The reader might feel some unease at 
the thought of the army working for another paymaster, and some suspicion at 
Seuthes‟ generosity. The reader may also be shocked that Cleanor and Phryniscus 
took what Seuthes offered.  
Both paymasters ultimately have a selfish motive for wanting to make use of 
the Greek army- Cyrus to get revenge on his brother, and Seuthes to regain his 
ancestral territory- and they offer the leaders ηηκή and θέξδνο for their own benefit 
rather than the benefit of the recipients. We saw that Cyrus‟ inability to pay the army 
threw doubt on his ability to fulfil his other generous promises. However, his 
intentions may be honourable in this case. The narrator dwells on Cyrus‟ rewarding 
of friends and good behaviour in his obituary (1.9.16-28), and it seems likely that, if 
he had the resources, Cyrus would match his words with his actions. Cyrus dies 
before he gets the chance to fulfil his promises, and so his trustworthiness in terms of 
these particular promises is left unconfirmed by the narrator. By contrast, Seuthes‟ 
failure to pay the army their wages even though he has money, suggests that he 
would be unlikely to have fulfilled his promises of ηηκή and θέξδνο to Xenophon and 
the army, although he has given relatively low-costing gifts to Cleanor and 
Phryniscus.
194
 Indeed, because Xenophon repeatedly requests the outstanding wages 
for the Greeks, Seuthes no longer offers Xenophon the coastal forts that he 
previously promised (7.5.7-8).
195
 Thus, the narrator undercuts Seuthes‟ presentation 
                                                             
194 Azoulay (2004b) argues that Seuthes’ claim that he did not mean to cheat anyone shows that his 
failure to pay the soldiers was due to Heracleides’ influence. Scholars such as Flower (2012, 113), 
however, disagree and believe that Seuthes deliberately did not pay the Cyreans and routinely lied. 
195
 See Azoulay (2004a, 294 and 2004b, 162) for the difference between acceptable xenia-gifts from 
Seuthes, such as these forts, and the offer of corrupt gifts, which the men incorrectly criticise 
Xenophon for receiving.  
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of himself as generous and willing to reward others for aiding him, and characterises 
him as untrustworthy.  
 These appeals demonstrate that most of the Greek leaders are highly 
motivated by thoughts of their own honour and profit, and that Xenophon is an 
exception. In a later defence speech, Xenophon claims that instead of accepting 
Seuthes‟ offers, he led the army to where it could quickly cross to Asia, because he 
thought that this was the best course for the Greeks and because he knew that this 
was what they wanted (7.6.12). Thus, Xenophon claims to have had the best interests 
of the army in mind when he declined Seuthes, although he might be saying this 
simply to save himself. He and the other leaders only go to Seuthes when the gods 
have indicated that they would allow Xenophon to lead the army to Seuthes after 
Aristarchus has demonstrated his untrustworthiness (7.2.15ff.), and again, Xenophon 
appears to be doing what is best for the army.  
 These speeches indicate that appealing to the desire for profit and honour in 
leaders is usually successful, but not always. Examining the outcomes of these 
appeals further indicates that it is not always right to do so. We have seen that in the 
long term, following Cyrus into battle is catastrophic for the army and Cyrus, despite 
the short-term morale boost Cyrus‟ speech brings that benefits both the leaders and 
himself. Seuthes‟ failed attempts at persuasion do not bring harm or benefit to the 
army, but he brings both harm and benefit when he does persuade the leaders to want 
to work for him. Although the army comes under his protection, by reneging on his 
promises, he causes the army to turn on Xenophon and to remain in limbo waiting 
for its pay. Seuthes does not suffer physically for his actions, but is roundly criticised 
by Xenophon the character, especially for his attitude to profit and honour (7.6.20-2 
and 7.7.21-47). Thus, the reader may judge Seuthes to be a poor leader and should 
understand not to follow his example in terms of appeals to ηηκή and θέξδνο. Cyrus 
also, because he ultimately causes the army harm by motivating his leaders to 
continue an inadvisable mission and is himself killed in the process, should not be 
emulated in the way he appeals to ηηκή and θέξδνο. The reader also sees the possible 
destabilising effect that offering specific rewards to leaders can cause to the army, 
and how it can influence a leader‟s actions and appeals. Even though Cleanor and 
Phryniscus ultimately do not lead the army to Seuthes, this could have driven their 
actions rather than their duty to the army. Further, when the army suspected 
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Xenophon of being enriched by Seuthes, much discontent is caused (7.5.7 and 7.6.9-
10), demonstrating what could have happened if Xenophon had accepted Seuthes‟ 
proposals and held conflicting interests. 
Commanders Gaining Κέρδος and Τιμή from Paymasters and the Army 
This image of Xenophon as prioritising the army‟s interests over his own is 
reinforced by briefly examining how he and Clearchus refer to the ηηκή and θέξδνο 
that they gained or could have gained from paymasters. It is not inherently wrong to 
receive ηηκή and θέξδνο from a paymaster, and problems only occur when accepting 
honour or profit comes into conflict with the leaders‟ duty to the army. We saw in 
the last chapter that Clearchus claims to his troops that he is distressed because he 
has been honoured (ἐηίκεζε) by Cyrus and may not be able to reciprocate this 
(1.3.3). Clearchus says that, with the soldiers, he thinks he will be valued or held in 
honour (ηίκηνο) wherever he may be, whereas without them he would be unable to 
help friends or harm enemies (1.3.6). Because (as Clearchus presents it) the ηηκή he 
owes to Cyrus and the soldiers cannot both be repaid, he claims to value the ηηκή 
from the men over that from a foreign friend. However, we have seen that actually 
he retains both, to his own advantage.  
 The dramatic effect of Clearchus‟ speech stems from the reader knowing 
that Clearchus is being deceptive, and we also saw how this deception impacts on his 
characterisation. Clearchus presents himself as someone who takes his relationships 
seriously, who desires to reciprocate the ηηκή given to him, and who is ultimately 
loyal to his men. Yet we saw in the last chapter that the narrator undercuts this 
presentation. Clearchus accepts the soldiers‟ ηηκή without properly reciprocating it, 
and only pretends to follow their wishes while actually maximising his own ηηκή.196 
                                                             
196 See Cyropaedia 1.2.7, 5.4.32 and 8.3.49 and Memorabilia 2.1.28, 3.6.3, and 3.12.4 for the 
importance of repaying others and the necessity of actually earning τιμι. Elsewhere, see Aristotle’s 
Ethica Nicomachea (1162b.31-4) for the importance of repaying a friend. Underpinning the giving 
and receiving of τιμι and κζρδοσ is the concept of reciprocity. See particularly Seaford (1998, 1-3) 
and von Reden (1998, 258-60). Reciprocity is often regarded as creating long-lasting ties that are 
mutually beneficial and encourage positive social relations (see von Reden, 1998, 255 and Mitchell 
1997, 9). However, reciprocity also has a problematic role in Athenian politics (see von Reden 1995, 
89, 94-6 and 219, Engen 2010, 33-5, 47, 101-2, 132 and 135, Seaford 1998, 6-11 and Missiou 1998, 
191 and 196). See further Gauthier (1985) who demonstrates that we must be careful when making 
sweeping judgements about reciprocity based on what constitution a community has and where it is 
located. 
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The moral attitude he presented was only a façade to persuade the men to act in the 
way he wants, and he is failing to do his duty to the soldiers. He used the men‟s 
expectation that a good leader would prioritise their ηηκή to his own advantage. 
Like Clearchus, Xenophon presents himself as desiring honour from the army 
and as wanting to repay what the soldiers have given him. When Xenophon refuses 
sole command, he claims that he is happy (ἥδνκαη) and grateful (ράξηλ) to be 
honoured (ηηκώκελνο) by the soldiers because he is human, and he prays that the 
gods allow him to benefit (ἀγαζνῦ) the army (6.1.26). He attempts to make the men 
feel that he values their honour, and to give them confidence that he conforms to 
their expectations of how a leader should act in desiring to repay them. The army‟s 
response does not specifically indicate that his mention of the men giving him 
honour has influenced its reaction. However, because more men want Xenophon as 
leader, this suggests that they believe that he will carry out his wish to benefit them 
in return. Thus, Xenophon has used a representation of his attitude towards honour to 
influence his audience. Unlike with Clearchus, the narrator shows that Xenophon 
matches his words with his actions because he benefits the army repeatedly, 
including immediately by rejecting the sole command, and hence avoiding the wrath 
of the Spartans, and later by gaining the men their pay from Seuthes.  
When Xenophon is sent by the Spartan leaders to Seuthes to obtain the 
soldiers their outstanding pay, Xenophon explains the choice he makes between 
accepting ηηκή and θέξδνο from Seuthes or working in the interests of the army. At 
7.7.40, Xenophon reminds Seuthes that he has not received anything from him, and 
says that it would have been disgraceful (αἰζρξὸλ) to look to his own affairs and 
leave his soldiers‟ in a bad state, especially because he had been honoured 
(ηηκώκελνλ) by the men. Xenophon presents himself as thinking highly of reciprocal 
relationships, and as wanting to pay back the men as his priority. The narrator has 
already demonstrated that Xenophon can be characterised in this way, as we have 
seen. Indeed, Xenophon chooses to put aside his plans to make a settlement where he 
would get honour as its founder in favour of keeping the soldiers safe and preserving 
their ηηκή (5.6.31-3). Thus, Xenophon‟s words match his actions and he is motivated 
positively. Xenophon is willing to work in the interests of the men even though they 
are ungrateful and suspicious towards him and want to stone him to death. Xenophon 
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does not let his love of honour overcome his duty, even though honour is something 
that men in general desire greatly (see Hiero 7.1). 
 Xenophon the character here offers his own example to Seuthes, 
suggesting that Seuthes should likewise reciprocate the soldiers‟ ηηκή by paying 
them. Xenophon the character‟s comments here can also partly be read as a comment 
on Clearchus‟ failure to reciprocate acceptably. Indeed, Xenophon‟s extrication of 
himself and the army from their relationship with Seuthes, as I shall discuss below, 
demonstrates that Clearchus could possibly have engineered a friendly departure for 
the Greeks from Cyrus if he had really wanted to.  
 Which leader acts correctly can be seen by how Clearchus‟ and 
Xenophon‟s leaderships end in the work. Tissaphernes‟ recognition that Clearchus 
prioritises his own ηηκή facilitates Tissaphernes‟ treachery of the army and leads to 
Clearchus‟ death. The narrator says that Clearchus wanted to lead the entire army 
and desired to remove rivals for this leadership, specifically Menon, who he believes 
Tissaphernes will implicate when he takes the Greek leaders to him (2.5.29). Thus, 
Clearchus is punished for prioritising the ηηκή he wants from the army over the 
soldiers‟ interests and concerns. This can be contrasted with the rewards Xenophon 
receives at the end of the Anabasis.  
 Xenophon the character presents his attitude about leaders being rivals for 
ηηκή in a speech at 5.7.10, which may comment further on Clearchus‟ actions. 
Xenophon is responding to accusations that he is deceiving the soldiers into 
returning to the Phasis, and he claims that such stories are invented by foolish people 
who are envious (θζνλνύλησλ) of him because he is honoured (ηηκῶκαη) by the 
men.
197
 This is unjust (νὐ δηθαίσο), Xenophon says, because he does not stop anyone 
from saying or doing beneficial things for the army or from being commanders, as 
long as they benefit the army.
198
 While other leaders are concerned with their own 
                                                             
197 Aristotle later argues that envy is felt by base people (Rhetorica 2.11, 1388a.35-8). Sanders (2008, 
272-3) argues that the main issue with envy is that it is an unjustified feeling of pain at someone’s 
good fortune rather than a justified feeling of pain at someone’s good fortune (indignation), which 
makes envy morally wrong. 
198 See Xenias and Pasion who desert the army because of jealous ambition (φιλοτιμθκζντεσ, 1.4.7). 
Even Thorax is always fighting with Xenophon over the leadership of the army (5.6.25). 
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standing, Xenophon claims that he is concerned with what is best for the army.
199
 
There is no specific response from the men to this particular argument, although the 
speech as a whole is successful. The narrator has already shown that Xenophon is 
not jealous of other people who are honoured or have positions of command. For 
example, Xenophon has said that it would be better for the army to follow Timasion 
and Thorax as leaders because they could offer the army pay and a trip home, rather 
than the army splitting up over his idea to settle (5.6.31). Thus, Xenophon matches 
his words and actions.  
 The negative repercussions resulting from Clearchus‟ speech for both 
himself and the army occur early in the work and demonstrate that such a selfish 
attitude to ηηκή should not be emulated.200 The narrator is presenting a real danger. A 
leader may be able to speak so convincingly about attitudes towards honour and 
profit which he only pretends to have that his audiences will not be able to stop him 
from acting in ways that will harm them, and they will carry out the actions that he 
wants the army to do to fulfil his own desires. Only Clearchus allows his xenia-
                                                             
199 The idea of leaders working together rather than against each other also occurs in the 
Memorabilia and Agesilaus. At Memorabilia 2.6.24-5, Socrates says that leaders who have good 
motivations for commanding should be able to share public honours (πολιτικῶν τιμῶν) for the 
benefit of each other. Agesilaus even honours (ἐτίμα) political opponents when they do something 
positive because, the narrator claims, Agesilaus thought so highly of Sparta’s citizens (Agesilaus, 7.3). 
Whether this motive is accurately represented or not, the narrator is presenting it as the ideal. 
200 In the Cyropaedia (5.5.5-36), Cyaxares is likewise concerned with his own honour over the 
interests of his men. He does not present himself deceitfully but is quite open to Cyrus about his 
feelings towards honour. Cyaxares believes that Cyrus’ actions in aiding his army have robbed him of 
his reputation (ἀξιώματοσ) and honour (τιμῆσ) by making Cyrus look better than him. Cyaxares even 
says that he would have preferred it if Cyrus had harmed the soldiers instead of benefitting them. 
Scholars disagree over how Cyaxares should be interpreted, but I agree with scholars such as Gray 
(2011b, 268 and 271-5) and Danzig (2012, 514-38) who interpret Cyaxares as weak, ineffective and 
selfish, and as wrong to be more concerned with his own honour than the interests of his men or the 
advancement of the campaign. That the narrator allows Cyaxares to be seen like this and to have his 
arguments undone by Cyrus suggests the didactic message that a leader should prioritise the 
interests of the soldiers over his own. See further Hellenica 4.1.34ff. and 6.1.17, and Agesilaus 5.4-7 
for positive representations of speakers prioritising their own community over foreign friends. Of 
course, the mercenaries themselves have chosen to work for a foreign friend over their own 
communities, but we have seen Socrates’ warning about this, and the possibility that Xenophon was 
exiled because of this.  
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relationship to affect his loyalty to his men, even though the narrator also says that 
Proxenus valued Cyrus more than his own state (3.1.4).
201
 
 The soldiers are punished for trusting that Clearchus prioritises their ηηκή. 
Cyrus is also punished for thinking that Clearchus prioritises his ηηκή. When 
Clearchus deceives Cyrus over the orders at the battle of Cunaxa, Clearchus is 
looking after the interests of himself and the Greeks, and Cyrus dies partly because 
of this. It is clear that a leader‟s appeals to his own attitudes to honour are useful 
persuasive tools, but they must accurately reflect the speaker, and the leader should 
have a selfless attitude and put his duty to the soldiers first.  
Leaders Discussing Κέρδος and Τιμή with Outsiders 
During the same speech to Seuthes in which Xenophon explains that he values 
honour from the army, Xenophon teaches Seuthes several further lessons about how 
to behave concerning honour and profit, as part of his demonstration as to why 
Seuthes should pay the men. These lessons indicate that a leader may have to address 
behaviour concerning these concepts to outsiders, as well as to those within the 
army. Xenophon says that it is important that Seuthes is thought of as being 
trustworthy because the words that untrustworthy men say go wandering 
(πιαλσκέλνπο) without achieving anything, without power and without honour 
(ἀηίκνπο, 7.7.22-4). Thus, Xenophon is suggesting that Seuthes should prove 
trustworthy to the Greeks and pay them or risk being unable to form relationships or 
receive ηηκή in the future. Xenophon also accuses Seuthes of selling the Greeks‟ trust 
in him for the thirty talents he owes them. Thus, he is now relating the desire for 
θέξδνο to issues of trust, again to suggest that Seuthes should pay the men. 
Xenophon argues that because Seuthes has received much more profit because of the 
Greeks than the thirty talents he owes them, it would have been a small sum to pay 
to ensure that the Greeks thought well of him (7.7.25-6).
202
 Later in the speech, 
                                                             
201 See Humble (1997, 186) who comments regarding the Spartans in the Anabasis and Hellenica that 
“a common desire for personal glory at the expense of what is best for the state and a fiercely 
competitive attitude towards one another…undermine their success”. Humble (1999, 339) disagrees 
with scholars who argue that Xenophon portrays sophrosyne as a typical trait of the Spartans, and 
my interpretation backs this up. See also Seelinger (1997, 25-30) who argues that Xenophon was 
concerned with the interests of all while Clearchus was driven by his personal friendships rather 
than benefitting the soldiers.  
202 C.f. Cyropaedia 4.2.42-5, where Cyrus argues to the army that enhancing its reputation is more 
important than making a short-lived profit. 
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Xenophon explains how friendship is more desirable than riches (7.7.41-2).
203
 
Xenophon is here reminding Seuthes that his friendship with the Greek army and the 
benefits this will bring are more important than the amount he could save by not 
paying the army. Finally, Xenophon says that after all he has done for Seuthes, 
Seuthes has the effrontery to overlook the fact that the soldiers are holding 
Xenophon in dishonour (ἄηηκνλ) because they think that Xenophon has received gifts 
from him (7.7.46). By contrast, Xenophon emphasises that he has continued to treat 
Seuthes as a friend (7.7.43-5). This argument suggests that Seuthes should help 
Xenophon and repay his friendship by paying the men.  
Xenophon appeals to the benefits that being honoured, being well thought of, 
and having friends can bring, in contrast to selfishly desiring money. Xenophon is 
also playing upon the fear of what will happen if Seuthes does not mend his 
relationship with the Greeks, and also shame at how he has treated the Greeks. 
Xenophon perhaps also tries to evoke pity for himself by describing how his 
reputation with the soldiers has suffered, and tries to evoke feelings of gratitude and 
goodwill towards himself and the army for what they have done for Seuthes. 
Xenophon presents himself as someone who knows what constitutes right and wrong 
behaviour for a leader regarding honour and profit. He also appears to recognise the 
value of a positive reputation and does not value selfish gain highly. He presents 
himself as a loyal friend who wants to relay his wisdom for the benefit of his 
audience and as someone who is disappointed that his friend did not support him. 
The narrator backs up this self-presentation by Xenophon. He is elsewhere seen to be 
concerned with the reputation a leader‟s actions can accrue, for example, in his 
thoughts about whether he should take sole command (6.1.20-1). Xenophon is also 
shown not to be motivated by gain.
204
 Xenophon is unable to give Seuthes gifts 
(7.3.20ff., unlike Timasion who offers expensive gifts), and later chooses not to take 
payment when there is not enough to split between all the generals (7.5.2-4). Indeed, 
near the end of the work, Eucleides the seer confirms that Xenophon has not 
                                                             
203 C.f. Memorabilia 1.2.7, 2.4.1 and 4.2.9 where Socrates argues that friendship and wisdom are 
more important than money and profit, and Symposium 4.34-44 where Antisthenes says that wealth 
is based on what is in one’s heart rather than possessions. Socrates seems to endorse this view 
(4.61-4). Further, c.f. Plato (Respublica 336e.2-9) and Isocrates (1.19, 1.21 and 3.50) who place 
wisdom, justice and reputation above riches. 
204 Pace Buzzetti (2014, 57-8, 63 and 114) who argues that the narrator presents Xenophon as 
desiring gain from the mission. 
191 
 
enriched himself (7.8.2-3). Xenophon only receives his financial rewards when he 
sacrifices to Zeus the Merciful. He has his horse redeemed (7.8.4-6) and is informed 
of a way that he can win plunder (7.8.8-9).
205
 He thus earns his rewards in an 
acceptable way.
206
 Also, confirming his presentation as a good friend, we see that 
Xenophon is a loyal friend to Proxenus, going forward to learn his fate when the 
Persians have seized the generals (2.5.37), and setting up a plaque to him at Scillus 
(5.3.5). Xenophon also offers wise advice elsewhere (7.3.37, for example). Thus, 
Xenophon presents his attitude honestly, and his advice matches his own actions.  
After this speech, Seuthes curses the man responsible for the soldiers not 
being paid, and claims that he did not mean to defraud the Greeks of their wages and 
that he will pay them (7.7.48). Seuthes is persuaded to do as Xenophon recommends. 
However, what follows indicates either that Seuthes is not persuaded by Xenophon‟s 
words about the rightness of prioritising ηηκή from the soldiers, or that he does not 
believe Xenophon‟s presentation of himself as prioritising the soldiers‟ ηηκή and 
wants to test Xenophon‟s resolve with an offer of ηηκή and θέξδνο from himself. 
After Xenophon requests that payment is made through him to restore some of his 
standing with the army, Seuthes says that Xenophon will not be more dishonoured 
(ἀηηκόηεξνο) among the soldiers if he and a thousand Greek hoplites remain with 
him. As we saw above, Seuthes also promises to give Xenophon all the gifts and 
honours that he offered before, but Xenophon refuses. When Seuthes tells Xenophon 
that it would be safer to stay with him, Xenophon again says that it is not possible, 
but that wherever he is more highly honoured (ἐληηκόηεξνο) it will be good for 
Seuthes too (7.7.52). This suggests that Xenophon believes that he will get greater 
honour elsewhere, perhaps from the men, but that the army will still reciprocate 
                                                             
205
 C.f. Agesilaus’ and Cyrus the Great’s attitudes and actions concerning financial gain (Agesilaus 
1.36, 4.1-6, 8.8, 11.5 and 11.8-9; Cyropaedia 1.6.8, 3.3.2-6, 5.1.28, 5.2.7-11 and 8.1.26). Both speak 
and act similarly to Xenophon. 
206 Azoulay (2004a, 289-92, 295-6, 299-300 and 303, and 2004b, 192ff.) argues that Xenophon the 
author’s agenda in presenting this careful portrait of Xenophon the character is to distance him from 
accusations of being a mercenary who is motivated by pay and mercenary exchange. Trundle (2004, 
19, 60-1 and 68) and Perlman (1976-7, 255-6) also argue that Xenophon the author deliberately 
intended to distance the army from the negative associations that mercenary service brought. See 
further Flower (2012, 45), who draws attention to the motif of the return home as possibly 
encouraging the reader to forget that the mercenaries desire plunder. I argue that while Xenophon 
may indeed have wanted to represent himself as being above the mercenary way of life, his actions 
in regard to gain also form part of his moral teaching for potential leaders, in offering an example for 
others inside and outside the army. 
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Seuthes properly by spreading a good word about Seuthes because he finally kept his 
promise to them.  
 Seuthes is characterised by Xenophon‟s speech and his own response. The 
reader can judge exactly where Seuthes‟ leadership and moral attitude lack, and 
recognise that Seuthes is unable or unwilling to understand Xenophon‟s morally 
correct lesson. Indeed, Seuthes‟ inability to learn a lesson has already been 
demonstrated. For example, Xenophon previously suggested a way that Seuthes 
could prevent the army from being drawn apart at night (7.3.36-9) but Seuthes 
forgets this by 7.3.47. Seuthes clearly has much to learn, and the narrator also 
presents Xenophon giving advice about the kind of people Seuthes should take 
captive (7.4.24). Seuthes‟ lack of regard for Xenophon‟s choice to reciprocate 
honour from his men also fits with Seuthes‟ criticism that Xenophon is too friendly 
with the soldiers (7.6.4). Even if Seuthes does not learn Xenophon‟s lessons about 
how a leader should act, the reader surely does. Instead of presenting an attitude to 
honour and profit that will ensure himself more rewards from Seuthes, Xenophon 
uses his real attitude to confront Seuthes about his actions and to teach Seuthes how 
a good leader should act. 
The reader engages with this speech by anticipating the effect a critique of 
Seuthes‟ actions will have on a man who is already hostile to Xenophon. The reader 
may also momentarily wonder if Xenophon will be tempted to stay with Seuthes 
when Seuthes requests this, and may anticipate that Seuthes will make the same 
mistakes as he does with the Greeks in his future relationships. Xenophon is 
motivated to act positively for the army and Seuthes here, but may also want to clear 
his name amongst the army. Thus, he acts both selflessly and selfishly. However, 
Xenophon benefits the army and Seuthes, as well as himself, with this speech, even 
if he only benefits Seuthes for a short time. He obtains the soldiers their pay and 
ensures that they parted from Seuthes on good terms and are ready to join their new 
employer. Xenophon benefits himself by restoring the army‟s faith in him (7.7.55) 
and departing from Seuthes on good terms. Finally, Xenophon benefits Seuthes by 
restoring his friendship with the Greeks, saving him on this occasion at least from 
the repercussions that he envisioned that Seuthes‟ failure to pay could have incurred, 
and by promising that the army will speak well of him. In the longer term, because 
Seuthes does not take on board Xenophon‟s message about whose honour to 
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prioritise, the reader may assume that Seuthes will continue to act poorly in his 
leadership.
207
 Xenophon is rendered a positive paradigm for his attitude and his 
attempt to instil good behaviour in others 
Earlier, Xenophon has attempted to manipulate Seuthes‟ desire for profit and 
honour for his own and the army‟s benefit, further demonstrating the importance of a 
leader being able to judge what drives outsiders. Heracleides recommends to 
Xenophon that he needs to honour Seuthes as magnificently as possible at Seuthes‟ 
dinner party. However, Xenophon has no gifts to give and so must improvise. 
Gnesippus, the guest before Xenophon, also has no gifts to give. Gnesippus says that 
Seuthes should give gifts to those who have nothing to give first so that these people 
can give gifts and honour (ηηκᾶλ) back to Seuthes (7.3.28). Gnesippus may be trying 
to create a fictional relationship of reciprocity in a way that a Greek would 
understand and where he would not feel so inferior to Seuthes.
208
 Gnesippus‟ appeal 
receives no reply, however, and presumably does not please Seuthes. Xenophon, 
having drunk a little, stands up confidently (ζαξξαιέσο, 7.3.29). He offers Seuthes 
himself and the soldiers as faithful and willing friends who will bring Seuthes 
territory, horses and people as gifts of honour (δῶξα) while in his service, rather than 
Seuthes having to take them as plunder (ιῄδεζζαί) himself (7.3.30-1). Xenophon 
here amalgamates the Greek and Thracian systems of honour and gift giving and 
attempts to create a more equal relationship that will benefit both parties.
209
 
Xenophon has highlighted the ease with which Seuthes will be able to make gains, 
and the long-term advantage of having Xenophon and the army provide him with 
gifts in this fashion, while also working for him. Seuthes drains the drinking horn 
and sprinkles the last drops with Xenophon, seemingly accepting his gifts (7.3.32). 
The army does indeed win captives and cattle for Seuthes while regaining him his 
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 See further Seelinger (1997, 25-30), who argues that Seuthes may not have understood the 
message that Xenophon presented or did not believe that he should live by it, and that Xenophon 
admits that he could not make Seuthes an ideal leader. See also Nussbaum (1967, 127 and 142) who 
argues that Xenophon acted in the opposite way to Clearchus by putting the army before his 
friendship with Seuthes and the rewards offered to him.  
208 Mitchell (1997, 113 and 135-7) describes how Thracian kings were perceived to like to receive 
gifts in an “essentially supplicatory” fashion and how they subsequently controlled if and when to 
return gifts. She argues that the Thracian system created “social inequalities”, compared to the 
“rough equality” of Greek reciprocal exchange. 
209 Pace Buzzetti (2014, 272-3) who argues that Xenophon’s companions were not his to offer to 
Seuthes and that Xenophon is actually concerned with saving himself from Aristarchus and trying to 
earn himself rewards from Seuthes. Xenophon’s failure to provide gifts to Seuthes would surely have 
affected Seuthes’ relationship with the army, however.  
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father‟s realm, and the Greeks prove to be good friends to him (7.3.48, 7.6.22 and 
7.7.25). Xenophon has immediately benefitted himself by being able to offer 
something to Seuthes, and he has benefitted the army by cementing the soldiers‟ 
good relationship with Seuthes, who provides them with protection and food. In the 
longer term, the army‟s friendship brings benefits to Seuthes because the army fights 
for him and brings him plunder. Because Seuthes does not fulfil his promise of pay, 
the army and Xenophon suffer for a while, until Xenophon persuades Seuthes to do 
so, although, as we saw, working for Seuthes benefits the army in non-financial 
ways. Xenophon has overcome a potentially troublesome situation through his 
appeal to profit and honour.  
 There are also examples where a leader portrays to outsiders the attitude to 
honour and profit of those he is representing. We saw in chapter 2 that, when talking 
to the Sinopeans, Xenophon presents the Cyreans as not having focused on taking 
property (ρξήκαηα) but on saving themselves (5.5.13). He also talks in terms of ηηκή 
when he describes how the army reciprocated friendly and hostile behaviour 
(5.5.14).
210
 Later, Xenophon represents the army as having a positive attitude to 
reciprocating benefits given in the form of wealth when Medosades warns the 
Greeks that they are acting unjustly by plundering his villages and tells them to 
leave. Xenophon argues that it is actually Medosades and his people that are acting 
badly, because the army enriched (πινπηνῦληα) Medosades by winning him the land, 
yet now Medosades and his people will not even allow the army to bivouac on the 
land before they leave (7.7.4-10). The Odrysian whom Medosades has brought with 
him to hear Xenophon‟s response says that he is ashamed (αἰζρύλεο) at what he has 
heard about Medosades‟ behaviour and that the king would never endorse driving his 
benefactors (εὐεξγέηαο) away (7.7.11). Both the Sinopeans and the Odrysian believe 
Xenophon‟s representation of the army‟s attitudes, and believe that the army has 
acted rightly. Xenophon is thus able to prevent trouble for the army, benefitting 
them. The narrator confirms Xenophon‟s claims in the narrative (4.1.5ff., 4.3.4, 
4.7.1ff., 4.8.1ff., 4.8.23-4, and 7.7.1), and Xenophon is characterised as being able to 
diffuse dangerous and tense situations in order to ensure the army‟s good relations 
with others and to secure the army‟s well-being.  
                                                             
210
 While Perlman (1976-7, 264) considers that the attitude which Xenophon presents here has 
nothing to do with morals but simply survival, I argue that the focus on reciprocity makes this a 
moral issue. 
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Ariaeus tries to represent the Persians as having a good moral approach to 
ηηκή, reciprocity and friendship when talking to the Greeks. After Tissaphernes‟ 
treachery, he tells Cleanor, Sophaenetus and Xenophon that because Proxenus and 
Menon have benefitted the Persians by giving information on Clearchus‟ perjury and 
the violation of his agreement with the Persians, they are being held in high honour 
(κεγάιῃ ηηκῆ) by them (2.5.38). Ariaeus is presumably attempting to make the 
remaining Greeks trust that the Persians acted morally in rewarding Menon and 
Proxenus, and persuade them that the Persians will also treat them well if they 
cooperate. Any concern that the reader may have about the Greeks believing Ariaeus 
is quickly ended. Cleanor, who responds to Ariaeus, does not appear to believe him. 
He does not refer to Proxenus or Menon but criticises Ariaeus instead. The Greeks 
are perhaps largely influenced by what happened when they trusted Ariaeus‟ fellow 
Persian, Tissaphernes. When Xenophon speaks, he asks the Persians to return 
Proxenus and Menon to the Greeks, but the Persians give no answer and depart 
(2.5.41-2). This seems to confirm that the Persians are lying about the pair being 
held in honour. Ariaeus‟ ethos is shown to be false, and he is characterised as 
untrustworthy. Ariaeus fails to benefit anyone, and the reader‟s final impression of 
him is the criticism directed at him by Cleanor (3.2.5). Clearly, communicating a 
positive ethos on behalf of those a leader represents is an important role for a leader, 
and it is important not only that the audience believes his words but also that the 
audience believes that the leader can enforce the good moral behaviour he is 
describing in those he represents. 
Commanders and Paymasters Providing Τιμή and Κέρδος for the Greek Army  
In this section, I firstly compare appeals by Xenophon, Timasion, and a joint speech 
by Lycon and Callimachus in which the speakers suggest how the army can obtain 
profit (3.2.39, 5.6.22-4 and 6.2.10-11). These speakers all make their appeals when 
they are trying to persuade the army to follow their leadership or have only just 
begun their leadership role. Secondly, I compare speeches by Xenophon and Lycon 
when they are both trying to provide financial gain for the army but from two 
different types of source (5.1.8, 5.2.18 and 6.2.4-5). Finally, I examine two appeals 
by Xenophon where he is trying to persuade his audience to follow him after he has 
been accused of acting poorly and where he mentions honour and profit (5.6.30-1 
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and 5.8.25). To the second of these speeches, I compare Seuthes offering honour 
directly to the Greek army (7.3.10-11).  
Xenophon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (3.2.39) 
We have seen that Cheirisophus, Cleanor and Xenophon take it in turns to speak to 
the army after new leaders have been elected to replace those killed by Tissaphernes, 
and that Xenophon deceives the soldiers over the cavalry in his speech. At the end of 
this speech, Xenophon appeals to different groups who have specific motivations, 
including those who desire material gain (ρξεκάησλ). He says that these people 
should try to defeat the enemy because then they can keep their own possessions and 
gain the enemy‟s too.211 Xenophon is trying to overcome the men‟s despondency 
about the situation, and he must hope that the soldiers‟ desire for material goods will 
be stronger than their fears and disinclination to act. He is linking his advice for what 
to do next to one of the soldiers‟ motivations for coming on the mission, and 
therefore knows he is appealing to strong desires. Not only is Xenophon arguing that 
the soldiers stand to gain, and presumably here he is conjuring up images of Persian 
finery, but he is also appealing to the soldiers‟ fear that they will lose their own 
possessions. As Xenophon presents the situation, it is to the men‟s own advantage to 
prepare to go against the Persians. Xenophon presents himself as someone who 
knows what motivates different groups of people and how their desires can be 
fulfilled. We have seen that he is successful in motivating the soldiers to follow his 
instructions, although they do not respond to any of his arguments specifically. 
Timasion’s Appeal to Κέρδος (5.6.22-4) 
In the last chapter, we saw how Timasion persuaded the Heracleot and Sinopean 
merchants to give him money to ensure that the army left the area. After Timasion 
has secured this promise, he speaks to the army, some of whom want to remain and 
some of whom do not. Timasion says to the soldiers that they should return to 
Greece, that he will pay them a wage and that, once returned, he will lead them to 
places where they can get much money (πνιιὰ ρξήκαηα). Timasion begins by 
linking his recommendation about leaving to the long-term aim of the mission, to 
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 Elsewhere in Xenophon’s work, appeals to taking the possessions of the enemy are made without 
condemnation (see Cyropaedia 1.5.13, 3.3.45, 4.2.26 and 7.5.73, and Hellenica 3.1.26 and 5.1.17).  
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return home having been paid, but he then alters this by suggesting that, once home, 
their aim becomes about making further gains. He is not trying to persuade the men 
to do anything that the majority are unwilling to do in setting out for home, but he is 
explaining why it would be advantageous to follow him by appealing to a desire that 
mercenaries typically have. He is presumably using this to try to evoke the soldiers‟ 
goodwill and confidence towards his potential leadership. Timasion presents himself 
as someone who values home and Greece, and as someone who knows what the 
soldiers desire and who will be able to fulfil this personally.  
After Timasion, Thorax stands up and offers to pay the soldiers and lead 
them to the Euxine. Unlike Timasion, he does not appeal to the gains they could 
make. The narrator does not indicate a response from the army to Timasion‟s or 
Thorax‟s appeal, and Philesius and Lycon go on to criticise Xenophon instead 
(5.6.27). The soldiers agree to the recommendation Xenophon makes in his 
subsequent speech to return home with the leaders who are offering pay (5.6.33), but 
Xenophon has not mentioned anything about making further profit once they have 
returned. It is unclear whether the army does not get a chance to respond, does not 
want further campaigning or does not believe that Timasion can fulfil his promises, 
but it seems relevant that no one else refers to the gain that could be made.  
Lycon and Callimachus’ Appeal to Κέρδος (6.2.10-11) 
After Cheirisophus has been elected sole commander, the army proceeds to 
Heracleia and discusses the rest of the journey (6.2.1-4). Here, Lycon recommends 
that the army demands money from the Heracleots, as we shall see in a later section. 
Cheirisophus and Xenophon refuse to play any role in the mission and, when the 
mission fails, those who had recommended going to the Heracleots accuse the 
generals of ruining the mission. The Arcadians and Achaeans band together under 
Callimachus and Lycon (6.2.6), and the narrator presents the speech that Lycon and 
Callimachus give to the Arcadians and Achaeans in oratio obliqua. Because they 
blame the generals for the previous mission failing, it is clear that these men aim to 
turn the army against the current leaders, and shift the blame from themselves. 
Lycon is perhaps motivated by shame and also anger that the generals did not aid 
him in his suggestion. Lycon has previously criticised the generals‟ running of the 
army (6.2.4), suggesting that he thinks he can do a better job than the current leaders. 
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No motives are indicated for Callimachus, and the reader may simply assume that he 
also wants power. 
These men say that it is shameful (αἰζρξὸλ) for Peloponnesians and 
Lacedaemonians to be commanded by an Athenian who brought no troops. They say 
that while the Arcadians and Achaeans do the hard work (πόλνπο) in the army, the 
profits (θέξδε) go to others, even though the Arcadians and Achaeans achieved the 
army‟s deliverance (ζσηεξίαλ). They say that the rest of the army amounts to 
nothing, and the narrator breaks in to confirm that the Arcadians and Achaeans 
formed more than half the army. The speakers recommend that the Arcadians and 
Achaeans split away from the others, choose new leaders, and try to get some 
benefits (ἀγαζόλ ηη) for themselves. In asking the Arcadians and Achaeans to 
separate themselves from the rest of the army, Lycon and Callimachus are trying to 
persuade the group to do something they already seem inclined to do, and so they are 
appealing to the men‟s emotions and desires to fully convince them to act. The 
speakers try to evoke shame at the audience‟s contentedness to follow Xenophon, 
and try to arouse contempt for Xenophon‟s contribution to the army, as well as the 
rest of the army‟s ability to save itself without them. They then try to evoke anger 
and jealousy over the division of the profits and the unfairness of their situation. The 
speakers also appeal to confidence by recalling how big the group of Arcadians and 
Achaeans is, and then give the soldiers a solution whereby they no longer need to 
feel shame or anger. They further appeal to the desire for benefits that they 
themselves have won and that they themselves can keep.  
This solution is clearly advantageous to the audience, but the speakers also 
seem to suggest that it is a matter of fairness that the Arcadians and Achaeans 
separate from the rest of the army and get the rewards they deserve. The speakers 
clearly expect the soldiers to believe that they deserve to have received the gains 
they have been responsible for earning. They anticipate that returning home with 
profit is one of the soldiers‟ main aims. Lycon and Callimachus present themselves 
as being sensitive to feelings of shame and as being outraged that the Arcadians and 
Achaeans are not getting their just rewards. They also present themselves as 
knowing what it is best for the group to do and as being able to lead them to make 
gains. 
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The division of the army is arranged (6.2.12). Thus, the speakers seem to 
have successfully anticipated what would motivate their audience. Because the 
soldiers have recently made it clear that they want to return home with something 
(6.1.17), appealing to the profits they are not getting and the profits they can get is 
effective. The soldiers seem to believe in both the speakers and their own ability to 
make gains.  
Reader Involvement 
These speeches produce tension for the reader by making him consider whether 
directly appealing to profit will prove best for the army and whether the army should 
trust that the speakers are speaking truthfully. The reader may also be surprised to 
hear some of the claims in Lycon and Callimachus‟ speech regarding the division of 
the spoils and how the Arcadians and Achaeans delivered the army. The narrator at 
no point indicates that there has been an unfair division of the spoils or singles out 
those responsible for saving the army.  
Characterisation 
We saw in the last chapter, that in these speeches, Xenophon is motivated by 
wanting to encourage the soldiers, and that Timasion is motivated by his own 
interests, which happen to coincide with what the majority of the army wants. Lycon 
and Callimachus are also selfish in their motivations and manipulation of the men‟s 
desires and emotions.
212
 This immediately differentiates the leaders, but we can also 
examine how well they live up to their promises of obtaining profit or their 
suggestions for how the army might make gain. In Xenophon‟s case, the narrator 
demonstrates that by defeating the enemy, the Greeks do in fact gain the enemy‟s 
possessions, as Xenophon said they would, because the narrator later describes a 
surprise attack on the Greeks when they are scattered about getting booty (ἁξπαγήλ, 
3.5.2). The enemy also do not take the Greeks‟ possessions, as he claimed they 
would not do. Thus, Xenophon‟s suggestion proves accurate and the army gains 
                                                             
212 Nussbaum (1967, 188) argues that there is no logical connection between what proceeded Lycon 
and Callimachus’ speech, i.e. the attempt to obtain money from the Heracleots for the entire army, 
and Lycon and Callimachus being outraged that the Arcadian and Achaean division get no share of 
profits. He argues that it is also inconsistent that the army has just decided to operate under a sole 
commander but the speakers now want to run the new division under multiple generals. Nussbaum 
argues that these factors demonstrate that the speakers’ claims are a “brazen fabrication” for their 
own benefit.  
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profit. We saw in the last chapter that Timasion proves unable to fulfil his promise of 
pay and tries to get out of his promise to lead the men home. If he had led the army 
home, it is unclear whether Timasion would have taken the soldiers out on 
expedition again, especially because his desire for home seems strong. Timasion 
claims that his city will receive the army willingly, but he is an exile, and so it is 
unclear whether this is true. Having proved to be unable to give the soldiers the pay 
he promised, the reader may suspect that Timasion should not be trusted about what 
else he claims he can offer the army. In any case, Timasion does not seem to have 
understood what the men want at this time. Lycon and Callimachus are also unable 
to fulfil their words because the Arcadians and Achaeans do not make any gains on 
their own.  
Didactic Function  
Xenophon and Lycon and Callimachus illustrate successful ways of appealing to 
profit. However, we must also examine the benefits and harm caused, and the way 
the speakers‟ leaderships end in the Anabasis. Xenophon benefits the army in the 
short and long term by encouraging them to face and defeat the enemy, and ends 
well in the work. Timasion‟s appeal causes no direct harm or benefit, because he 
does not get to lead the army home. However, by trying to get out of leading the 
army after the Heracleots and Sinopeans fail to pay him, he causes dissension in the 
army, and so causes harm. As we saw in the last chapter, though, he may redeem 
himself after this incident. Lycon and Callimachus directly harm their audience and 
themselves. The Arcadians and Achaeans set out to obtain booty from the Bithynians 
(6.2.17) but the division fares badly and suffer losses against the Thracians until 
Xenophon‟s men come to their rescue (6.3.2ff.). The harm is not just short-term. 
Nussbaum (1967, 189) argues that the loss of cavalry and light infantry, as well as 
the significant number of other deaths, came just as the army was about to embark 
into an area where the locals were well-known for their bad feeling towards the 
Greeks, as well as their strength in cavalry and archers, and where the Greeks had no 
friends nearby. Nussbaum also argues that the split of the army is an ethnic division, 
whereas previously the army had been bound together by their common Greekness. 
This, he suggests, is a dangerous new precedent. Xenophon the character attributes 
the Arcadian and Achaeans‟ troubles to the gods punishing them for their boasting 
(6.3.18), which included their overconfidence that they can get gains themselves. 
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Thus, these speakers receive their comeuppance, and their audience receives 
punishment for trusting them. At this point, the reader may think back to Xenophon 
the character‟s earlier warning that the army will be safer if everyone sticks together 
(5.6.32-3).  
The situations for these appeals are slightly different. Xenophon has been 
elected as a leader and is addressing the soldiers for the first time. By contrast, 
Timasion, Lycon and Callimachus are trying to increase their leadership status with 
their appeals. These speeches indicate that it is inadvisable to try to win increased 
power by using an appeal to profit. Timasion, Lycon and Callimachus take the easy 
approach of appealing to what typically motivates a mercenary army in order to get 
an immediate following. By contrast, Xenophon is a positive paradigm of how to use 
an appeal to profit early in a leadership reign to persuade soldiers to follow good 
advice for their own benefit rather than the leader‟s benefit. Appealing to profit may 
not be ideal because of the stigma attached to the desire for money, but Xenophon 
appeals to it to good effect by using it to help motivate the men out of their 
despondency. Unlike the situations where Timasion, Lycon and Callimachus speak, 
Xenophon‟s appeal is made when the army is facing a real external danger and when 
he needs to use whatever means necessary to persuade the men to act. It is clear that 
direct appeals to financial gain should only be made when the speaker‟s motives are 
unselfish, when it is absolutely necessary, and that if a speaker claims he knows a 
way to make gain, he can fulfil this, to the benefit of his audience.  
Xenophon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (and Τιμή) (5.1.8) 
Further speeches by Xenophon and Lycon can be compared in the way both speakers 
appeal to getting financial gain for the army. Lycon is technically suggesting getting 
money for provisions, but we shall see that this may not be his real aim. When 
Cheirisophus has left the army to get ships, Xenophon makes proposals for what the 
army should do while they are waiting. Xenophon claims that he will speak about the 
things that it seems fitting (θαηξὸο) that they should do (5.1.5). Thus, he seems to 
aim at ensuring that the army acts rightly and does all it should. The men have 
agreed with Xenophon‟s first proposal regarding how they should obtain provisions 
(5.1.7).  
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Xenophon next proposes that when the army plunders, the soldiers should 
take measures to ensure that they do it safely by informing the others of where they 
are going. Then, the others can help with preparations and advice, and can go to the 
soldiers‟ aid if necessary (5.1.8). In order to get the men to accept his proposals, 
Xenophon is outlining why it would be advantageous for them to follow his plans. 
Xenophon appeals to the soldiers‟ desire for plunder, which is part of their overall 
aims for the mission. The ability to make a profit for those at home is also linked to a 
soldier‟s ηηκή.213 Therefore, Xenophon is presenting himself as being concerned with 
the army obtaining both θέξδνο and ηηκή.214 The men believe that they are about to 
return home on the ships Cheirisophus is bringing, and so this will be their last 
chance to make any gains. They are thus likely to attempt to gain plunder anyway, 
but Xenophon‟s suggestion appeals to a desire for safety, good chances of success, 
and backup if needed. Xenophon is perhaps also attempting to raise the soldiers‟ 
confidence in their attempts if they adopt his proposals. Xenophon presents himself 
as being concerned with the safety and success of the men‟s attempts at profit, and as 
being approachable for advice and aid. The men accept Xenophon‟s proposals 
(5.1.8) and so it seems that he has anticipated both their desire for plunder and their 
desire to be as safe and successful as possible doing it. 
Xenophon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (5.2.18) 
When the army is trying to capture a stronghold, the peltasts and light armoured 
troops rush in and try to take plunder, although Xenophon tries to keep them out 
because there are further enemies approaching (5.2.16). Soon the plunderers start 
trying to flee from the stronghold because there is a citadel inside and they were 
being attacked (5.2.17). At this point, Xenophon tells the herald to say that whoever 
wanted to plunder (ηη ιακβάλεηλ) should enter the stronghold (5.2.18). The narrator 
does not indicate why Xenophon says this, but reveals that many proceeded to enter 
the stronghold. Xenophon is here appealing directly to the men‟s desire for gain.  
 
                                                             
213 See Cairns (1992, 70), for example. Also, c.f. Odyssey 11.355-61. Odysseus wants to return home 
from the Phaeacians with more gifts because he will be received with a greater welcome and will be 
better regarded. 
214 Xenophon is offering the men ways of getting honour from profit, which is the opposite to 
Menon’s method of obtaining honour to gain profit (2.6.21).  
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Lycon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (6.2.4-5) 
We saw above that after the army arrives in Heracleia and receives hospitality from 
the Heracleots, the soldiers discuss whether they should complete their journey by 
land or sea, and that Lycon speaks at this meeting (6.2.2-4). Neither the narrator nor 
Lycon specifies Lycon‟s aims and motives, but from what Lycon says, he aims to 
obtain the army money and provisions and is motivated by the generals‟ lack of care 
for the army. The reader may suspect Lycon‟s motives because the narrator has 
given no indication that the generals have not been doing all they can to supply the 
army.  
Lycon says that he is amazed that the generals are not trying to get the army 
money for provisions because what has been given by the Heracleots will not last 
three days, and the army will not have the opportunity to get anything more before 
departure. He proposes that the army demands three thousand Cyzicenes from the 
Heracleots, and another speaker suggests ten thousand. Lycon says that they should 
choose ambassadors to go on the mission there and then. Lycon is attempting to 
persuade the soldiers to do something that they might find objectionable, given that 
that Heracleots are friendly to them. Thus, Lycon makes it seem necessary and 
possible. He plays on the soldiers‟ fears that they will have no money to buy 
provisions to sustain them, and evokes either contempt of the leaders or anger 
towards them for not providing for the army. Lycon presents himself as being 
concerned that the army is being inadequately led and that the men‟s interests are not 
being looked after. He appears as someone who has foresight and recognises the 
problems the army will face, while also offering a solution.  
 The narrator states that the army proceeded to nominate ambassadors 
(6.2.6). Xenophon and Cheirisophus are chosen but they both decline strongly 
because, the narrator says, they both thought that they should not compel a friendly 
Greek city to give what it did not want (6.2.6). This argument is ignored, and the 
mission goes ahead. Lycon has clearly correctly anticipated that the men want 
money to obtain provisions, and this desire is so strong that it overrides what the 
soldiers are told is morally right by Xenophon and Cheirisophus. It also outweighs 
any obedience the soldiers feel is due to these leaders, presumably because of the 
contempt Lycon raised about them. After the demands are made to the Heracleots, 
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and Lycon threatens them, the Heracleots move their market inside the wall and set 
up arms (6.2.7-8).  
Reader Involvement 
Xenophon‟s speech upon Cheirisophus‟ departure reminds the reader of how 
dangerous plundering can be for an army.
215
 Thus, the reader may feel concern for 
the army, but also relief that Xenophon is making arrangements to combat this. His 
later indirect message telling the soldiers to go into the stronghold for plunder may 
make the reader question Xenophon‟s intentions, because he wanted to keep the 
soldiers out just before. Lycon‟s speech evokes tension for the reader, because the 
reader may suspect that it is inadvisable to make demands of a friendly Greek 
people, especially given that Cheirisophus and Xenophon are against the plan.  
Characterisation 
The narrator does nothing to suggest that Xenophon wants anything other than to 
benefit the army when he makes his speech about safe plundering, and that he is 
speaking selflessly in this example. Likewise, the reader may assume that 
Xenophon‟s motives for telling the men to go after plunder are positive because he 
has just shown concern for the army regarding the approaching enemy. By contrast, 
the narrator has created a question mark over Lycon‟s motives. The Heracleots have 
already given three thousand medimni of barley, two thousand jars of wine, twenty 
cattle and a hundred sheep (6.2.3). One Cyzicene is also the equivalent of a month‟s 
pay for the soldiers, therefore requesting three thousand or ten thousand Cyzicenes 
seems to be more than simply about provisioning the army. The reader may think 
that Lycon is trying to gain a following for himself and that there is an element of 
greed to his suggestion, rather than that he is motivated by concern for the army.
216
  
 After Xenophon‟s speech regarding safely plundering, the narrator reveals 
that the army does go out in search of booty (ιείαλ) and that some people were 
obtaining it while some were not. On one particular occasion, the commander and 
                                                             
215 Soldiers coming under attack while plundering or scavenging is so commonly portrayed that Hau 
(2014, 242-3) argues that this is a topos in Greek historiography. 
216 See further Nussbaum (1967, 186-7). He argues that Lycon’s real aim was to take over leadership 
of the army and that Lycon was using the situation as a pretext, because the gifts from the 
Heracleots amounted to more than the gifts sent by the Sinopeans at 6.1.15, and these had been 
deemed sufficient then.  
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many men were killed (5.1.17). This suggests that Xenophon‟s recommendation did 
allow some to gain plunder safely, although it did not work in other cases. This may 
raise some questions over Xenophon‟s trustworthiness. In the second example, 
where Xenophon has the herald tell those who want plunder to enter the stronghold, 
Xenophon gains the men profit, because the narrator says that the Greeks seized 
everything outside the citadel (5.2.19). Here, Xenophon backs up his 
recommendation for how to get profit. By contrast, Lycon cannot back up his words 
with his actions because, instead of the Heracleots providing money for the army, 
they move their market inside their walls, close their gates and set up arms (6.2.8). 
Thus, Lycon is revealed to be wrong in his estimation. Lycon must have been aware 
that he was taking a risk by attempting to obtain money in this way and so can be 
characterised as a risk-taker, as well as someone who does not understand the right 
way to reciprocate allies and treat fellow Greeks.  
Didactic Function 
Both leaders demonstrate how to successfully appeal to θέξδνο, and both have 
recognised it as something that the army wants or needs and provide a plan for 
getting it. However, they can be separated by examining the benefit and harm that 
occurred from their speeches. That some men were killed after Xenophon‟s 
recommendation for how to plunder safely suggests the difficulty and danger of such 
plundering missions, and that Xenophon was right to attempt to make the soldiers 
plunder as safely as possible. While Xenophon did not benefit all the plunderers, his 
plan may at least have benefitted some by helping them to safely make gains that 
they can spend or save. Perhaps the reader is meant to think that the soldiers and 
leaders that were unsuccessful and were harmed did not follow Xenophon‟s 
recommendations. Xenophon himself accrues no particular benefit from his appeal, 
and it seems to be to Xenophon‟s credit that he tries to alleviate some of the dangers 
involved in plundering. He is a positive exemplum in this respect. Xenophon could 
not have forbidden the men to go out plundering, and so he has to try to ensure that 
they are as safe and successful as possible when doing it.
217
 Xenophon also gets the 
                                                             
217 Cyrus the Great has similar concerns at Cyropaedia 7.2.11. After Cyrus’ army has taken Sardis, 
Cyrus reveals to Croesus that he knows that if his men do not receive some gains soon, their 
obedience will decrease, they may destroy the city and the worst people would get the largest 
share. Cyrus therefore secures wealth from Sardis without the men needing to pillage. Both 
Xenophon and Cyrus provide for their men’s desires but in a safe and beneficial way. 
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army to work as a group rather than as individuals in the pursuit of gain. After 
Xenophon tells the men to go into the stronghold for plunder, the narrator says that 
the people entering the stronghold forced back those Greeks trying to retreat, which 
in turn forced the enemy back into their citadel (5.2.18). Thus, Xenophon has 
benefitted the army in the short term by preventing the enemy from harming them 
and gaining them plunder. In the longer term, Xenophon also engineers a way for the 
army to retreat from this point, and so benefits them further.  
Xenophon allows the soldiers to make profit from an acceptable source, 
enemies, whereas Lycon wants the Greeks to profit from friends.
218
 While Xenophon 
tries to prevent future danger, Lycon is a danger to the army himself. Lycon‟s 
proposal harms himself and the army by losing them the friendship of the Heracleots, 
by showing the army as unwilling to repay the Heracleots‟ hospitality, by losing the 
army the opportunity to buy from the Heracleots‟ markets, and by having obtained 
them nothing in the process. As we saw above, Lycon then makes the situation even 
worse by trying to blame the generals for this episode and causing the army to 
divide. Lycon receives his comeuppance, and it is clear that he would not be a better 
leader than the current generals and has made a poor recommendation. By contrast, 
Xenophon and Cheirisophus are proved to have acted rightly in refusing to 
participate. Lycon‟s example should not be emulated.  
Xenophon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (and Τιμή ) (5.6.30-1) 
Xenophon gives two defence speeches in which he appeals to his own actions 
regarding providing honour and profit for the army. In the first example, Xenophon 
has to defend himself before the men who have assembled to listen to Timasion and 
Thorax speak, most of whom do not want to settle down (5.6.19). Philesius and 
Lycon have accused Xenophon of acting poorly in regards to his idea for settling the 
army, and the narrator says that Xenophon was compelled (ἠλαγθάζζε) to speak 
(5.6.27). The narrator does not specify that Xenophon wants to defend himself, but 
Xenophon presumably aims to set the record straight, because Philesius and Lycon‟s 
accusation is inaccurate.      
                                                             
218 See Hellenica 3.1.8 and 4.8.30 for the unacceptability of taking money from friendly cities who do 
not wish to give it. 
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Amongst other arguments, Xenophon says that he would have tried to get the 
men possession of a city if he saw that they were without resources (ἀπνξνῦληαο). 
This, he says, would have allowed those who wanted to return home immediately to 
do so while others would have been able to procure enough (θηήζαηην ἱθαλὰ) to 
benefit those at home and then to return home themselves. He says that the army 
does not need this now, however, because there are men offering them a return and 
pay. Again, making gains for those at home affects a soldier‟s ηηκή, and so 
Xenophon is appealing to the desire for both honour and profit. He represents 
himself as someone who assesses situations and who can be trusted to both 
understand what the men most need at any given time and to seek to provide it. 
Xenophon needs to alter the men‟s perception that he is someone who does what is 
best for himself and is primarily concerned with his own reputation, and convince 
them that he puts the army first. Whilst representing his own intentions, Xenophon is 
also appealing to the soldiers‟ desire for home, as well their pride in returning home 
with enough to provide for their family. In arguing that he attempted to fulfil these 
desires, Xenophon may also be attempting to evoke goodwill and gratitude towards 
himself. 
The men agree with Xenophon‟s suggestions to keep the army together and 
depart for Greece, and that anyone attempting to desert should be put on trial 
(5.6.33). There is no indication that the soldiers believe Xenophon‟s claim that he 
would have tried to provide profit and honour for them, but it seems that he rightly 
anticipated that the men ultimately want to go home. Shortly after, the narrator says 
that the soldiers decide to elect a sole commander to enable them to get gains to take 
home. This suggests that Xenophon is anticipating a real motivation by appealing to 
profit and honour (6.1.17). 
Xenophon’s Appeal to Τιμή (5.8.25) 
When the army puts their generals on trial, Xenophon has to defend himself against 
an accusation of hitting men out of hubris. After Xenophon has successfully 
defended himself against one particular case and the other accusers remain silent, he 
continues with another speech on the subject. Xenophon has already won over his 
audience, because, after his account of why he hit a particular man, the narrator says 
that the soldiers shouted that the man had not received enough strikes (5.8.12). 
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Because Xenophon is on trial, the reader must assume that Xenophon‟s aim is to 
clear his name. He has already cleared himself of the specific charges and so the 
reader may assume that his second speech has the motive behind it of defending his 
leadership more generally.  
At the end of this speech, Xenophon gives a list of the positive things he has 
done to aid the army, including saying that he honoured (ἐηίκεζα) men who were 
brave as best he could. Xenophon is not trying to get his audience to change their 
opinion of him, but is reminding them that he meets their expectations about how a 
good leader should reward his soldiers. He is trying to evoke goodwill and gratitude 
for his past actions. He is also appealing to the army‟s desire to have good behaviour 
rewarded and to earn honour, which plays on feelings of their own pride. Xenophon 
presents himself as someone who recognises and rewards good behaviour, and 
understands that this is something that the men appreciate. He suggests that he has 
acted justly in reciprocating the men‟s good behaviour. 
The narrator says that the soldiers stand up and recall examples of the 
positive things Xenophon has done for them, although he provides no specific detail 
(5.8.26). It seems that Xenophon has correctly anticipated that the men do appreciate 
the positive things he does for them, but that they have temporarily forgotten about 
them.  
Seuthes’ Appeal to Τιμή (7.3.10-11)  
Seuthes also offers the army honour. Xenophon has arranged for the army to listen to 
what Seuthes has to offer in terms of employment. The reader knows that Seuthes 
has made extravagant claims in front of Xenophon and some of the others leaders in 
the army about what he will give the leaders and soldiers, even if the army is 
prevented from helping him. Seuthes is aiming to persuade the army to work for him 
because he wants to regain his realm.  
Seuthes claims that he will provide pay for the army, as well as food and 
drink, and will honour (ηηκήζσ) those who deserve it. In describing his intentions, 
Seuthes wants his audience to be persuaded that he understands what the soldiers 
will want from him and that he is someone who will fulfil his promises. Seuthes 
appeals to the key needs and desires of the army to show that it will be advantageous 
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for the army to work for him. The Greeks deliberate amongst themselves, and the 
speakers argue that working for Seuthes means safety for them, and that being paid 
as well is a bonus. Xenophon offers anyone who has an opposing view the chance to 
speak, and then puts the matter to vote. The army agrees to work for Seuthes (7.3.13-
14). Thus, although Seuthes‟ promise of ηηκή is not the chief reason that the army 
decides to work for Seuthes, referring to it might have given the soldiers an 
impression of the type of leadership they can expect from Seuthes in general.  
Reader Involvement 
The tension arising from Xenophon‟s speeches stems from the danger that Xenophon 
is in and seeing whether he can convince the army that he acted rightly. The reader 
may also feel tension over whether Seuthes can be trusted to fulfil his promises. 
Characterisation 
Xenophon is of course trying to save himself from harm in these two speeches, but 
the narrator does not undercut Xenophon by suggesting that he is not representing 
himself accurately. Although the hypothetical nature of Xenophon‟s first claim does 
not allow the reader to see whether Xenophon would have fulfilled his words with 
his actions, the prior and later narrative suggests that Xenophon would have done so. 
As we saw, Xenophon has already demonstrated a concern to make the men gains to 
return home with when he discusses how the army should best undertake plundering 
missions. When the men later choose Xenophon as sole commander, the reader 
further sees that the men believe that Xenophon would be the best to help them make 
gains. This suggests that the soldiers would have believed his claim in his defence 
speech. Regarding the second example, the soldiers‟ response demonstrates that 
Xenophon matches his words and actions. Xenophon emerges as a trustworthy leader 
both in describing his own leadership and in providing the men with honour and 
profit, even when the soldiers momentarily believe that he is acting against their 
interests.  
In contrast, the narrator undercuts Seuthes‟ presentation of himself by not 
describing any times when Seuthes honoured the men. Seuthes‟ failure to pay the 
men and failure to honour Xenophon further suggest that it is unlikely that he 
honoured the soldiers. Seuthes may not have intended to renege on his promise of 
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honour at the time, but, by not fulfilling his words with his actions, he can be 
characterised as untrustworthy and as being selfish in not reciprocating the benefits 
the soldiers gave to him. Whether or not providing ηηκή has any bearing on the 
soldiers‟ decision to work for him, once Seuthes has said that he will honour those 
who deserve it, he should adhere to his words. Seuthes may have taken advantage of 
the fact that the army was in a desperate situation. 
Didactic Function  
Again, both speakers are successful in using the concepts of ηηκή and θέξδνο in their 
appeals. While Xenophon‟s speeches primarily benefit himself by countering 
criticism against him and encouraging the army to follow him again, they also 
benefit the army in calming the immediate situation. In the first example, Xenophon 
recovers the situation in the short-term to the benefit of the soldiers, because the 
whole army follows one plan again and does not split up. The army even turns on 
Silanus when he says that anyone should be able to leave the army (5.6.34). After the 
second speech that we examined, the narrator ends the scene by saying that 
consequently all was well (5.8.26). This suggests that Xenophon has benefitted both 
the army and himself in the short term by regaining the men‟s goodwill. Xenophon‟s 
speech also ensures that the army continues to follow a leader who is concerned with 
its interests and believes in honouring those who deserve it. However, the longer-
term effects of these two speeches for Xenophon and his audience are negligible. 
The army later doubts Xenophon again and does eventually split up, when Lycon 
and Callimachus encourage them to do so.  
Xenophon‟s speeches teach the reader that even conscientious leaders will be 
criticised for their actions. It is thus extremely important for a leader to be able to 
draw on his past behaviour, here regarding his provision of ηηκή and θέξδνο to the 
army, in order to restore an army‟s faith in him, even if it is fleeting. In an army 
where the men can easily desert a commander, the leader should not make empty 
claims. Once again, Xenophon is rendered a positive exemplum in how he appeals to 
ηηκή and θέξδνο.  
Seuthes benefits the army in the short term by keeping the Greeks safer than 
they would have been on their own, although they do not receive any honour. In the 
longer term, although his failure to live up to his promise of honouring the soldiers 
211 
 
does not cause problems, his choice not to fulfil his promise of pay causes a 
breakdown of relations within the Greek army and an impasse while the army waits 
for its money. Seuthes himself benefits from his false promises by gaining the use of 
the army in the short term, and is able to offload the army before it causes him too 
much harm in the long term. Xenophon‟s words at 7.7.28-34 recounting the 
problems that the Greeks could cause Seuthes remind Seuthes and the reader that 
soldiers can make life difficult for leaders who do not fulfil their promises, and 
suggest what could have happened to Seuthes.  
The difference between Xenophon being rewarded for his treatment of the 
army at the end of the Anabasis, and the criticism of Seuthes‟ leadership by 
Xenophon the character that closes Seuthes‟ involvement in the work, indicates to 
the reader which of the two should be emulated, especially because Xenophon‟s 
speech includes censure for Seuthes‟ failure to fulfil his promises. However, while a 
leader is ultimately responsible for fulfilling his promises, soldiers should also be 
wary of trusting leaders until it is clear that their words and actions match. Both 
Xenophon‟s words at 5.8.25 and Seuthes‟ speech indicate how important giving 
honour in return for good behaviour is because Xenophon lists it with fundamental 
duties such as providing for the men when they are sick, and Seuthes lists it 
alongside essential requirements for survival.  
Outsiders Providing Τιμή and Κέρδος for the Greek Army 
In order to persuade their audiences to undertake a particular course, Menon (1.4.14-
15), Clearchus (2.1.16-17) and Xenophon (3.1.37, 3.2.25-6, 5.6.30-1, 6.3.18 and 
6.6.16) all refer to the honour or profit that their audiences can obtain from outsiders 
through particular behaviour. 
Menon’s Appeal to Τιμή (1.4.14-15) 
After the mutiny at Tarsus, Cyrus offers the men a bonus and pay for the journey 
home. The narrator says that most of the Greeks were persuaded (1.4.12-13), but 
before it is apparent whether the army would follow Cyrus, Menon speaks to his own 
troops. The narrator does not reveal why Menon speaks but, as Menon presents it in 
his speech, his aim is to obtain his men benefits from Cyrus and his motivation is to 
provide for his troops.  
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 Menon says that, if his men obey him, without suffering any danger or 
having to do any work, Cyrus will prefer them in honour (πξνηηκήζεζζε) to the other 
troops. He explains that his men should proceed while the other troops are still 
deciding. If the other troops follow them, Menon‟s troops will get the credit for 
going on first and Cyrus will be grateful and will repay them. If the other troops do 
not follow, all the Greeks will go back together but Cyrus will reward Menon‟s 
troops because they were the only obedient ones, and will employ them as garrison 
commanders and captains. Menon also says that his men will get whatever else they 
may want (ἄιινπ νὗηηλνο ἂλ δέεζζε) because of their friendship.  
 It is unclear to what extent the soldiers are already inclined towards 
following Cyrus but Menon seems to need to overcome some hesitation. He appeals 
to the men‟s desire to gain and to do so without putting in effort, without needing to 
fear and without risking anything. He may also be trying to evoke feelings of rivalry 
with the other troops. Menon specifies particular honours the men will receive but is 
also vague about the extent of what Cyrus could offer, which may encourage the 
men to let their imaginations run wild. Menon presents himself as someone who has 
spotted an opportunity for his men to gain without risk, and as someone who puts his 
men‟s interests first. He projects himself as knowing what the men want, and as 
knowing how Cyrus will react. The narrator says that the soldiers are persuaded by 
Menon‟s speech and follow his plan (1.4.16). Thus, Menon has anticipated their 
desires and motivations correctly. Cyrus is delighted (ἥζζε), as Menon anticipated. 
He commends the soldiers and promises them recompense in the future, while he 
rewards Menon with magnificent gifts immediately (1.4.16-17).  
Clearchus’ Appeal to Τιμή (2.1.16-17) 
After the death of the generals, heralds from the king and Tissaphernes have come to 
tell the Greek generals that they should give up their arms and go to the king. 
Leading this group is the Greek Phalinus who is now working for Tissaphernes. He 
says that the king believes himself victorious in the battle and so orders the Greeks to 
hand over their arms, go to his court and find whatever favour they can. The Greeks 
become angry and Clearchus says that victors do not hand over their arms. He tells 
the other generals to give the best and most honourable answer while he is away 
examining the vitals from a sacrifice. Cleanor, Proxenus and Theopompus/ 
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Xenophon (depending on the manuscript tradition) all tell Phalinus that they will not 
do as the king is asking, but the narrator reveals that some other generals offer their 
services to the king. When Clearchus returns, Phalinus says that the generals have 
given different answers, and he asks for Clearchus‟ opinion (2.1.7-23). The narrator 
reveals Clearchus‟ aims and motives after the speech. Clearchus wanted to give 
Phalinus a lead (ὑπήγεην) so that he would tell the Greeks not to surrender to the 
king, which would make the Greeks more hopeful (εὐέιπηδεο κᾶιινλ, 2.1.18).  
 Clearchus argues that, as a fellow-Greek, Phalinus should advise the 
Cyreans on what they should do. He reminds Phalinus, with an appeal to the gods as 
witnesses, that the advice he offers will be reported in Greece and has the capacity to 
bring Phalinus honour (ηηκὴλ) in the future when people talk about it. Clearchus is 
trying to persuade Phalinus to neglect his employer‟s orders, benefit his employer‟s 
enemies and perhaps even lie about his opinion. As incentives, Clearchus appeals to 
a desire for a positive reputation in Greece, and the fear of shame at being spoken 
badly of. He also tries to evoke feelings of kinship. Clearchus presents himself as 
being loyal to his compatriots over the Persians, as believing that one should do right 
in the eyes of gods and men, and as being concerned with Phalinus‟ reputation in 
Greece. He also presents himself as being grateful for the advice that Phalinus will 
give. 
 The narrator reveals that Phalinus‟ response went against Clearchus‟ 
expectation (παξὰ ηὴλ δόμαλ) and that Phalinus eluded (ὑπνζηξέςαο) Clearchus 
(2.1.18). Phalinus‟ response is carefully worded to present himself as being willing 
to advise the Greeks according to their interests but still informing them that they 
should surrender, as per the instructions from his employer (2.1.19). Clearchus has 
failed to read what Phalinus is likely to be driven by, despite the fact that they have 
both chosen to work in the interests of a Persian over Greeks.  
Xenophon’s Appeal to Τιμή (3.1.37) 
After Proxenus‟ captains have gathered the remaining generals, lieutenant-generals 
and captains, Xenophon speaks to them. As we have seen, they are most likely 
perplexed (ἀπνξίᾳ), dispirited (ἀζύκσο), feeling grief (ιύπεο), and yearning (πόζνπ) 
for home and family, along with the rest of the army (3.1.2-3). One of Proxenus‟ 
captains introduces Xenophon‟s speech by saying that the meeting has been called so 
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that the leaders can take counsel as to whether they can do anything positive, and he 
asks Xenophon to repeat what he said to Proxenus‟ captains (3.1.34). Xenophon‟s 
aim is to encourage the leaders to take action, and he is motivated by the fear that 
they will all surely suffer if the army does not form a plan.   
 One of Xenophon‟s arguments in this speech is to explain why the leaders 
should plan and work hard on the soldiers‟ behalf; it is proper (δίθαηόλ) that they 
should surpass the soldiers in wartime because in peacetime they received more pay 
and honour (ηηκαῖο) than the soldiers did (3.1.37). The leaders have received honours 
in advance with the expectation that they will reciprocate these by benefitting 
(ὠθει῅ζαη) those they are responsible for whenever needed.219 Xenophon then 
proceeds to explain what actions he thinks the army should take. Xenophon needs to 
overcome the leaders‟ feelings of fear and depression, and provide them with a good 
reason to act. He thus evokes the leaders‟ shame that they are not acting as their 
societies demand. Xenophon appeals to the leaders‟ own attitude towards honour 
rather than their desire to achieve it. They have a duty, which Xenophon has to 
remind them of, and he is appealing to the justness of reciprocating honours. 
Xenophon presents himself as knowing what a leader‟s duty is, what constitutes right 
behaviour and how reciprocity should work. The leaders do not reply and so we 
cannot tell whether they were persuaded by Xenophon‟s words about honour. 
Cheirisophus, who appears to be presiding over this meeting, praises Xenophon and 
says that he would be glad to have others like him (3.1.45), although he also does not 
specifically mention Xenophon‟s words about honour.   
Xenophon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (3.2.25-6) 
Shortly after, the leaders address the assembly, and we have already seen that in his 
speech, Xenophon deceives about the cavalry and recommends that those who want 
profit should face the enemy. He also says that if the Greeks remain in Persia, he 
fears that they will learn to live in idleness and luxury and consort with the women 
there, forgetting that they want to return home, like Lotus-Eaters.
220
 Xenophon says 
that he thinks that it is fitting (εἰθὸο) and right (δίθαηνλ) that the men should 
prioritise returning to their families in Greece. He suggests that when they do return 
                                                             
219
 Scholars often link Xenophon’s sentiments here with Sarpedon’s arguments for why he and 
Glaucus should lead their men in battle at Iliad 12.310-21 (see, for example, Dillery, 2001, 230). 
220 The reference is to Odyssey 9.82-104.  
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home, they should tell the Greeks that it is their choice to be poor because they could 
bring those who have a harsh life in Greece to Persia and they would enjoy riches 
(πινπζίνπο) there. Xenophon is not suggesting that the soldiers are actually planning 
to remain in Persia or should relocate their families there, but affirming the army‟s 
attitude and aims.
221
 Xenophon seems to anticipate that the soldiers may begin to 
want riches in preference to home, rather than riches to take home, and attempts to 
combat this. This is thus an appeal to θέξδνο the army should not try to obtain.  
 Xenophon recalls the Greek approach to life and the army‟s desire for this 
life; a poor life in Greece, accompanied by hard work but also freedom and family, is 
preferable to the possessions the Greeks could gain by living idle in Persia under a 
king. Xenophon reaffirms that the army was not aiming for such long-term riches. 
Xenophon appeals to the men‟s desire for home and family, as well as pride in the 
Greek way of life, and evokes contempt of the Persians for their luxurious life-style. 
Xenophon may also be trying to evoke shame in the men at the thought that they 
may choose not to act rightly, since he presents returning home as the just and noble 
course. In relating the soldiers to the men on Odysseus‟ mission, Xenophon may also 
be evoking feelings of pride at taking part in a comparable mission. He may also 
evoke pride by presenting the soldiers as messengers who can report in Greece that 
they overcame the temptation to live idly.  
Xenophon presents himself as being able to anticipate how the army will 
respond when faced with the temptations of Persia, and afraid of what will happen 
because of it. He also represents himself as being wise in recognising that it would 
not be beneficial or right for the army to chase long-term riches. He appears as 
someone who values Greece, home, and the Greek way of life, over ease, luxury and 
the fulfilment of desires. He may also be presenting himself as an Odysseus figure, 
who recognises the danger facing the soldiers. The army votes in agreement with the 
measures Xenophon recommends in the rest of his speech (3.2.33), although there is 
no indication that his reference to the Lotus- Eaters had any particular effect.  
 
                                                             
221
 Ruderman (1992, 139-40) seems to misinterpret Xenophon’s aims here and believes that 
Xenophon is recommending bringing Greeks to Persia. Ruderman thus interprets Xenophon as being 
“willing to give a place to love of gain in his political regime”.  
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Xenophon’s Appeal to Τιμή (5.6.30-1) 
During the speech in which Xenophon defends himself over his sacrifices regarding 
settling the army down, where he says he would have tried to get the soldiers a city if 
it had seemed that they needed to obtain profit to take home, Xenophon also directly 
appeals to ηηκή. Xenophon says that he renounces his plan to found a settlement 
partly because he thinks that if the army remains together, it will be held in honour 
(ἔληηκνη) and will be able to get provisions, whereas if the army splits up, it will not 
be able to find food and will likely be harmed.
222
 The army is divided over the issue 
of whether to settle, and Xenophon needs to restore faith in himself and unite the 
army‟s aims. He appeals to the soldiers‟ goodwill when he presents himself as 
putting their interests first and as being concerned with their ηηκή and obtaining 
provisions for them. He further attempts to arouse the army‟s desire to be well 
regarded, as well as the fear that they may not be. He also appeals to the men‟s fear 
that they will be unable to obtain food and will suffer harm if they split up. As he 
presents the situation, it would be disadvantageous to their safety, well-being and 
success to separate. Xenophon represents himself as knowing what is best for the 
army and as being able to foresee the issues they will have with others and with 
obtaining provisions. He presents himself as putting his own ηηκή aside for the 
army‟s collective ηηκή. As we saw, the army vote in favour of his proposals.  
 Xenophon’s Appeal to Τιμή (6.3.18) 
When the men are proceeding in three separate groups and Xenophon hears about 
the Arcadian and Achaean division being in trouble, he calls a meeting of his troops 
(6.3.10-11). There is no indication of the troops‟ frame of mind and the narrator does 
not reveal before Xenophon‟s speech why Xenophon called the meeting or what his 
aim is. Xenophon‟s own words make the reader think that Xenophon‟s motive is 
concern for his own troops. Xenophon claims to believe that the enemy have become 
more confident and so his men need the help of the Arcadians and Achaeans in 
facing this threat. He thus seems to aim to get his men to want to save the Arcadians 
and Achaeans.  
                                                             
222 See also 5.6.13 for Xenophon discussing the necessity of the army having larger numbers than 
opponents. 
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As part of his argument, Xenophon claims that the gods might be punishing 
the Achaeans and Arcadians because they boasted and might be about to put 
Xenophon‟s men in a place of higher honour (ἐληηκνηέξνπο) because his men always 
begin (ἀξρνκέλνπο) with the gods. As he presents it, their own positive actions have 
provided them with the desirable reward of honour from the gods. This is less an 
appeal to gaining honour and more the use of honour that they have already gained 
to motivate them. Xenophon needs to overcome the fact that the soldiers may be 
disinclined to put themselves in danger on behalf of the Arcadians and Achaeans 
because this group deliberately split from them. Xenophon appeals to the men‟s 
confidence that they have acted rightly and consequently will be able to save their 
comrades, and that this will be advantageous to them. Xenophon might also be 
appealing to the men‟s goodwill because he has ensured that they are earning honour 
from the gods by acting in the right way. Xenophon is presenting himself as 
understanding how the gods view both his troops and the Arcadian and Achaean 
division, and as understanding what constitutes behaviour that the gods would find 
acceptable and unacceptable. No verbal response is indicated but the men follow 
Xenophon‟s commands. 
Xenophon’s Appeal to Τιμή (6.6.16) 
Xenophon speaks at a meeting to discuss what to do about Cleander‟s demand that 
the army hands over to him certain people who were involved in a particular 
incident. Cleander is angry with the army after becoming frightened of the army‟s 
violent actions, and he threatens to make a proclamation prohibiting any city from 
receiving the Cyreans (6.6.5-9). The narrator has said that the Greeks thought the 
matter grievous (πνλεξὸλ) and that they begged Cleander not to do as he threatened 
(6.6.10). The commanders are at a loss (ἀπνξία) and call a meeting of the army. The 
narrator reveals that some people think that Cleander is of little account, but that the 
situation did not seem slight (θαῦινλ) to Xenophon (6.6.11). It becomes clear from 
Xenophon‟s speech that he aims to get the army to do as Cleander wishes because 
this will provide the best chance of getting back to Greece.  
Xenophon describes the negative repercussions of what may happen if 
Cleander carries out his threat, and thus indicates why it will be advantageous to the 
army to comply with Cleander‟s request. He ends his speech by saying that the army 
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would take it hard if instead of receiving praise (ἐπαίλνπ) and honour (ηηκ῅ο) in 
Greece, the army was not even equal with other Greeks and not allowed into their 
cities. Xenophon is trying to change the men‟s opinion about Cleander and make 
them take the situation seriously. Thus, he links the situation to their long-term aims, 
appealing to the men‟s fear at losing their homecoming and not receiving the 
expected reception.
223
 He also appeals to the fear of shame at not being praised and 
honoured but being treated as enemies by their compatriots. Xenophon presents 
himself as having foresight and as understanding the repercussions that their actions 
would have. He also represents himself as knowing the men‟s ultimate goal, as well 
as what they hope for. There is no confirmation that the men were motivated by 
Xenophon‟s appeal to the ηηκή they might not obtain, but overall the appeal is 
successful. Agasias swears that no one influenced his actions and that he will put 
himself in Cleander‟s hands (6.6.17-18). 
Reader Involvement 
These speeches have several different ways of engaging the reader. In the case of 
Menon‟s and Clearchus‟ speeches, the reader may suspect the wisdom of what both 
speakers are trying to achieve. In Menon‟s case, the reader may wonder how the 
other troops will react to Menon‟s troops separating themselves off so clearly. In 
Clearchus‟ case, the reader may question whether it is best for the army to fight 
against the king, as Clearchus wants. Further suspense may arise over what Phalinus 
will advise. In Xenophon‟s speeches at 3.1.37 and 3.2.25-6, the involvement of the 
reader comes from making the connection with two passages from Homer, and 
judging Xenophon‟s words in light of these. In the case of the Lotus-Eaters appeal, 
the reader may be suspicious as to whether the mercenaries would actually prefer a 
poor life in Greece full of hard work to luxury and ease. The reader may also 
remember the fate of Odysseus‟ men and be concerned that Xenophon‟s soldiers 
may similarly all be lost on their return home. Regarding Xenophon‟s speech at 
5.6.30-1, tension comes from whether Xenophon will be able to defend himself and 
whether the reader should trust what Xenophon says when he is trying to defend 
himself. Xenophon‟s speeches at 6.3.18 and 6.6.16, come while the army is facing a 
                                                             
223 The Cyreans may hope to gain τιμι in the form of more important roles in their communities, 
more support for any attempt at obtaining such roles, preferential treatment, or even more formal 
commemorations. 
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dangerous situation, and there is tension in seeing whether Xenophon can use his 
appeals to overcome these.  
Characterisation 
Menon presents himself as having selfless motives, but the picture that the narrator 
subsequently paints of Menon indicates that this is a façade. In Menon‟s obituary, 
the narrator indicates that Menon is primarily concerned for his own interests and 
that he benefits his men because this will further his desires. The narrator says that 
Menon wants honour in order to fulfil his eagerness for enormous wealth 
(ἐπηζπκῶλ…πινπηεῖλ ἰζρπξῶο, 2.6.21), and that he helped his men in their 
wrongdoing in order to get them to honour him (2.6.27).
224
 In retrospect, it thus 
seems likely that through his speech, Menon was attempting to gain more honour 
from his soldiers as well as winning himself a better position with Cyrus, perhaps 
because Clearchus has just acted well for Cyrus by ending the mutiny.
225
 The 
narrator also suggests that Menon was conspiring with the Persians (see 2.2.1, for 
example), and perhaps he began this when Cyrus began to favour Clearchus. As Roy 
(2004, 278-9) highlights, it is only Menon who actually receives any rewards from 
Cyrus in this episode. Perhaps Menon recognised that this would be the case and was 
only concerned with thoughts of his own gain. The reader may judge that Menon‟s 
loyalty is primarily to himself, in which case he has a selfish motive for appealing to 
his men‟s desire for honour and for feigning loyalty to Cyrus.226  
Menon feeds rather than controls his men‟s desires, for his own gain. We saw 
that Clearchus and the narrator claim that it was shame at betraying someone to 
whom loyalty is owed that made the troops continue with Cyrus, but Menon‟s 
speech demonstrates that his men are motivated by thoughts of the honours they 
                                                             
224 Compare Proxenus, who also wanted honour and profit, but only if he could gain them justly 
(2.6.18). At Cyropaedia 2.2.25, Cyrus says that those who are shameless for advantage are 
particularly bad people to have in an army because they lead others to wicked behaviour by 
demonstrating that bad behaviour can lead to gain.   
225 Buzzetti (2014, 49) directly links Menon’s actions here to Clearchus’ at Tarsus, because, similar to 
Clearchus, Menon chooses Cyrus over the Greek army, although, as Menon presents it, not over his 
own men. Buzzetti argues that Menon’s decision to do this was worse, because it caused discord 
within the troops. 
226 See also Kelly (1977, 44-5) who argues that Menon works for his own interests, and that he 
“sacrifices the common good” for this. Buzzetti (2008, 10) argues that Menon has his and his men’s 
interests above “the common safety” and that he “jeopardizes not only these soldiers’ well-being 
but even his own”.  
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could win. Thus, they are characterised as being motivated more selfishly than the 
other troops. Because of Cyrus‟ death, Menon‟s troops do not get to find out whether 
Cyrus would actually have given them the honour Menon said Cyrus would. Menon 
himself is only making an assumption rather than knowing that Cyrus would reward 
them. In comparing Menon‟s self-presentation and the reality of his actions, the 
reader knows that the loyalty seemingly demonstrated towards Cyrus in Menon‟s 
actions is false because the reader has heard Menon‟s words.227 
Even though the narrator says that Clearchus wanted to give the Greeks heart 
to go on, which seems positive, the reader may question whether Clearchus only 
wants the men to continue because he wants to remain on the march and leading an 
army. Thus, again, Clearchus may appear selfish. It is unclear whether Phalinus 
would indeed have been honoured in Greece, particularly because he has chosen to 
work for the Persians, and so we cannot tell whether Clearchus‟ words are accurate. 
However, the narrator demonstrates that Clearchus‟ self-presentation does not match 
reality. Clearchus faced the same dilemma as Phalinus of whether to prefer Greek or 
Persian honour. Clearchus advises Phalinus to prioritise the Greek honour, but the 
reader knows that Clearchus chose to hedge his bets between the two, while only 
pretending to prefer honour from the Greeks, just as Phalinus ends up doing. Thus, 
this speech reminds the reader of Clearchus‟ poor attitude towards reciprocating 
ηηκή.  
The narrator does not indicate that Xenophon is speaking for any reason other 
than the army‟s interests, although he may also be concerned about his own 
reputation when defending himself over his desire to settle the army. The leaders that 
Xenophon addresses presumably recognise that Xenophon is truthfully representing 
their relationship with their troops. Thus, Xenophon‟s words match reality. When he 
talks about the gains that the Greeks could make in Persia, this is hypothetical, and 
Xenophon is not promising his audience anything. His words suggesting that if the 
troops stick together, they will be held in honour do not specifically come true, 
because we do not see any particular honour given to the army. However, they are 
able to find provisions, and the negative repercussions Xenophon envisages do not 
come true. When Xenophon says that the gods honour his troops and may do so 
                                                             
227 Menon has been sent by Aristippus to command his troops, rather than being directly employed 
by Cyrus and so Menon does not necessarily have much direct loyalty to Cyrus. 
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again, this is proved correct when they are able to save the Arcadians and Achaeans. 
Xenophon‟s claim that the soldiers will not receive honour and praise in Greece is 
not put to the test. However, Cleander‟s threat does make this seem a likely 
repercussion.  
In contrast to Menon and Clearchus, the narrator does not undercut 
Xenophon‟s representation of himself and instead demonstrates that Xenophon‟s 
words and actions match. Regarding his speech about leaders repaying the honour 
shown to them, Xenophon himself is scrupulous in repaying the honour that others 
show him, particularly when he persuades Seuthes to pay the soldiers. His repeated 
putting of the army first demonstrates that he knows what a leader‟s duty is. In terms 
of Xenophon‟s speech referencing the Lotus-Eaters, Xenophon himself is the person 
who prioritises returning to Greece the most and endeavours to get the men back 
there, and so he matches his self-presentation with his actions and provides an 
example to the rest of the army. Xenophon again matches his words about how the 
army should stay together in order that they receive honour by elsewhere acting on a 
concern with the army‟s well-being. For example, when sacrifices do not permit the 
army advancing, Xenophon refuses to lead the army out. This proves to be the right 
decision because Neon leads the men out and his group is attacked (6.4.13-6.5.2). 
When the army does split into three later, the Arcadians and Achaeans are harmed 
(6.3.2ff.). Thus, Xenophon‟s words about strength in numbers appear to be true, and 
demonstrate that Xenophon is able to foresee issues that may arise. Again, regarding 
Xenophon‟s mention of the ηηκή that the army have earned from the gods through 
their good behaviour, Xenophon matches his words and actions because the reader 
sees him repeatedly consulting and thanking the gods.
228
 The men also do not 
disagree with Xenophon‟s claim that he ensures that they begin with the gods, 
suggesting the truth of his statement that he ensured they acted rightly. Xenophon 
matches his words about the possibility that the army may not receive ηηκή at home 
to his actions by repeatedly showing concern as to how the army‟s actions will affect 
relations with the Spartans, especially when he turns down the sole command. From 
these examples, it is clear that Xenophon is trustworthy and versatile in his appeals, 
and that he consistently works in the army‟s interests.  
                                                             
228 See 3.2.9, 4.3.13, 5.6.16, 6.1.22, 6.4.9ff., 7.8.10 and 7.8.20. 
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Didactic Function 
Menon and Xenophon represent successful persuasion attempts using appeals to ηηκή 
and θέξδνο, but again, only Xenophon should be emulated. After Menon‟s men act, 
Cyrus advances and the rest of the army follows (1.4.17). In the short term, Menon 
has benefitted Cyrus by ensuring that his expedition can continue, has benefitted his 
men by winning them promises of future gain, and has benefitted himself by 
obtaining gifts. In the long term, continuing the mission brings trouble to them all. 
Even though Menon is successful in his persuasion attempt, he does not achieve 
anything for the soldiers other than a promise that is never fulfilled, and the trials 
that they experience after Cyrus‟ death. In fact, Roisman (1985-8, 33 and 38-9) 
argues that Menon‟s actions “isolated” his contingent from the others and that 
Clearchus was more favoured as a result. Buzzetti (2014, 49) even argues that the 
episode where Clearchus clashes with Menon‟s men stems from Menon separating 
his troops from the rest of the army.  
 Menon is one of the generals killed by the Persians, but instead of being 
killed immediately like the others, the narrator reveals in Menon‟s obituary that he 
was tortured for a year, the death of a rogue (πνλεξὸο, 2.6.29). The narrator 
mentions Menon‟s comeuppance after the extensive criticism of Menon‟s behaviour 
and attitude, including his approach to ηηκή and θέξδνο. Clearly, Menon‟s attitude to 
honour and profit was particularly corrupt and he is a negative paradigm generally as 
well as in how to use these concepts as part of an appeal.
229
 The account of Menon 
demonstrates that it is imperative that a good leader combines a positive moral 
attitude with the ability to persuade others.  
Clearchus‟ failed appeal is striking, because he is unable to anticipate how 
someone who, like him, faced a choice between Persians and Greeks will respond. 
The reader may question whether Clearchus‟ appeal to honour was ever likely to 
succeed, because Phalinus appears to have no use for honour from Greece. 
Clearchus‟ judgement as to how best to persuade is questionable here. After the 
exchange, Clearchus tells Phalinus to take back the message that if the Cyreans 
become friends with the king, they would be better friends if they kept their arms, 
                                                             
229 C.f. Memorabilia 2.6.24-5. Socrates says that bad leaders want positions in order to embezzle and 
hurt others and to live in luxury. 
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and if they went to war with him, they would also do better if they kept their arms 
(2.1.20). Phalinus questions Clearchus further on the army‟s intentions, and 
Clearchus gives non-committal answers (2.1.21-3). Because he did not succeed in his 
persuasion attempt, Clearchus has not harmed himself or the Cyreans with his words, 
and it is perhaps actually a benefit that Phalinus did not recommend fighting the king 
directly. However, Clearchus has not extricated the army from their dangerous 
situation. We have already seen that Clearchus‟ selfish attitude to honour leads to his 
comeuppance, and this speech is another example of Clearchus using references to 
honour to try to manipulate others for his own benefit.  
That a leader should not appeal to the desire for honour and profit in others 
for selfish reasons but should only appeal to these concepts when it is good for those 
he is responsible for, can be seen by comparing the benefits Xenophon‟s speeches 
bring and the way he ends in the work. The outcomes from Xenophon‟s speeches are 
variously beneficial. After he speaks to the leaders following Tissaphernes‟ 
treachery, new leaders are chosen (3.1.45-7) and an assembly is called (3.2.1). 
Xenophon has initiated the formation of a plan and so he clearly brings benefit to the 
army and himself with his appeal in both the short and long term. After his speech to 
the army encouraging them to prioritise home over gains, Xenophon speaks further 
on what he believes the army should do (3.2.34-9) and they follow his 
recommendations. No specific benefit occurs because of this particular appeal, but 
the speech sets in motion the plan that the army begins to implement. After his 
speech in which he renounces his idea to settle the army, the whole army follows one 
plan again and does not split up. Again, this is a benefit in the short term, although 
his message is forgotten by the time the army splits into three and so may not have a 
long-term effect. After his speech regarding helping the Arcadians and Achaeans, 
Xenophon‟s division scare away the enemy and they are reunited with their 
comrades (6.3.15-26). Through his appeal, Xenophon brings benefit to the Arcadians 
and Achaeans by saving them, aids his men and himself by ensuring that they do not 
have to face the enemy alone, and benefits the whole army and himself longer-term 
by reuniting these two groups. After Xenophon‟s speech regarding Cleander, the 
army cooperates with Cleander and allows him to investigate the matter until the 
army becomes friends with him (6.6.19-37). Xenophon benefits himself and the 
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army in the short and long term by heading off the possibility that they will offend 
Cleander and not be able to enter the Greek cities.  
 Some of Xenophon‟s particular appeals have parallel elsewhere, which may 
suggest to the reader the righteousness of Xenophon‟s methods. Both the internal 
audience and the reader may be meant to recognise the correspondence of attitudes 
between Xenophon‟s and Sarpedon‟s appeals to the leaders of the army about their 
duty.
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 Homer‟s authority may confirm that Xenophon‟s attitude and use of this 
appeal are apt.
231
 It is necessary at this point in time that Xenophon the character 
appeals to an attitude which has external verification because he has no experience 
or rank to use as a basis for persuasion yet. The sentiments on the negative effects of 
idleness and luxury that Xenophon expresses in his speech referring to the Lotus-
Eaters are reflected more widely in Greek literature.
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 Xenophon the character‟s 
appeal may thus be drawing on a particular warning that would be familiar to his 
internal audience and readers, and which they would understand as being right.
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Xenophon‟s insistence that consulting the gods and praying to them is a vital part of 
a leader‟s role is also found in the Hipparchicus (1.1-2, 3.1, 5.14, and 9.7-9), 
indicating how such an attitude should be held by an ideal leader. His argument that 
boasters are punished by the gods finds parallel in Odysseus‟ punishment from the 
gods for boasting to Polyphemus (Odyssey 9.500-35). Regarding Xenophon‟s 
concerns that the army will lose honour if they split up, at Cyropaedia 8.7.9-24, 
Cyrus anticipates that his sons will fight over his throne, and he makes arguments 
concerning potentially losing ηηκή if they act in this way. Clearly, good leaders will 
try to use arguments about losing honour to persuade others to act in ways beneficial 
to themselves.  
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 C.f. also a similar attitude presented by Socrates at Memorabilia 2.7.14. For the importance of 
reciprocating honour from others as a leader, see Cyropaedia 5.1.29 and Hellenica 3.4.9.  
231 Some scholars, such as Domingo Gygax (2009, 173-4 and 184), see reciprocal relationships as 
obtaining closure when each party gives once, because the second gift cancels out the first. Other 
scholars, such as Rubinstein (2013), emphasize the continuous and complex nature of reciprocal 
relationships. Xenophon’s work appears to corroborate the second interpretation, particularly in 
terms of leaders continuously doing their duty to the soldiers.  
232 See Isocrates 2.2 and Herodotus 9.122. Waterfield (2006, 231) also makes the connection 
between these passages on “environmental determinism”, and further connects Aristotle Politica 
1327b, Aeschylus Supplices 497-8 and Pseudo- Hippocrates De Aëre Aquis et Locis 16. Gray (2011b) 
also connects Cyropaedia 7.5.75. 
233 C.f. Agesilaus 2.16, where Agesilaus chooses to return home and be ruled rather than to have 
supreme power in Asia. 
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It is evident that Xenophon‟s references to honour and profit are 
commendable and instructive. Using the concepts of honour and profit as part of his 
arguments, Xenophon encourages his audiences to save themselves, desire the right 
things, act well and be safe. When Xenophon makes his appeals, the army is 
involved in dangerous situations, which he helps to deliver it from. 
Recalling How the Army and Others Acted in Relation to Τιμή and Κέρδος 
Cleanor (3.2.4-6) and Xenophon (5.4.19-21, 5.7.13-33 and 5.8.13-26) use how others 
acted in relation to honour and profit as negative examples.  
Cleanor’s Appeal to Τιμή (3.2.4-6) 
At the assembly of the army after the Greek generals have been killed, Cleanor 
speaks after Cheirisophus and before Xenophon. Cleanor is speaking as part of 
Xenophon‟s recommendation that the leaders should encourage the soldiers, make 
them more cheerful and motivate their goodness, in order to make them more 
confident and successful (3.1.39-44). Cleanor dwells on the perjury, impiety and 
faithlessness of the Persian leaders, and the punishment they will receive because of 
this. He claims to be particularly appalled that Ariaeus feels no shame at joining 
Cyrus‟ enemies after Cyrus‟ death, and is trying to harm Cyrus‟ friends, even though 
Cyrus honoured him most highly (ηηκώκελνο κάιηζηα) when he was alive. Cleanor‟s 
objection here is with Ariaeus not continuing to provide honour or respect 
(αἰδεζζείο) in return for the honours given by Cyrus, even though Cyrus has died. As 
Cleanor represents it, reciprocating ηηκή goes beyond death.  
Cleanor is using this representation of Ariaeus‟ poor attitude to make the 
soldiers confident that the Persians have acted so unjustly that they will be punished 
by the gods, while the Greeks, who maintained their friendships and oaths will easily 
be successful. Cleanor may be trying to evoke contempt or hatred of the Persians in 
general for their actions. He may further be warning the Cyreans to ensure that they 
continue to act well in their friendships and in respect to ηηκή. Cleanor represents 
himself as being appalled at the behaviour of others in not reciprocating friendship or 
honours and as having faith in the gods that they will avenge such behaviour. Thus, 
he presents himself as having the right attitude to these moral concepts. No response 
from the men is indicated but Xenophon the character says that he trusts that 
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Cleanor‟s message is understood by all (3.2.8), seemingly endorsing Cleanor‟s point. 
The narrator does not indicate how the men respond to this endorsement either. 
Xenophon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (5.4.19-21)  
With three different speeches, Xenophon restores three situations by referring to 
others‟ attitudes and actions towards making selfish profit. In the first example, 
certain Greek soldiers have followed their Mossynoecian allies to attack an enemy 
citadel without orders from the Greek generals, because they seek plunder (ἁξπαγ῅ο 
ἕλεθελ). Some are killed and others flee. The narrator states that the other Greeks are 
very angry (κάια ἤρζνλην) because the Cyreans had not fled at any point before and 
because the enemy had been made bolder (5.4.16-18). The narrator indicates that 
Xenophon called the Greeks together and spoke to them. It is not stated, but the 
reader might presume that Xenophon aims to calm the men and encourage them 
again, for their safety.  
Xenophon describes what good has come from the situation and tells the 
Greeks not to lose heart (κεδὲλ ἀζπκήζεηε). They can be confident that their allies 
are indeed enemies of the people in the citadel and that the plunderers will not leave 
their lines so easily next time. He urges the Greeks to prove to their allies that they 
are better men (θξείηηνπο) than the plunderers and to show the enemy that they are 
not as disordered (ἀηάθηνηο) as those that went after plunder. Xenophon has both 
made an example of the plunderers by condemning them and tried to use their 
actions to evoke calmness in the men by making them think about the advantages of 
the situation. He attempts to evoke confidence in the allies and the future behaviour 
of the plunderers, as well as a spirit of competition in trying to outdo the plunderers, 
and contempt of the plunderers in describing how disordered they were. Xenophon 
presents himself as understanding why the men are angry but as wisely being able to 
look beyond this to see how the army can benefit from the situation. He presents 
himself as having faith that the Greeks who did not seek plunder can better their 
colleagues. The Greeks do not respond at the time. 
Xenophon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (5.7.13-33)  
Xenophon gives a speech defending himself to the army against Neon‟s accusation 
that Xenophon was trying to deceive the men into going to the Phasis in the wake of 
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Timasion‟s and Thorax‟s attempts to lead the army back home (5.7.1-12). At the end 
of this speech, Xenophon says that the men should listen to his description of what 
he sees growing in the army. If it progresses as it is doing, he says, they need to take 
counsel on their own behalf so that they do not seem most wicked and shameful. The 
narrator says that the men wonder (ἐζαύκαζάλ) what this could be and ask 
Xenophon to continue (5.7.13). The narrator does not reveal Xenophon‟s aim or 
motive here, but Xenophon the character presents his aim as being to prevent the 
army destroying its reputation and ability to return home. Yet the reader may wonder 
if Xenophon is simply trying to distract the men further from accusing him.   
 Xenophon describes how Clearetus the captain arranged with his 
messmates to plunder (πνξζήζσλ) a stronghold friendly to the Cerasuntians and 
escape from the army with their gains. When the plan backfires, according to 
Xenophon, those plunderers who survive cause havoc in the army. They attack 
ambassadors who are preparing to report the incident, and encourage others in this 
until the ambassadors are killed. When the Cerasuntians report the incident to the 
generals, the soldiers suddenly rush in and seem to be about to throw stones, 
although many, Xenophon claims, do not even know why they are doing this. One 
who does claim to know says that the market-clerk had treated them very badly. The 
market-clerk is attacked, and several Cerasuntians and Greeks drown.  
 Xenophon dwells on the repercussions of Clearetus‟ selfish desire for 
money. Firstly, the army is perceived badly by outsiders and there are catastrophic 
effects on the relations of the army with others. He also says that if the market-clerk 
was guilty, then he has escaped punishment, while if he was innocent, he has 
departed in fear of the army. Because of their actions, the army cannot safely go to 
Cerasus, and the Greeks are unable to bury their own dead. If the soldiers approve of 
such deeds, they will not be able to offer sacrifices to the gods because of their 
sacrilegious (ἀζεβ῅) actions. The army will also be unable to fight its enemies 
because the men will be too busy killing each other, and friendly cities will not 
receive the army or provide a market. Finally, the soldiers would not receive the 
praise they wanted from those in Greece. Xenophon says that the soldiers themselves 
would judge other people who acted like this to be rogues (πνλεξνὺο). Xenophon 
also dwells on the dangers of the men following corrupt leaders like Clearetus who 
are only concerned for their own gain. He says that, under such leaders, ambassadors 
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will not be allowed to speak to the men, the commanders will be unworthy and the 
general will be able to make those willing to obey him kill anyone without a trial.  
 Xenophon makes an example out of those who acted selfishly by dwelling 
on the injustice, negative repercussions, and ignoble behaviour that can stem from a 
desire for gain, and how this can affect the whole army‟s aims and survival. 
Xenophon appeals to anger at the men who began this affair, shame in those who 
took part in the events, and fear at what the outcomes could be both short and long 
term. Xenophon presents himself as being concerned for the reputation and interests 
of the men. He also represents himself as finding selfish greed reprehensible, and the 
inciting of the army and the killing of innocents inexcusable. Xenophon also presents 
himself as having the foresight to see what problems these actions could cause and as 
being the opposite of the selfish leaders he describes. 
This speech evokes a strong reaction. The audience proposes that those who 
began the affair should be punished and that no one should be allowed to instigate 
lawlessness in the future. If they do so, they must face trail. The army also decides 
that anyone who has committed an offense since Cyrus‟ death must undergo trial, 
with the captains as jury, and the army is purified (5.7.34-5). The response focuses 
on future and past lawlessness and so the reader might assume that a desire to appear 
to act rightly in their own and in others‟ eyes, as well as their fear of appearing 
negatively, chiefly persuade the soldiers. Thus, Xenophon seems to have 
successfully demonstrated the dangers that can stem from selfish financial gain. The 
men clearly believe Xenophon‟s account of events.  
Xenophon’s Appeal to Κέρδος (5.8.13-26) 
We have seen that once Xenophon has defended himself against striking certain 
men, he gives a second speech. Xenophon is presumably trying to clear his name, 
although he has already successfully done this in his first speech on the subject. 
Xenophon admits that he hits, among others, those soldiers who wanted to 
enjoy plunder over the rest of the men (ἁξπάδεηλ ἤζεινλ θαὶ ὑκῶλ πιενλεθηεῖλ). He 
explains that this is because it is detrimental to discipline and, if everyone had tried 
to get such an advantage, it would have destroyed (ἀπσιόκεζα) the whole army. 
Xenophon claims that the army neither helped him punish these men nor stopped 
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him from punishing them, and that this allowed the selfish plunderers to act as they 
pleased. Xenophon singles out Boïscus as an example of someone who fought to 
avoid carrying a shield due to tiredness but stripped (ἀπνδέδπθελ) the dead when he 
had the opportunity. Xenophon says that the army should tie Boïscus up at night and 
let him loose by day.  
Xenophon is trying to change the army‟s perception of his actions and thus 
links them to a direct concern for the army‟s safety and success, explaining how they 
are just, advantageous and necessary. Xenophon appeals to the men‟s fears that the 
army could potentially have been ruined, and their gratitude towards him for acting 
to prevent this. He also appeals to the shame of those in the army who did not help 
him one way or the other, as well as evoking anger at Boïscus, whom Xenophon 
makes an example of. Xenophon presents himself as defending the discipline and 
well-being of the whole army by punishing those who threaten this, and thus as 
knowing what is beneficial for the army. He represents himself as being alone in his 
endeavours to punish those who have the potential to cause the army harm and as 
being aware of how individual soldiers act. In response, the soldiers recall the good 
things that Xenophon has done for them, but this does not confirm that they were 
persuaded that people who go after selfish gain should be punished. Xenophon is not 
charged for hitting such men, however, and so he seems to have anticipated that the 
army would judge that he had acted rightly concerning such people.  
Reader Involvement 
The reader engages with Cleanor‟s speech because of the tension arising from 
whether his arguments will motivate the soldiers enough to persuade them to try to 
extricate themselves from their dangerous situation. Xenophon‟s speech trying to 
calm the soldiers after some of their number go plundering causes tension for the 
reader in contemplating what the army will do in their anger, and how Xenophon 
will recover a potentially dangerous situation. Xenophon‟s speech recounting 
Clearetus‟ actions may cause the reader surprise because the narrator did not 
describe the incident at the time it occurred in the narrative. The description is also 
particularly dramatic and forewarns of danger. Regarding Xenophon‟s speech 
shaming Boïscus, the reader may feel tension over whether the army will believe 
Xenophon‟s claims or think that he is passing the blame onto Boïscus. 
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Characterisation 
Cleanor seems to want to be beneficial to the army. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the 
narrator undercuts Cleanor‟s presentation of himself. He is generally pious, honest, 
dedicated, and leads his men well,
234
 although he gives bad advice when trying to 
evoke fear in the other leaders. We also saw, however, that Cleanor accepted gifts 
from Seuthes (7.2.2). Cleanor does not repay these gifts because he does not lead the 
army to Seuthes, as Seuthes wanted. This is a striking lapse from Cleanor‟s attitude 
in the speech we examined, where even death should not stop a person from 
returning honour. This characterises Cleanor as not living up to his words and as 
being untrustworthy in representing his attitude. 
 Xenophon also seems to be motivated to ensure that the army acts well in 
the future, although this may be combined with thoughts of clearing his own name. 
Again, Xenophon‟s representation of himself matches his actions elsewhere. Firstly, 
he himself sets a good example of not striving for individual gain, as we have seen. 
The narrator also confirms that Xenophon understands the men‟s feelings, as he 
represents himself as doing when calming the soldiers after their fellows have sought 
plunder. For example, Xenophon dismounts from his horse because he recognises 
that the soldiers will follow more eagerly if he leads them on foot (7.3.45). 
Regarding the same speech, the narrator also confirms that Xenophon is wise in 
understanding how the men can benefit from a situation and as having foresight 
when, for example, he arranges for local roads to be repaired even though the men 
do not want to travel by land (5.1.14). The narrator also represents Xenophon as 
echoing the same concerns in this speech elsewhere. For example, Xenophon the 
character praises discipline and order and acts on a desire to maintain it (3.1.38, 
3.2.29 and 5.8.1-11).
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 As we have seen before, Xenophon is concerned for the 
army‟s interests and reputation (see also 6.5.24). Regarding the speeches at 5.7.13-33 
and 5.8.13-26, the reader might think that Xenophon is trying to shift the blame onto 
others. However, the narrator has confirmed that the Clearetus incident took place 
(5.7.2) and, because he says that some feared that the men would act in the same way 
as this again, Xenophon has a valid reason for mentioning it in the subsequent 
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 See 2.1.10, 4.8.18, 6.4.22, 7.1.40 and 7.5.10. 
235 See Oeconomicus 8.4 for the importance of an ordered army and De Re Equestri 3.6 for the 
problems of a disobedient army.  
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speech. Also, no one denies that Boïscus acts in the way Xenophon describes. 
Xenophon further claims that people have seen him punishing wrongdoers and done 
nothing, which no one objects to, and so this seems to confirm that Xenophon acts as 
he says. Indeed, the reader has already seen that Xenophon is concerned with the 
whole army punishing wrongdoers when he recommends that everyone in the army 
needs to be like Clearchus in punishing disobedience (3.2.31). Seemingly, only 
Xenophon has attempted to act on this. Through Xenophon‟s self-characterisation 
and the narrator‟s confirmation of this, Xenophon appears as a wise, selfless and 
concerned leader who speaks for the army‟s benefit and is the opposite of the selfish 
people he describes.   
Didactic Function 
From the comparison between Cleanor‟s and Xenophon‟s use of exempla, the reader 
learns that if a leader is going to criticise others, he must be able to act rightly in this 
respect himself. What Cleanor advocates is morally right,
236
 and he has a positive 
effect at the time. The men go on to prepare to face the Persians after Xenophon‟s 
subsequent speech. Simply by including Cleanor‟s speech before this, the narrator 
suggests that Cleanor has a positive impact on the morale of the men, and thus, that 
he benefitted the army and himself. By still being loyal to Cyrus‟ cause, the Greeks 
have acted well, and are perhaps encouraged to continue to honour any relationships 
they have or make. This may be why Cleanor does not appear to be punished for 
failing to live up his words, and why the internal characters do not appear to discover 
that Cleanor fails to act according to his words. The reader, however, learns that 
Cleanor cannot be entirely trusted to work for the men‟s interests, and that there is a 
danger in trusting a leader who has not been fully tested in such a situation. We saw 
that Xenophon twice refused Seuthes‟ gifts to him personally, and that these two 
occasions fell either side of the narrator revealing that Cleanor had accepted them. 
Clearly, Cleanor should not be emulated in his actions here. 
 By contrast, Xenophon himself should be emulated in how he attempts to use 
the concepts of honour and profit to teach lessons. On the day after his speech 
                                                             
236 Similar opinions can be seen elsewhere. C.f. Isocrates 1.1: base men only honour their friends 
while they are present, whereas the friendships of good men are not erased by time. See also 
Thucydides 3.39: Cleon argues that the Mytileneans had been held in the highest regard by the 
Athenians and so they should be punished firmly for their revolt. See also Aristotle Rhetorica 2.4, 
1381b.25-6. He claims that men like those who are fond of friends who have died. 
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regarding those who followed the Mossynoecians for their own gain, the army 
maintains order and discipline, are victorious, and are able to plunder the strongholds 
(5.4.22-6). By presenting Xenophon‟s speech just before the success, it appears that 
the speech has played a role in encouraging the men in their undertaking. Because 
Xenophon has both stopped the Greeks potentially acting on their anger and 
encouraged them on to victory, Xenophon has benefitted the army and himself. 
Xenophon‟s speech regarding Clearetus‟ actions benefits the army in the short term. 
The wrongdoers are punished, new laws are created, the generals undergo trial, and 
the army is purified. Xenophon is also able to clear his name, benefitting himself in 
the short term too, although he is further suspected later. The soldiers seem intent 
upon changing their way of acting for the future, which should benefit them long-
term, but they fail to act admirably in some later situations. After Xenophon‟s speech 
regarding hitting the men, no particular benefits are specified, although Xenophon 
clears his name. Given what he does for the soldiers, it may be to their benefit that 
they trust Xenophon again, although they do not feel positively towards him long-
term.  
In his creation of lessons for the army, Xenophon the character mirrors the 
narrator‟s creation of leadership exempla. Xenophon the character instructs the 
internal as well as external audience, teaching about the dangers of a desire for 
financial profit, the importance of order, discipline, safety, obedience, relations with 
outsiders, reputation, marshalling the army in the future and the army‟s own moral 
character.
237
 Given the repetition of incidences involving men going after their own 
private gain, it is clear that the desire cannot be overcome, although it can be 
controlled for the most part. Flower (2012, 200-1) argues that Xenophon the 
character never cures the army of its indiscipline and that the author presents us with 
                                                             
237 C.f. similar lessons by other leaders. At Cyropaedia 7.2.5-8, Cyrus teaches his men that obedience, 
teamwork and the protection of a community are more important than the quick profit they can 
make, and he ensures that people profit fairly through this lesson. At Cyropaedia 2.2.23-8, Cyrus 
recommends weeding out of the army those that are excessive (ςφοδροὶ) and shameless 
(ἀναίςχυντοι) in trying to gain an advantage (πλεονεκτεῖν). Ischomachus also releases those who are 
incurably greedy (ἀνθκζςτουσ πλεονζκτασ, Oeconomicus 14.8). At Hellenica 6.3.11, an Athenian 
ambassador argues that the repercussions from Spartan deeds such as the seizure of the Cadmea 
have taught everyone that trying to gain advantage (πλεονεκτεῖν) over others is unprofitable 
(ἀκερδζσ). Even the Spartans agree with this (6.3.18). In this work as a whole, Xenophon seems to 
imply that the Spartans are punished for such actions (see Dillery, 1995, 192ff.). See also criticism of 
the selfish gain of the Sophists (Cynegeticus 13.1-9). Elsewhere, for a strong condemnation of those 
who selfishly plunder despite friendships, alliances and justice, see Polybius Historiae 4.6. 
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no hope that such an army can overcome its greed for gain. The reader might judge 
that it is to Xenophon‟s credit, however, that he repeatedly tries to persuade the men 
to act in a disciplined way and does not allow them to give into their desires as 
leaders such as Menon did.
238
  
Conclusion 
We have seen that the narrator does present a clear message about how a leader 
should use the concepts of θέξδνο and ηηκή as part of his persuasion attempt. Despite 
the success that most of the speakers we have examined achieve with their speeches, 
the leaders can be separated by their selfless and selfish motivations, by their 
accurate or inaccurate representations of their attitudes, by their ability and intent to 
make good their promises, by whether they bring benefit or harm to their audiences 
and themselves, and how their leadership ends in the work. References to θέξδνο and 
ηηκή can be directly compared to each other, and clear messages emerge. 
Particularly, it is clear that Xenophon is a positive exemplum in his use of the 
concepts of θέξδνο and ηηκή in his persuasion attempts, even though he occasionally 
has his own defence partly in mind, and even if the benefits his speech brings do not 
always have lasting effect. The range of dangerous situations in which Xenophon 
uses references to θέξδνο and ηηκή to aid the army indicates the usefulness of being 
able to appeal to these concepts, but also the necessity to do this rightly, without 
damaging the army‟s moral outlook. The other leaders who use the concepts do so in 
various unacceptable ways. Those speakers whom the reader eventually recognises 
as negative paradigms or ambiguous characters often fail to reciprocate adequately 
while trying to get something for nothing, and cause problems to the community of 
men as a result. The reader learns specific lessons from the comparisons. In a leader 
himself, the desire for θέξδνο and ηηκή from a paymaster must not conflict with his 
duty to the army and bring harm to it, and ηηκή from the soldiers should motivate a 
leader positively and cause him to do his duty.
239
 When a leader himself appeals to 
the θέξδνο and ηηκή the army can gain, it should be to motivate his audience to 
extract itself from a dangerous situation, not cause danger, or to encourage the 
                                                             
238 See Hellenica 3.2.6-7, for the influence a leader has over the army’s actions.  
239 Nussbaum (1967, 143) similarly argues that Xenophon appreciated material gains but did not let 
these conflict with his duty to the men. See also Johnstone (1994), who argues that in his works 
Xenophon was advocating a lifestyle for the elites in the polis that was built on self-control over the 
desires that the elite competed over. This argument also appears to hold true for elites in the army.  
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audience to positive actions, not to manipulate them into acting a certain way. A 
leader must also reflect his own attitude to the concepts accurately in order to inspire 
the army to trust him because he lives up to his words. Being able to draw on past 
behaviour and set a personal example in relation to these concepts is vital. A leader 
must not use the audience‟s desires for his own benefit, such as to gain power or 
control.  
 A mercenary army will inevitably try to plunder and gain profit, and a 
leader will have to provide for this by trying to ensure that this is done acceptably 
and safely. Ideally, a leader would appeal to ηηκή over profit, but this is not always 
practical.
240
 When direct appeals are made to gaining θέξδνο, this must be because it 
is absolutely necessary for the army‟s safety. It must also be gained from acceptable 
sources. An admirable leader must also be able to represent well to outsiders the 
army‟s attitude to θέξδνο and ηηκή. A good leader should be able to make an 
example of others but be able to back this up with his own actions. Finally, 
audiences should not trust a leader until he has been tested and proves that he will 
match his actions to his words and aims to do what is beneficial for the army.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
240 Ferrario (2012, 371) argues that the soldiers think of their reputation in terms of the booty they 
can return with, whereas Xenophon the character focuses on ensuring that the army acted nobly. 
Dover (1974, 172) similarly argues that Xenophon the author recommends using φιλοτιμία to 
overcome the desire for gain (see particularly Oeconomicus 14.10). We have seen that it is more 
nuanced than this in the Anabasis.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to investigate the roles and effects of the speeches in relation to 
Xenophon‟s aims and agenda for the Anabasis through an examination of the 
speeches as persuasion attempts by leaders of an internal audience that should be 
read in conjunction with the prior and subsequent narrative. I began by establishing 
that such a narratological and rhetorical analysis of Xenophon‟s speeches can 
produce new interpretations of certain speeches in the Hellenica, and that this may 
also prove true for speeches in the Anabasis. To begin my study of the speeches in 
the Anabasis, I investigated examples of speakers attempting to evoke emotions in 
their audience. By looking at how the speakers achieved or did not achieve 
persuasion, my analysis established two things. Firstly, Xenophon had an interest in 
contemporary rhetorical theory and pre-empts some of Aristotle‟s later 
recommendations for how to evoke certain emotions. Secondly, based on this first 
point and also on Xenophon the author‟s clear interest in leaders elsewhere in his 
oeuvre, the speeches act as examples of how a leader can successfully evoke 
emotions and what elements can lead to failure. My analysis could have stopped 
here. The majority of the speeches in the work are successful, and so their function 
could be to indicate to the reader how to compose his own speeches. However, the 
prior and subsequent narrative indicates that Xenophon is interested in far more than 
success when he presents the speeches. I demonstrated that when the motives of the 
speakers for making these appeals are examined, as well as the harm or benefit the 
success or failure of the appeal causes in the short and long term, the picture of the 
leader and the correctness of the persuasion attempt that emerges becomes more 
complicated. The speeches themselves also produce a number of dramatic effects on 
the reader, which seems to suggest that Xenophon wanted the reader to engage with 
the speeches, the speaker and the internal audience, in order to understand these 
nuances. Thus, I suggested that dramatic effect, characterisation of the speaker and 
audience, and presentation of a didactic message are the three key roles and effects 
for the speeches in the Anabasis, when examined in context with the narrative.  
In the subsequent chapters, I established that an examination of the speeches 
in terms of these three roles and effects enabled the reader to judge which characters 
and persuasion attempts he should emulate and which he should shun the example 
of. Ultimately, the reader may learn that successful techniques of persuasion need to 
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be combined with a moral approach to persuasion. Although I examined the 
speeches through three different themes, the conclusions emerging from each chapter 
were the same. This presentation simply facilitated comparisons and contrasts 
between leaders‟ responses to situations and the methods they used. I established that 
the speeches engage the reader in numerous ways. Particularly, the reader may share 
the mood of the internal audience when the army is in a dangerous situation and may 
feel the emotions the speaker subsequently evokes. The reader also becomes 
involved in the leader‟s deceit of others, both in terms of being deceived himself and 
in recognising the deceit before or during a leader‟s speech. The reader also engages 
with whether a leader will match his words with his actions when he appeals to the 
desire for honour and profit in others, and whether his representation of his attitude 
towards these concepts matches reality. The reader is further involved with 
understanding whether or not successful appeals to these concepts will prove to be 
for the benefit of the army, and whether the audience is right to trust the leader‟s 
self-representation in this area.  
I also demonstrated that the reader could distinguish between leaders who are 
motivated selflessly and leaders who are motivated selfishly through their attempts 
to evoke emotions, deceive others and make use of references to honour and profit to 
present their own attitude and to motivate their audience. Between Xenophon, 
Clearchus and Cyrus, these three leaders control the army for the majority of the 
Anabasis. They are also all usually successful in their persuasion attempts. Yet, it is 
clear that Xenophon the character is consistently driven by the needs and interests of 
the army when persuading, while Clearchus and Cyrus are driven by their own needs 
and interests. Thus, there is a way to distinguish between their characters, for better 
and for worse. Other supporting leaders have positive and negative motivations for 
their persuasion attempts, although they are not always so successful at persuading 
their audiences, and can also be characterised as selfish or selfless accordingly. 
Whether a speaker matches his motives, words and actions also characterises him in 
terms of his trustworthiness. Leaders who make promises that they cannot or will not 
fulfil, or who make untrue claims about their attitudes are, for the most part, not 
working in the best interests of the army. Again, only Xenophon emerges as being 
trustworthy. The combination of narrative and speech exposes the real character of 
the leader, which is often different from the ethos he presents. The reader also sees 
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what the audiences of these speeches are susceptible to in terms of emotional appeals 
and appeals to their desires and motivations, as well as what deception they will 
believe, and who they put their trust in. 
We can also distinguish between successful persuasion that benefits the 
speaker and the audience, and successes that cause harm in the short or long term. 
Xenophon‟s speeches consistently benefit the army in the short term, and nearly 
always in the long term, while other leaders often produce longer-term harm with 
their speeches, most notably Cyrus and Clearchus. Some leaders also produce 
immediate harm. It should be clear to the reader from this that the repercussions of a 
persuasion attempt must be taken into account when assessing which persuasion 
attempts should be emulated and which should not. Failure to persuade an audience 
can also produce negative outcomes.  
The way a speaker‟s leadership ends in the work ties characterisation and the 
harm or benefit produced together. We saw that Xenophon is rewarded at the end of 
the work, which suggests that he should be emulated in how he has led, including the 
persuasion attempts he has made. Other leaders suffer death, or criticism from 
internal characters, which can often be related to their persuasion attempts, and 
which indicates that their example should be shunned. Thus, the reader learns that 
not all successful persuasion is praiseworthy. The reader also learns that the internal 
audiences must not trust a leader to work in their benefit without testing him first. 
These elements of the narrative also indicate to the reader important lessons about 
when it is appropriate to deceive friends and appeal to the desires in others. A leader 
must understand this in order to carry out his duties acceptably.  
Combining all these elements, the reader sees that only Xenophon is 
represented as an ideal leader in terms of the persuasion attempts he makes. The 
other leaders become negative exempla to varying degrees, or at least are not fully 
positive exempla. Xenophon consistently does his duty to those he is responsible for 
and offers his own example to them in terms of his own attitudes and corresponding 
actions. He is skilled at persuasion, but he does not use this for his own benefit and 
does not harm the army with it. He receives his reward from those he has benefitted. 
The army is actually in danger from the other leaders either because of the leaders‟ 
inability to persuade successfully even though they have good advice, or because the 
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leader can successfully persuade but does not put the interests of the army first, and 
so gives bad advice.  
What I have established is significant because it locates the speeches as 
integral elements in the work as a whole. They are closely linked to the narrative, the 
reader‟s involvement, the understanding of the characters and the lessons that can be 
learnt from the work. Learning these lessons through the speeches and the 
corresponding narrative is more engaging than simply being provided with direct 
instructions on how to persuade or lead others in an acceptable way, such as are 
found in the Hipparchicus. In allowing the leaders to speak for themselves and the 
reader to experience the leaders‟ speeches, the reader is drawn in. In indicating 
motives and outcomes, more subtle characterisation can be achieved than if the 
narrator simply praised or blamed the leaders, although Xenophon does this as well 
through the obituaries. Indeed, it is significant that what the narrator reveals in the 
obituaries is different in some aspects to what emerges from the speeches. Through 
the speeches, the fine lines between ultimate success and failure can be better 
illustrated. Thus, we may be closer to establishing that the aim of the Anabasis as a 
whole is didactic. The roles and effects of the speeches also suggest Xenophon‟s 
intended readership for the work. I argue that Xenophon has in mind prospective or 
even established leaders as his readers.
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This thesis has challenged some of the previous interpretations of certain 
speeches from the Hellenica by allowing the speeches and the corresponding 
narrative to speak for themselves. In terms of the Anabasis, this thesis has built on 
previous work rather than challenged it.
242
 For example, my thesis has furthered 
general statements made by some scholars about the speeches in the work 
characterising speakers, illustrating the importance of leaders being good speakers, 
illustrating leadership qualities, and being examples for composing speeches. All of 
these are true, but I have demonstrated how they are true. I have also extended the 
work of Kelly, who only examined the speeches in the first book of the Anabasis. 
                                                             
241 See Appendix 4 for previous scholarly suggestions.  
242 However, it does continue the trend of refuting the idea that Xenophon did not truly understand 
what he was writing. For example, my conclusion opposes scholars such as Westlake (1966, 255, 257 
and 269), who argues in relation to the Hellenica that Xenophon the author cannot understand what 
makes truly great leaders because of his own inadequate experience as a leader. He “admires the 
wrong leaders or admires the right leaders for the wrong reasons”. 
239 
 
We reach similar conclusions, but some of his conclusions were hypotheses based on 
what he assumed he would find in the rest of the Anabasis. I have shown that the 
majority of his conclusions were correct, although we disagree on whether Cyrus‟ 
and Clearchus‟ speeches should be emulated. Likewise, I have extended 
investigations such as those by Morales Harley and Varias, who each analysed one 
speech as a piece of rhetoric. I widened this out to examine what roles and effects 
persuasion attempts had in the whole work. Other theories specifically about the 
speeches that we encountered are extended by this thesis. For example, Grethlein‟s 
argument that the speeches make the past seem present for the reader; Farrell‟s 
argument that Xenophon achieves success and authority through his speeches and 
that they ensure order and instil virtue; Pontier‟s argument about tackling disorder 
and lack of courage; and Rood‟s suggestion that there might be a didactic element to 
the speeches. I have simply investigated the speeches on a wider scale and in more 
depth, than these scholars did. We further saw that there have been previous 
investigations of the whole Anabasis in terms of narratological elements, 
Xenophon‟s interest in leadership, his use of didactic exempla, and his presentation 
of Xenophon the character as an ideal leader. This thesis combines these areas of 
investigation and demonstrates what the speeches and their corresponding narrative 
reveal concerning these topics, sometimes producing new conclusions and 
sometimes reaffirming existing interpretations.  
 This thesis has contributed a new narratological and rhetorical approach to 
the work, and a methodology that is proven to obtain new and interesting 
interpretations of the speeches in Xenophon‟s works. It has also contributed a 
possible way of understanding Xenophon‟s aim for the Anabasis, the text as it 
stands, the characters, lessons emerging from the work, and the role of the speeches. 
Individually, the three themes of persuasion that I investigated have had little 
research carried out on them so far, and so this thesis contributes to research on 
Xenophon‟s interest in these particular areas. I have also added to the research on 
Xenophon‟s interest in contemporary rhetoric generally. This investigation may 
further our understanding of Xenophon and the Anabasis, and the approach and 
method could be used elsewhere. 
The most important limitation of this research is that it is one particular 
reader‟s interpretation of the function of the speeches in the Anabasis and cannot be 
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taken to have „proven‟ anything. It is nowhere indicated that Xenophon had a 
specific overarching agenda behind his inclusion of any of the speeches, and he may 
not have specifically intended for the reader to make the connections and 
comparisons between the speeches and leaders that this thesis highlights. Indeed, the 
hunt for such a design is a product of modern approaches to literary analysis. We 
also cannot assume that we understand exactly how Xenophon‟s contemporary 
audience would have interpreted the speeches. The nuances of the characterisation 
and didactic message that I suggest would perhaps take several readings of the work 
to become apparent. A reader simply may not recall which speech has led to which 
outcome on first reading, or recall that Xenophon and Clearchus both have to choose 
between honour and profit from a paymaster and their soldiers, and that both react 
differently to this. It would also depend on the reader‟s particular interests and 
agenda behind reading the work.  
To combat being led in my interpretation by my own interests or forcing a 
particular agenda on the speeches, I have tried to be guided by the speeches 
themselves and their relation to the narrative, and let the roles and effects emerge 
organically. In illustrating what I argue are the three main roles and effects, I also 
base my argument on three themes associated with persuasion that an ancient 
audience might have been particularly interested in: emotions, deception, and honour 
and profit. Because of this interest, a reader may have been more inclined to make 
comparisons between leaders in these areas and remember what a leader had 
previously said relating to these. However, in analysing the work thematically, I 
have deconstructed the text by taking speeches out of sequence and arranging them 
in my own order, to examine them as speeches given in similar scenarios or on 
similar topics. Nevertheless, the characterisation and didactic message that emerges 
from each theme is similar, and so a reader would only need to engage with one to 
understand the messages Xenophon may have been trying to convey. Because the 
messages are similar, the reader also does not need to engage with any particular 
theme and may grasp the lessons of the speeches by reading them as a whole. It is 
also not improbable that a reader would consult the work more than once. Indeed, in 
the Hipparchicus, Xenophon directly recommends reading his instructions several 
times in order to understand them (9.1).  
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The number of occasions where the links I argue for can be found, and such 
comparisons can be made does seem to suggest that Xenophon did have a design for 
the speeches that involved the reader in understanding the leaders‟ characters and 
how a leader should act when trying to persuade others. This interpretation may 
seem to require that the reader has an interest in rhetoric or leading an army. 
However, because these interests can be demonstrated as belonging to Xenophon the 
author from his other works, they may lie behind his aim, even if his not all his 
readers engage with it.  
 There are further limitations in my work that could be eliminated by further 
research. My thesis does not cover all the speeches in the work, sometimes covers 
only specific sections of a longer speech, mainly focuses on set speeches and direct 
speeches, and does not interpret the few speeches given by non-leaders. The themes I 
chose also did not capture the speeches of all the different leaders. Agasias, for 
example, is a particularly interesting leader, but none of his speeches are analysed in 
this thesis. Thus, an examination of more speeches, more types of speeches and 
different themes would make my interpretation more complete. Using my 
methodology on further speeches in the Hellenica may also shed light on the roles 
and effects of the speeches in this work. Similarly, applying it to the Cyropaedia 
may help to indicate whether Xenophon had an ironic aim in this work or not. My 
approach could also be applied to the works of other authors that contain speeches. It 
would be particularly interesting to see whether my methodology adds confirmation 
to the possibility that Caesar used Xenophon's Anabasis as a model when writing his 
Commentarii de Bello Gallico and Commentarii de Bello Civili. Like the Anabasis, 
the speeches in this work have also been neglected.  
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Appendix 1: Direct Speech in the Anabasis
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Total number of direct speeches: 269 
Speakers: 
Total number of different speakers: 63 
Total number of speakers given personal names: 40 
------------------------ 
Total number of speeches assigned to more than one named speaker: 7 
Speaker References 
Procles and 
Cheirisophus 
2.2.1-2     
Thorax and Timasion 5.6.19-20     
‘The Lacedaemonians’/ 
‘Laconians’ (previously 
indicated as referring to 
Charminus and Polynicus) 
7.6.4 7.6.5 7.6.6 7.6.7 7.7.17 
 
Total number of named speakers who give one speech only: 17 
Speaker References 
Menon 1.4.14-16 
Gaulites 1.7.5 
Theopompus (possibly Xenophon) 2.1.12 
Socrates 3.1.7-8 
Hieronymus 3.1.34 
Mithradates 3.3.2 
Soteridas 3.4.47 
Callimachus 4.1.27 
Leon 5.1.2 
Thorax 5.6.26 
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 Where a speech moves from indirect to direct, or vice versa, I have included reference to the 
direct part. See Tuplin’s (2014) analysis for further statistics. He lists both direct and indirect 
speeches in his appendices. 
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Lycon 6.2.4-5 
Anaxibius 7.1.13 
Aristarchus 7.2.13 
Arystas 7.3.25 
Gnesippus 7.3.28 
Eurylocus 7.6.40 
Polycrates 7.6.41 
 
Total number of named speakers who give more than one speech: 20 (219 
speeches)
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Xenophon (93 speeches) 
1.8.16 (or 
Clearchus) 
2.5.41 3.1.15-25 4.1.19 5.1.5-8 6.1.26-9 7.1.6 
  3.1.27-30 4.1.22 5.1.8-9 6.1.31 7.1.9-10 
  3.1.35-44 4.6.10-15 5.1.9-11 6.3.12-14 7.1.10 
  3.2.8 4.6.17-18 5.1.12 6.4.12 7.1.22 
  3.2.9 4.7.5-6 5.1.13 6.4.17 7.1.25-31 
  3.2.10-32 4.7.7 5.4.5-7 6.4.21 7.2.24 
  3.2.34-8 4.8.5 5.4.9 6.5.9 7.2.25 
  3.2.38 4.8.5 5.4.19-21 6.5.10-11 7.2.26 
  3.2.39 4.8.10-13 5.5.13-23 6.5.14-21 7.2.28 
  3.3.12-20 4.8.14 5.6.12-13 6.5.23-4 7.2.29-30 
  3.4.39  5.6.28-33 6.6.12-16 7.2.35 
  3.4.41  5.6.37 6.6.31-3 7.2.37 
  3.4.46  5.7.5-13  7.3.3-6 
  3.5.5-6  5.7.13-33  7.3.6 
    5.8.3-5  7.3.8 
                                                             
244 In the Hellenica, 20 different speakers also give more than one speech, but they mostly give low 
numbers of speeches: two (7 speakers), three (6), four (2), five (1), and six (2). The other two 
speakers are Agesilaus with 31 speeches, and Dercylidas with 15. This can be compared to the 
Anabasis, where eight speakers give 7 or more speeches. In Herodotus, 28 characters give more 
than 2 speeches. In Thucydides, 14 speakers give only 1 speech. 7 speakers give more than 1 speech. 
For the function of Herodotus’ speeches, as well as themes and characterisation within the 
speeches, and his use of direct and indirect speech, see Pelling (2006), Marincola (2003), Harrison 
(2000), Gould (1989), Lateiner (1989), Walters (1985), Lang (1984), Hohti (1976), Guzie (1955), 
Solmsen (1944 and 1943), and Lattimore (1939). For the method, function and type of Thucydides’ 
speeches, as well as themes and characterisation within the speeches, see De Romilly (2012), Lang 
(2011), Zoido (2007), Frolov (2006), Morrison (2006), Gribble (2006), Luginbill (1999), Rood (1998) 
Heath (1990), Hornblower (1987), Cogan (1981), Harding (1973), Immerwahr (1973), Stahl (1973), 
Kennedy (1973), Soulis (1972), Tompkins (1972), Westlake (1971 and 1968), Wallace (1964), and 
Jebb (1880). 
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    5.8.6  7.3.9 
    5.8.7-9  7.3.12 
    5.8.9-11  7.3.14 
    5.8.11  7.3.30-2 
    5.8.13-26  7.3.37-8 
      7.3.45 
      7.3.48 
      7.4.24 
      7.5.3 
      7.5.5 
      7.6.11-38 
      7.7.4-10 
      7.7.14 
      7.7.18 
      7.7.20-47 
      7.7.49 
      7.7.51 
      7.7.52 
      7.7.54 
      7.7.56 
 
Clearchus (22) 
1.3.3-6 2.1.4 
1.3.9-13 2.1.9 
1.3.15 2.1.16-17 
1.6.6-10
245
 2.1.20 
1.7.9 2.1.22 
 2.1.22 
 2.1.23 
 2.2.2 
 2.2.3-4 
 2.2.10 
 2.3.5 
 2.3.9 
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 Clearchus’ report of Orontas’ trial could be categorised as speeches given by Cyrus and Orontas, 
as Tuplin does, but the narrator makes it clear that Clearchus is describing proceedings to his friends. 
Thus, he may have altered the wording or misremembered it.  
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 2.3.21-3 
 2.4.5-7 
 2.5.3-15 
 2.5.24 
 2.5.26 
 
Seuthes (18) 
7.2.32-4 
7.2.38 
7.3.9 
7.3.10-11 
7.3.12 
7.3.35 
7.3.36-7 
7.3.39 
7.3.41 
7.3.43 
7.3.44 
7.3.45 
7.3.47 
7.4.9 
7.7.48 
7.7.50 
7.7.51 
7.7.53 
 
Cheirisophus (17) 
3.1.45-6 4.1.20-1 5.1.4 6.1.32-3 
3.2.2-3 4.6.7-8   
3.2.33 4.6.16   
3.3.3 4.6.19   
3.4.39-40 4.7.3   
3.4.40 4.7.4   
3.4.42 4.7.7   
3.5.6    
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Cyrus (13) 
1.3.20 
1.4.8 
1.4.16 
1.5.16-17 
1.7.3-4 
1.7.6-7 
1.7.9 
1.7.18 
1.8.12-13 
1.8.17 
1.8.26 
1.9.25-6 
1.9.26-7 
 
Heracleides (8) 
7.3.17 
7.3.18 
7.3.19-20 
7.6.2 
7.6.4 
7.6.5 
7.6.6 
7.6.42 
 
Phalinus (7) 
2.1.11 
2.1.13 
2.1.15 
2.1.19 
2.1.21 
2.1.22 
2.1.23 
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Cleander (7) 
6.6.25-6 7.1.8 
6.6.28 7.1.10 
6.6.34 7.1.39 
6.6.36  
 
Tissaphernes (6) 
2.3.18-20 
2.3.24 
2.3.26-7 
2.3.29 
2.5.16-23 
2.5.25 
 
Agasias (4) 
3.1.31 6.1.30 
 6.6.17-18 
 6.6.21-4 
 
Medosades (4) 
7.2.27 
7.2.28 
7.7.3 
7.7.16 
 
Ariaeus (3) 
2.2.11-12 
2.5.38 
2.5.40 
  
Cleanor (3) 
2.5.39 3.2.4-6 4.6.9 
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Charminus (2) 
7.6.39 
7.7.15 
 
Eucleides (2) 
7.8.3 
7.8.4 
 
Episthenes (2) 
7.4.9 
7.4.10 
 
Hecatonymus (2) 
5.5.8-12 
5.6.4-10 
 
Timasion (2) 
5.6.22-4 7.5.10 
 
Proxenus (2) 
2.1.10 
2.4.16 
  
Dracontius (2) 
4.8.26 
4.8.26 
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Total number of speakers not described with a personal name: 23 (26 speeches)
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Speaker Reference 
‘One man’ 1.3.14 
‘Another person’ 1.3.16-19 
‘Messengers from the King’ 2.3.7 
‘The greater part of the Greeks’ 2.4.3-4 
‘The man’ 2.4.16-17 
‘A young man’ 2.4.19-20 
‘A Rhodian man’ 3.5.8 3.5.9-12 
‘A peltast who had been a slave at 
Athens’ 
4.8.4 
‘The Macronians’ 4.8.6 
‘The Generals’ 4.8.6 
‘They’ (Greeks) 4.8.26 
‘Mossynoecian chiefs’ 5.4.10 
‘One of Hecatonymus’ fellow 
ambassadors’ 
5.5.24 
‘The first man who spoke’ 5.8.2-3 5.8.6 5.8.11 
‘Arcadians’ 6.3.25-6 
‘Someone’ 6.4.18 
‘The Generals’ 
(who have gone with Agasias to 
Cleander) 
6.6.20 
‘The one who had been rescued’ 6.6.27-8 
‘The Soldiers’ 7.1.21 
‘A Thracian’ 7.3.26-7 
‘The Greeks’ 7.3.34-5 
‘An Arcadian’ 7.6.9-10 
‘The Odrysian’ 7.7.11 
 
 
                                                             
246 A lack of name for the speaker does not mean that the speech has no importance. Tuplin (2014, 
88) suggests that Xenophon may simply have forgotten the names of these speakers and either 
chooses not to invent them for the sake of it or because the lack of name makes the account seem 
more reliable. In the Hellenica, 25 speakers, who give 28 speeches between them, are not identified 
by a personal name. 
250 
 
Audiences by Speaker: 
Total number of the 20 named speakers who give more than one speech but which 
are all in the same episode: 3 
Phalinus 
Eucleides 
Episthenes 
 
Total number of the 20 named speakers who give more than one speech over more 
than one episode: 17 
Clearchus Cheirisophus 
Cyrus Medosades 
Xenophon Seuthes 
Proxenus Heracleides 
Ariaeus Charminus 
Tissaphernes Hecatonymus 
Cleanor Timasion 
Agasias Cleander 
Dracontius  
 
Of these 17, more often than not they speak to more than one type of audience:
247
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
247
 I have categorised these based on whom the speech is addressed to primarily, although there are 
often other people present, as I have indicated in the audience section below. In the Hellenica, only 
10 of the speakers who speak more than once speak in more than one episode. 
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Xenophon 
Named 
Individuals 
Named 
Individual 
and 
Unnamed 
Individual 
Greek 
Leaders 
Ambassadors 
Greek 
Troops 
The 
Greek 
Army or 
Mixture 
of 
Troops 
and 
Leaders 
Specific 
Member 
of the 
Troops 
1.8.16 7.7.4-10 
3.1.15-
25 
5.4.5-7 3.4.46 3.2.8 
4.8.5 
(peltast) 
2.5.41  
3.1.35-
44 
5.4.9 3.5.5-6 3.2.9 
4.8.5 
(peltast) 
3.1.27-30  
3.3.12-
20 
5.5.13-23 4.8.14 
3.2.10-
32 
5.8.3-5 
(accuser) 
3.4.39  
4.6.10-
15 
5.6.12-13 
5.4.19-
21 
3.2.34-8 
5.8.6 
(accuser) 
3.4.41  
4.6.17-
18 
 
5.6.28-
33 
3.2.38 
5.8.7-9 
(accuser) 
4.1.19  
4.8.10-
13 
 
5.7.5-
13 
3.2.39 
5.8.9-11 
(accuser) 
4.1.22  5.6.37  
5.7.13-
33 
5.1.5-8 
5.8.11 
(accuser) 
4.7.5-6  6.5.9  
6.3.12-
14 
5.1.8-9  
4.7.7  
6.5.10-
11 
 6.4.21 5.1.9-11  
6.6.31-3  
6.5.14-
21 
 
6.5.23-
4 
5.1.12  
7.1.6    7.1.22 5.1.13  
7.1.9-10    
7.1.25-
31 
5.8.13-
26 
 
7.1.10     6.1.26-9  
7.2.24     6.1.31  
7.2.25     6.4.12  
7.2.26     6.4.17  
7.2.28     
6.6.12-
16 
 
7.2.29-30     7.3.3-6  
7.2.35     7.3.6  
7.2.37     7.3.14  
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7.3.8     
7.6.11-
38 
 
7.3.9       
7.3.12       
7.3.30-2       
7.3.37-8       
7.3.45       
7.3.48       
7.4.24       
7.5.3       
7.5.5       
7.7.14       
7.7.18       
7.7.20-47       
7.7.49       
7.7.51       
7.7.52       
7.7.54       
7.7.56       
 
Clearchus 
Named 
Individuals 
Greek 
Troops 
Greek 
Leaders 
Ambassadors 
Specific Members of 
Army 
1.7.9 1.3.3-6 2.1.9 2.3.5 1.6.6-10 (his friends) 
2.1.4 1.3.9-
13 
2.2.3-4   
2.1.16-17 1.3.15 2.3.9   
2.1.20 2.4.5-7    
2.1.22     
2.1.22     
2.1.23     
2.2.2     
2.2.10     
2.3.21-3     
2.5.3-15     
2.5.24     
2.5.26     
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Seuthes 
Named Individuals Greek Army Greek Generals 
Specific Greek 
Troops 
7.2.32-4 7.3.10-11 7.3.35 
7.3.41 
(those at front of 
army) 
7.2.38 7.3.43 7.3.36-7 7.3.44 (hoplites) 
7.3.9    
7.3.12    
7.3.39    
7.3.45    
7.3.47    
7.4.9    
7.7.48    
7.7.50    
7.7.51    
7.7.53    
 
 
Cheirisophus 
Named Individuals 
Mixture of Troops 
and Leaders 
Named Individuals 
and Leaders 
Greek Leaders 
3.3.3 3.2.2-3 3.1.45-6 4.6.7-8 
3.4.39-40 3.2.33   
3.4.40 5.1.4   
3.4.42 6.1.32-3   
3.5.6    
4.1.20-1    
4.6.16    
4.6.19    
4.7.3    
4.7.4    
4.7.7    
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Cyrus 
Named 
Individuals 
Greek 
Leaders 
Leaders 
and 
Troops 
Specific 
Greek 
Troops 
Specific 
Members of 
the Army 
No 
Audience 
Specified 
1.7.9 1.3.20 1.5.16-17 
1.4.16 
(Menon‟s) 
1.9.25-6 
(his friends) 
1.8.26 
1.7.18 1.4.8   
1.9.26-7 
(his friends) 
 
1.8.12-13 1.7.3-4     
1.8.17 1.7.6-7     
 
Heracleides 
Named Individuals People Referred to by their Ethnicity 
7.3.18 7.3.17 
7.3.19-20  
7.6.2  
7.6.4  
7.6.5  
7.6.6  
7.6.42  
 
Cleander 
Named Individuals Greek Generals 
Specific Member of the 
Army 
6.6.25-6 6.6.36 6.6.28 (rescued man) 
6.6.34   
7.1.8   
7.1.10   
7.1.39   
 
Tissaphernes 
Named Individuals Greek Generals The Greeks as a Whole 
2.3.24 2.3.18-20 2.3.26-7 
2.5.16-23  2.3.29 
2.5.25   
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Agasias 
Named Individual The Army in General 
Named Individual and 
Leaders 
6.6.21-4 6.1.30 3.1.31 
 6.6.17-18  
 
Medosades 
Named Individuals 
Xenophon, Charminus and Polynicus, 
and all the Important Men of the Army 
7.2.27 7.7.16 
7.2.28  
7.7.3  
 
Ariaeus 
Named Individuals 
2.2.11-12 
2.5.38 
2.5.40 
  
Cleanor 
Named Individual 
Mixture of Troops and 
Leaders 
Named Individual and 
Leaders 
2.5.39 3.2.4-6 4.6.9 
 
Charminus 
Greek Army Named Individual 
7.6.39 7.7.15 
 
Hecatonymus 
Greek Army 
5.5.8-12 
5.6.4-10 
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Timasion 
Greek Troops Named Individuals 
5.6.22-4 7.5.10 
 
Proxenus 
Named Individual Unnamed Character 
2.1.10 2.4.16 
 
Audiences:
248
 
Total number of speeches directed at named individuals: 140 
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Xenophon (39) 
Reference Others Present 
3.1.7-8  
3.4.39-40  
3.4.40  
3.4.42  
3.4.47 
His troops and some of Cheirisophus‟ 
troops 
3.5.6 Greeks in a rescuing party 
4.1.20-1  
4.6.16  
4.6.19 Greek generals and captains 
4.7.3 Peltasts and hoplites from the rearguard 
4.7.4  
                                                             
248
 The following lists detail the main recipient of the speech, with the other people indicated as 
being present listed in a separate column. There are presumably other people present during certain 
speeches, such as attendants, but where they are not indicated in the text, I have not mentioned 
them. Sometimes translators are specifically mentioned but I have not listed these as the person 
giving the speech. Where translators are not indicated as being present, I have not listed them, even 
in cases where it is likely that they were there. The following shows clearly what type of interactions 
are important in the work as a whole, and especially that interaction between leaders is just as 
important as interaction between leaders and troops. The audiences in the Hellenica are as follows: 
named individuals (80 speeches), Athenian or Spartan official bodies within the cities (34), people 
who are referred to by their ethnicity or both their ethnicity and role (20), troops of some kind (13), 
and audiences who do not fall into a clear category (15). 
249 Characters who give the most speeches in the Hellenica also have the most speeches directed at 
them: Agesilaus 27 and Dercylidas 8. 
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4.7.7  
4.8.4  
5.4.10 Timesitheus and other Greek generals 
5.8.2-3 Greek troops and jury of captains 
5.8.6  
5.8.11  
6.6.34 
Greek generals, captains, Dracontius the 
Spartan and others as seemed fitted for 
the mission 
7.1.8  
7.1.10  
7.1.21  
7.1.39  
7.2.13 The Greek army 
7.2.28 Seuthes, Phryniscus and Polycrates 
7.2.32-4 
Medosades, Phryniscus, Polycrates and a 
man from each general (except Neon) 
who they had confidence in 
7.2.38 
Medosades, Phryniscus, Polycrates and a 
man from each general (except Neon) 
who they had confidence in 
7.3.9 The Greek army 
7.3.12 The Greek army 
7.3.19-20  
7.3.39 Greek generals 
7.3.45 Greek hoplites 
7.3.47 
30 horsemen, and the most active men up 
to 30 years old 
7.7.3 
An Odrysian, 30 horsemen, certain of 
Xenophon‟s captains and men who were 
fit for the purpose 
7.7.48 
The men who were deemed fittest to go 
with him 
7.7.50 
The men who were deemed fittest to go 
with him 
7.7.51 
The men who were deemed fittest to go 
with him 
7.7.53 
The men who were deemed fittest to go 
with him 
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7.8.3  
7.8.4  
 
Seuthes (26) 
Reference Others Present 
7.2.24 Medosades, Phryniscus and Polycrates 
7.2.25 Medosades, Phryniscus and Polycrates 
7.2.27 Xenophon, Phryniscus and Polycrates 
7.2.35 
Medosades, Phryniscus, Polycrates and a 
man from each general (except Neon) 
who they had confidence in 
7.2.37 
Medosades, Phryniscus, Polycrates and a 
man from each general (except Neon) 
who they had confidence in 
7.3.8 The Greek army 
7.3.9 The Greek army 
7.3.12 The Greek army 
7.3.26-7 
The noblest of the Thracians, the 
generals and captains of the Greeks, and 
embassies from other states 
7.3.28 
The noblest of the Thracians, the 
generals and captains of the Greeks, and 
embassies from other states 
7.3.30-2 
The noblest of the Thracians, the 
generals and captains of the Greeks, and 
embassies from other states 
7.3.34-5  
7.3.37-8 Greek generals 
7.3.45 Greek hoplites 
7.3.48 
Seuthes‟ 30 horsemen and the most 
active men up to 30 years who were with 
Xenophon 
7.4.9 Xenophon 
7.4.10 Xenophon 
7.4.24  
7.5.3  
7.6.2  
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7.6.42  
7.7.20-47 
The men who seemed fittest to go with 
Xenophon 
7.7.49 
The men who seemed fittest to go with 
Xenophon 
7.7.51 
The men who seemed fittest to go with 
Xenophon 
7.7.52 
The men who seemed fittest to go with 
Xenophon 
7.7.54 
The men who seemed fittest to go with 
Xenophon 
 
Clearchus (12) 
Reference Others Present 
1.7.9 Some of the Greek commanders 
1.8.12-13 
Pigres, an interpreter and 3 or 4 
unspecified „others‟ 
2.1.15 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.19 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.21 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.22 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.23 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.2.11-12 
The highest rank of Ariaeus‟ followers 
and Greek generals and captains 
2.3.7 Other generals and their troops 
2.3.24 
Greek generals, the brother of the King‟s 
wife, 3 other Persians and many slaves 
2.5.16-23  
2.5.25  
 
Medosades (7) 
Reference Others Present 
7.1.6 (message for Seuthes)  
7.2.26 Seuthes, Phryniscus and Polycrates 
7.2.28 Seuthes, Phryniscus and Polycrates 
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7.7.11 
Xenophon, 30 horsemen and certain of 
Xenophon‟s captains and men who were 
fit for the purpose 
7.7.15 
Polynicus, Xenophon and all the 
important men of the army 
7.7.17 
Xenophon and all the important men of 
the army 
7.7.18 
Polynicus, Charminus and all the 
important men of the army 
 
Charminus and Polynicus (7) 
Reference Others Present 
7.6.4 Seuthes 
7.6.5 Seuthes 
7.6.6 Seuthes 
7.6.9-10 
The Greek army, Seuthes, an interpreter 
and Heracleides 
7.6.40 
Seuthes, Charminus, Polynicus, 
interpreter, Heracleides, Greek army 
7.7.14 Xenophon‟s best men 
7.7.56  
 
Phalinus (7) 
Reference Others Present 
2.1.10 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.12 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.16-17 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.20 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.22 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.22 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
2.1.23 Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders 
 
Cleander (6) 
Reference Others Present 
6.6.20 
The man Agasias had rescued and 
Agasias 
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6.6.21-4 
The man Agasias had rescued and the 
generals who have gone with Agasias 
6.6.27-8 
Agasias and the Greek generals who 
have gone with him 
6.6.31-3 
Greek generals, captains, Dracontius and 
others as seemed fitted for the mission 
7.1.9-10  
7.1.10  
 
Cheirisophus (6) 
Reference Others Present 
3.4.39  
3.4.41  
4.1.19  
4.1.22  
4.7.5-6  
4.7.7  
  
Tissaphernes (4) 
Reference Others Present 
2.3.21-3 
The brother of the King‟s wife, three 
other Persians, many slaves and an 
interpreter 
2.5.3-15  
2.5.24  
2.5.26  
 
Heracleides and Seuthes (4) 
Reference Others Present 
7.5.10 
The rest of the generals except 
Xenophon 
7.6.4  
7.6.5  
7.6.6  
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Ariaeus (3) 
Reference Others Present 
2.2.10 
The highest rank of his followers, and 
Greek generals and captains 
2.5.39 Sophaenetus and Xenophon 
2.5.41 Sophaenetus and Cleanor 
 
Cyrus (3) 
Reference Others Present 
1.7.5 Greek generals and captains 
1.7.9 Some of the Greek commanders 
1.8.16  
 
Cleanor, Sophaenetus and Xenophon (2) 
Reference Others Present 
2.5.38  
2.5.40  
 
Procles and Glus (1) 
Reference Others Present 
2.1.4 Greek generals 
 
Silanus (1) 
Reference Others Present 
1.7.18  
 
Xenophon/Clearchus (1) 
Reference Others Present 
1.8.17  
 
Theopompus/Xenophon (1) 
Reference Others Present 
2.1.13  
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Procles and Cheirisophus (1) 
Reference Others Present 
2.2.2 Other Greek leaders 
 
Agasias (1) 
Reference Others Present 
6.6.25-6 
The Greek generals who have 
accompanied him and the man whom he 
rescued 
 
Seuthes and Polycrates (1) 
Reference Others Present 
7.2.29-30 Medosades and Phryniscus 
 
Clearchus, Proxenus and Xenophon (1) 
Reference Others Present 
2.4.19-20 Messenger from Ariaeus and Artaozus 
 
 Apollonides (1) 
Reference Others Present 
3.1.27-30 Proxenus‟ generals 
 
Mithradates (1) 
Reference Others Present 
3.3.3 
The Greek generals and Mithradates‟ 30 
horsemen 
 
Dracontius (1) 
Reference Others Present 
4.8.26  
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Timasion (1) 
Reference Others Present 
7.3.18  
 
Episthenes (1) 
Reference Others Present 
7.4.9 Xenophon 
  
Heracleides (1) 
Reference Others Present 
7.5.5  
 
Total number of speeches given to people who are referred to by their ethnicity or 
both their ethnicity and role: 6 
Speaker Reference Others Present 
The Greeks  
(possibly leaders, but 
unclear) 
2.3.26-7 
 
2.3.29 
Mossynoecian chiefs 
5.4.5-7 
Other Greek generals 
5.4.9 
Heracleot and 
Sinopean merchants 
5.6.19-20  
People from Parium 7.3.17  
 
Total number of speeches directed at troops of some kind: 27 
Greek Troops 
Reference Others Present 
1.3.3-6  
1.3.9-13  
1.3.14 Clearchus 
1.3.15 Previously unnamed speaker 
1.3.16-19 Clearchus and unnamed speaker 
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2.4.5-7  
4.8.14  
5.4.19-21  
5.6.22-4 Xenophon 
5.6.26 Xenophon 
5.6.28-33 Timasion and Thorax 
5.7.5-13  
5.7.13-33  
6.2.4-5  
6.3.12-14  
6.4.21 Other Greek generals 
6.5.23-4  
7.1.22  
7.1.25-31  
 
Menon’s Troops 
Reference Others Present 
1.4.14-16  
1.4.16  
 
Xenophon’s Troops 
Reference Others Present 
6.3.25-6  
 
The Greeks at the Front of the Army 
Reference Others Present 
7.3.41  
 
Greek Hoplites 
Reference Others Present 
7.3.44  
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Xenophon’s Troops and Some of Cheirisophus’ Troops 
Reference Others Present 
3.4.46  
 
Greek Troops in the Rescuing Party 
Reference Others Present 
3.5.5-6 Cheirisophus 
 
Guards 
Reference Others Present 
2.4.16-17 Proxenus and Xenophon 
 
Total number of speeches directed at generals, captains or people in 
leadership/ambassadorial roles: 27 
The Generals 
Reference Others Present 
1.4.8  
2.1.9 Barbarians heralds and Phalinus 
2.3.9  
2.3.18-20 
The brother of the King‟s wife, 3 other 
Persians and many slaves 
3.3.2 Mithradates‟ 30 horsemen 
4.8.10-13  
6.5.9  
6.5.10-11  
6.6.36  
7.3.35  
7.3.36-7  
 
Generals and Captains 
Reference Others Present 
1.7.3-4  
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1.7.6-7 Gaulites 
2.2.3-4  
3.5.8  
3.5.9-12  
4.6.7-8  
6.5.14-21  
7.1.13  
 
Generals, Lieutenant-Generals and Captains 
Reference Others Present 
3.1.34  
3.1.35-44  
 
Greek Leaders 
Reference Others Present 
2.1.11 Barbarian heralds 
2.2.1-2  
 
Leaders Representing the Greek Army (including Clearchus) 
Reference Others Present 
1.3.20  
 
Proxenus’ Captains 
Reference Others Present 
3.1.15-25  
  
All the Generals except Neon 
Reference Others Present 
5.6.37  
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Generals and Captains of the Peltasts and Hoplites 
Reference Others Present 
4.1.27  
 
Total number of speeches directed at audiences made up of named individuals and 
people in leadership roles: 10 
 Reference Others Present 
Clearchus and other 
generals 
2.4.3-4  
Xenophon and Proxenus’ 
captains 
3.1.31 Apollonides 
Xenophon and generals, 
lieutenant-generals and 
captains 
3.1.45-6  
Cheirisophus and the 
eldest generals 
3.3.12-20  
Cheirisophus, generals 
and captains 
4.6.9 
 
4.6.17-18 
Cheirisophus, Cleanor, 
generals and captains 
4.6.10-15  
Hecatonymus and 
Sinopean ambassadors 
5.5.13-23 
Greek army 
5.6.12-13 
Charminus, Polynicus, 
Xenophon and all the 
important men of the 
army 
7.7.16  
 
Total number of speeches directed at audiences made up of troops and leaders: 41 
Menon, Clearchus, Proxenus and all their troops 
Reference Others Present 
1.5.16-17  
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Greek Army 
Reference Others Present 
4.8.26  
4.8.26  
5.1.2  
5.1.4  
5.1.5-8  
5.1.8-9  
5.1.9-11  
5.1.12  
5.1.13  
5.5.8-12  
5.5.24 Hecatonymus 
5.6.4-10 Sinopean ambassadors 
6.1.26-9 Xenophon 
6.1.30 Xenophon 
6.1.31 Xenophon 
6.1.32-3  
6.4.12  
6.4.17  
6.4.18 Xenophon 
6.6.17-18  
7.3.3-6 (except Neon‟s men)  
7.3.6 (except Neon‟s men)  
7.3.10-11  
7.3.14 Seuthes 
7.3.43  
7.6.7 Seuthes and Heracleides 
7.6.11-38 
Seuthes, Charminus, Polynicus, 
interpreter and Heracleides 
7.6.39 
Seuthes, Polynicus, interpreter and 
Heracleides 
7.6.41 
Seuthes, Charminus, Polynicus, 
interpreter and Heracleides 
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Greek Generals and Troops 
Reference Others Present 
3.2.2-3  
3.2.4-6  
3.2.8  
3.2.9  
3.2.10-32  
3.2.33  
3.2.34-8  
3.2.38  
3.2.39  
6.6.12-16  
 
Greek Troops and Jury Made up of Captains 
Reference Others Present 
5.8.13-26 Generals 
 
Total number of speeches directed at audiences who do not fall into a clear 
category: 18 
 Reference Others Present 
Clearchus’ Friends 1.6.6-10  
None Specified 1.8.26  
Cyrus’ Friends 
1.9.25-6 
 
1.9.26-7 
Messengers from the 
King 
2.3.5 
Greek generals and their 
best troops 
A Certain Man 2.4.16 Xenophon 
A Man who has Accused 
Xenophon of Beating 
him 
5.8.3-5 
Rest of the army 
5.8.6 
5.8.7-9 
5.8.9-11 
5.8.11 
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The Man who has been 
Rescued by Agasias 
6.6.28 
Agasias and the Greek 
generals who have gone 
with him 
A Peltast who was 
Formerly a Slave at 
Athens 
4.8.5  
Macronians and Greek 
generals 
 
 
4.8.5 
4.8.6 
 
4.8.6 
Greek Generals and 
Macronians 
A Cupbearer 7.3.25 
Noblest of the Thracians, 
the Greek generals and 
captains and embassies 
from other states 
Medosades and the 
Odrysian 
7.7.4-10 
30 horsemen and certain 
of Xenophon‟s captains, 
and men who were fit for 
the purpose 
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Appendix 2: Euphron‟s Killer to the Theban Council (Hellenica 7.3.7-11)250 
In this speech, we again see how difficult it is to interpret whether a speaker is 
trustworthy or not. This speech also further develops the dangers of being persuaded 
by arguments relating to the audience‟s advantage, as we saw with Procles‟ 
speeches. Again, we shall see that the narrative after the speech is vital to 
interpreting the speech. Scholarly interpretations tend to focus on what the speech 
reveals about Euphron rather than it being a persuasion attempt.  
Euphron has visited the Thebans as part of his plan to regain control of 
Sicyon. While talking to the Theban officials and council on the Theban Acropolis, 
he is killed (7.3.5). The Theban officials arraign his killers on a capital charge but 
only one man admits killing Euphron (7.3.7). This man attempts to persuade the 
officials and council members that Euphron‟s killers were right in their actions. This 
is, in effect, a forensic speech, rather than a deliberative speech.  
The speaker is unnamed, but before the speech, the narrator reveals that he is 
one of a group of former Sicyonian exiles. The story of his exile appears earlier 
(7.1.44-6). Euphron wanted to make an alliance with the Argives and Arcadians, and 
so he arranged that he would establish a democracy in Sicyon. To achieve this, he 
banished particular officials, and certain people for favouring the Spartans. At 7.3.1, 
the narrator reveals that Aeneas the Stymphalian has arranged for the exiles, who had 
been banished without a decree of the people, to return. The narrator states that the 
group of former exiles took the risk of killing Euphron on the Acropolis and in front 
of the Thebans because they feared that Euphron would achieve his aim of being the 
master of Sicyon by persuading the Thebans to banish the aristocrats and give the 
state over to him again (7.3.5). If Euphron regains power, they will clearly be in 
danger of exile or death again. Thus, when killing Euphron, they are thinking of their 
own interests and the safety of the Sicyonian aristocrats in general. Indeed, at this 
time, the people in Sicyon are backing Euphron (7.3.4). Knowing these motives, the 
reader is armed with more information than the internal audience, who does not 
appear to know the relation of the killers to Euphron. The reader has also heard a 
condemnation of the killers‟ deeds by the Theban officials (7.3.6) and so may at this 
                                                             
250 A slightly altered version of this appendix has been submitted for potential publication in Auctor, 
the Royal Holloway Classics journal.  
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point be inclined to believe that the killers are villains. That none of the other killers 
admit to killing Euphron further suggests that the others do not think that their 
actions can be justified to the Thebans. By contrast, this speaker must be confident in 
his own ability to persuade, if not in his righteousness.  
In terms of the audience of this speech, from the preceding narrative (7.3.4), 
the reader knows that the Thebans have an interest in Sicyon because they have a 
governor there, and that Euphron believes that he will not be able to regain his 
control of the state with that governor in place. The narrator also reveals Euphron‟s 
belief that the Thebans can be bribed with money to banish the aristocrats and give 
Sicyon back to him. Euphron does not seem to have proceeded very far in his plan to 
bribe the Thebans because at 7.3.6, the Theban officials seem to say that Euphron 
has not yet had a chance to explain why he has come to Thebes. The Theban officials 
recommend to the Theban council that they arraign the killers on a capital charge 
(7.3.6). They believe that the killers have surpassed all men in hardihood and 
brutality because they took the killing of Euphron into their own hands and did it in 
front of the Theban leaders and the council, who are the only ones entitled to decide 
on who is killed and who is not. The officials are concerned that, if these men are not 
put to death, no one will dare to visit Thebes and the city will suffer for allowing it to 
happen. They argue that the killers are most unrighteous, unjust and lawless and 
have shown contempt for the city. The council members do not respond to this, but 
the reader may expect that they have similar concerns to the officials. 
The speaker opens by confronting the Theban officials‟ impression of him 
and their accusation of contempt. He says that it is impossible for anyone to feel 
contempt for the council if he knows that the council has the power to punish him. 
He claims instead to have trusted that he was doing a just deed and that the Theban 
officials would decide rightly (7.3.7). This claim directly contrasts with the 
presentation by the Theban officials of the killers as most unjust men. He flatters the 
council‟s righteousness and shows that he was not attempting to usurp their power.  
Throughout the rest of the speech, the speaker characterises himself by 
identifying the Theban officials‟ opinions about the kind of men who deserve 
punishment with his own. He presents himself as someone who, like them, is 
concerned to punish unrighteousness, injustice and lawlessness. Instead of the killers 
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being unrighteous, unjust and lawless, however, the speaker repeatedly argues that 
Euphron was a traitor, double-deserter and tyrant (7.3.7, 7.3.8 and 7.3.11), as well as 
greedy for money and property (7.3.8).  
The speaker also presents himself as being concerned with the threat Euphron 
posed to the Thebans‟ moral reputation because he describes the damage and the 
shame that Euphron‟s attempted bribe might have brought upon them (7.3.9). The 
Theban officials may be concerned with what others would think about Thebes 
because of Euphron‟s death, but the speaker implies that people might have had an 
even worse impression of the Thebans if Euphron had succeeded in his mission. 
Thus, the speaker presents himself as being driven to save others from shame. He 
furthers his presentation of himself as righteous by saying that it would not have 
been right to kill Euphron in Thebes if Euphron had been an enemy to him but a 
friend to the Thebans (7.3.10). Hence, he presents himself as knowing what is right 
and wrong and as having no choice but to act because of the threat to the Thebans.  
The speaker has three main strands of argument: the killers‟ deeds accord 
with Theban precedent, were beneficial, and the Thebans now have an opportunity to 
appear positively in their own and others‟ eyes. Firstly, he says that he based his 
perception that the Thebans would judge Euphron and the killers rightly on decisions 
the Thebans have made previously. He describes a group of people whom the 
Thebans have previously had killed and demonstrates that Euphron was just like 
them (7.3.7). He also explains how the killers‟ actions accord with a previous 
Theban vote about exiles and argues that, as an exile who returned without a 
resolution of the allies, Euphron should have been killed anyway (7.3.11). He further 
argues that the killers‟ actions benefitted the Thebans‟ interests because Euphron 
was intending to harm the Thebans more than he already had done when he betrayed 
them previously, by using money to corrupt them (7.3.9-10). He thus argues that 
deciding that the killers acted rightly would show the Thebans to have taken 
vengeance on Euphron on behalf of both themselves and the allies.  
The speaker must be aware that his actions have provoked strong emotions 
and that he will need to calm the anger directed towards him. He will also need to 
convert the audience‟s general hatred of murderers and those who show contempt 
towards them into friendly feelings. He counteracts these negative emotions by 
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presenting what Euphron was planning to do as fearsome. He represents Euphron as 
having the intention and ability to harm the Thebans, and indicates how close it came 
to happening. As he mentions explicitly at 7.3.9, this fear is of the shame that the 
Thebans could have incurred from the misdeed of accepting a bribe, and the 
dishonour this would have brought them in the eyes of others. He states that the 
Thebans would have been grateful (ράξηλ…εἴρεηε) to him if Euphron was bringing 
troops against them, and thus that they should be grateful to him for the favour he 
has done them of acting when Euphron was attempting to corrupt them (7.3.9). That 
the Thebans have the opportunity to do something on behalf of their allies might also 
appeal to their pride. 
The reader is made aware that the speaker was successful in defending 
himself when the narrator states that the Thebans decide that what had happened to 
Euphron was just (δίθαηα, 7.3.12). Euphron‟s killers and the Theban council are not 
specifically mentioned again. The narrator says that Euphron‟s citizens (νἱ…πνιῖηαη 
αὐηνῦ) thought that Euphron was a good man (ἄλδξα ἀγαζὸλ) and so buried him and 
continue to pay him honours as the founder of their city. The narrator comments in 
his own voice that it seems that most people determine their benefactors to be good 
men (7.3.12). At 7.4.1, the narrator says that the citizens of Sicyon, along with the 
Arcadians, regained the Sicyonian port. This suggests that the aristocrats and pro-
Spartan exiles did not regain power in Sicyon. The speaker has thus benefitted 
himself and the other killers, but only in the short-term. It is unclear whether he 
really benefitted the Thebans.  
Interpretation 
The narrator clearly states that he is making a digression on Euphron (7.3.4 and 
7.4.1), but he reveals many of the same details about Euphron in both the narrative 
and the killer‟s speech. Most importantly, before the speech, the narrator has already 
told the reader that Euphron intended to bribe the Thebans because the presence of a 
Theban governor in Sicyon means that he will not be able to rule the state (ἔγλσ νὐθ 
ἂλ δπλάκελνο…η῅ο πόιεσο θξαηεῖλ, 7.3.4).251 The narrator also confirms some of 
the speaker‟s criticisms of Euphron (see 7.1.44-6, 7.2.11-15 and 7.3.1-4). 
                                                             
251
 There may be a parallel between Euphron and Procles here. Both sought external support against 
their home cities to fulfil their own interests. Even though Euphron is not asking the Thebans for a 
military intervention, his actions are still condemnable.   
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Particularly, after Euphron establishes democracy in Sicyon, the narrator says that 
Euphron was clearly a tyrant (ζαθῶο ηύξαλλνο ἦλ, 7.1.46). The narrator has also 
described how Euphron established democracy because of his personal ambitions to 
be first with the Spartans, Argives and Arcadians. Further, the narrator confirms that 
Euphron lies about his loyalties, uses public and sacred money to keep mercenaries 
on side and to pay supporters, makes his son the mercenary commander, banishes 
Spartan supporters and keeps their property without a decree of the people, and 
treacherously (δόιῳ) has certain fellow officers killed and others banished, until he 
has everything under his control. He persuaded his allies to allow him to act in this 
way by giving them money and by supporting them on expeditions. Indeed, the 
narrator makes it clear at 7.2.11 that there was a Theban governor and garrison at 
Sicyon and that, at this point, Euphron supported him by going on campaign with 
him. When Euphron fears the return of the exiles, he hands over the Sicyonian port 
to the Spartans, changing sides again, and claims that he had always been faithful to 
the Spartans, despite establishing a democracy and working with Sparta‟s enemies. 
He even claims that the Spartan supporters whom he exiled were traitors to Sparta. 
While Euphron is absent from Sicyon, the aristocrats and the demos are at variance, 
so Euphron brings mercenaries from Athens and uses the demos to rule the town 
(ηνῦ…ἄζηεσο ἐθξάηεη). While these details confirm that the speaker‟s account of 
Euphron‟s deeds is mostly accurate, the reader may question the need to provide the 
information twice.
252
 Thus, the key to understanding this digression might be in 
explaining the need for the speech.  
 The point of interest in this speech seems really to be in seeing what the 
speaker does with the facts in the process of taking the arguments made against him 
and completely turning them on their head in dramatic fashion. These accusation and 
defence speeches indicate Xenophon‟s interest in how a person can talk his way out 
of a seemingly damning position. Indeed, Gray (1989a, 135) mentions that Aristotle 
describes arguments made by an unnamed killer as a rhetorical topos (Rhetorica 
2.23, 1397b.9-11), and that Aristotle actually seems to be referring to this speech 
                                                             
252 There are some discrepancies between the two accounts. For example, the speaker’s claim that 
Euphron took up arms against the Theban governor (7.3.9) finds no parallel in the narrative. Another 
episode not paralleled in the narrative is at 7.3.8. The passage is controversial in itself. Whitehead 
(1980, 175-8) highlights that the Greek either means that Euphron enslaved free men and citizens or 
that he freed and enfranchised slaves. Whitehead argues for the second option. 
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from the Hellenica as a good example of this topos. The suggests that Xenophon was 
particularly interested in the rhetorical aspect of this episode.
253
  
Most interpretations do not dwell on the speech as a persuasion attempt. 
Pownall (2004, 103-5) argues that the whole account about Euphron, including this 
speech, serves as a moral example of how Euphron‟s poor character precipitated his 
deserved death, in contrast to the surrounding account of the loyal Phliasians. The 
difficulty with this is that it does not account for the detail about the honours 
Euphron received after his death. Tuplin (1993, 124) appreciates this difficulty and 
argues that Euphron‟s overall story demonstrates that regaining power in a corrupt 
and violent way will cause a man‟s downfall, even if such a person does seem to 
benefit some people. Indeed, Euphron‟s honours render him extremely ambiguous in 
comparison to what the narrator and speaker have revealed about him. His people 
clearly believe that he has treated them well, despite the narrator making it clear that 
Euphron was primarily concerned with his own power, that he took public funds and 
made decisions above their heads. His people do not seem to view him as a tyrant, 
but as a liberator. He must have been beneficent to his people (perhaps even „kindly‟, 
as his name suggests), if only to further his own interests. In this way, the narrator 
invites the reader to question what he and the speaker have previously said about 
Euphron and understand that events and characters can be viewed from different 
perspectives, despite what the facts of the matter seem to suggest.
254
 The narrator is 
not claiming that Euphron‟s people are wrong, just that this is how they interpreted 
his actions.  
                                                             
253 Buckler (2008, 150-1) concludes that the reference in Aristotle’s Rhetorica and the account at 
Diodorus 15.70.3 confirm the authenticity of the speech in Xenophon. Diodorus’ account does not 
actually mention a trial, however. A further difficulty with Buckler’s interpretation is that Diodorus 
may well have read Xenophon’s account, as Gray argues Aristotle has. Indeed, other authors may 
also have been influenced by Xenophon. Bowen (1998, 19), for example, argues that Plato may have 
been influenced by Xenophon’s Symposium when writing his own. 
254 See Lewis (2004, 65, and 73-4) who locates Euphron’s story within Xenophon’s discussion of 
tyranny, and argues that Euphron illustrates the opposing ways that sides could label the ruling 
power. She explains this as the result of the stasis in Sicyon, which would split public opinion 
dependent on political views. In this, she argues, Xenophon is highlighting a contemporary problem 
of defining and understanding types of leadership. She argues that “almost any ruler or regime could 
be claimed as a tyranny” and that a reader must understand exactly what individuals or regimes 
provided for the community they led. While I agree with this interpretation, it does not take into 
account the relevance of the killers’ speech, particularly because the reader can appreciate the 
contrasting viewpoints about Euphron from the narrative alone.  
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This contrast would have been apparent without the speech, however. Thus, I 
argue that the narrator‟s final comment, that people judge their benefactors to be 
good men, reflects not just on how the different parties whom Euphron dealt with 
saw him in relation to their own interests, but also on the methods Euphron‟s killer 
used in his speech. The Theban officials believe that the speaker is the worst kind of 
person until he persuades them that he was acting in their interests.
255
 Thus, like 
Euphron‟s people, the Thebans have judged their benefactors to be good men. 
Although, as Tuplin (1993, 123-4) highlights, the narrator states that the Thebans 
decide that Euphron had suffered rightly rather than stating that they thought the 
speaker did rightly, by not punishing the killers, the Thebans are proclaiming that the 
killers acted acceptably. 
As Tuplin further argues, the narrator never confirms that the speaker was 
fair in his actions. Indeed, Tuplin concludes that it is questionable whether the killers 
were entirely justified in killing Euphron, even though Xenophon clearly believed 
that Euphron was corrupt. The reader may indeed feel this suspicion about the 
killers, especially because of the killers‟ motives. It is clear that by claiming a 
concern for the Thebans, the killer is using a persuasive tactic rather than revealing a 
real motivation, because the narrator has already revealed the killers‟ real, self-
interested motives. Indeed, the speaker barely mentions the benefit he himself will 
get from Euphron‟s death, despite it being considerable.256 This parallels the 
persuasive methods of Euphron himself when he convinced the Argives and 
Arcadians, and later the Spartans to trust him. He succeeds in convincing them all 
that he is working in their interests (7.1.44 and 7.3.2), despite previously being on 
good terms with their enemies (like the Spartan-supporting killers) and trying to 
increase his own power (like the killers who want the aristocrats to regain power in 
Sicyon). Thus, in some ways, the killer is as much of a „double-dealer‟ as he accuses 
Euphron of being. This interpretation is pace Gray (1989a, 136) who argues that the 
trial is “a memorial to the impeccable justice of the killer, revealing hidden virtue 
where at first there was only apparent vice”, and that Xenophon is interested in 
showing justice being served. The chief difficulty with this interpretation is that it 
                                                             
255 Indeed, Lewis (2004, 67) questions why the council need such convincing if Euphron is clearly a 
tyrant. 
256 See also Lewis (2004, 66), who argues that the reader cannot take this speech at face value 
because of the particular aims of the speaker. 
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does not adequately take into account the motivations of the speaker and the 
information that the narrator provides about Euphron‟s citizens honouring him after 
his death. 
The narrator may not give the speaker a name for several reasons. Perhaps 
Xenophon did not know the name of this speaker, or he may have thought it 
irrelevant, or the speech may be fictitious. Given that the speaker is trying to identify 
himself as much as possible with the Thebans‟ interests, previous actions and beliefs, 
it might be appropriate that he is not named. The audience is not individualised 
either which perhaps indicates that this method of persuasion is common and that the 
speaker and audience could indeed be anyone. The speech indicates a 
straightforward way to alter an audience‟s mind, even in such an extreme case when 
the audience seems set against the speaker, and is perhaps a warning to those who 
listen to speeches to examine exactly how a speaker is trying to persuade and what 
his real motives are.  
Euphron‟s killers are seemingly not famous tyrant-slayers, despite the usually 
commendable nature of tyrannicide, which perhaps again throws into question the 
righteousness of their deed and their good character. In the Anabasis, we likewise 
see the interplay between real and feigned motives, and the methods speakers use to 
get out of tight situations, as well as the importance of narratorial comments. We 
also see audiences not recognising that a speaker has his own interests at heart and 
consequently considering the speaker to be their benefactor.  
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Appendix 3: Xenophon and the Emotions 
 
The reference for the following article is: 
Winter, J. (forthcoming 2016) „Instruction and Example: Emotions in Xenophon‟s 
Hipparchicus and Anabasis‟ in E. Sanders and M. Johncock (eds.) Emotion and 
Persuasion in Classical Antiquity, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Pp. 165-181. 
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INSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLE: EMOTIONS IN XENOPHON’S 
HIPPARCHICUS AND ANABASIS
257
 
 
Jenny Winter 
 
 
Xenophon‟s Hipparchicus is a didactic work, which contains directions relating to 
all aspects of commanding cavalry.
258
 Included amongst these instructions is 
Xenophon‟s advice on how to evoke, dispel and manipulate the emotions.259 I shall 
argue that in this area of interest we see links with Xenophon‟s Anabasis.260 This 
work offers the exempla, particularly in speeches, that illustrate the instructions 
regarding emotions from the Hipparchicus.
261
 From this, I argue that the speeches in 
the Anabasis are also didactic and that, in both works, Xenophon is interested in the 
handling of the emotions as an important aspect of leadership.  
That the Hipparchicus does not contain examples to illustrate its instructions 
is contrary to the expectations of its genre as a technê, as I shall demonstrate in the 
first section of this chapter. In the second part, I shall examine two ways in which 
Xenophon displays an interest in rhetorical matters. I conclude that Xenophon is 
clearly interested in certain issues that were being discussed in contemporary 
rhetorical treatises and that the speeches in the Anabasis provide didactic exempla. 
Having identified Xenophon‟s interests and established the need to look elsewhere 
for examples to accompany his instructions, I then discuss how the Hipparchicus and 
the Anabasis correspond in their discussion of emotional persuasion. For each 
emotion that Xenophon recommends verbally evoking, allaying and manipulating in 
the Hipparchicus, I shall discuss a passage from the Anabasis that illustrates this 
advice.
262
  
   The Hipparchicus is a largely neglected work, although there has been 
recent interest in it.
263
 The importance for leaders of being able to persuade others is 
often stated,
264
 but the instructions regarding emotions in this work have not been 
investigated, nor has the overlap in this area with the Anabasis. Whereas the 
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 I would like to thank the editors for organizing a stimulating colloquium and for their comments 
on this chapter, as well as those who gave feedback at the event.  
258
 Since I use the Hellenized title Hipparchicus throughout this chapter, I abbreviate it Hipp. to avoid 
confusion (rather than Eq. mag., as per the OCD abbreviations followed elsewhere in this volume). 
259
 The relevant guidance is spread across the work at 1.8, 1.11, 1.13-15, 1.21-3, 1.26, 2.5, 2.8-9, 4.11-
12, 4.17-19, 5.3, 5.8, 6.1-6, 7.6-7, 8.19-20, 9.3, and 9.6-7. These little-known passages are a useful 
Classical-period foil to Aristotle‟s instructions at Rh. 2.2-11, 1378a30-88b30 and Anaximenes‟ in Rh. 
Al. 34, 1440a26-b5 and 36, 1443b15-22 /1444b36-45a27 (see also 7.5, 1428a39-b2). See further 
Sanders (this volume) pp.__. 
260
 The genre of the Anabasis is disputed, but it is often classed as historiography. See Sanders (this 
volume) pp.__ and Fragoulaki (this volume) for emotions in Thucydides‟ historiographical work. See 
also Hagen (this volume) pp.__ for emotions in Roman historiography. 
261
 Other instructions from the Hipparchicus that are illustrated in the Anabasis are not my concern in 
this chapter. 
262
 Xenophon also recommends evoking emotions through action and exploiting situations to evoke 
emotions, but I will only investigate verbal persuasion in this chapter.  For these other passages, see 
Hipp. 4.11-12, 5.3, 5.8, 7.6-7 and 8.19-20 (fear) and 4.17-19, 5.3 and 5.8 (confidence). These 
instructions are reflected in certain episodes in the Anabasis: see 1.7.14-20, 2.6.10, 5.2.28-31, and 
7.3.35 (fear) and 4.3.27-32 and 5.4.16-17 (confidence). 
263
 See Althoff (2005), Stoll (2010) and (2012), Toalster (2011) and Blaineau (2014). 
264
 See e.g. Stevenson (2000), Stoll (2010) 54-8 and 70-3, and Wood (1964) 52-4. 
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speeches in the Hellenica have been examined by Gray in particular,
265
 the speeches 
in the Anabasis have received less attention and there has been little interest in the 
emotional appeals within them. Xenophon‟s interest in emotions is beginning to be 
investigated, however; Tamiolaki, for example, has examined how Xenophon 
innovates in his use of emotions in the Hellenica.
266
 She is interested mainly in 
emotions as facilitating historical explanation, however, whereas my approach is 
broader. It is my aim that the following investigation gives further insights into 
Xenophon‟s interest in rhetoric, emotions and leadership theory, and helps to suggest 
a didactic, as well as historiographic, purpose for the speeches in the Anabasis. 
 
The Hipparchicus and other treatises 
 
The Hipparchicus is frequently compared to Aeneas Tacticus‟ Poliorcetica because 
they both pioneer the genre of the military treatise and because they share some 
similarities in approach, content and language.
267
 The works are contemporary and 
Whitehead even suggests that the two authors discussed ideas about their works.
268
 
Although we cannot prove this, if indeed the works did influence each other or if 
there was collaboration, we may have expected the two authors to use examples in a 
similar way. In fact, they differ completely.  
For Aeneas, examples are integral to his work. He uses them repeatedly to 
accompany his advice, and they often detail events from recent history. Most 
frequently, Aeneas uses them to demonstrate the necessity for his advice by showing 
that what he is warning against has happened previously.
269
 On other occasions, they 
describe a person or group of people who did as Aeneas is recommending and who 
succeeded because of this,
270
 or demonstrate what happens when people do not do 
what Aeneas is recommending.
271
 Finally, on four occasions, they are relevant to the 
general topic of the section but do not illustrate the particular instruction he is giving 
at the time.
272
 Thus, Aeneas‟ examples encourage the reader to follow his 
instructions.
273
 
Examples are also prevalent in the nearest extant rhetorical treatises to 
Xenophon‟s time: the Rhetoric to Alexander, now usually assigned to Anaximenes, 
and Aristotle‟s Rhetoric. We shall see below that Xenophon appears highly 
interested in the content of such works. It would be strange, then, if he was not also 
influenced by their form when writing within the same technical genre.  
Anaximenes‟ work provides practical instructions for the composition of 
speeches, and he uses examples regularly throughout. He once refers to a passage in 
another work, Euripides‟ Philoctetes, to exemplify a point (18.15, 1433b10-14), but 
on all other occasions, he invents his own examples, mostly of what one could say in 
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 See Gray (1981) and (1989). 
266
 Tamiolaki (2013). 
267
 See Whitehead (2001) 35-6 and Burliga (2008) 96. See Vela Tajeda (2004) for the development of 
this genre. 
268
 Whitehead (2001) 35-7. 
269
 Aen. Tact. 4.1-5, 11.2, 11.3-6, 11.7-10, 11.10a-11, 11.12, 11.13, 12.3, 12.4-5, 17.2-4, 18.3-7, 18.8-
11, 18.12, 18.13-19, 18.20-1, 18.22, 23.3-5, 23.7-11, 28.5, 29.3-10, 29.11, 31.2-5, 31.6, 31.7, 31.8, 
31.9a, 31.10-23, 31.24, 31.25-7, 31.28-9, 31.30-1, 31.31 (two), 31.32, 31.33, 31.34 and 31.35. 
270
 Aen. Tact. 2.2, 2.3-6, 5.2, 10.21-2, 16.14, 17.5-6, 20.4-5, 22.20, 24.16, 24.18, 27.7-10, 27.11, 28.6, 
37.6-7 and 40.2-3. 
271
 Aen. Tact. 4.7-11, 15.8-10, 24.3-14 and 29.12. 
272
 Aen. Tact. 25.2-4, 37.4, 39.6 and 40.4-5. 
273
 For more on Aeneas‟ examples, see Hunter & Handford (1927). 
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a speech that illustrates how to follow his instructions. Aristotle‟s Rhetoric 
demonstrates that rhetorical theory is an area that interested philosophers. Although 
it is more exposition than instruction, Aristotle again uses examples regularly. This 
can be illustrated by examining his section on emotions, which is representative of 
his method in the rest of the work. Like Aeneas, Aristotle also uses examples from 
historical events to explain his ideas.
274
 Aristotle also quotes Homer and his 
characters and refers to plot lines in Homer‟s works,275 as well as referencing the 
events in a play.
276
 Finally, Aristotle refers to proverbs in order to use his analysis to 
explain them.
277
 All these examples reinforce the correctness of his arguments by 
drawing on familiar cases.  
Although the number of extant works within the genre of the treatise is small, 
the ones we have examined all use examples in some way.
278
 We can hypothesize, 
then, that providing extensive exempla is an accepted convention within the genre. In 
this case, it is surprising that Xenophon does not use them within the 
Hipparchicus.
279
 From the range of Xenophon‟s own corpus, it seems clear that he 
would have been familiar with technical works in various fields and with 
philosophical texts, including their frequent use of examples.
280
 If we accept that 
Xenophon would have felt it necessary to provide accompanying examples, we will 
need to look elsewhere in his corpus. The Anabasis was written before the 
Hipparchicus and yet contains corresponding illustrations, as I shall demonstrate. I 
argue that when writing the Hipparchicus, Xenophon expected readers to be familiar 
with his earlier work and believed that he had already provided the relevant 
examples, particularly in the Anabasis. 
 
Xenophon’s interest in rhetorical theory 
 
Showing that Xenophon was interested in contemporary rhetorical theory will give 
credence to my argument that Xenophon wanted to include examples of verbal 
emotional persuasion in the Anabasis. This interest can be demonstrated by 
examining Xenophon‟s use of technical vocabulary and the range of emotions that he 
discusses.  
I begin with Xenophon‟s use of the term enthumêma. Aristotle and 
Anaximenes define enthymemes very differently. Aristotle describes them as 
rhetorical syllogisms (Rh.1.1, 1355a2-8), while Anaximenes calls them contraries in 
word, action and all other ways (10.1-3, 1430a23-40). Because there seems to have 
been at least these two definitions slightly after Xenophon‟s time, we must assume 
that Xenophon could have known more still. Xenophon certainly recognises a 
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 Arist. Rh. 2.3, 1380b8-13 (two); 2.6, 1384b15-16; 2.6, 1384b32-5; 2.6, 1385a10-13; 2.6, 1385a27-
8; 2.8, 1386a14; and 2.8, 1386a20-2. 
275
 Arist. Rh. 2.2, 1378b4-10; 2.2, 1378b30-5 (two); 2.2, 1379a5-7 (two); 2.3, 1380b22-5; 2.3, 
1380b27-30; and 2.9, 1387a31-3. See further Knudsen (2014) 147-50.  
276
 Arist. Rh. 2.2, 1379b14-17. 
277
 Arist. Rh. 2.4, 1381b15; 2.6, 1383b23-4; 2.6, 1384a34; and 2.10, 1388a16-17. 
278
 The case studies used in medical treatises may also have led to examples becoming fixed within 
technical writing – see e.g. Hippoc. Epid.   
279
 Xenophon does use brief comparisons: 1.26, 2.3, 2.7, 4.16-20, 5.9-10, 8.3, 8.5-6 and 8.8, and gives 
two very small examples 7.4 and 9.4. 
280
 Althoff (2005) 237, note 9 239, and 251 even sees similarities between the ways Xenophon, 
Aristotle and some of the Hippocratic texts move between sections and discusses the similarity of the 
pious opening of the Hipparchicus with some of the openings in the Hippocratic corpus. 
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meaning for „enthymeme‟ not connected with rhetoric,281 but on two occasions his 
usage indicates that he is aware that it is also a specialised term connected with 
persuasion and rhetorical theory. At Anabasis 6.1.21, the narrator uses the term to 
refer to arguments that make Xenophon want to take the role of sole commander.
282
 
These specifically „induce‟/„persuade‟, and work by creating desire. Although 
Xenophon is here referring to internal thoughts and not part of a speech, the usage 
here seems to suggest his awareness that enthymemes are part of the world of 
arguments and persuasion.
283
 At Cynegeticus 13.9.3, Xenophon mentions that 
philosophers use enthumêmata. Xenophon does not say „rhetoricians‟ here, but he 
may have considered that rhetorical theory primarily belonged in the domain of 
philosophy. He at least seems to appreciate that the term has a technical meaning 
associated with those who are concerned with argumentation.  
These two uses do not prove that Xenophon had specialised knowledge. 
However, the majority of authors who use this term before or contemporary with 
Xenophon are orators, professional rhetoricians, and philosophers.
284
 These authors 
connect enthymemes to giving or writing speeches, and with the kinds of techniques 
and reasoning that speakers or philosophers use. Xenophon‟s similar usages suggest 
that he is among a small group of writers who have sufficient knowledge of rhetoric 
and persuasion to employ the term in its technical capacity. 
There is further evidence to suggest that Xenophon was familiar with the 
theory in rhetorical treatises: the emotions mentioned by Xenophon in the 
Hipparchicus overlap significantly with those listed by Anaximenes and Aristotle. 
Although Xenophon would be unaware of their particular discussions, all three 
writers seem to be reflecting on a pre-existing and on-going discussion of emotions, 
which presumably mostly occurred in rhetorical treatises. The emotions that 
Xenophon instructs the commander to evoke and exploit are given in table 1 in the 
appendix to this chapter. Anaximenes refers to five of the same emotions as 
Xenophon, as can be seen in table 2. The other emotions that Anaximenes mentions 
are given in table 3. There is an even clearer overlap with the list of emotions in 
Aristotle‟s Rhetoric.285 Table 4 shows the eight emotions referred to by both. Table 5 
indicates the other emotions that Aristotle mentions.  
Even though the terms used by the three authors sometimes differ, I shall 
demonstrate below that what Xenophon refers to corresponds with Aristotle‟s 
definitions of the various emotions. When assessing the convergence, we must 
remember that neither Anaximenes nor Xenophon were aiming to produce a 
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 An. 3.5.12, Hell. 5.4.51 and 4.5.4, Oec. 20.24.4 and Cyn. 13.13.4. 
282
 In the Anabasis, Xenophon is both narrator and character. Because Xenophon the narrator speaks 
about Xenophon the character in the third person throughout, it is not immediately apparent that 
Xenophon is the narrator, however. 
283
 See Grimaldi (1972) 71 who also argues that this reference is different to the basic meaning found 
elsewhere. 
284
 Isoc.  Panathenaicus 2.4, Antidosis 47.2, In sophistas 16.10, Evagoras 10.3 and 10.7; Aeschin. On 
the False Embassy 109.10; Alcidamas On the Sophists 3-4, 18-20,  24-5 and 33; Demetrius of 
Phaleron On Style 30, 32-3 and 109; Nausiphanes fr. 2.48; [Hippoc.] De decente habitu 3.  There are 
two anomalies. Athenaeus 5.65.19-24 quotes the comic poet Anaxandrides as using the term, although 
it is possible that he has not copied his exact words. Indeed, as his is a philosophical work, Athenaeus 
might be using philosophical words where they were not originally used. However, the meaning of 
the term assigned to Anaxandrides seems to accord more with Xenophon‟s non-technical meaning of 
the term anyway, as a kind of scheme or craft, rather than with rhetoric or philosophy. Sophocles uses 
the form tanthumêmata at OC 292 and 1199.  
285
 Cf. Sanders (this volume) pp.__ for more on this work. 
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comprehensive list of emotions like Aristotle,
286
 but were referring to them when 
they became relevant. Of the emotions mentioned by Anaximenes and Aristotle that 
Xenophon does not mention, it is perhaps difficult to envisage how or why he would 
recommend that a cavalry commander evoke or manipulate some of them in his daily 
role, such as envy, shamelessness and ingratitude.  
Xenophon‟s interest in contemporary rhetorical theory and persuasion, and 
the seemingly intentional overlap with the instructions on good leadership in the 
Hipparchicus (see below), suggests that the Anabasis speeches could be didactic 
exempla from which aspiring leaders could draw lessons for their own speeches. 
 
Instruction and example 
 
I shall now discuss the passages in the Hipparchicus where Xenophon gives 
instructions regarding verbally fostering or allaying emotions as a way of influencing 
actions and morale, and the corresponding passages from the Anabasis that illustrate 
the same concept, taking the emotions he discusses one by one. 
I begin with fear. At Hipp. 1.8, Xenophon writes that a commander should 
have speakers in the Council whose speeches may frighten the troops. Cavalrymen, 
he says, do better under the influence of fear (phobos). This passage indicates that 
fear does not always have to be engendered by the commander himself. He is said to 
have (echein) these speakers, however, which suggests that he has influence over 
what they say and that they work together as a team to get the best out of the troops. 
Xenophon may here be recommending that the speakers evoke fear about the 
Council punishing the soldiers. Having the troops fear punishment by the Council 
may indeed be preferable to having them fear punishment by the day-to-day 
commander. Fear of the commander may breed further emotions, such as anger, 
which may cause the soldiers to feel and act negatively towards him. Anger may 
grow into resentment and hatred and cause such problems as disobedience and 
disloyalty. Fear of a commander can, of course, also be effective. In the Anabasis, 
for example, Clearchus relies upon making his soldiers fear him. While he does get 
military success from this, it later fails him too. In Clearchus‟ obituary, the narrator 
tells us that in wartime, fear of Clearchus‟ punishments kept his soldiers disciplined. 
When they were no longer compelled to stay with him, however, they left because he 
was always harsh and rough (2.6.12-14). That the fear centres so much on Clearchus 
is not always positive, then. Arguably, if the fear is focused on a person or a body of 
people that the soldiers do not come into contact with and take orders from daily, 
negative feelings may have less effect on their obedience and loyalty.  
A second – more likely – possibility is suggested by the Anabasis. Here, in 
contrast to Clearchus, when Xenophon the character creates fear, it is often about 
others; for example, in his first speech, he evokes fear of the Persian King (3.1.17-
18). To some extent, Xenophon has to create fear about himself, but he makes it 
clear that he only uses punishment as a last resort, in extreme conditions, for the 
soldiers‟ own good, and against people who react only to such treatment (5.8.2-26). 
Xenophon the character‟s success makes it seems likely that in the Hipparchicus 
Xenophon is envisaging the Council evoking fear about an enemy.
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 Aristotle‟s comment at 2.11, 1388b29-30 that he has finished describing the emotions (ta pathê) 
that are related to pisteis suggests that he has discussed them all, although he then mentions desire 
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The Hipparchicus passage has highlighted the strong impact fear can have 
and the importance of a leader having other people to raise it, and has hinted at the 
different effects it can have when fear is focused on different sources. We must now 
find a corresponding passage in the Anabasis. It must be admitted that there is no 
exact equivalent to the Council in this work. Nussbaum aligns the captains in the 
Anabasis with the Athenian Boulê because of their „intermediate‟ position between 
soldiers and general.
288
 Several speakers act as intermediaries between the general 
and the soldiers at a meeting arranged by Clearchus (1.3.13-19), although the 
narrator does not indicate that they are captains. Clearchus has pre-arranged for these 
men to create fear in the soldiers who wish to desert Cyrus, their current paymaster. 
These speakers appear to the other audience members to be raising concerns on their 
behalf to the general and to each other, while they are actually working in tandem 
with Clearchus. The essence of teamwork between the commander and Council 
members that is hinted at in the Hipparchicus is explicitly played out in this passage.  
To make the soldiers fear, one speaker argues that even if Cyrus seems to be 
helping them leave to go home, he will, in fact, be arranging to attack them. This is 
because they will have ruined his plans to fight the king. The speaker also highlights 
that there is no way for the Greeks to leave without Cyrus knowing. The speaker 
mentions what Cyrus is likely to do to them if they try to leave him, and the fear he 
creates complements and enhances the fear that Clearchus had been trying to arouse 
when he spoke about Cyrus being a fearsome enemy in his previous speech (1.3.12). 
The speaker also specifically mentions his own feelings of fear concerning Cyrus‟ 
possible actions in order to encourage fear in the others. Once he has created fear 
about their chances of success, he recommends asking Cyrus what use he wants to 
make of them. He makes it clear that this is the only safe option.  
This passage in fact plays out both the creation of fear about someone other 
than the day-to-day commander who has the power to punish the army, and also fear 
of an enemy punishing them, because Cyrus is envisaged as becoming their enemy. 
Aristotle‟s discussion of fear suggests why the speech is successful; he describes fear 
as being a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil 
that causes destruction or pain, in particular, a fatal misfortune (2.5, 1382a21-2, 
1382b29-30). He also highlights that men particularly fear being injured by others, 
including those who think they have been wronged (2.5, 1382b9-12 and 1382a30-5). 
Indeed, Clearchus has previously deliberately represented Cyrus as feeling wronged 
by the Greeks (1.3.10), even though this is untrue.  
The speech has the desired effect of making the soldiers agree with the 
suggestion to send representatives to ask what use Cyrus wants to make of them 
(1.3.20). Clearchus is able to exploit the fear created by someone else for his own 
aims. The importance of Xenophon‟s instructions about using others to create fear 
can be seen in the fact that Clearchus has tried several other methods to persuade the 
soldiers himself but it has culminated in arranging for other speakers to evoke fear. 
The instruction in the Hipparchicus is brought to life by having it played out in the 
Anabasis. The fundamental message to draw from the passages examined in both 
works is the same, but the Anabasis provides a case study of when the instruction 
was used successfully and indicates why it was necessary. The Anabasis has far 
more room to develop the usefulness and pitfalls of evoking fear, yet we can see that 
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Xenophon has successfully condensed a key message from the Anabasis into a 
couple of lines in the Hipparchicus.
289
  
We can now turn to confidence. At Hipparchicus 2.5, Xenophon advises that 
the leader in the rear of each file has the important task of evoking the confidence of 
the soldiers when they need to drive out the enemy. Aristotle‟s analysis of tharsos 
can help us to elaborate on why such an exhortation would be successful (Rh. 2.5, 
1383a31-2): the soldiers become confident when they see that the enemy does not 
inspire fear in their commander. If the soldiers feel confidence in their leader after 
such a speech, it may also encourage them to feel friendly feelings (philein) towards 
him, because, if Aristotle‟s argument at 2.4, 1381b32-3 is correct, confidence 
(tharrein) and friendly feelings (philein) are linked. Speeches of this kind, then, may 
increase the bond between leader and soldiers. 
On a larger scale than file leader, Xenophon the character is the commander 
of the rear-guard in the Anabasis and is represented as giving speeches urging on the 
confidence of the soldiers before they are about to face the enemy – for example, at 
3.4.46. He firstly cheers the troops by telling them to believe that they are striving 
for Greece and their families. This gives the soldiers a reason to fight and also works 
on the emotion of desire (see below). Next, he alleges that they will only have to put 
in a little work to overcome this enemy and to achieve their return. This gives the 
soldiers confidence that there is no real danger or difficulty to this battle, perhaps 
also evoking contempt of the enemy. This could be dangerous and make the soldiers 
underestimate the enemy but it also encourages them to have confidence that they 
will be successful. Xenophon also makes the soldiers confident by saying that they 
will return home without further opposition after this battle. Xenophon has nothing 
on which to base this assurance, which reveals it as a tactic to encourage confidence 
in the soldiers rather than a statement of fact.  
The speech is successful because Xenophon seems assured about the 
accuracy of his words, which gives them authority. As we saw, and as Aristotle 
recommends, Xenophon shows that he does not fear, evokes the benefits they will 
get from their efforts, and indicates that there will be nothing further to fear in the 
future. While the passage in the Anabasis does not develop further any points from 
the Hipparchicus passage, it does give an example of the tactics a leader could adopt 
to instil confidence in his soldiers.  
Xenophon also writes about the emotion of calmness or mildness (using 
katapraun ) in the Hipparchicus. At 1.8, Xenophon mentions the importance of 
having speakers who can appease the Council if its members become unduly angry. 
Here he is suggesting that a good commander will sometimes need to manage those 
who are involved alongside him in the management of the cavalry, in order to stop 
rash decisions being made or punishments being given in anger. A leader who can 
successfully demonstrate that on previous occasions there was no need to get angry 
with him may reduce the likelihood of the same people becoming angry with him 
again in the future.  
An example of this instruction occurs in the Anabasis when Xenophon the 
character has to appease Cheirisophus and the eldest generals, a group of men that 
the leaders have to answer to. At 3.3.11, they have found fault with Xenophon for 
leaving the main body of the army to pursue the enemy and for then being unable to 
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do the enemy any harm. Cheirisophus and the elders are not specifically described as 
being angry, but it is clear that they have to be pacified by Xenophon. In the speech 
following their rebuke of Xenophon (3.3.12-19), we see him using several 
techniques to calm them down. Xenophon begins evoking mildness in them by 
telling them that they are right, and repeats this assertion again later. Xenophon also 
admits that he was responsible for what happened. Aristotle also particularly posits 
humbling oneself and not contradicting one‟s audience in order to calm an audience. 
Xenophon then goes on to explain his actions, starting with the argument that he had 
no other choice. He also perhaps evokes sympathy when he argues that he was 
motivated by the thought that the Greeks were suffering badly. He also represents the 
events as being something that they should all be thankful for, because the army‟s 
shortcomings might have been revealed at a more catastrophic time. Xenophon then 
reveals his chief argument: his actions actually allowed him to discover that the army 
could be arranged better. He also confirms that little damage was actually done. He 
concludes by providing a solution to the problem that was revealed. There is no 
discussion after this speech, but the proposals Xenophon makes are adopted (3.3.20). 
From this, it can be assumed that Xenophon succeeded in calming down 
Cheirisophus and the elders, after they heard his point of view. This episode 
demonstrates the kind of issue that may anger a body to which the leaders must 
answer. It also shows an array of tactics that can be used to calm such a body down. 
It does not add further information to the Hipparchicus passage, but it shows a 
scenario where the advice given might be necessary and demonstrates how the 
instruction can be carried out.  
A fourth emotion that interests Xenophon is desire. At Hipparchicus 1.10, 
Xenophon advises that the commander get soldiers to enrol in the cavalry either by 
court order or by persuasion. At 1.11, he gives details for how to persuade them. He 
recommends speaking about the brilliance of horsemanship to encourage young men 
to feel desire (epithumia) to be in the cavalry and to overcome the resistance of their 
guardians. Xenophon advises the commander to say that the young men will be made 
by someone to keep horses anyway, but under his leadership their extravagance will 
be ended and they will be made into good riders. This seems designed to appeal to 
the guardians‟ financial concerns and their desire for their charges to be successful, 
rather than being about horsemanship. The young men may be reluctant to join the 
cavalry due to fear for their safety or contempt for the cavalry, yet an appeal to 
desire may overcome these feelings.  
How this could work is made clearer in the Anabasis. An exact parallel 
cannot be found, because the men have already enrolled in the army and mostly are 
not horsemen. However, we can see various attempts to encourage people to 
undertake something by appealing to the desirable things or benefits that they may 
get out of it. There is also no exact parallel of the appeal to the guardians, but the 
instruction can be illustrated by speeches that use arguments to overcome opposition 
to undertaking something, again by appealing to desirable benefits. We see both of 
these illustrated in a speech by Menon to his soldiers at 1.4.14-16. When the 
mercenaries refuse to go on, Cyrus promises them more money to continue. Before it 
is clear whether the other soldiers will agree to follow Cyrus or not, Menon calls his 
soldiers together and tries to persuade them to follow him, based on what they can 
get out of it. 
Menon first appeals to the soldiers being honoured over and above the other 
troops by Cyrus, without danger or toil. This appeals to a pre-existing desire to 
obtain rewards from Cyrus; the narrator later states that many of the soldiers had 
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come on the mission because they were aware that Cyrus gave out benefits (6.4.8). 
Presumably, Menon‟s troops are such men. The ease and safety of the undertaking is 
also desirable, while the appeal to the soldiers being regarded more highly than the 
other troops may also be effective in terms of their rivalry with others. Menon says 
that Cyrus will be grateful to them even if the other contingents go on because they 
started the crossing, and, he says, Cyrus knows how to return a favour if any man 
does. This hint that Cyrus is extremely generous is again designed to work on the 
desire and perhaps even greed of Menon‟s soldiers. If the others do not go on, Cyrus 
will still think that only Menon‟s soldiers were obedient to him and will give them 
leadership roles and whatever else they may want. Here Menon is encouraging his 
soldiers to consider what else they might desire from Cyrus. The promise of 
promotions also appeals to their desire for honour. Following Menon‟s instructions 
will lead to a „win-win‟ situation for his soldiers and they are persuaded. Menon‟s 
argument is solely based on thoughts of gain, and does not take into account whether 
it is right for them to follow Cyrus or how the other soldiers may react to them being 
the only ones to go on. All this suggests that desire is a powerful motivator.
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Although this speech differs slightly in context from the Hipparchicus 
recommendation, it still provides an example that demonstrates how the instruction 
works in practice, and why it works.  
Xenophon evokes a strong emotion at Hipparchicus 9.7. He states that the 
most effective infantrymen are those who are „most opposing‟ (superlative of 
enantios) towards the enemy (or „very bitter‟ as Marchant translates). This clearly 
represents a strong feeling, which a commander can harness and deploy in a way 
useful to the army. This emotion seems most like Aristotle‟s definition of 
enmity/hatred (echthra/misos, 2.4, 1382a1-19). Hatred, Aristotle says, is directed 
indiscriminately at classes of people, without any personal injury necessarily causing 
it. The person who hates wants the destruction of the object of his hatred, and this 
can be directed in a way useful to the army. The Hipparchicus passage does not 
suggest whether a leader should continue to foster hatred once he has enlisted 
soldiers who hate the enemy. A passage in the Anabasis suggests that he should, 
however. As part of a pre-battle exhortation, we see Xenophon the character 
fostering strong opposition by urging the soldiers to eat the enemy raw (4.8.14). The 
likely emotion being encouraged here is hatred. The enemy are the Colchians, a class 
of people, rather than individuals. They have caused the army no personal outrage, 
but instead are simply an obstacle in the way of their reaching home, as Xenophon 
tells the soldiers. They need to be overcome with no pity or any consideration of 
individual Colchians. The metaphor of eating the Colchians raw does not aim at just 
hurting the Colchians but absolutely destroying them, until there is no trace of them 
                                                             
290
 For other passages regarding desire, compare Hipp. 1.8 with An. 3.1.39-42. See also Hipp. 1.22-3, 
although I have been unable to find a convincing parallel to this one. At Hipparchicus 1.26, Xenophon 
recommends that if prizes are offered to the regiments for the things that the men are expected to do 
in the public cavalry spectacle, it will encourage the Athenians into philonikia. It is unclear whether 
this refers to the Athenians in the crowd, in which case we could translate this as emulation, along 
with Marchant, and see a further overlap with the emotions mentioned by Aristotle (Rh. 2.11 on 
zêlos). Because this comes in a section regarding how to make the soldiers and chief-officers perform 
well, it seems more likely that it refers to feelings the soldiers have, and therefore refers to rivalry or 
ambition. In this case, we can link this to the emotion of desire, because the men want victory, prizes 
and honour, as well as shame, because the men want to avoid performing poorly. In the Anabasis, 
Xenophon promotes rivalry at 4.8.25-8 and 4.3.29, and encourages Proxenus‟s captains to emulate 
and surpass the generals at 3.1.24. See also Hipp. 9.3, 9.6 and 1.21 for philotimia which is linked to 
desire. 
290 
 
left, not even their flesh. Xenophon is not literally suggesting they eat the Colchians; 
instead, it is symbolic of the strong feeling that Xenophon is trying to evoke and the 
dehumanization of the opposition. The speech appeals to an irrational action and 
may be designed to whip the soldiers into a frenzy. This creation of hatred may be 
strong enough to overcome any fears the soldiers may have.  
Finally, Xenophon discusses the emotions of friendly or loving feelings 
(philikôs/eunoïkôs echein) and contempt (kataphronein), specifically directed at a 
leader, at Hipp. 6.1-6.
291
 Xenophon advises that no one can get soldiers to do 
anything, unless they regard a leader with friendly feelings. This indicates the 
importance he assigned to arousing this emotion, and avoiding its opposite. The 
passage contains a list of things that a leader should do to evoke friendly feelings in 
his soldiers and to avoid contempt. These seem to be straightforward responsibilities 
that any leader should carry out simply for the survival of his army, and they perhaps 
first evoke feelings of confidence in the soldiers for the leader. Aristotle‟s analysis 
helps us to understand Xenophon here. He argues that we like people who do 
important service for us (2.4, 1381a11-13) and that we like those in whom we have 
confidence rather than those we fear (2.4, 1381b32-3).
292
 We may think again of 
Clearchus who created so much fear of himself that, Xenophon says, no one 
followed him out of friendship or goodwill (2.6.13).  
It is unclear whether Xenophon is recommending that friendly feelings be 
evoked by action or words. Examples of both can be seen in the Anabasis, but I shall 
provide references below to speeches as far as possible. Many of the examples that 
correspond to Xenophon‟s list of instructions in the Hipparchicus passage are 
straightforward, demonstrating no more than that Xenophon is concerned by the 
things that are recommended in the Hipparchicus. As they require little comment, I 
shall quote the Hipparchicus passage in full and indicate in footnotes where each 
recommendation can be illustrated in the Anabasis. After the passage, I shall discuss 
one example in more detail to demonstrate the convergence. 
 
„However, no man can mould anything to his mind unless the stuff in which 
he proposes to work lies ready to obey the artist‟s will. No more can you 
make anything of men, unless, by God‟s help, they are ready to regard their 
commander with friendly feelings (philik s echein) and to think him wiser 
than themselves in the conduct of operations against the enemy. Now the 
feeling of friendliness (euno k s echein) will naturally be fostered when the 
commander is kind to his men,
293
 and obviously takes care that they have 
victuals,
294
 and that they are safe in retreat,
295
 and well protected when at 
rest.
296
 In the garrisons he must show an interest in fodder, tents, water, 
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firewood, and all other supplies:
297
 he must show that he thinks ahead,
298
 and 
keeps his eyes open for the sake of his men.
299
 And when he is doing well the 
chief's best policy is to give them a share in his good things.
300
 To put it 
shortly, a commander is least likely to incur the contempt (kataphronoien) of 
his men if he shows himself more capable than they of doing whatever he 
requires of them.
301
 He must therefore practise every detail of horsemanship 
– mounting and the rest, – that they may see their commander able to take a 
ditch without a spill, clear a wall, leap down from a bank and throw a javelin 
skilfully. For all these feats are so many stepping stones to their respect (m  
kataphroneisthai).
302
 If they know him also to be a master of tactics,
303
 and 
able to put them in the way of getting the better of the enemy;
304
 and if 
besides, they are certain that he will never lead them against an enemy 
recklessly,
305
 or without the gods‟ approval or in defiance of the sacrifices,306 
all these conditions increase the men‟s readiness to obey their 
commander‟.307 
 
The first instruction, that a commander should be kind to his soldiers, can be 
illustrated at An.7.4.7-9. Here, Xenophon has been begged by one of the soldiers, 
who is a lover of boys, to rescue a handsome young man from being killed. 
Xenophon has no particular reason to fulfil this wish, except that, as he himself tells 
Seuthes, this man previously performed bravely. This passage indicates that 
Xenophon rewards good behaviour and takes the time to remember what people 
within the army have achieved. Both will evoke friendly feelings towards him.  
None of the examples I provided explicitly show the soldiers reacting with 
friendly feelings. It is clear from other passages in the Anabasis that Xenophon has 
won the affection of the soldiers (see 3.4.47-9, 4.2.20-1, 7.6.4 and 7.6.38) but it is 
difficult to find them responding to a speech in this way. There is at least one 
example, though. During a speech at 5.8.12-26, Xenophon explains that he only 
beats soldiers when it is for their own good and the good of the army. He ends by 
saying that he is surprised that people remember such incidents but not the good 
things he has done for them. He lists helping soldiers in the cold, warding off the 
enemy, providing for the sick or needy, praising soldiers for good deeds and 
honouring the brave as examples. As a response, soldiers stand up and reminisce 
about particular positive incidents. This episode suggests that the soldiers were able 
to remember many occasions when Xenophon had done something for them, which 
presumably made them feel friendly towards him. Overall, the Anabasis is a 
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masterclass from Xenophon in fulfilling the instructions regarding friendly feelings 
in the Hipparchicus, despite the criticism he sometimes faced. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen that Xenophon was interested in contemporary rhetorical theory and, 
in particular, the discussion of emotions. He clearly thought that being able to 
persuade others, and make use of emotions to do so, was vital for any leader and 
could determine success or failure – which is why arousing emotions through words 
and actions, and making use of emotions created by situations, feature in both the 
Hipparchicus and Anabasis. By examining other technical works, we ascertained 
that Xenophon might have been expected to include examples to illustrate his 
instructions regarding evoking emotions in the Hipparchicus. It is my contention that 
when Xenophon was writing this work, he specifically considered that he had 
provided examples to illustrate and even develop his instructions elsewhere, 
particularly in the numerous speeches in the Anabasis. Xenophon‟s interest in 
rhetoric, his conviction in its importance for leaders, and the role he seems to have 
assigned to the speeches as didactic exempla, seem to offer an explanation as to why 
there are so many speeches in the Anabasis. Indeed, the Anabasis also includes 
speeches acting as negative exempla, demonstrating how not to manipulate the 
emotions. Thus, the narrator illustrates both competent and incompetent leaders from 
whom readers can learn. 
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Appendix: Emotions referred to in Xenophon’s Hipparchicus, the Rhetoric to 
Alexander, and Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
 
 
Table 1: Emotions referred to by Xenophon in the Hipparchicus 
Emotion Greek References 
fear (and Panic) 
phobos / phobe  / phoberos 
(and ekpl ss ) 1.8, 1.13-15, 4.11-12, 5.3, 5.8, 7.6-7 and 8.19-20 
confidence tharsos / tharse  / r m n 2.5, 4.17-19, 5.3 and 5.8 
calmness/mildness katapraun  1.8 
shame aischros 2.8-9 
desire 
epithumia /  epithume  (see 
also philonikia / philotimos / 
philotimeomai) 
1.8, 1.11 and 1.22-3 (1.21, 1.26, 9.3 and 9.6) 
opposition  
(hatred/enmity) 
enantios 9.7 
love/friendship philikos / eunoikos 6.1-4 
contempt kataphrone  6.4-6 
 
 
Table 2: Emotions referred to in the Rhetoric to Alexander corresponding to Xenophon‟s 
Emotion Greek References 
fear deid  7.5, 1428a40 
desire 
epithume  (see also 
philotimia, here classed 
amongst ta pathê) 
7.5, 1428b1-2 (7.14, 1429a19) 
hatred/enmity misos / mise  / echthra 
34.12-13, 1440a26-32; 34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; 
36.29, 1443b15-22; and 36.49, 1445a13-19 
friendship philia 
34.12, 1440a26-9; 34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; and 
36.29, 1443b15-22 
contempt kataphrone  7.5, 1428a39 
 
 
Table 3: Other emotions referred to in the Rhetoric to Alexander 
Emotion Greek References 
anger org  
7.14, 1429a18; 34.12, 1440a26-9; 34.14, 
1440a32-4; 34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; 36.29, 
1443b15-22;  and 36.49, 1445a13-19 
gratitude charis 
34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; 36.29, 1443b15-22; and 
36.47, 1444b36-1445a4 
pity eleos 
34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; 36.29, 1443b15-22; and 
36.47-8, 1444b36-1445a13 
envy phthonos / phthone  
34.12, 1440a26-9; 34.15-16, 1440a34-1440b5; 
36.29, 1443b16-22; and 36.49-50, 1445a13-27 
feeling pleasure  domai 7.5, 1428b1 
feeling pain lupe  7.5, 1428b1 
sexual passion/desire erôs 7.14, 1429a18 
295 
 
drunkenness methê 7.14, 1429a18 
 
Table 4: Emotions referred to in Aristotle‟s Rhetoric corresponding to Xenophon‟s 
Emotion Greek References 
fear phobos / phobe  2.5, 1382a20-1383a12 
confidence tharsos / tharse  / tharsaleos 2.5, 1383a13-1383b10 
calmness/mildness praot s / praos / praun  2.3, 1380a6-1380b34 
shame aischun  / aischun  2.6, 1383b11-1385a15 
enmity/hatred 
echthra / echthros / and misos / 
mise  
2.4, 1382a1-19 
friendly/loving feeling philia / phile  2.4, 1380b35-1381b37 
contempt 
kataphron sis / kataphrone  
kataphron tikos 
2.11, 1388b22-8 
desire  epithumia 2.12, 1388b33 
 
 
Table 5:  Other emotions referred to by Aristotle in the Rhetoric 
Emotion Greek References 
anger org  / orgiz  2.2, 1378a30-1380a5 
pity eleos / elee  2.8, 1385b11-1386b7 
indignation 
nemesis / nemesa  / 
nemes tikos 
2.9, 1386b8-1387b19 
emulation z los / z lo  / z l tikos 2.11, 1388a31-1388b22 
envy 
phthonos / phthoneros / 
phthone  
2.10, 1387b22-1388a30 
shamelessness anaischuntia / anaischunte  2.6, 1383b11 and 2.6, 1385a14-15 
gratitude charis / chariz  2.7, 1385a16-29 
ingratitude acharistos / achariste  2.7, 1385a33-1385b10 
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Appendix 4: Views on the Authorship, Date and Audience of the Anabasis 
Authorship of the Anabasis 
In Xenophon‟s Hellenica, the narrator directs the reader to an account of the march 
of the Ten Thousand by „Themistogenes of Syracuse‟ (3.1.2). Plutarch later claims 
that Xenophon wanted to make himself seem more trustworthy by putting the 
account of his own deeds under the name of another (De Gloria Atheniensium, 
345e.1-6). This suggests that in the Hellenica, Xenophon is referring to his own 
Anabasis. An initial problem is that the passage in the Hellenica only seems to refer 
to part of the story contained in the Anabasis, although scholars have argued around 
this.
308
  
It could be that Plutarch is wrong and that Xenophon had simply not written 
his Anabasis at the time of writing this part of the Hellenica, or that both 
Xenophon‟s and Themistogenes‟ accounts had been written at the time but that 
Xenophon preferred to refer to another‟s account. Buzzetti (2014, 302), however, 
believes that it is “implausible” that Xenophon would have directed his readers to 
another account of the march if he had written his own.  
Flower (2012, 53-5) argues that Xenophon did not go so far as to publish the 
work under a pseudonym but that the passage in the Hellenica may simply be a 
“polite and rhetorically self-effacing reference to his earlier work”, although this 
contradicts Plutarch. Indeed, as Flower argues, not referring to his own Anabasis in 
the Hellenica would fit with Xenophon not naming himself when he appears as a 
speaker in the Hellenica (3.2.7), and later not mentioning his son‟s death in battle 
(7.5.15-17).
309
 Xenophon is not averse to referring to his own work elsewhere (see 
                                                             
308 Maclaren Jr. (1934, 243-4) argues that it is unimportant that the reference in the Hellenica does 
not seem to cover the entire contents of the Anabasis as we have it, because Xenophon only needs 
to refer the reader to a particular section of the Anabasis events for his narrative in the Hellenica. 
Anderson (1974, 83-4) argues that Xenophon may have published two editions of the Anabasis, with 
the first one describing the period that Xenophon records Themistogenes’ account as covering. 
Flower (2012, 53) even argues that the Hellenica passage could actually cover the events of the 
Anabasis if not taken literally. 
309 See Maclaren Jr. (1934, 242-3) who argues that when Xenophon appears in the Hellenica it is only 
as a commentator and not as a historian who participated in events. See further Cuniberti (2011) 
who discusses how Xenophon does not reveal his own experience of events in the Hellenica so that 
his readers will appreciate it as unbiased, impersonal and historically accurate.  
297 
 
De Re Equestri 12.14 for a reference to his Hipparchicus), but these works do not 
involve his own deeds.  
However, seemingly corroborating Plutarch and pointing to Xenophon‟s use 
of a pseudonym, there is no other ancient evidence that a Themistogenes of Syracuse 
existed, except for a reference in the Suda, which Dillery (2001, 7) and Maclaren Jr. 
(1934, 241) argue appears to have been based on this passage in the Hellenica. The 
name itself seems suspicious, and Gray (2004, 130 n. 7), argues that its meaning, 
„born of Themis‟, suggests a truthful author, given Themis‟ links to justice. Thus, 
„Themistogenes‟ may have been a particularly apt name to select if, as Plutarch 
argues, Xenophon wanted to appear more trustworthy.
310
 Gray (2011b, 40, n. 40) 
argues that Xenophon did not use the pseudonym to deceive people into believing 
his account but that a seemingly unbiased account of his deeds, given in the third 
person, was a powerful narrative tool.
311
 Xenophon may indeed have faced an 
impossible decision. If he published the Anabasis under a pseudonym, he could 
indeed be open to accusations of deceiving his readers, but if he circulated the work 
under his own name, he could be accused of deceiving the reader about his role and 
influence. 
Xenophon‟s need to use a pseudonym may also have been related to the 
expectations of the autobiographical genre. Most (1989, 124-31) argues that the form 
of autobiography that the Anabasis would take if published under Xenophon‟s name 
did not exist in Classical Greece. He describes how autobiographical accounts 
usually took the form of laments about current misfortunes or defences against 
current charges, which the author had to invent if they did not really exist, and how 
an audience would baulk at an account in which the author was not in imminent 
danger and which was self-praising. Gray (2011c, 31) argues that in using a 
                                                             
310 See also Buzzetti (2014, 307 and 311), who argues that “Xenophon is “Themistogenes” because 
he is “the offspring of Socrates,” and because Socrates is himself law incarnate”, and that 
Themistogenes means “”Xenophon the Socratic, author of a propaedeutic to philosophy designed to 
earn a measure of toleration for philosophy””. Buzzetti’s reasoning behind this elaborate 
interpretation is complicated, but it demonstrates the tendency to believe that Xenophon selected a 
meaningful pseudonym. Another suggestion, made by Prentice (1947), is that ‘Themistogenes’ is the 
error of a copyist. He claims that Xenophon actually wrote that the relevant account “‘has been 
written, rightfully and dutifully, by one of Cyrus’ men’”. 
311
 See further Marincola (1997, 128-216) for the various ways in which ancient historians tried to 
give credibility to their accounts and make themselves appear authoritative, as well as the different 
methods historians used to recount events in which they participated. 
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pseudonym despite his readers knowing that he really wrote the work, Xenophon 
was commenting on the difficulties of recounting one‟s own achievements.312  
Other scholars discuss at what point it became obvious to Xenophon‟s 
readers that he was the real author. Similar to Gray, Flower (2012, 53-5) argues for 
the likelihood that Xenophon‟s style would immediately be recognised by 
contemporary readers. Tuplin (2003a, 154) argues that Xenophon‟s readers must 
have accepted the pseudonym for some time at least, while Marincola (1997, 186) 
argues that some readers would never recognise that Themistogenes was a 
pseudonym. I am inclined to agree with Gray and Flower.  
Date of the Anabasis 
Scholars cannot agree on when Xenophon published the Anabasis. Dillery (2001, 8-
9) goes as far as to say that “all that can be said with confidence is that the Anabasis 
was written late in Xenophon‟s life”. Typically, dating the work relies on references 
within the Anabasis to Xenophon‟s exile and time at Scillus, the mention of the 
Anabasis in the Hellenica, and the possibility that either Xenophon drew on 
Isocrates‟ work or Isocrates drew on Xenophon‟s work.313 More recently, several 
scholars have discussed unique methods for dating the Anabasis. Millender (2012), 
for example, tries to date it based roughly on the evidence contained in it regarding 
the Spartan policy on Persian friendships. As Rood (2005, xvii-iii) argues, different 
scholars often argue for dates that relate to what they perceive as Xenophon‟s aim in 
writing. He gives the example that a scholar who believes that Xenophon was 
advocating a Panhellenic expedition against Persia would be likely to date the work 
to the early 360s. However, Xenophon‟s aims are far from clear, and so dating based 
on this criterion is speculation only. 
Scholars have used these various methods to suggest dates ranging between 
the 390s and the 350s, but there are difficulties associated with most pieces of 
„evidence‟. For example, basing whether Xenophon was still at Scillus when he 
                                                             
312 See further Buzzetti (2014, 303-11) who argues that the use of the pseudonym at its particular 
place in the Hellenica links to the oath that precedes it in the text, allows Xenophon to avoid having 
to mention his status as an exile, disguises Xenophon’s association with Cyrus during a passage in 
which Xenophon is describing the suffering that Athens underwent due to Cyrus’ aid of the Spartans, 
and implies that Xenophon was a Socratic and had philosophical interests. Again, this further 
illustrates the tendency for scholars to explain the reasoning behind using a pseudonym. 
313 See Maclaren Jr. (1934, 244-7) for early bibliography on these dating criteria. 
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wrote or had already left Scillus on the tense of the verbs and tone of the passage is 
“inconclusive”, according to Humble (1997, 29), and “highly speculative”, according 
to Dillery (2001, 9). Dating the work is further complicated by scholars who argue 
that the Anabasis was written in two or more periods. For example, Delebecque 
(1957, 83) believes that he can identify two different stages of composition, dated to 
386BC and 377BC, although this is not a popular theory now. Perhaps more likely, 
Cawkwell (2004, 49-50) believes that Xenophon wrote certain parts in different 
periods, especially the obituaries. 
Audience of the Anabasis 
Certain other works by Xenophon are explicitly aimed at the Athenians 
(Hipparchicus and Poroi) but Xenophon does not identify his expected readership 
for the Anabasis. Focusing on Xenophon‟s interest in leadership, Gray (2011b, 6) 
and Pownall (2004) argue that the kaloi kagathoi who took part in politics might be 
Xenophon‟s envisioned audience for all his works. Buzzetti (2014, 293) similarly 
argues for “high-minded and talented youths with some political ambition”. Kelly 
(1996, 161-2) even envisages Xenophon wanting some of his works to be read by 
educated reading groups who could discuss his works after. Cuniberti (2007) 
proposes a mainly Spartan target audience for Xenophon‟s works, along with other 
Greeks who are friends of the Spartans. 
Scholars have proposed various audiences specifically for the Anabasis. 
Waterfield (2006, 190) argues that Xenophon wrote the Anabasis for the Athenians 
in order to demonstrate why his exile was undeserved. Alternatively, some scholars 
argue that Xenophon was defending himself against written or verbal accusations 
made by others. Delebecque (1957, 295-9), for example, argues that Xenophon was 
defending himself against criticism by his former comrades and the Spartans. 
However, Delebecque‟s other proposals for the purpose of the Anabasis (n. 32) 
require both a Spartan audience and an audience of the other major Greek powers. 
More generally, Flower (2012, 34-8) posits the idea that the Anabasis was written for 
“participants and posterity” as a record of the Ten Thousand‟s actions. I argue that 
Xenophon directed the Anabasis at men who aimed to become leaders, as well as 
existing leaders. 
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